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Abstract 
 
This study examines to what extent Indonesia’s transition to democracy has impacted Jakarta’s 
foreign policy, particularly regarding the foreign policy-making process, its fundamental 
doctrine, and foreign policy strategies in three specific areas: regional cooperation in ASEAN, 
promotion of political values, and conflict management. The puzzle this thesis addresses is that 
Indonesia’s foreign policy in many ways does not conform to expectations generated by 
theoretical works on democratization and foreign policy. The dissertation argues that 
Indonesia’s democratisation has affected Jakarta’s foreign policy only in a mixed and limited 
fashion. While Indonesia’s democratisation has shaped ideas that have influenced Indonesia’s 
foreign   policy,   some   traditional   foreign   policy   pillars   continue   to   be   relevant. 
 
First, notwithstanding Indonesia’s democratic transition, Jakarta remains committed to the 
principle of an independent and active (bebas-aktif) foreign policy. As such, maintaining a 
balanced presence of big powers remains a key explanation for Indonesia’s policies on East 
Asia cooperation. Second, while democratisation has led to the proliferation of foreign policy 
actors, foreign policy-making remains largely unaltered, with the president and the foreign 
minister serving as the central decision-makers. However, democratisation has changed the 
substance or style of Indonesian foreign policy, and such a change is discernible in efforts to 
shape political cooperation in ASEAN, Jakarta’s management of conflict on Ambalat dispute 
with Malaysia, and its Myanmar policy. Additionally, democracy and human rights now 
prominently feature in Indonesia’s foreign policy strategy towards the wider Asia. 
Significantly, however, while democracy promotion has been driven by the desire of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy leaders to reflect its newfound identity, human rights promotion has 
been lacking in Indonesia’s promotion of political values abroad due to domestic 
considerations. Hence, frameworks focusing on the role of identity and ideas in foreign policy 
flowing from democratization offer an important, yet insufficient explanation of Indonesia’s 
foreign                   policy                   in                   the                   cases                   discussed. 
 
Using an integrative approach that draws on works on the role of leaders, the salience of 
institutions, and the influence of identity and ideas in foreign policy, this study contributes to 
the wider discussion about the relationship between democratisation and foreign policy. 
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1   Introduction 
 
 
Following the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian government in 1998, a period historiographically 
referred to as Reformasi,1 Indonesia, the largest country in Southeast Asia with a population of 
around 240 million, has sought to develop a more open, transparent, and democratic political 
environment.2 The advent of a relatively free and fair parliamentary election in 1999 was crucial 
for Indonesia’s democratic transition, marking Jakarta’s first conscious attempt to follow 
democratic procedure after the fall of Suharto. The influence of this domestic political 
development was also seen in Indonesia’s foreign affairs. However, a quick review of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy during certain periods of Suharto’s administration and the post-1998 
period also indicates that in many ways Indonesia’s foreign policy has remained largely 
unaltered, notwithstanding democratisation. Indonesia’s policy toward ASEAN continues to 
rely on the importance of projecting what was considered by the government to be domestic 
strength; Indonesia’s regional policy beyond the context of Southeast Asia continues to focus 
on cooperation, including strategic/security cooperation; the way foreign policy is made in 
Indonesia also continues to focus on the authority of foreign policy leaders in the executive. 
Even in relation to its basic foreign policy principles, Indonesia appears to place an emphasis 
on maintaining pragmatic approach manifested in the bebas-aktif doctrine. In other words, 
democratisation at best have had limited impact on Indonesia’s foreign policy, notwithstanding 
the works that have highlighted in particular the role of parliament in foreign policy (see, for 
instance, Rüland 2009; Murphy 2005). 
This thesis aims to contribute to the emerging literature on explaining the impact of 
Indonesia’s democratic transition (independent variable) on its foreign policy (dependent 
variable). It is guided by the following central questions: how has Indonesia’s democratisation 
affected foreign policy decision-making in the country, and what is the impact of 
democratisation in relation to particular foreign policy areas and issues? 
In seeking to address this central question, this research considers three important 
aspects of Indonesia’s foreign policy, namely, foreign policy decision-making processes, 
foreign policy doctrine, and foreign policy decisions, particularly in the areas of regional 
cooperation, promotion of political values, and conflict management. Three case studies were 
 
 
1 The period of democratisation in Indonesia, beginning in 1998, is referred to in Indonesian as the Reform period 
(Reformasi). In a State Address made on 16 August 2010,  President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) stated 
that Reformasi remains a work in progress. Therefore, he referred to the period from 1999-2009 as the first wave 
of reform (Reformasi gelombang pertama) and his second term (2009-2014) was defined as the second wave of 
reform (Reformasi gelombang kedua). Nevertheless, this thesis will employ the term Reformasi to describe the 
period since the fall of Suharto to the present. 
2 Indonesia’s rating by Freedom House (FH) went from being ‘partly free’ in 2004 to ‘free’ in 2008. See, Freedom 
House Reports 2004 and 2008. 
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selected in this context: Indonesia’s foreign policy towards ASEAN, Indonesia’s foreign policy 
on Myanmar and towards East Asia regional arrangement, and the bilateral relationship 
between Indonesia and Malaysia, particularly in relation to the Ambalat dispute. These cases 
are active points of Indonesia’s foreign policy to date and highlight the areas in which the 
impact of democratisation has been most visible. Essentially, these questions will be 
approached by focusing on the role of three factors in Indonesia’s foreign policy decision- 
making process, which includes the role of leaders, the influence of institutions, and the salience 
of identity and ideas. 
 
 
1.1     The puzzle 
 
The literature on the link between democratisation and foreign policy suggests that 
democratising countries tend to be inward-looking, hence unlikely to actively pursue external 
relations. It is also assumed that democratising countries experience a rise in nationalism and 
suffer from weak state institutions. According to some scholars, this leads leaders of 
democratising countries to opt for aggressive foreign policy behaviour in relation to conflict 
management with other countries, especially when territorial disputes are involved. The 
literature on democratisation also suggests that following an increase in the number of political 
actors participating in foreign policy decision-making and the growing influence of public 
opinion, foreign policy-making is assumed to be bottom-up. Notwithstanding these theories, 
even a cursory examination of Indonesia’s foreign policy-making and Indonesia’s approach to 
regional cooperation and conflict management demonstrates that Indonesian foreign policy has 
defied these expectations. This makes for an important puzzle that this thesis aims to address. 
For this reason, this study seeks to address the lacuna in debates about the link between 
democratisation and foreign policy by investigating the factors that have shaped the formulation 
and implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy following the nation’s democratic transition. 
 
 
1.2    The arguments 
 
The democratisation of Indonesia has had a mixed and limited impact on Indonesian foreign 
policy, displaying both continuity and change in the way Indonesian leaders practice it. 
Therefore, while in some areas the impact is salient, it is less significant in others. In relation 
to regional cooperation and the promotion of political values, this thesis argues that Indonesia’s 
foreign policy continues to emphasise the projection of ideas that are shared by the foreign 
policy-makers sitting in the executive. The changes are thus a reflection of the preferences of 
these policy-makers. In relation to conflict management, this study demonstrates that Indonesia 
did not advocate a military approach for the resolution of territorial disputes, particularly in 
ASEAN. Such a policy approach reflects a continuation of Indonesia’s foreign policy during 
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Suharto’s period. In essence, this was the result of the leaders’ commitment to democracy and 
 
the continuity in the way foreign policy is made in Indonesia. 
 
The reason why the impact of democratisation on foreign policy is more limited than 
the theoretical literature dealing with democratising states suggests is linked to both continuity 
in the decision-making process as well as the continuing concern with basic foreign policy 
precepts. Overall, this thesis argues that Indonesia’s foreign policy following the fall of Suharto 
is still, by and large, determined by the preferences of Indonesian leaders. In this case, leaders 
became the variables that explained change and continuity of Indonesian foreign policy during 
Reformasi while democratisation, as a political process, only served as the context for these 
developments to exist. 
 
 
1.3    Review of the literature 
 
The following literature review is divided into two major parts. The first part reviews literature 
about the link between democratisation and foreign policy behaviour by looking at examples 
from a number of countries that have undergone political changes. This is followed by a review 
of the actors involved in the foreign policy decision-making process in democratic contexts. 
From these reviews, this study expects to see the ways in which democratising countries change 
their foreign policy and the extent to which political development affects the way foreign policy 
is made in these countries given the increase of political actors involved in the decision-making 
processes. The second part of the review explores literature that is related to Indonesia’s 
domestic political changes and its transition to democracy. 
 
1.3.1    PART I 
 
 
1.3.1.1   Understanding the link between democratisation and foreign policy behaviour 
 
The link between democratisation and foreign policy behaviour has been studied by looking at 
the domestic features of a state, which involves the role of institutions (Mansfield and Snyder 
1995, 1997, 2005; Gleditsch and Ward, 2006; Clare 2007; Snyder 2000), certain political values 
adhered to domestically (Mansfield 2002; Acharya 2010; Park 2008), and political problems 
that accompany a democratic transition, such as reforming the military (Bruneau and Trinkunas 
2005), civil-military relations (Huntington 1995), or economic issues (Galbreath 2004). In view 
of these features, scholars suggested that newly democratising states may have weak 
government institutions since the old have been eroded and the new are not fully developed 
(Mansfield and Snyder, 2002:301). This is characterized by the need of military and economic 
actors, which once benefited from the strong authoritarian regime, to secure their interests in 
the changing polity, frequently doing so by recruiting mass support (Mansfield and Snyder, 
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2002:299). Mansfield and Snyder (1995) suggest that one way to do this is by resorting to 
nationalist rhetoric, which could be effective in motivating collective action in the presence of 
weak institutions.3 
Resorting to nationalism can lead political elites to pursue hostile foreign policy 
behaviour (Mansfield and Snyder 1997). Some examples include military interference launched 
by a state to protect its citizens abroad (Adamson 2001) or lodging a claim over disputed 
territories (Keck 2006). While this has been a popular view concerning the impact of 
democratisation on external relations, competing theories do exist. To this end, Clare 
(2007:260, 274) suggests that even if institutions in democratising states are weak, the new 
democratising regimes are less likely to initiate disputes owing to a heightened domestic 
vulnerability. This vulnerability makes elites more cautious about foreign policy as they seek 
to maintain office, and as a result, foreign policy failure can be seen as a sign of incompetence, 
which would provide the opposition with a reason to attack the new democratic government 
and therefore, undermine their chance at re-election (Clare 2007:261). More specifically, in the 
context of East Asia in general and Southeast Asia in particular, authors have argued that 
nationalistic sentiments could strengthen democratisation through the promotion of a positive 
sense of nationalism (‘democratic pride’) (Acharya 2010). Instead of instigating hostile 
strategies, such pride could have a positive result for foreign relations (Park 2008).4  This 
‘democratic pride’ manifests in the growth of a robust civil society, the need for the democratic 
 
regime to distance itself from policies pursued by the previous authoritarian regime, and 
pressure   to   establish   domestic   legitimacy   through   economic   performance   (Acharya, 
2010:337,353). Therefore, following a democratic transition the leadership would be more 
likely to look inward to install democratic infrastructure, including institutions and values, so 
as to avoid  domestic problems that  may arise following democratisation (see Galbreath, 
2004:208-11).5 
 
Scholars also argue that inward-looking leaders of newly democratised countries have 
little incentive to actively pursue foreign relations in the context of cooperation within regional 
institutional mechanism, unless they see a domestic imperative for doing so. Such imperatives 
could  include,  among  others,  strengthening  the  progress  of  democratisation  or  resolving 
 
 
 
3 While the rise of nationalism may lead countries to become involved in armed conflicts, it may not hamper the 
process of democratisation itself. For an example of an in-depth examination on this topic, see Gutierrez (2009); 
regarding a specific point of discussion on nationalism and war see, among others, Comaroff and Stern (1995). 
4  For instance, in spite of the territorial disputes between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan over the 
Dokdo/Takeshima Island, and the rising nationalistic sentiment associated with it, both countries have refrained 
from using excessive military power as a means to resolve the claim, instead exchanging arguments based on 
historical and legal facts regarding the island. For details, see, among others, Cho and Kim (2011); Korea Times, 
31 July 2008; and BBC, 25 September 2012. 
5 For other criticisms toward Mansfield and Snyder’s analysis, see, among others, Narang and Nelson (2009). 
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economic problems. For example, following its democratic transition, Brazil was quick to 
engage with its neighbouring region by participating in the creation of Mercosur (Common 
Market of the South) in 1991 (Steves 2001). Mercosur was driven by the desire to nurture intra- 
regional trade and to reduce economic dependence on the US, as well as to counter American 
hegemony in the region (Heine, 2012:211; de Oliveira 2010). While informed by the spirit of 
nationalism and economic motives, enhancing regional cooperation was also seen as a means 
to secure their democratic transition. In this case, Brazil and other democratising Latin 
American countries signed the Santiago Commitment in 1991 to re-emphasise the principle of 
democracy in the OAS (Organisation of American States) (Steves, 2001:91). Recognising the 
fragile and vulnerable process of democratisation, leaders of newly democratised Latin 
American countries sought to build a collective identity and mechanism with a view to 
strengthening the process of democratic consolidation (Dabène, 2009:61). The regional 
activities of these democratising countries were intended to support internal stability while 
capitalising on potential for economic gain. 
Some authors, for example Cox (2000) and Kunczik (1997), have also suggested that 
the involvement of new democracies in regional mechanisms can be linked to a desire to 
improve their international reputation. Policies pursued to achieve this goal have primarily 
involved projecting certain ideas (see, Haacke, 2003:Ch.7). In the ASEAN case, for instance, 
regional co-operation fostered attempts to modify the structure of the association and to 
question the sanctity of existing regional norms, thus encouraging a redefinition of traditional 
patterns of elite interaction (Acharya, 2003b: 376-7, 388). Accordingly, the newly democratised 
Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines supported a broadening of the institution’s agenda, 
permitting a more relaxed understanding of state sovereignty, and allowing issues, that were 
previously deemed taboo by authoritarian governments, to be addressed (Acharya, 2003b:377). 
For most democracies, projecting certain ideas abroad is a way to increase their 
international influence and it is often a feature in their foreign policy initiatives (see, for 
instance, Cox et.al 2000). These ideas have generally been about, although not limited to, 
democracy, and the promotion of democratic ideals (see, among others, Nau 2000; Levitsky 
and Way 2005a; Gershman 2004; Kurki 2010; Youngs 2009).6  Only once certain ideas are 
appreciated by political leaders and the public can they be promoted abroad (McClosky, 1964; 
Linz 1991). In practice, there are various reasons why countries incorporate certain ideas into 
 
 
 
6  Apart from the discussion on the promotion of democracy, authors have also examined promotion of human 
rights but in a domestic, instead of foreign policy, context. For this discussion, see, for example, (Ga rreton 1994; 
Campbell and Mahoney-Norris 1998; Appiagyei-Atua 2002, Shuto 1998; and Cierco 2011). This thesis, however, 
will not separate the two components in such a way because human rights is often practically regarded as one of 
the measuring components of democracy (see, for instance, Freedom House Reports). 
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their foreign policy strategies, the most common reasons involving image-building in order to 
foster domestic and international legitimacy (see, for instance, Gorjão 2002; Kunczik, 1997:74, 
Carbone 2009; He 2008)7, and the removal of adversarial political regimes (Kegley Jr. and 
Hermann, 2002:27; Clement 2005; Goldsmith 2008; McFaul 2004). If foreign policy is 
considered an extension of domestic policy (Fearon 1998), then certain ideas need to be 
recognised and embraced internally, at least by decision-makers, before they can be projected 
abroad because without such recognition it is unlikely these ideas will be incorporated into the 
decision-making process (Wolff and Wurm, 2011:89). Once diffused, leaders can promote 
these ideas abroad through foreign policy strategy that may be linked, or identical, to what other 
countries have been pursuing (Seitz 2003).8 This linkage of policy, referred to as ‘geopolitical 
linkage’, is particularly salient in the connection between the West and the East (Asia) (Levitsky 
and Way 2005b). For example, policies on aid schemes, generally practised by developed 
countries, e.g. the Japanese Overseas Development Assistance (ODA)9, which was similar to 
the European practice on democracy promotion in other countries started particularly in the 
1990s (see, among others, Youngs 2001). 
 
For these promoted ideas to be effective elsewhere, the policy should be aimed at 
changing the relative power of political actors in the targeted polity (Gleditsch and Ward, 
2006:919-20). For this reason, authors have generally focused on development in targeted 
countries in order to assess the impact of ideas promoted by other countries (see, for instance, 
Carothers 1999; Schraeder 2002; Doyle 2000). In countries promoting certain ideas, the 
preferences and strategies have become norms for decision-makers who regulate foreign policy 
(Wolff and Wurm, 2011:88-89). In practice, mature and consolidated democracies are more 
likely to promote their national values (democracy) abroad than newly democratised ones (Nau 
2000; Gershman 2004). This is because consolidated democracies have had democratic ideas 
embedded in their state affairs, while newly democratising states tend to be preoccupied with 
the task of consolidating democracy at home. 
Overall, this section highlights that unless certain political or economic gains can be 
achieved by pursuing active external relations, democratising countries are likely to be inward- 
looking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 For detailed discussions on the relationship between image and foreign policy, see, among others, Wang (2003); 
Hülsse (2009). 
8 In the study of IR, this is often addressed as “imitation”. See, for instance, Wendt (1999:325). 
9 For background information and a discussion about ODA, see JICA, “Overseas Economic Cooperation 
Operations”; Sudo (1992). For an examination of its implementation on other countries, see, among others, Fouse 
and Sato (2006); Er (2013:14); Yasutomo (2005) 
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1.3.1.2   Understanding the link between democratisation and foreign policy-making: 
 
actors in the decision-making processes 
 
 
1.3.1.2.1  Authoritative actors 
 
 
The executive: the president and the foreign minister 
 
In general, democratisation allows for freedom of expression and political rights for citizens 
while executive power is constrained and accountable to other institutions, if not by the public 
(see Diamond, 1996:22-23).10 Under such circumstances, the number of actors involved in 
foreign policy decision-making process is likely to increase. Therefore, as a political system 
democratises, the role of the main foreign policy decision-makers in the executive is often 
challenged by other actors. These challenges could be ‘vertical’, originating from the electorate 
or interest groups in society, or ‘horizontal’ emanating from bureaucrats or the legislative body 
(Kozhemiakin 1997:61). In spite of these challenges, it should be noted that official foreign 
policy strategy is, ultimately, a product of the executive with the President, or Prime Minister, 
as the paramount decision-maker (Hill, 2003:53-54).11 Therefore, in some cases of 
democratisation, the role of the president and his foreign minister remained unchanged. 
In post-apartheid South Africa, for example, it is argued that foreign policy remains a 
state-centric affair, emphasising the role of the president, which negates the importance of other 
institutions as well as the people’s participation (van Wyk, 2012:80). The centrality of the 
president was evident in the case of the early post-apartheid period when Mandela viewed an 
outward-looking policy as a prerequisite for addressing the state’s economic problems. For this 
purpose, he sought to immediately reinstate relations with other Southern Africans states, 
promoting democratisation and fostering regional development within the region utilising 
multilateral means through the Southern African Development Conference (SADC) 
(Nytagodien 1997; Lyman 1996). The parliament’s ability to influence foreign policy decision- 
making was further limited under Thabo Mbeki’s administration. The Mbeki’s administration 
created the Policy Coordination and Advisory Service (PCAS) in the president’s office as a 
response to the existing ‘fragmented, ineffective, and expensive’ foreign policy processes, thus 
allowing the president to keep the foreign policy decision squarely within his office (Nel et.al, 
2004:47). 
The centrality of the president was also evident in Russia’s foreign policy-making 
following the democratic transition. In this regard, authors have proposed similar conclusions, 
 
 
 
10 A more comprehensive and detailed definition on democratisation will be included in Chapter Two. 
11 For practical purposes, unless otherwise stated, the term “president” will be used when referring to the political 
position of the head of state/government. 
Neher (1995). 
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suggesting that democratisation has modified the relatively unconstrained foreign policy 
decision-making authority of the top leadership due to the involvement of new domestic actors 
(Malcolm and Pravda, 1996:552; Trenin and Lo 2005; Light, 2000:97-8). Nevertheless, they 
also argue that regardless of these new actors, the authority of the president in making foreign 
policy remained strong. For instance, the role of Gorbachev was salient in Russia’s refusal to 
launch a military operation to preserve the communist regimes of Eastern Europe in 1989 
(Brown, 1997:249). Pointing to disagreements between Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament over 
the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) agreement in 1996, Malcolm and Pravda 
(1996:544) assert that ‘through all the conflicts with the parliament over foreign affairs, the 
executive has succeeded in retaining dominant control.’ Therefore, Russian foreign policy was 
regarded as ‘the sum of the president’s personal relations with foreign leaders’ (Trenin and Lo, 
2005:9). The dominance of the president, consequently, circumvented the Soviet Communist 
Party Central Committee, and the Foreign Ministry, who were mainly tasked with executing 
decisions already made by the president (Trenin and Lo, 2005:10). 
In Thailand, the centrality of the executive following its democratisation was 
represented by the prominence of the foreign minister. For instance, in 1991, in the context of 
Thai foreign policy on Myanmar, Thai Foreign Minister (FM) Arsa Sarasin put forward the 
approach of ‘constructive engagement’, the spirit of which was renewed by FM Surin Pitsuwan 
when he introduced the concept of ‘flexible engagement’ in 1998 (Haacke 1999; Acharya 
2004).12 These approaches indicate the dominant role of Thai diplomats – represented by the 
 
foreign minister – over the military generals whose personal economic ties with the Myanmar 
junta had existed since the 1980s (Dosch, 2006:55).13 For this matter, key civilian foreign 
policy-makers were at the forefront of Thailand’s foreign policy and this has been an attempt 
to establish civilian supremacy over the military and also to emphasise the dominance of the 
Foreign Ministry (Dosch, 2006:54). 
 
 
 
1.3.1.2.2  Non-authoritative actors 
 
 
The parliament 
 
The non-authoritative actors in foreign policy decision-making discussed here mainly involve 
the parliament. Public opinion will also be discussed in the context of its ability to influence 
foreign policy decisions in a democracy. In general, it is suggested that democratisation allows 
 
 
 
12 For a detailed discussion on this topic see Chapter Six. 
13 For further explanation on the role of the military in Thailand’s democratisation between 1970s and 1990s, see 
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for an increase to role of the parliament. The growing role of parliament is often the result of 
constitutional changes (Dosch 2006; Baviera 2012). This increased role manifests in the 
parliament’s ability to scrutinise foreign policy decisions made by the executive and, in some 
cases, has allowed the parliament to propose its own foreign policy ideas. As a consequence of 
this change, the process of foreign policy-making can be lengthy as the executive may have to 
consult the parliament while making policy decisions. The example of Russia demonstrates this 
situation well. 
In the Russian bicameral parliamentary system the parliament is able to assert its 
influence through the Duma (the Lower House) and the Federation Council (the Upper 
Chamber). They are endowed with the power to scrutinise foreign policy primarily when it 
concerns the ratification of an international treaty (Malcolm and Pravda, 1996:543-4) and are 
also permitted to work with foreign parliaments as their immediate foreign counterparts (Trenin 
and Lo, 2005). At times, however, the role of the parliament has been disruptive as it often 
opted for a foreign policy approach that was not traditionally held by the Russian government 
(Malcolm and Pravda, 1996:544). This was indicated by the radical approach, exposed during 
Yeltsin presidency and often informed by a nationalistic sentiment, on foreign policy issues that 
has a component of ethno-nationalism, which has in turn increased tensions between Moscow 
and mainly other CIS countries (see, Pravda, 1996, 203-7; Kozhemiakin, 1997:69). The 
centrality of the presidency in Russia, however, has allowed the president to ignore a number 
of parliament’s foreign policy preferences, such as those related to the CIS integration policy 
(Malcolm and Pravda, 1996:544). A strong presidency on the one hand, and the increasing role 
of the parliament on the other, has led to a political power struggle in Russian foreign policy 
decision-making and tensions between the two institutions was reflected in the process of most 
Russian foreign policy under Yeltsin (Pravda 1996). The dominance of the Russian presidency 
over the parliament on foreign policy issues can be traced back to the position of the Emperor 
during the tsarists’ period, which gave the Tsar complete decision-making control (Trenin and 
Lo, 2005:9).14 
In Thailand, the role of the parliament was limited and occasionally, the power of the 
 
executive in foreign policy decision-making prevailed over other influences. In general, the 
responsibilities of the Thai parliament were less clear, except in cases where a submission to 
international treaties was concerned (Dosch 2006; see also, Thailand Constitution B.E. 2550, 
art.190). Further, in a parliament whose members were heavily linked to, if not originating 
 
 
14 Under the 2007 Russian Constitution, the role of presidency in foreign policy, as in other state policies, was 
strengthened by significantly curbing the role of the parliament as well as by changing the election method of the 
parliament members and thus, centralised the decision-making power in the hands of the president. For details, see 
Russian Constitution; Oliker et.al (2009) 
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from, the local capitalist class (Sidel, 1996:59), political issues such as foreign affairs were less 
attractive than business-related affairs. This was evident in an analysis of the amount of sessions 
held by the parliament in relation to foreign affairs as opposed to other matters between 1993 
and 2002, where only 129 sessions were conducted by the foreign affairs committee while 203 
sessions were held by the agriculture and cooperatives committee (Stern, 2006:57). Thus, the 
minimal influence of the Thai Parliament in the context of foreign policy initiatives regarding 
the Myanmar during the early 1990s was no surprise. A change in attitude amongst the Thai 
legislature in foreign affairs, however, was observable between the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
This change was driven by the increasing political participation of individual parliamentarians 
in public policy (Stern 2006). A number of individual parliamentarians actively submitted 
inputs for foreign policy during this period (see Dosch, 2006:59). In this regard, the 
parliament’s involvement was highlighted by its participation in various inter-parliamentary 
networks in the region, such as AIPA and AIPMC. As a result, it was possible for the Thai 
Parliament to establish its own diplomatic channels (see Manunpichu 2013). 
In the Philippines, the 1987 constitutional amendments granted the legislature, both the 
Congress and the Senate, substantial authority over the foreign policy-making process. 
Significantly, the role of the Philippines parliament was important in treaty ratification and the 
appointment of ambassadorial posts (Baviera, 2012:10). Notwithstanding the rejection of the 
extension plan for the US military base, which resulted in the closure of the base in 1991 by 
President Aquino (Dosch, 2006:61; Tarling 2010), the parliament’s contribution to foreign 
affairs was relatively low, such that its actions were deemed to be ‘toothless expressions of 
concern’ (Jones, 2009:389).15 As far as public opinion in the Philippines was concerned, it was 
not unusual for the president to ignore public opinion when formulating foreign policy, as the 
public was considered mostly inattentive unless foreign policy issues had major repercussions 
for larger constituencies, such as the rights of overseas workers (Baviera, 2012:11; Medeiros, 
2008:xx). 
 
A theory maintained that public is inattentive and ill-informed (see Risse-Kappen 1991), 
hence, foreign policy decision-makers were unlikely to follow public preferences as they 
believe them to be irrational (Sørensen, 1998:98). This, in turn, increases the likelihood of top- 
down foreign policy-making (Skidmore and Hudson 1993). A competing view, however, was 
suggested by Headley and van Wyk (2012:5-9) who argue that given the impact of globalization 
and revolution in information technology, the public are not always ignorant and as a result it 
makes sense for them to seek more influence in the policy-making process. While this argument 
 
 
 
15 Lately, however, there has been speculation that Washington is planning to reopen its military base in these two 
areas of the Philippines. For details see Tarling (2010) and Johnson (2012). 
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points to the factors that are likely to increase the public’s knowledge on foreign affairs, 
Headley and van Wyk did not explore the question of whether the government would actually 
follow public opinion in making foreign policy, given the dominant role of the president in most 
states.16 
In South Africa, the state-centric model offers an example of the government’s ability 
 
to discount public opinion in foreign policy decision-making (van Wyk, 2012:81-2). As van 
Wyk (2012:84) contends, even during Mandela’s presidency ‘a broad participatory mechanism 
was never created’, despite the promise to make foreign policy-making a more people-centred 
activity. In Thailand, the public is permitted a role in foreign affairs, demonstrated in Thailand’s 
changing foreign policy orientation in ASEAN, particularly during the1990s, which was driven 
by calls to emphasise human rights and democracy in the region (Lynch, 2004:352). 
Accordingly, as Dosch (2006:62-3) writes, Thailand’s leadership attempted to gain a positive 
international reputation by announcing the country’s ‘participation in the global protection and 
promotion of democracy and human rights’. While acknowledging the role of public opinion, 
in practice, even in a democracy there is a limited degree to which the government can consider 
public opinion as a factor in foreign policy-making (see, e.g. Risse-Kappen 1991). Thus, 
making foreign policy remains primarily the domain of key foreign policy-makers in the 
executive. 
Overall, the surveyed works demonstrate that separating foreign policy actors based on 
their authority to make formal decisions is useful to understand which actors matter and which 
should be focused on when analysing the foreign policy of a democratising country. 
Understanding this separation is also important to discover who, in a democratic political 
context, decides foreign policy. In this regard, the president and the foreign minister are likely 
to be the major foreign policy actors. In relation to new foreign policy actors (those that did not 
previously have the role in foreign policy, notably the parliament) the literature suggests that 
notwithstanding their lack of power to make and execute state’s foreign policy strategies, these 
actors can still shape the government’s foreign policy preferences, albeit only to a certain 
degree.17 In short, while democratisation has been able to modify the previously closed process 
of foreign policy-making by allowing the involvement of new political actors, the authority of 
the executive over the foreign policy-making process has generally not been compromised. 
 
 
 
 
 
16 For an in-depth discussion on the link between public opinion and foreign policy see, among others, Hinckley 
(1992), Cohen (1973, 1995), Robinson (2008), and Hilsman (1971). 
17 For further discussions on how they matter in foreign policy, see Chapter Two. For an explanation on how the 
Indonesian non-authoritative actors influence foreign policy decision-making, see, primarily, Chapter Three, Four, 
and Five. 
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In sum, the literature reviewed in Part One suggests the following: (a) democratising 
countries are unlikely to pursue active external relations because they tend to be inward looking. 
However, if they do, an active pursuit of external relation is encouraged if there are certain 
political or economic gains that would benefit the domestic political situation; (b) 
democratisation has led to a widening participation of foreign policy actors in the creation of 
foreign policy, highlighted by the increasing role of the parliament and, to some extent, public 
opinion. However, notwithstanding this development, foreign policy remains generally the 
domain of key foreign policy actors in the executive where the president and the foreign 
minister continue to be the main foreign policy actors; 
Part Two below reviews the literature on Indonesia’s democratisation by highlighting 
domestic changes since 1999. This discussion is followed by a synthesis of the general views 
about the link between democratisation and aspects of Indonesia’s foreign policy, including 
decision-making as well the values that are reflected in foreign policy strategy. This review is 
useful to understand the progress of Indonesia’s democratisation and therefore important 
because Indonesia’s political development contextualised the way Indonesian foreign policy 
leaders operate foreign policy. 
 
1.3.2    PART II 
 
 
1.3.2.1   Understanding Indonesia’s democratic transition: from Habibie to SBY 
 
A number of scholars have conducted important research on the internal political environment 
following Suharto’s fall, and sought to further analyse the trends in post-authoritarian Indonesia 
(see, e.g., Emmerson 1999; Forrester 1999; Hefner 2000; and Aspinall 2005). The general 
consensus of scholars who assessed the early days of Indonesia’s Reformasi was that the fall of 
Suharto and the subsequent transition to democracy created an uncertain, if not gloomy, mood 
regarding Indonesia’s future (see, Forrester 1999, Emmerson 1999). The pessimism revolved 
around the question of whether the democratic transition would be successful, as argued by 
Eklöf (1999:236): 
 
…it remains to be seen whether Suharto’s resignation signalled the beginning of a 
gradual democratic transition or merely an adaptation of the authoritarian regime to 
shifting circumstances with no more than a broadening of elite support. 
 
Further, even though Indonesia had its first direct election in 2004, a number of scholars were 
still sceptical about the future of Indonesia’s democracy (see, e.g. Kimura 2012). As noted by 
Cook (2006:167): 
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Indonesia’s sudden and rapid democratisation has meant that it is difficult to gain a clear 
picture of what kind of democracy Indonesia is, and how and when the period of 
democratic consolidation will end. 
 
Meanwhile, Diamond (2009) argued that: ‘while Indonesia’s democratisation has been settled, 
it is still premature to say that democratic political systems have already been consolidated’. 
This is because the Indonesian leaders after Suharto must settle the unfinished problems of the 
past, such as corruption and separatism movements (Paul 2010), while ‘planting the seeds for 
the future’ (Abdullah, 2009:569). 
Despite this series of doubts, from 1998, Indonesia underwent what Huntington 
(1991:9) refers to as the initial stage of democratisation, marking the end of the non-democratic 
regime. The downfall of the New Order was sparked by the inability of Suharto to manage the 
impact of the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) for the country, which led to street 
demonstrations organised by pro-democratic movements marshalled primarily by Amien Rais, 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono (see, among 
others, Aspinall 2005; Crouch, 2010:19-20). The movement, comprised mainly of ordinary 
people who were protesting about price rises and middle class – which included students, 
lawyers, NGO activists, and religious leaders (Uhlin, 1997:46) – were motivated by a feeling 
of distrust towards the ruling regime and a strong desire to curb corruption, collusion, and 
nepotism—widely known in Indonesia as KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme). The 
movement demanded an overhaul of Indonesia’s political and governance system that would 
embrace greater openness and transparency, and the supremacy of law (including in this 
context, the respect for human rights) (Abdullah, 2009:530). These demands were outlined in 
what the Indonesians called the ‘six reform demands’ (enam tuntutan Reformasi), which 
included (1) respect for legal supremacy, (2) the eradication of KKN, (3) the trial of Suharto 
and his cronies, (4) the amending of the 1945 Constitution, (5) the application of regional 
autonomy, and (6) the abolishment of the military’s dual-function (dwi-fungsi militer) 
(Vivapemuda 2012). 
After the resignation of some key members in his Cabinet, such as Ginandjar 
Kartasasmita (Coordinating Minister for Economic and Industrial Affairs) and Akbar Tanjung 
(Minister of State Secretariat), Suharto was abandoned by his closest aides thus realising that 
he lost the necessary political support to sustain his presidency.18 Although the economic crisis 
 
 
 
18 In total, there were fourteen ministers that submitted their resignations to Suharto. Apart from Ginandjar and 
Akbar, they were Hendropriyono (Minister of Transmigration and Forest Settlement), Giri Suseno Hadihardjono 
(Minister of Transportation); Dr Haryanto Dhanutirto (Minister of Horticulture and Medicine); Justika S. 
Baharsjah (Minister of Agriculture); Kuntoro Mangkusubroto (Minister of Energy); Rachmadi Bambang 
Sumadhijo (Minister of Public Works); Rahardi Ramelan (Minister of Research and Technology); Subiakto 
Tjakrawerdaya  (Minister  of  Cooperatives  and  Small  Businesses);  Sanyoto  Sastrowardoyo  (Minister  of 
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appeared to catalyse the fall of the regime, to some, the crisis was no more than a context (see, 
for instance, Dosch, 2007:9). For example, former Indonesian Foreign Minister (2001-2009) 
Hassan Wirajuda believes that the 1997/98 crisis was merely a trigger for greater change in 
Indonesia as it was actually the imbalances between the economic growth and the political 
freedom demanded by the people triggered the collapse of the regime (Wirajuda, personal 
communication, 2010). 
Indonesia’s democratic period began when the new president, Baharuddin Jusuf (B.J) 
Habibie, Suharto’s former vice president, was inaugurated as president on 21 May 1998. 
Immediately after assuming office, Habibie took the substantial step of removing the Anti- 
Subversion Law and government regulation regarding Pancasila as the sole basis of Indonesia’s 
political life. Essentially, both regulations were provisions used by Suharto’s regime to curb the 
political freedoms. Suharto, through his speeches in 1982 and 1983 (later formalised in 1985) 
required all organisations to adopt Pancasila as the ideological basis (Ramage, 1995:18; 
Hefner, 2000:121). Pancasila was the New Order’s manifestation of the integralist stream of 
thought as it provided the basis of the government’s rejection of Western notion of democracy 
and an ideology which rejected the idea of opposition, depicting it as un-Indonesian (Elson, 
2001:240). Therefore, for Suharto, Pancasila ‘integrated all Indonesians with the basis, 
ideology, and ideals of Indonesia and prevented the Indonesians from inner conflicts and 
tensions which could become the source of division’ (Elson, 2001:239).19 In other words, 
through the use of Pancasila as the sole basis, Suharto wanted to curb the potentials for powers 
and ideologies that did not receive his ‘approvals’ from challenging his political power. 
Unsurprisingly, once Habibie lifted the Anti-Subversion Law, Islamist organisations and 
political parties mushroomed in the new democratic environment. Another central element of 
Habibie’s presidency was decision to support decentralisation. As opposed to Suharto’s 
centralised politics, through Law No. 29/1999 on Regional Autonomy (later amended by Law 
No. 32/2004), Habibie catered to public demand for more regional autonomy, essentially 
allowing the regions to be self-regulated on all matters apart from foreign policy, security and 
defence, the judiciary, fiscal and monetary matters, and religious affairs. 
Indonesia’s democratisation process continued when Abdurrahman Wahid, leader of 
Islamic organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), was elected president following the rejection of 
Habibie’s accountability speech by parliament. Wahid was in office from 1999 to July 2001. 
His rise to presidency was the result of a highly fractured parliament, with a religious (Islamic) 
 
 
 
Investment); Sumohadi (Minister of Forestry); Theo L. Sambuaga (Minister of Manpower); and Tanri Abeng 
(Minister of State-owned Enterprises) (Kompas, 27 May 1998). 
19 A greater discussion on the relevance of Pancasila in the current period and its importance in Indonesia’s foreign 
policy will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
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faction, who preferred a male president, and nationalist groups who demanded Megawati, initial 
winner of the presidential vote, as leader. In order to avoid political stagnation, and to calm 
Wahid’s supporters who were protesting outside the parliament building, Amien Rais, the then 
MPR speaker, formed the middle axis (poros tengah) and devised a political compromise that 
made Wahid president and Megawati vice president. As the son of the NU’s longest serving 
chair, Wahid Hasyim, and the grandson of NU’s pioneer founder, Hasyim Asyari, Abdurrahman 
Wahid had been chairman of NU for three consecutive terms (from 1984 to 1999).20 Further, 
according to Saiful Mujani (2003:71), Wahid was an agent who sought to modernise Muslim 
political culture. He always believed in pluralism21, which was why his political party, PKB 
(Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, The National Awakening Party) – although traditionally being an 
inclusive Islamic party – maintained Pancasila as its ideological foundation in the 1999 
election. 
In the manifestation of his democratic mind-set, Wahid decided to revoke Suharto’s 
Presidential Instruction No.41/1967 on the restriction of Chinese religious practices and 
traditions in January 2000 as a means to promote religious freedom in Indonesia. Further, in his 
attempt to implement democratic principles, Wahid restored civilian supremacy over the 
military. It was during his term that civil-military relations improved, marked by, inter alia, the 
separation of the police from the military and the appointment of Juwono Sudarsono as the first 
civilian defence minister since the 1950s (Clear, 2003:178). Wahid maintained his commitment 
to civilian supremacy by installing Machfud M.D, a civilian and cadre of PKB, as Sudarsono’s 
replacement following a Cabinet reshuffle in 2000. It was also under Wahid’s presidency that 
the Indonesian military decided to abolish the doctrine of dwifungsi - a commanding doctrine 
that evolved from General Abdul Haris Nasution’s ‘Middle Way’ concept as a means for 
justifying the Indonesian military’s expansion into socio-political life, popularised in the mid- 
1950s (Honna 2003).22 As such, the renunciation of the dwifungsi doctrine provided a pathway 
 
for the military’s gradual withdrawal from daily political and social affairs, marked by the 
readjustment of its position in parliament to becoming a  ‘professional Indonesian military’ 
(Chrisnandi, 2005:31).23 Additionally, the Indonesian media, for the first time since Suharto’s 
 
 
 
 
20 NU chairmanship was elected every five years. 
21  For Wahid, pluralism means both descriptive and prescriptive. By this, it meant awareness that Muslims are 
diverse and people are religiously diverse. It also means that everyone has the right to be exclusive and inclusive. 
Wahid, in this sense, chose to be an exclusive person. See, for instance, Muhammad Ali, The Jakarta Post, 6 
January 2010. 
22 For details on the function of this doctrine, see e.g. Schwarz (1994) and Hadiwinata (2003). 
23 In this context, the TNI parliamentary seats were reduced from 100 in the mid-1990s to 38 in the 1999 election 
(Rabasa and Haseman, 2002:47). In 2004, TNI no longer had parliamentary representatives and in the 2009 
election, TNI soldiers were ordered to surrender their right to vote (see, Pikiran Rakyat, 28 June 2010). For a 
detailed discussion on the role of the TNI in the post-Suharto’s Indonesian politics, see Mietzner (2006). 
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ousting, enjoyed greater freedoms, evidenced by the increased number of publishers from 289 
during the thirty-two years of Suharto’s government to 1,389, while the number of TV stations 
multiplied ten times to 60, including local networks (Antara, 15 February 2008). However, after 
a series of political crises and an allegation of involvement in several corruption cases, not to 
mention his erratic behaviour, Wahid was forced to abandon the presidency in July 2001 (Azra, 
personal communication, 2 March 2009; see also Barton, 2002:344-345).24 
Following this, Megawati took over Indonesia’s presidency due to her capacity of 
 
Wahid’s vice president. During Megawati’s presidency (2001-2004), Indonesia attempted to 
develop a better, more stable political landscape through which it might consolidate its 
democratisation. One of Megawati’s achievements was promoting good governance and 
transparency by establishing the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan 
Korupsi, KPK).25 During her short presidency, Indonesia was faced with multiple challenges as 
well as opportunities, both in terms of domestic and foreign policies. Most notably was the 
response of the Muslim community in Indonesia towards not only her status as a female 
president – she was initially rejected by a number of Islamic groups, including that of her vice 
president’s – but also her policies on terrorism and relations with the US following the 9/11 
tragedy. Islamic groups in Indonesia has viewed President George W. Bush’s response to 9/11 
as an attack against Islam, which led to mounting anti-American sentiment (Hainsworth, 
2007:137). In attempts to convince the public of her pro-Islamist stance, Megawati was paired 
with Hasyim Muzadi, then NU chairman, in the 2004 presidential elections. It was also during 
the final year of Megawati’s tenure that Indonesia assumed the ASEAN Chairmanship in 2003 
– a year in which, for the first time, Indonesia took the bold step of promoting democracy 
abroad. Megawati’s defeat in the 2004 direct presidential election led to the rise of a former 
general, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (popularly known, and hereafter referred to, as SBY), 
who ran with businessman-cum-politician Jusuf Kalla of the Golkar Party.26 
 
 
24 Further, according to a prominent political scientist and Islamic figure, Azyumardi Azra, there were six situations 
involving his emotional and stubborn behaviour for which Wahid was further cornered. First, in response to 
Wahid’s waning relationship with the DPR over the increasing tension on Wahid’s alleged corruption cases, he 
seemed to condone the violence committed by his fanatical supporters, mostly in East Java. Second, he appeared 
to condone the abuse by certain NU ulamas of classic Islamic concepts, such as jihad, against his opponents, who 
were Modernist Muslims. Third, he threatened that a number of provinces, mainly with a large mass-base for NU 
such as East Java, would separate from Indonesia if he were unseated in the Special Session of the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (MPR). Fourth, he asserted that, if the Session was held, he would issue a decree to dismiss 
parliament. Fifth, he fired the national police chief without consulting the DPR and, sixth, on the 23 rd July 2001, 
he finally declared martial law, which finally led the MPR to hold an early special session the same day. This, in 
the end, resulted in Wahid’s impeachment. See Azra (2006:46). 
25 The KPK, formed based on the Law No.30/2002 regarding the Formation of the Corruption Eradication 
Commission, is an independent body that works separately from the other law enforcements bodies – the police 
and the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) – to probe corruption cases in Indonesia. The body has been at the 
forefront of this effort. 
26 Golkar stands for Golongan Karya (Functional Group). It was once the strongest government party and served 
as the political machine of Suharto’s presidency. Jusuf Kalla was previously the Coordinating Minister for People’s 
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In this election, SBY and Kalla won more than 60% of the total votes. The parliamentary 
election, that took place in April of that same year, was contested by twenty-four political 
parties, the majority of which were new. The instalment of a democratic election system as well 
as a number of domestic achievements, such as improved economic performance, relatively 
peaceful conflict resolution, e.g. in Aceh, and promises to improve Indonesia’s human rights 
situation, served as indicators of Indonesia’s democratic potential. 
 
1.3.2.2   Indonesia’s democratisation and foreign affairs 
 
Based on the domestic changes, Indonesian foreign policy is said to have been has been affected 
primarily in three important areas: the process of foreign policy decision making, the actors 
involved, and the issues (Dosch, 2006:66, 2007). Dosch argues that democratisation leads to 
increased interaction between formal institutions and informal influences, creating a more open 
decision-making process which includes more actors than in previous times. Regarding foreign 
policy issues, the ‘new actors’ in foreign policy have been more free to introduce certain ideas 
that would not have been on the agenda under the authoritarian regime, such as human rights. 
As far as foreign policy decision-making is concerned, other authors have generally 
arrived at a similar conclusion: it is affected by democratisation, which diversifies the decision- 
making power of the central authority, and non-governmental actors have increased influence 
over foreign policy-making (see, among others, Anwar 2003, 2010a; Sukma 2006; Vermonte 
2005). Murphy (2005:283-84) argues that democratisation has led to a power shift from the 
executive to the legislature, which according to Laksmana (2011:163-64), foreign policy- 
making has been more complicated than ever. Further, Indonesia’s foreign policy decision- 
making during the Reformasi period has been marked by the increasing role of the parliament 
(DPR), which in turn made foreign policy-making more consultative.27 Another effect of 
democratic transitions on Deplu, as the formal foreign policy-making institution, has been 
bureaucratic reforms, which were launched to better reflect the values of Reformasi, thus 
supporting the transformation of Indonesia’s foreign policy (Nabbs-Keller, 2013:56). 
The parliament is represented by the Commission I (hereafter, Komisi I) as the principal 
legislative body that deals with foreign policy issues. In conducting its tasks, the DPR asserts a 
role that involves approving ambassadorial appointments, overseeing the foreign policy budget, 
and determining foreign policy execution (Murphy, 2005:260; also see Rüland 2009). The 
increased role of the DPR has led to a more consultative process in foreign policy decision- 
 
 
Welfare under Megawati’s Cabinet. He was made Chairman of the Golkar party after becoming Vice President in 
2004. For analysis on Golkar, particularly during the Reformasi period, see, among others, Tomsa (2008). 
27 For an examination of how political decisions are made in the parliamentary process, see, Sherlock (2010:160- 
178). For an authoritative discussion on the role of Deplu in response to the changing dynamics of the foreign 
policy-decision making process, see, Nabbs-Keller (2013). 
stipulated this analogy in the context of Cold War blocs and non-alignment position of Indonesia (see, Hatta 1953). 
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making especially in cases that require parliamentary approval, such as the ASEAN Charter 
ratification (Rüland 2009). Further, the DPR, in tandem with the epistemic community, has 
been instrumental in persuading the government to elevate democracy and human rights in it 
foreign policy values (Rüland 2009:398). With the increased involvement of these actors, 
Indonesian foreign policy has been argued to take a bottom-up decision-making model (see 
Rüland 2011), therefore signalling a change in the foreign policy-making process. 
While these works presented authoritative arguments about how foreign policy is made 
in Indonesia, only a handful of work recognised that essentially the leaders in the executive 
remained the key foreign policy-makers in Indonesia. In this context, Nabbs-Keller (2013) notes 
that the Indonesian foreign minister was the key actor in transforming Indonesia’s foreign 
policy particularly between 2001 and 2009. Nevertheless, an account on the role of Indonesian 
Presidents during these periods was not thoroughly discussed. Indeed, a discussion on the role 
of president is important given that Indonesia’s governing system is presidential thus, s/he has 
the ultimate decision-making power. Similarly, while recognising the involvement of new 
political actors in Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making, Novotny (2007) maintains that 
foreign policy has been determined by the perceptions of foreign policy “elites”. However, his 
study suffered from several conceptual, definitional, and factual mishaps. For instance, it failed 
to specify who these elites were casting the net so wide that included all ranks in bureaucracy 
as well as businessmen and military leaders (Novotny, 2007:69). He was unclear in who is 
primarily responsible for the decision-making process in Indonesia, an issue that will be tackled 
in this thesis. Businessmen in Indonesia are unlikely to be considered foreign policy elites and 
while low level bureaucrats can offer their views on certain situations, it does not necessarily 
mean they are in a position to make decisions. Essentially, the authority to make such decisions 
lies in the hands of their superior, most notably the foreign minister.28 Therefore, as this study 
demonstrates, other foreign policy actors who participate in the decision-making process had 
only limited roles in determining Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions and that the literature 
only partially explored Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making. Indeed, the salience of the 
president and foreign minister in Indonesia underscores the continuity, and not a change, in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy-making. 
In terms of substances of Indonesia’s foreign policy, Dosch (2006, 2007) held that 
 
human rights and sovereignty, among other issues, became more salient in Indonesia’s post- 
 
 
 
28 Other mishaps were minor and these include, for instance, his assertions on the year in which Indonesia gained 
independence (p.2) and his understanding on the notion of “rowing between two reefs” – popularised by 
Indonesia’s first Vice President Mohammad Hatta, in which he incorrectly applied the interpretation of “two reefs” 
as to involve China and the US (p.9). To this extent, Indonesia’s first vice president Mohammad Hatta initially 
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authoritarian foreign policy. His study, however, did not fully considered that while human 
rights has only occupied certain areas of foreign policy, such as Indonesia’s foreign policy on 
Myanmar, the importance of sovereignty has been at the core of Indonesia’s diplomacy long 
before Indonesia democratised. These issues will be addressed by this thesis in Chapter Six and 
Chapter Four, respectively. In relation to ASEAN, Anwar (2010a) argues that Indonesia 
continued to put ASEAN as its foreign policy focus while making democracy and human rights 
important foreign policy features in this regard. However, while she mentioned that Deplu has 
been ‘greatly assisted by the inputs provided by think-tanks and independent scholars’ (Anwar, 
2010a:139), she was not entirely clear as to how these ideas came to feature in Indonesia’s 
foreign policy. This lack of analysis will be addressed by this thesis by looking at the roles of 
ideas entrepreneurs and the preferences of Indonesian foreign policy leaders in Indonesia’s 
foreign policy on ASEAN (see Chapter Five). 
Indeed, Indonesian leaders encouraged the prominence of news ideas following the 
 
ousting of Suharto’s regime, most notably democracy and human rights (e.g. Sukma 2011).29 
 
These ideas were largely absent during most of the New Order period, where individuals were 
treated as an organic part of the state, thus allowing the government to avoid guaranteeing 
fundamental rights and liberties against the state, known as the integral state’s concept (konsep 
negara integral) (Feith and Castles, 1970:191).30 Notwithstanding the emergence of these 
values at the domestic level, democracy and human rights only became a foreign policy focus 
in 2003, when Indonesia assumed the ASEAN chairmanship (see, Wibisono 2010; Sukma 
2011; Acharya 2009a). In this regard, Jakarta had included the idea of promoting democracy in 
the region via the Indonesia-initiated concept of the ASEAN Political-Security Community 
(APSC). Furthermore, in 2008, Indonesia embarked on a new foreign policy initiative to 
emphasise the importance of democracy and human rights by establishing the Bali Democracy 
Forum (BDF), a forum for mainly Asian countries to share experiences of democracy (see, 
among others, Murphy, 2009; Currie 2010). 
In addition to democracy and human rights, given that Indonesia is the world’s most 
 
populous Muslim country and political Islam plays a key role in domestic politics, there is 
 
 
 
 
29  At the domestic level, following his presidential inauguration Habibie was quick to introduce two national 
regulations that were essential to the promotion of human rights: Law No. 39/1999 regarding Human Rights, and 
Law No. 26/2000 regarding the Human Rights Court. Such a decision was expected to help enhance Habibie’s 
popularity at home and abroad. 
30 This concept of amalgamation between the rights of the individual and the obligation of the state towards such 
rights was first introduced by Professor Soepomo, Sukarno’s former Justice Minister (1945, 1949-1950). Soepomo 
believed that there should not be a separation between the rights of the individuals and the obligation of the state 
to protect these rights, as individuals, with their own position, are obliged to help achieve the state’s greatness. In 
this regard, Suharto’s regime was perceived as a good example for the application of this concept. For details, see 
Simanjuntak (1994). 
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potential for Indonesia’s foreign policy to reflect Islamic values in its decisions. During the 
early years of Suharto’s administration until the late 1980s, Islam was not an important political 
feature as Suharto feared that it could challenge and ultimately overcome his authority (Sukma 
2006; Vatikiotis, 1993:121). Suharto’s concern in this regard was informed by three 
considerations: first, Suharto was an abangan (nominal Muslim) rather than a santri (devout 
Muslim) (Suryadinata, 1996:14-15);31 second, the military still believed that Islam could 
threaten political stability and that elements of the Muslim community still wanted to establish 
an Islamic state (Perwita, 2007:44); and, third, Islam was not the philosophical basis of the 
state. In other words, although Islam is the religion of the majority, it is not that of the state. It 
was not until 1990 that the role of Islam in Indonesia’s politics increased, as Suharto was forced 
to embrace Islam as a new socio-political pillar in order to balance the power of the military 
after his relationship with the army soured (Ramage, 1995:50). In this case, the passing of 
Suharto’s strongest loyalists and the founders of CSIS, Ali Murtopo (died in 1984) and Sudjono 
Humardani (died in 1986), added to Suharto’s already strong suspicions of Benny Murdani, 
who was allegedly preparing for a leadership succession within the army, which inspired a ‘de- 
Bennyisation’ in 1993 (Eklöf, 2003:231). Military officers loyal to Murdani were purged after 
his own removal from the post of Defence Minister, bringing Suharto’s relationship with the 
military to new lows. Hoping that he could sustain his leadership, Suharto reached out to Islamic 
constituents. Consequently, in 1990, the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association (Ikatan 
Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI) was formed to accommodate Islamic interests in 
politics. ICMI, while gradually becoming an important player in the politics of Suharto, also 
became essential for recruitment of ICMI members into the senior government ranks (Aspinall, 
2005:32). 
 
During the Reformasi era, the revival of Islam saw it become a bargaining tool for 
political purposes (see, for instance, Jamhari 1999; Emerson, 2005c:33). As such, strong 
Islamic credentials helped to elevate individuals who wished to become involved in politics. 
The ascendancy of Wahid to the presidency32 on the one hand, and the desire of Munarman – 
spokesperson of the FPI (Front Pembela Islam, Islamic Defenders Front) – to become  a 
parliamentary   candidate   for   PPP   (Partai   Persatuan   dan   Pembangunan,   United   and 
Development Party) in the 2014 election, on the other, offer examples of this phenomenon.33 
 
 
31 A definition and further discussion of this typology will be presented in Chapter Three. 
32  Although Wahid came from a very prominent Islamic background, his political ideology has been ‘secular - 
exclusive’, meaning that he believed that the Pancasila was compatible with Islam, but perceived that the 
development of Islamic society and the accommodation of Islamic moral values and aspirations by the government 
would threaten the existence of the secular state and the tolerance towards minority groups (Baswedan 2004). 
33  The decision by PPP to include Munarman, who is known as one of the top leaders of the hardline Muslim 
group, FPI, as a potential candidate for the 2014 parliamentary election was made public in January 2013. This 
decision was criticised by many. The most salient fear was that PPP was increasingly being dragged into the games 
32 
 
However, Islam is not a pillar of foreign policy and was given a ‘secondary place’ (Sukma, 
 
2006:5) therefore, Indonesian foreign policy was never “Islamised” in terms of its key agendas. 
An example would be Indonesia’s recognition of Palestine, which was not based on demands 
of the Muslim brotherhood or coreligionists (Leifer, 1983:138), but rather on the spirit of 
humanitarianism and solidarity among nations, as enshrined in the Preamble of Indonesia’s 
Constitution.34 As such, the influence of religion in Indonesian foreign policy was a matter of 
form   over   substance   and   it   has   remained   circumscribed   during   Reformasi   (Fealy, 
2004:143,154). 
 
Apart from democracy and Islam, another idea that could manifest in foreign policy 
during the Reformasi period was nationalism. As Part One of the literature review outlines, 
nationalism is often prominent during democratic transitions. Traditionally, the Indonesian 
people have been staunch supporters of nationalism, motivated by the struggle for 
independence. It was an element that was greatly emphasised in the five principles of 
Pancasila35, and it was through ‘nationalist’ rather than ‘Islamic’ ideas that Sukarno envisioned 
a country in which religions could coexistence peacefully (Reinhardt, 1971:26). While in 
Indonesia there has not been a hostile foreign policy approach taken on the ground of 
nationalism, as Mansfield and Snyder (1997, 2002) hypothesised. However, ordinary 
Indonesians have often expressed nationalist sentiment in their own (foreign) policy 
preferences. Political leaders have also drawn upon nationalism when they wish to appeal for 
domestic support. The dynamics of Indonesian-Malaysian bilateral relations provides a good 
example on this (see Chapter Seven). 
Notwithstanding the political freedoms introduced during the Reformasi era and the 
consolidation of democracy, Indonesia’s democratisation has presented a number of foreign 
policy options, most notably the through the increasing number of actors involved in foreign 
policy-making and the emergence of ideas or values that have the potential to influence foreign 
policy strategy. Democratisation has contextualised the emergence of these ideas and allowed 
for specific notions, notably democracy and human rights, to become the primary ideas featured 
 
 
 
 
of Islamic hardliners and thus could lose its most mainstream political supporters. Munarman, however, was found 
unqualified for the post as he failed to submit his papers as an administrative requirement to the National Election 
Commission (KPU). See, Diputra, Okezone, 31 January 2013; Merdeka, 28 June 2013. 
34 The Preamble of the Indonesian Constitution, Paragraph One, states “Bahwa sesungguhnya kemerdekaan itu 
ialah hak segala bangsa, dan oleh sebab itu maka penjajahan diatas dunia harus dihapuskan karena tidak sesuai 
dengan prikemanusiaan dan prikeadilan (whereas independence is the inalienable right of all nations, colonialism 
must be abolished from this world as it is against humanity and justice). Further, in a public seminar in Jogjakarta, 
Central Java, November 2012, the Director for Middle-East Affairs of Deplu stated that Indonesia will be 
consistent in supporting the Palestinians to achieve their independence as such a support is ‘mandated’ by the 
Indonesian Constitution”. See, Islam Times, 1 December 2012. 
35 Other than nationalism, Pancasila is based on humanitarianism, a representative government, social justice, and 
a belief in one God. 
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in the foreign policy arena. 
 
 
1.4    The analytical framework36 
 
In approaching the main research question, this thesis employs an analytical framework with 
core arguments linked to literature on democratisation, foreign policy decision-making, and the 
relationship between identity, ideas, and foreign policy. This is primarily because the basic 
tenets posited by the literature on democratisation facilitate an examination of Indonesia’s 
political transition in light of democratisation theories. Meanwhile, the theories on decision- 
making suggests that in spite of the growing influence of political actors in decision-making 
process that resulted from an open political environment, foreign policy remains exclusively 
the domain of certain individuals in leadership position within the executive. Institutions other 
than the Foreign Ministry, such as the parliament, did not significantly matter as far as making 
state’s foreign policy is concerned. This underscores that even in democracies, foreign policy- 
making remained a top-down process. Lastly, developing a conceptual framework based on 
theories about the influence of identity and ideas in foreign policy allows this thesis to 
demonstrate that while particular ideas (most notably about democracy) featured in foreign 
policy, hence promotion of these ideas abroad, the process is not automatic. This process is 
likely to be mediated by the role of ideas/policy entrepreneurs in foreign policy decision- 
making and for ideas to shape foreign policy, they must be internalised and shared by primarily 
the foreign policy leaders. 
Therefore, the framework this thesis developed will focus on the role of leaders, the 
salience of institutions, and the influence of identity and ideas in foreign policy. A focus on 
these factors permits an analysis of the impact of democratisation on, as well as the changes 
and continuities in, Indonesia’s foreign policy. 
 
 
1.5    Methodology 
 
In their work, Clough and Nutbrown (2007:23) distinguish methodology from method. The 
former provides the reason for using a particular method, while the latter refers to the 
ingredients of research. Put simply, method is the means with which we conduct the research 
(i.e. discourse analysis, interviews, or surveys) and methodology covers the justification for the 
method taken. The first task here is to clarify how the research was conducted. This will be 
followed by an explanation of the reasoning behind selecting certain methods with which to 
conduct the research. 
 
 
 
 
 
36 The analytical framework will be further explored in Chapter Two. 
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This is a qualitative research study which employs empirical research to understand the 
context of events.37 In principle, this research seeks to understand the impact of a socio-political 
event that has influenced the conduct of contemporary Indonesian foreign policy by studying 
the perspectives of those involved in the decision-making and by exploring the causal 
relationship between democratisation and foreign policy. In understanding this causal 
relationship, one assumes that ‘particular outcomes can be explained in light of a factor that 
exerts the same impacts across all observations’ (Goertz and Mahoney, 2009:307). 
This assumption is checked by examining case studies that reflect the influence of a 
factor (or a set of factors) (Sprinz and Wolinsky, 2002:10). Case studies are well defined aspects 
of a historical happening that one selects for analysis (Bennett, 2002:29). A case study analysis 
allows the author to explore a phenomenon in context using a variety of data sources (Baxter 
and Jack, 2008:544). This thesis selects case studies which can be categorised into two inter- 
related types: on the one hand, they are instrumental because they are used to provide insight 
into an issue – in this case, the link between democratisation and foreign policy –while on the 
other, they are intrinsic as the cases were specifically chosen to obtain further insight into this 
relationship (Stake 1995). The case study approach was chosen for a number of reasons: (i) 
apart from answering what, this thesis also seek to address why the impact of democratisation 
on Indonesia’s foreign policy is, arguably, limited; (ii) the author is not involved in the decision- 
making process on policies related to the case studies therefore, he can only interpret the 
perceptions or statements of those involved in the process and cannot manipulate the behaviour 
of the decision-makers; and (iii) this thesis considers that the context in which foreign policy is 
made is important and relevant to the phenomenon under study (see also, Yin 2003). 
This thesis utilises Southeast Asia as the regional context in which Indonesian foreign 
policy is applied, because this region, with ASEAN as the regional mechanism, has been a 
cornerstone for Indonesia’s diplomacy.38 Further, Indonesia is perceived to be the de facto 
leader in the region therefore, a change in the domestic political situation in Indonesia is likely 
to influence regional politics more generally. 
The specific case studies were selected for two main reasons. First, they highlighted 
areas in which the impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy has been most 
visible. Second, these case studies are instrumental in describing the changes and continuities 
in Indonesia’s foreign policy following the ouster of Suharto, both at the bilateral as well as 
regional-multilateral level. Specifically, the Ambalat dispute with Malaysia serves as the most 
 
 
 
 
37 For a distinction between qualitative and quantitative method, see, among others, Punch (1998). 
38  For a declaration on this, see, the Annual Press Statement of the Foreign Minister of Indonesia (2002, point 
149). See also Deplu, “Lingkaran Konsentris Deplu (the concentric circle of Deplu).” 
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important conflict that Indonesia has had to deal with in its bilateral relations in recent years. 
Therefore, Indonesian behaviour in relation to such an important case would indicate the 
approach to conflict management more generally. Indonesian foreign policy on Myanmar is 
also an important case study because Myanmar is the most egregious case and symptomatic of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy in general. Myanmar also serves as key case study to highlight the 
lack of human rights promotion in the context Indonesia’s promotion of democracy and human 
rights at the bilateral level. By focusing on the importance of leaders, the role of institutions, 
and the salience of identity and ideas in foreign policy, these case studies help to address a 
lacuna in the existing literature. Focusing on these variables provides a means for explaining 
the impact of democratisation on foreign policy and how democratisation has shaped foreign 
policy. These cases were selected after a preliminary study and assessment of relevant foreign 
policy events, which found them to be the cases that were most pertinent to the issue of 
democracy. 
In analysing the link between democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy, the 
salience of the aforementioned variables was traced through literature studies and interviews 
with Indonesian foreign policy elites. The majority of interviews were conducted during field 
research in Indonesia and Singapore, between 2009 and 2011, and include meetings with former 
ministers, active and retired diplomats, parliamentarians, members of civil society groups, and 
foreign observers. The interviews were conducted thoroughly to ensure reliability and validity 
of the information given. For this purpose, the author used a set of questions designed in 
accordance with, and categorised based on, the relevant foreign policy areas to ensure that the 
topic is well covered and the substance of the event is revealed. In order to obtain focused 
answers, the questions raised during the interviews were selected based on the expertise of the 
source. For example, questions on Indonesia’s foreign policy activities in ASEAN regional 
cooperation were not raised to human rights activists or religious leaders. In other words, semi- 
structured interviews with open ended questions, tailored to the respondent’s position and 
expertise, were used. 
It is important to raise questions to the respondents based on their position and expertise 
because a respondent is likely to respond based on their knowledge on, and experience in 
dealing with, certain foreign policy issues. Prior to raising the questions to the respondents, the 
author considered the respondents’ professional background and the likelihood for them to be 
able to generate the desired response towards the questions. In this context, a general type of 
questions were asked to nearly all interviewees. Questions such as whether one sees democracy 
as a foreign policy value during the Reformasi era or the general feeling that one has toward 
Malaysia were some of the examples. Meanwhile, questions that were linked to the selected 
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foreign policy areas were raised to individuals who possessed the expertise on the relevant 
foreign policy issues or were involved in the decision-making process with regard to these 
foreign policy issues. For instance, a question on the decision regarding the dispatch of the 
Indonesian Navy’s warships to the disputed area in the Ambalat was asked to, the first and 
foremost, Prof. Juwono Sudarsono, who was the Minister of Defence when the event occurred. 
Classifying the interview questions in such a way helps the author to obtain more specific 
information about the context of, and the reasoning for, the making of certain foreign policy 
decisions. 
The interview respondents were divided into two categories: Deplu officials and non- 
Deplu individuals. This distinction helped the author to limit the amount of raw data and 
building a workable data set, before they were checked against the initial assumptions held by 
the author. Therefore, this separation was useful for cross-checking the interview responses 
with information about certain foreign policy events obtained from secondary sources in order 
to avoid unjustified and, to some extent, biased information (McNabb, 2010:234), which was 
often noted as the vulnerability of qualitative method (see Mays and Pope, 1995:119). In 
addition to interviews, the primary sources used in this research include unclassified 
governmental and legislatures documents, public statements, speeches of main foreign policy 
actors, written correspondence between the foreign minister and the parliament, reports, and 
minutes of meetings. Printed and online secondary sources were also used, including books and 
magazines, newspapers, journal articles, PhD and Masters Dissertations. These sources were 
both in Indonesian and English. 
The information gathered from these sources was analysed by employing an 
interpretative approach.39 This meant that the author interpreted and constructed the meaning 
of texts and interviews in order to understand the context of certain foreign policy decisions 
and their relations with Indonesia’s democratisation. 
In principle, interviews were the main primary source of data for this study because the 
research topic was relatively recent and hence there was a limited amount of secondary source 
materials available. This study also took advantage of the author’s position as someone close 
to primarily the former Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Hassan Wirajuda, as well as an employee 
of the Indonesian Foreign Service. These positions facilitated access to interviews with active, 
as well as retired Indonesian diplomats, and with other prominent individuals who were 
involved in making Indonesia’s foreign policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 For details on this approach and further discussion about the methods, see Chapter Two. 
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1.6    Contribution of the study 
 
This study firstly seeks to contribute to scholarship on democratisation and foreign policy. By 
using the aforementioned analytical framework to examine the impact of Indonesia’s 
democratisation on its foreign policy, this thesis asserts, in contrast to several academic theories, 
that democratic transition does not necessarily lead to hostile foreign policy preferences (see, 
for instance, Mansfield and Snyder 2002). This is because democracy, as a basis for foreign 
policy action, was common amongst the Indonesian decision-makers and it, therefore, 
constrained aggressive foreign policy approaches. Secondly, the shared consensus in the 
literature suggests that, following a democratic transition, it is likely that there will be a 
dispersion of power in foreign policy decision-making processes. In this case, in the democratic 
political context, the main foreign policy-makers in the government are influenced by actors 
outside the executive, such as the parliament and, to some extent, public opinion, leading to a 
more bottom-up approach to foreign policy-making (see, e.g. Skidmore and Hudson 1993). 
Indonesia, however, presents a different case. Although foreign policy-making is more complex 
as a result of the emergence of new political actors and more consultative than during most of 
the New Order era, the formal authority to make foreign policy remains in the hands of 
authoritative actors in the executive, namely the president and the foreign minister. Thirdly, it 
is argued in the literature that identity affects foreign policy through the ideas or values it 
promotes (see Ashizawa 2008, 2013). In this regard, this thesis seeks to add to the discussion 
on how ideas influence foreign policy preferences through an analysis of the role of foreign 
policy actors and how the internalisation of values/ideas are likely to influence the link between 
identity, ideas, and foreign policy. 
In addition to its theoretical contribution, this study seeks to add to the empirical 
discussion of Indonesian foreign policy during the Reformasi era. First, contrary to 
conventional wisdom (see, Anwar 2003, 2010a; Nabbs-Keller 2013, Rüland 2009), foreign 
policy decision-making patterns remain largely unaltered, with the president and foreign 
minister serving as the central decision-makers. Foreign policy has also been made in isolation 
from the public and is often guided by the interests defined limitedly by the actors in the 
executive, and therefore remains a top-down process. Second, notwithstanding Indonesia’s 
democratic transition, Indonesia remains committed to a number of traditional foreign policy 
aspects, demonstrated by, inter alia, the continuity of the bebas-aktif principle as the dominant 
foreign policy doctrine. This finding suggests that democratisation had a limited impact on 
foreign policy. In sum, using an integrative approach that draws on works about 
democratisation, foreign policy decision-making, and the link between identity, ideas and 
foreign policy, this thesis contributes to the wider discussion about the relationship between 
38  
democratisation and foreign policy. 
 
 
1.7    Limitations of the study and possible further research 
 
This study is limited in the following ways: First, the focus of this study is on foreign policy 
formation, foreign policy doctrine, and foreign policy preferences in Indonesia after the ousting 
of Suharto. It does not consider the outcomes of foreign policy during the Reformasi era on 
other states or regional/international institutions because such an analysis would require a 
comparative study. This being said, the focus of this thesis is essentially on the importance of 
domestic changes in Indonesia’s own foreign policy. 
Second, as this thesis focuses primarily on political issues, directing its attention to 
foreign policy initiatives that are related, by and large, to a political agenda, other economic 
and cultural issues, have not been addressed. This is because political issues are the primary 
areas in which changes to Indonesian foreign policy are visible. Nevertheless, since the 
variables used in this thesis are generalizable, one can indeed apply them to further studies 
about Indonesian foreign policy on issues that are not covered in this thesis. 
Third, this thesis is limited by the availability of data concerning particularly the 
Ambalat dispute. This is because bilateral border negotiation between Indonesia and Malaysia 
are still in place and, therefore, the data is sensitive and there were no final positions of 
countries’ as yet. For this reason, this thesis relies on the primary information provided in 
interviews with Indonesian policy-makers. The views of Malaysian policy-makers have not 
been considered in depth, and this is a potential realm for future research. 
Fourth, this thesis is also limited by a focus on the examination of Indonesia’s position 
vis-à-vis major powers in Asia in the context of regional cooperation beyond ASEAN. To this 
extent, the analysis of the impact of power structure, particularly between, but not limited to, 
the US and China in the East Asian regional arrangements on Indonesia’s foreign policy has 
been very modest. This is because the main focus of this study is to examine Indonesia’s foreign 
policy and not the impact of the external material factors on Indonesia’s diplomacy. A further 
study of triangular relations between the US, China, and Indonesia in the context of regional 
political structure and its influence on Indonesia’s regional leadership would be instrumental 
for analysing the significance of external factors and power politics in Indonesia’s foreign 
policy. 
 
Fifth, the analytical framework of this thesis focuses on the role of leaders, institutions 
(in this case is the parliament), and the link between identity, ideas, and foreign policy. As a 
result, this thesis does not assess the patterns of interaction between, for instance, leaders in the 
executive and public opinion or interest groups and their impact on foreign policy—which are 
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common in the study of democratisation. This is because this study argues that even in a 
democracy, the role of leaders remains influential in deciding foreign policy. This being said, a 
study on the role of public opinion or bureaucratic politics in Indonesia’s foreign policy could 
be useful to analyse foreign policy content from a different perspective. 
The final limitation concerns the timeframe of the case studies. This thesis examined 
case studies that occurred between 2001 and 2011 – although some reflections were as recent 
as 2012 and 2013. In 2014, Indonesia will undergo a general election. It is important to assess 
the impact of this political event on Indonesia’s foreign policy given that SBY will not be 
eligible for re-election as he has been in office for two consecutive terms. In this context, one 
may find it important to look at how the new administration will craft and practice Indonesia’s 
foreign policy in the areas examined by this study, in particular, and Indonesia’s foreign affairs 
in general. 
Given these limitations, this thesis acknowledges the constraints of data and scope 
inherent in this study. However, it does possess a strong argument on the important impact of 
democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy particularly in relation to political cooperation in 
the regional context. 
 
 
1.8     The structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. This Introduction is the first. Chapter Two discusses the 
analytical framework, integrating theories and concepts of democratisation, foreign policy 
decision-making, and the relationship between identity, ideas and foreign policy. Once 
constructed, the framework will be used to guide the analysis made in subsequent empirical 
chapters. Chapter Three discusses foreign policy-making in Indonesia, focusing on foreign 
policy actors in Indonesia, covering both the New Order and Reformasi periods. This chapter 
is essential because in a democracy, traditional foreign policy actors are joined by new actors 
who gained their influence as a result of democratisation. Consequently, in Indonesia, foreign 
policy-making became more complex due to this proliferation of actors. In Chapter Four, the 
thesis will discuss the importance of ideas in foreign policy, by examining Indonesia’s basic 
foreign policy doctrine, bebas-aktif. It will also cover its implementation in the post-Suharto 
era. This chapter demonstrates the relationship between Indonesia’s democratisation and the 
principal ideas that have long guided the practice of Indonesian foreign policy. 
Chapters Five to Seven address the case studies. Chapter Five discusses Indonesia’s 
regional cooperation following the democratisation process. Central to this chapter is 
Indonesia’s foreign policy in ASEAN, particularly after its 2003 chairmanship. This chapter 
highlights the role of Indonesian leaders, particularly the president and foreign minister, in 
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determining the state’s foreign policy preferences in relation to ASEAN, while not entirely 
excluding the influence of non-authoritative actors, especially the DPR and ideas entrepreneur, 
in the policy-making stage. 
Chapter Six examines Indonesian foreign policy in relation to promotion of political 
values beyond the ASEAN context. This chapter will explore the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) 
initiative as a hallmark of democracy promotion in the wider Asia and Indonesia’s foreign 
policy on Myanmar. This chapter will also discuss the link between democratisation and 
Indonesia’s foreign policy with regard to East Asia cooperation, where promotion of democracy 
and human rights was less visible. This chapter highlights the instrumental role of Indonesian 
foreign policy leaders in pursuing the policy of democracy and human rights promotion. 
Specifically, in the Myanmar case, if the Indonesian leaders were to bow to pressure from the 
public and the parliament, an aggressive Indonesia’s foreign policy would have been possible. 
Chapter Seven analyses Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Malaysia, particularly with 
regard to territorial disputes and Ambalat case. This chapter will demonstrate the effect of 
democratisation on the way Indonesia handled territorial conflicts at sea with its neighbour by 
highlighting the various foreign policy preferences emerged at different levels in Indonesia. 
This chapter also examine a period when foreign policy could have been more hostile, despite 
Indonesia’s democratic identity, but was not. Chapter Eight will summarise the findings and 
provides the overall conclusions. 
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2 Analytical framework: democratisation and the role of leaders, 
institutions, and identity and ideas in foreign policy 
 
 
This chapter sets up the framework for analysing the role of leaders and institutions as well as 
identity and ideas for the analysis of Indonesian foreign policy in the subsequent, empirical 
chapters in this thesis. Building on the theoretical literature on democratisation, foreign policy 
decision-making processes, and the nexus between identity, ideas, and foreign policy, this thesis 
opts for an analytical approach that allows us to understand who governs in Indonesian foreign 
policy, how the so-called ‘democratic identity’ influences foreign policy, which ideas are 
prevalent in certain foreign policy cases, and why they matter. This chapter shows that in 
analysing Indonesian foreign policy following democratisation, one should focus in particular 
on the role played by the Indonesian foreign policy leaders, however not to the complete 
exclusion of what this thesis refers to as non-authoritative actors40, i.e. the parliament and 
bureaucracies other than the foreign ministry, and the core ideas espoused in the context of 
Indonesia’s democratic identity. These factors explain why there was both change and 
continuity Indonesia’s foreign policy during the Reformasi era. 
This chapter begins by defining democratisation and the stages it involves. The purpose 
here is to fit Indonesia’s transition – as discussed in Chapter One – into the theory of 
democratisation. It then proceeds to examine the concept of foreign policy decision-making. 
Importantly, this section links democratisation, as a political context, with foreign policy 
decision-making, as a political process. In Section Three, this chapter discusses the salience of 
institutions and foreign policy leaders in the making and the execution of a state’s foreign 
policy. Here it will be argued that irrespective of the regime type, foreign policy decision- 
making processes will always be dominated by a set of limited actors by virtue of their 
designated authority and knowledge. Nevertheless,  (new) foreign policy actors who prior to 
democratisation had no role in the foreign policy-making process, namely, the parliament and, 
to some extent, certain individuals with expertise on foreign affairs, also influence the shaping 
of the state’s foreign policy agenda, despite their status as non-authoritative actors. This is 
especially likely when they hold ideas about certain foreign policy issues that are different from 
those of the authoritative actors. Section Four looks at the major foreign policy decision-making 
actors in the executive and the factors that are likely to influence these leaders to continue or 
chance a particular course of foreign policy. In Section Five, this chapter discusses the role of 
identity and ideas in foreign policy. The analysis of Indonesia’s foreign policy during the 
 
 
 
40 For further discussion on this classification in Indonesia, see Chapter Three. 
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Reformasi period shows very clearly that the ideas espoused primarily by the authoritative and, 
to some extent the non-authoritative actors, cannot be separated from the new perceived identity 
of the country. These ideas are therefore important for determining the preferences for foreign 
policy action. Drawing on the concept of the nexus between identity and foreign policy, how 
ideas turn into foreign policy behaviour is discussed. Section Six will conclude with a review 
of the framework used in this thesis based on the preceding sections. It also offers some notes 
on methods to operationalize the framework. 
 
 
2.1    Democratisation, democracy, and foreign policy: definitions 
 
 
2.1.1    Understanding democratisation and its stages 
 
In its simplest definition, democratisation can be understood as a transitional period 
experienced by a country with a non-democratic political system – usually authoritarian – as it 
becomes a democracy (see, among others, Huntington 1991; Mansfield and Snyder 2002, 
2005). Often an election becomes a yardstick for democratisation, in that it has to be conducted 
freely and fairly distinguishing it from elections in non-democratic regimes, where elections 
are usually used as “a means for forging support for the ruler to stay in power” (Gourevitch 
2002). The process of democratic transition usually consists of three stages: the end of the non- 
democratic regime, the inauguration of the democratic regime, and the consolidation process 
(Huntington 1991). 
Ending a non-democratic regime.41  The existing literature suggests that the motivation 
for ending a non-democratic regime can entail external and internal factors. External factors 
include, among others, a prerequisite for integration imposed by regional/international 
organisations embracing democratic principles (Oguzlu 2004; Ram 2003), foreign military 
intervention (Mandelbaum 2004; Grimm 2008; Dower 2002), and severe economic crises 
(Robinson 2006; Wright 2007). Meanwhile, internal factors usually involve, for example, a 
struggle to define national identity (see, for example, Rustow 1970; Linz and Stepan 1996; Hsu, 
Tsai, and Huang 2008; Turan 1997), as was the case in Britain in the 17th century. This alone 
could be the raison d’être for states undergoing democratisation. External and internal factors 
can sometimes be intertwined, as demonstrated by the case of India, where the ending of non- 
democratic regimes was accomplished through the process of decolonisation.42 In a situation of 
an acute economic crisis, the political transformation that democratisation entails is often a 
 
 
 
 
41 The notion of ‘regime’ is broader than ‘government’ as changing the former would usually include overhauling 
the systems in which the latter operates. For greater details about this distinction, see Hagopian and Mainwaring 
(1987). 
42 For details on India’s process of decolonisation, see, Randall and Scarritt (1996). 
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preferred exit strategy perceived by the elites to overcome the crisis (Bratton and van de Walle 
 
1997).43 
 
The fall of Suharto’s regime, as argued in Chapter One, is a case of intertwined internal 
and external factors. Internally, the end of the New Order in 1998, as argued by Wirajuda 
(personal communication, 2010), was caused by the paralyzed relationship between economic 
development and political freedom, including freedom of expression (see also, Freedman 
2005:239; Heryanto and Hadiz 2005). In this case, the inability of Suharto’s government to 
respond to the impact of the Asian financial crisis on Indonesia, as an external factor, 
contributed to his weakening authority, and consequently, the security of the regime. As a result, 
this situation allowed the pro-democracy political forces to assert pressure on the government. 
It is important to remember that the legitimacy of Suharto’s regime rested primarily on a 
developmentalism. Therefore, once the economy underperformed, the regime’s legitimacy was 
severely affected. 
Inauguration of democratic regime. Once the first stage is achieved, what follows next 
is the instalment of democratic regime. In many cases, this process is enabled by free and fair 
elections. Regular free and fair elections are often depicted as the basic procedural requirement 
for a country to become a democracy and, in this context, there are some minimum conditions 
that need to be met. A discussion on these dates back to Robert Dahl’s conceptualisation of 
democracy in 1971. For Dahl, democracy involves the existence of (1) the right to vote; (2) the 
right to be elected; (3) the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes; (4) free 
and fair elections; (5) freedom of association; (6) freedom of expression; (7) alternative sources 
of information; and (8) institutions for making public policies that depend on votes and other 
expressions of preference (Dahl, 1971:3). These conditions should be executed with, if not 
complemented by, a number of democratic standards, which include effective participation of 
those entitled to vote, equality in voting, gaining enlightened understanding of policy 
alternatives, and exercising final control of the state agenda (Dahl 1998:38). 
Elections should thus not be the sole determinant for ensuring the success of a 
democratic transition. They should rather be treated as an intermittent but essential prerequisite 
for democratic transition. This is because elections are expected to produce new political actors 
that work to make the state’s political institutions more committed to democratic principles.44 
 
 
 
43 Economic crisis in this case might create a focal point for opposition mobilisation. It might also cause business 
elites and capitalists to defect from the authoritarian regime and create a division within the regime over economic 
policy in response to the crisis. For an authoritative account on this, see Wright (2007). 
44 In some cases, this means allowing for public opinion to factor in the decision-making process. However, the 
inclusion of public opinion in that process should not set the standard for democratic institutions because even in 
non-democracies, public opinion could matter. For a greater discussion about the role of public opinion in non- 
democracies, see, for instance, Hughes (2012), Gries (2005), and Datong (2007). 
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These institutions include, but are seldom limited to, parties and party systems, legislative 
bodies, state bureaucracies, judicial systems, and systems of interest intermediation (Schedler, 
1998:100-01). In many cases, the inaugurated democratic regime would assign new leaders to 
those institutions where they would operate by making new regulatory systems – which usually 
requires amending the constitution – in order to build a democratic political polity with 
supporting institutions. 
Democratic political institutions usually allow for public opinion to feature in their 
decision-making processes although the final decision outcomes may not always reflect what 
all of the public aspire to. Political elites in democracies tend to listen to, but do not necessarily 
follow public opinion, even in parliamentary democracies (see, Capling and Nossal 2003; 
Saalfeld 1997). Indeed, political elites often ignore public opinion in times of crisis (see, e.g., 
Trumbore and Boyer 2000; Allison and Zelikow 1999).45 Here the argument is that the extent 
to which popular opinion influences political leaders will essentially depend on the personal 
judgement of the leaders concerned (see, for instance, Hilsman, 1971:118-20). A good example 
of this was the British government’s decision to send troops to Iraq in 2003. 
The success of democratic regimes in transforming political institutions is deemed to 
underscore the progress of a democratic transition (Dahl 1971; Huntington 1968). In other 
words, the absence of strong and democratic political institutions might lead democratisation 
to remain ‘incomplete’ (Huntington 1991). Through these transformed political institutions 
political elites are expected to facilitate the exercise of one’s rights as a citizen in order to 
strengthen the viability of a workable democratic transition (Whitehead, 2002:10; see also, 
O’Donnell and Schmitter 1993). Once democratic regimes are inaugurated, the political elites 
must deal with the third stage: consolidating democracy. 
Consolidation process. In Southeast Asia’s experience, democratisation has been a 
challenging task as the fall of non-democratic regimes has not always led to the dismantling of 
the patrimonial oligarchic system of the state, such as in the Philippines (Sidel 1996; see also, 
Hutchcroft, 1998:20). Other problems like corruption, the consolidation of power in the face of 
opposition from those who were ousted during the democratic transition (such as the military), 
and ethno-nationalism (see, Hsiao 2008; Chang 2008; Rustow 1970), are some of the major 
issues that the new government must handle. Therefore, consolidating democracy is regarded 
as a tricky process since the new democratically elected leaders have to tackle the legacies of 
the old regime (Davidson 2009). Due to the generally fragile nature of the consolidation 
process, democratising countries may well experience a democratic setback. This occurs, for 
 
 
 
45 For authoritative discussions about public participation and (foreign) policy-making in democracies, see, among 
others, Cohen (1973); Risse-Kappen (1991); Dye (2001); and Hilsman (1971). 
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example, when the military intrudes into the political process, particularly if it seeks to assume 
political leadership through non-democratic means, as in the case of Thailand’s coup in 2006 
(The Guardian, 19 September 2006). A democratic setback could also be stimulated by 
undemocratic behaviour of democratically elected leaders demonstrated in, for example, the 
manipulation  of  election  results  as  a  means  to  sustain  their  political  power  (Coppedge, 
2005:290; see also, Englebert and Bodunszynski 2005). 
 
In principle, during the process of democratic consolidation one would expect that a 
democratising country can achieve a situation in which none of the major political actors, 
parties, organised interests, forces, or institutions consider any alternative to democratic 
processes to gain power, and that no political institution or group has a claim to veto the actions 
of democratically elected leaders (Linz 1990).46 In other words, there is a consensus among the 
elites to accept democratic ideas as the rules of the game and that the electorate should 
determine the parameters of freedom (McClosky 1964:373).47 In this regard, the absence of the 
military from daily politics and the functioning of democratic political institutions become 
critical. At a minimum, democratic principles involve elections and the availability of civil and 
political freedom, commonly referred to as ‘procedural democracy’ (e.g. Schumpeter 1976; 
Schedler 1998; Dahl 1971). Extending the condition of the electoral process to other major 
aspects of governance could lead a democratising country to adopt the values of liberal 
democracies,48 characterised by, among others, the presence of civilian supremacy, public 
accountability, political freedom and freedom of expression, and the principle of equality before 
the law (Diamond, 1999:10-13; 1996:22-23). 
Importantly, democratic consolidation has become a phase where political actors submit 
to the constituents their moral commitment towards public accountability and democratic 
principles. If the consolidation of democracy is successful, a democratising country is likely to 
incorporate democratic principles for making that country a full-fledged democracy. In this 
case, a successful consolidation of democracy would help secure the transition process from 
undemocratic behaviour that could cause a democratic breakdown (Schedler, 1998:95). 
 
 
 
 
 
46 For other works on the consolidation of democracy, see, among others, Linz and Stepan (1996), who emphasised 
the need for a shared normative and behavioural commitment to the rules and practices of the country’s 
constitutional system. 
47 In the table data presented in his research, McClosky’s analysis on American politics (its elites and the public, 
or the electorate, in general,) showed that the need for consensus on democratic ideas should be stronger among 
the political stratum than the electorate is premised on the assumption that elites are better educated. This gave the 
elites the capacity to overcome political obstacles that the general public may not be able to cope with. To this 
extent, the public is thought to have lack of attention to political issues, thus, the public is considered to be not a 
part of the state’s decision-making circle. For a complete explanation on this, see McClosky (1964: 374-5). 
48 Authors have also labelled countries adopting democracy during the third wave of democratisation as illiberal 
democracies. For details on the reasons for such a labelling, see, among others, Zakaria (1997). 
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According to the above definitions, where does the case of Indonesia fit in? As discussed 
in Chapter One, Indonesia has indeed progressed through the three stages outlined here by 
ousting Suharto’s authoritarian regime, followed by a series of free and fair national elections 
in 1999, 2004, and 2009, and culminating in the inauguration of a democratic regime. 
Indonesian political elites have also reasonably inserted provisions into national laws that 
would ensure that its citizen’s rights are respected in order to consolidate its democracy. As a 
result, one would find a construction of political institutions in order to tackle the problems of 
the past (such as the anti-corruption Commission, or Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK), 
the Regional Representative Council (DPD) – a parliamentarian body established to reflect the 
politics of decentralisation, and the Broadcasting Commission (KPI) – an independent state 
institution established to ensure that public information is not monopolized by the government). 
At the same time, the military withdrew from politics and the police was civilianised. These 
domestic political developments suggest that Indonesia has made sufficient headway to be 
considered a democracy. 
In relation to foreign policy, what does the transition to democracy mean? Two major 
possibilities are proposed here. First, the transition could render the foreign policy decision- 
making process more complex given the increasing role of (new) political actors who 
previously had no role in the policy-making environment. In this regard, particular importance 
falls to parliament. Second, as Chapter One notes, the notion of having become a ‘democracy’ 
becomes the basis for the political leaders’ foreign policy decisions. In this case, foreign policy 
leaders refer to the ‘democratic identity’ of their country as the underlying impetus for pursuing 
distinct foreign policy decisions. Put differently, foreign policy preferences are linked to the 
perceived new identity of the country. The ‘flexible engagement’ strategy pursued by 
Thailand’s government officials in 1998 in relation to the issue of Myanmar is an example of 
this (e.g. Haacke 1999). In Indonesia’s case, former foreign minister Wirajuda included many 
references to the perceived democratic identity of Indonesia in his foreign affairs speeches. At 
the 56th session of the UNGA (15 November 2001), for example, he noted: ‘…Indonesia today 
stands proud as one of the largest democracy in the world… We, Indonesians, have a natural 
affinity to democracy.’ Before discussing identity in more detail, however, we need to discuss 
the relationship between democratisation and the way foreign policy is made. 
 
 
2.2 Understanding the link between democratisation and foreign policy-making 
process 
In the study of Foreign Policy Analysis (hereafter, FPA), analysing foreign policy generally 
 
means examining its decision-making process as the way decisions are made can shape the 
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eventual choice of foreign policy action (Mintz and De Rouen Jr., 2010:4). In the seminal work 
of Snyder et.al (1962:90) decision-making is understood as a process which results in the 
selection among a socially defined and limited number of alternative choices intended to bring 
about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision-makers. Therefore, the 
foreign policy decision-making process can be regarded as a process of selecting available 
options. Notably, what matters here more often than not is the judgment of the government, as 
the primary decision-maker within a state, as it engages with other international actors (see also, 
White, 1981:3). 
In general, the way foreign policy decisions are made is influenced by a number of 
factors. These include, but are not limited to, the rationality of the decision-makers, an issue 
much explored with reference to cognition (Rosati 1995, 1987; Saphiro and Bonham 1973; 
Holsti 1976), bureaucratic competition (Halperin and Clapp 2006; Carlsnaes 2008; Halperin 
1974), public opinion (Hinckley 1992; Cohen 1973), and domestic politics (Hagan 1995; 
Putnam 1988; Fearon 1998; Keohane and Nye 1977). Foreign policy decision-making is of 
course also influenced by systemic factors, such as the international power structure (Langhorne 
2005; Wohlforth 2008). Although these factors are important in their own respect, this thesis is 
above all interested in assessing how foreign policy formulation proceeds in the context of 
Indonesia’s democratisation. In other words, who shapes foreign policy in Indonesia and how 
has the transition from authoritarianism to democracy impacted upon the foreign policy 
decision-making process? 
If democratisation is thought to ‘open’ up the foreign policy decision-making process 
beyond the top executive leadership, then an increasing role of other actors should be 
anticipated. These actors usually include the parliament (e.g., Dosch 2006) and interest groups 
(see, e.g., Mearsheimer and Walt 2007; Risse-Kappen 1995). The role of the government in 
determining policy actions towards certain foreign policy questions is to a certain extent also 
compromised by the salience of non-governmental actors. The growing influence of those 
domestic actors in state-society relations could either expand or constrain the liberty of the 
foreign policy-makers in setting the state’s foreign policy agenda and priorities (e.g. Pakulski, 
2012a:10).49 To take account of these actors, some authors have characterised the foreign policy 
decision-making pattern as a bottom-up process, assuming that political leaders would follow 
the majority voice of the public, as opposed to a top-down model where foreign policy is guided 
by narrowly defined interests and isolated from the public (Skidmore and Hudson, 1993:7-8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 For a number of illustrations on this, see Chapter One. 
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Foreign policy-making is profoundly influenced by the context in which each issue 
occurs, internationally and domestically (Gyngell and Wesley, 2007:25; see also, Farrands 
1981; Anwar 1998).50  That concerns, particularly, the environment where a foreign policy is 
made and executed. For foreign policy analysts understanding the foreign policy context is 
fundamental because the nature of the international system and domestic politics is not constant 
hence, ‘there are likely to be major shifts in the relations between the two realms as well as in 
the  policy  responses  to  which  this  shifting  relationship  gives  rise’  (Webber  and  Smith, 
2013:30). Every country’s foreign policy strategy is influenced by different contexts, even when 
they face similar foreign policy events. When Indonesia and Malaysia were involved in 
Konfrontasi, Sukarno’s domestic political survival was salient in explaining Indonesia’s 
position, while the Malaysian leaders were more concerned about the nation’s survival 
following the country’s formation (Chua 2001). In this regard, the leaders’ foreign policy 
responses are likely to depend on the political context, as it is important for their policies to be 
accepted domestically (Gyngell and Wesley, 2007:26). As Farnham (2004:445) notes, foreign 
policy decision-makers (especially those who operate in democracies) would find it difficult to 
act effectively in the international sphere if a policy lacks domestic acceptability, and for this 
reason they would assess domestic sentiment along with the international situation. 
As highlighted in this thesis, for Indonesia the democratic political system served as the 
general context for foreign policy strategies during the Reformasi period. As Chapter Three 
notes, Indonesia’s top executive decision-makers did not only themselves believe in the value 
of democratisation, but they also regularly met with the parliament, which has considered itself 
a key locus of democratic reform. This demonstrates that these decision-makers felt it was 
‘necessary’ to incorporate Reformasi’s key values of democracy and human rights into 
Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda to reflect the post-Suharto political changes in the country. 
As we shall see, this development is particularly relevant to foreign policy on ASEAN, not least 
given Indonesia’s leadership role in the Association. This leadership role has ranged from 
Indonesia’s exercise of the grouping’s chairmanship to the wider region’s relationship with 
Indonesia as the Association’s primus inter pares (see, Chapter Five and Six). Similarly, the 
traditional foreign policy doctrine, bebas-aktif, which was promulgated by the Indonesian 
foreign policy leaders in response to the international political antagonism at the time of the 
Cold War, has also served as an important context (see Chapter Four). These contexts then have 
influenced the way the Indonesian founding fathers perceived the country’s international status 
 
 
 
 
50  In practice, these context can also intertwine thus, foreign policy analysts must assess two or three contexts 
together in order to explain the policy outcome. See, for instance, Milner and Mukherjee (2009); Galbreath (2004); 
and Putnam (1988). 
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and place in world affairs (see Weinstein 1976). In the next sections, the thesis explores the 
extent to which institutions and leaders matter in foreign policy. 
 
 
2.3    Democratisation and foreign policy-making actors 
 
 
2.3.1 The role of institutions: the parliament and bureaucracies other than the foreign 
ministry 
A transition to democracy usually has an impact on the role of the institutions, most notably the 
parliament, by way of allowing their views to be considered in the decision-making process. 
Foreign policy issues which contain other dimensions not traditionally handled by the foreign 
ministry would also require inputs from affected government institutions such as the TNI in 
relation to Indonesia’s decision concerning the Ambalat case, or Komisi I regarding the 
ratification of ASEAN Charter. 
Non-authoritative actors such as parliaments are more likely able to influence some 
decisions when they hold ideas that are different from the ones maintained by the main foreign 
policy actors. They thus become the proponents of new ideas and are sometimes recognised as 
policy entrepreneurs (see, e.g. Checkel 1993).51   Indeed, acknowledging the influence of the 
DPR, former foreign minister Wirajuda argued that ‘parliamentary diplomacy is an important 
component of Indonesia’s total diplomacy’ (BKSAP, 2009: foreword).52 
The role of the parliament in foreign policy is often regarded as that of counter-balance 
the executive (Hill, 2003:253). As such, the parliament plays a role in the decision-making 
process, either through supervision, scrutiny, or the investigation of the government’s policy 
initiatives (Hill, 2003:256). As the literature review in Chapter One notes, these parliamentary 
roles in the foreign policy decision-making practice in a democracy shape the state’s foreign 
policy agenda.53  Thailand and the Philippines are examples of how the parliament was able to 
persuade, if not pressure, their respective governments to follow a certain foreign policy 
direction. In a mature democracy, such as the US, the parliament (the Congress) has often acted 
as a constraint on a president’s decision (see, e.g., Mitchell, 2005:215). To this extent, as 
Mitchell argues, the knowledge a number of Congressmen or Senators had on certain issues 
provided the basis for the salience of the Congress in the US foreign policy decision-making 
process. Further, the Congressmen’s influence derives from the fact that the US Constitution 
 
 
 
 
 
51 A more detail discussion on policy entrepreneurs is included in Section 4 of this chapter. 
52 For the purpose of this study, when parliament, or the DPR, is referred to, it is usually emphasised on the Komisi 
I unless otherwise stated. 
53  For a more general discussion on the influence of the parliament in foreign policy and its relations with 
democratisation, including their illustrations, see Chapter One. 
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grants Congress the formal authority to declare war, raise an army, and prepare for the common 
defence, in addition to ambassadorial appointments and making treaties (Peterson, 1994:220).54 
In principle, the agendas of members of parliament are heterogeneous as they have 
different perceptions of and varying interests towards foreign policy issues (see Putnam 1988). 
It is unlikely, therefore, for them to have a single preference in relation to a particular foreign 
policy issue (see, e.g. Milner, 1997: Chapter 3 and 4). Hence, the precise role of the parliament 
in the foreign policy decision-making process is likely to be issue-based. In Southeast Asia, a 
particular issue that generally attracts the attention of parliamentarians is sovereignty. For 
instance, the failure to renew the military bases agreement between Manila and Washington in 
1991 was partly driven by parliamentary concern about the continued presence of the US 
military in the Philippines’ territory. Issues over sovereignty matters are likely to feature 
especially during a democratic transitions as  playing upon nationalist sentiment  is often used 
by political actors seeking to stay in office (see Mansfield and Snyder 1995). In Indonesia, the 
involvement of the members of the DPR in the Ambalat dispute was motivated by their 
perception that Ambalat was a problem of sovereignty, triggered by Malaysia’s intrusion into 
Indonesian territory (see Chapter Seven). 
The influence that parliament can have on foreign policy suggests that relations between 
the government and the parliament always need to be readjusted (Manning, 1977:307). This is 
because parliament is able to influence and occasionally set the foreign policy priorities of the 
government. Nevertheless, the diversity of interests among the members of parliament and their 
political partisanship limit the inability of parliament to consistently shape foreign policy 
(Frankel, 1969:29; see also Barnett and Spano 2008). 
Similarly issue-bound is the role played by other institutions such as other ministries or 
the military and, to some extent, civil society organisations. For instance, the role of the military 
and the defence ministry is usually conspicuous when a foreign policy issue has security or 
defence implications (see, e.g. Woodward 2002).55  In this case, the military or the ministry of 
defence will usually make their views known and these will normally be duly considered by the 
foreign ministry, the foreign minister, or even the president. Depending on the political context 
at hand, the input by the security establishment may occasionally dominate the thrust of the 
president’s foreign policy decision and as such will prevail over the preferences put forward by 
the foreign ministry. The advice given to President Habibie by the Indonesian senior military 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 For an authoritative discussion on the influence of the Congress in the US foreign policy-making process, see, 
among others, Abshire (1979), Manning (1977) and Schlesinger (1972). 
55 For a discussion on the influence of the military in non-democratic system, see, among others, Silverstein (1982). 
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leadership regarding the likelihood of the East Timorese to vote in favour of integration with 
 
Indonesia is an example where the TNI shaped foreign policy agenda (see Chapter Three). 
 
In practice, the salience of the link between the main foreign policy decision-makers in 
the executive and the parliament, or even public opinion, is likely to be shaped by the issue type 
and by the prior information held by each actor. Therefore, their opinions may differ from each 
other (Cunningham and Moore, 1997:655; see also Witkopff 1990:135). However, in 
democracies, there is a considerable variation in the way the government would ‘follow’ public 
pressures. In principle, the salience of pressures on the government is likely to be determined 
by the degree of centrality of the political system (Risse-Kappen, 1991:487-88). For example, 
in the democratic political system of France, foreign policy decision-making is highly 
centralised hence, public pressures acquire only a marginal role in influencing the state’s 
foreign policy action (Risse-Kappen, 1991:493; 1995:20-22). To this extent, those who enjoyed 
the formal authority of making foreign policy were likely to consider the public as not being 
fully informed about the foreign policy substance (Almond 1950). In consequence, the public’s 
attitude was considered a poor source of foreign policy making, meaning a decision would 
usually stem from the elite’s consensus (see Dye 2001).56 
In sum, the parliament and other institutions can be influential by shaping the foreign 
policy agenda of the government due to the ‘opening’ of the policy-making process following 
a democratic transition. This could normally shift the policy-making process to be bottom-up. 
Further, their role is noteworthy because they hold different ideas from the ones the 
authoritative actors maintain. In Indonesia, the parliament’s influence in foreign policy is 
usually exercised through various channels in foreign policy-making. Although they are not 
formally authorised to make foreign policy, the involvement of new meaningful players, in 
particular the parliament, has made the foreign policy-making process more complex and more 
consultative than was the case under Suharto’s authoritarian system. However, while the 
increasing salience of the parliament is noteworthy, in practice the foreign policy leaders in the 
executive are more likely to determine the state’s foreign policy decisions because they are 
responsible for formally making and deciding foreign policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 In different cases, where countries are highly decentralised, popular opinion may have a considerable result of 
influence, such as in the case of the US defence expenditures policy-making. For details, see Ostrom and Mara 
(1986:838). 
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2.3.2    Who governs?57: The inescapability of foreign policy leaders58 
 
Defining the actual foreign policy decision-makers is instrumental because although foreign 
policies cover various issues, ranging from politics to economics and from defence to the 
environment, the state’s foreign policy is decided primarily by those actors who are given 
formal authority to do so. Usually these actors are also limited in numbers (Hill, 2003:53). Only 
after clearly identifying who the foreign policy decision-makers are can one investigate the 
rationale for a state’s foreign policy action. 
Traditionally, the operationalization of foreign policy in most countries is entrusted to 
the foreign minister (Frankel, 1969:27). S/he would have the formal authority to shape the 
foreign policy agenda/priorities of a state. The foreign minister operates in a bureaucratic setting 
provided by the foreign ministry. While the foreign minister is responsible for the formulation 
of foreign policy, it is very likely that the final foreign policy options considered by the foreign 
minister are the result of the interactions between the minister and his or her subordinates. In 
this context, while it is important to recognise that such interactions demonstrate that there can 
be multiple ideas present within a single decision-making environment (Holsti, 1976:20), it is 
unlikely, although perhaps not entirely impossible, for a policy option to result from mere 
intermittent meetings at the lower levels and to be adopted as the state’s foreign policy without 
approval from the minister. The selection of the foreign minister is subject to the preferences 
of the head of government in the form of the president or Prime Minister (hereafter PM). 
In operating foreign policy, participation from ministers or bureaucracies other than the 
foreign ministry is likely. For example, when a matter concerns defence arrangements with 
another country, the defence minister will normally be involved. Likewise, the minister for 
manpower will convey his expertise and concerns in the case of migrant workers affecting 
bilateral relations. In this context, Legro (1997:37) introduces a framework for determining 
which ministries matter and when. He outlines three dimensions: the extent to which the 
bureaucracy has a monopoly on expertise, the complexity of the issue, and the time period 
available for action. In general, the foreign minister and his/her staff usually possess the 
expertise in foreign affairs compared to the bureaucrats from other ministries. This is 
underpinned by a number of factors including, but not limited to, the minister’s interest and 
experience in foreign affairs (Hudson, 2006:38-9). An experienced foreign minister generally 
 
 
57 This phrase “who governs” is borrowed from Christopher Hill’s work in his attempt to define the prominent 
office holders in an administration dealing with foreign policy. For details, see, Hill (2003:53). 
58  A different term had also been used to describe those who govern the foreign policy within a state, such as 
‘foreign policy executive’ (Hill, 2003:56-62), and ‘foreign policy elites’ (Wibisono 2010; Novotny 2006, 2007). 
While Hill identified clearly those considered to be in his ‘executive’ category, Wibisono and Novotny failed to 
do so. In this thesis, however, the term of ‘foreign policy leaders’ is used interchangeably with ‘foreign policy 
authoritative actors’ and therefore, does not account for the non-authoritative actors. The authoritative actors 
discussed in this study are in principle leaders in the foreign policy context. 
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faces less pressure from his peers in the cabinet. This, in turn, increases the salience of the 
foreign minister and his staff in determining the foreign policy content. 
As regards the time period for action, there are situations when foreign policy issues 
require an immediate response. This implies short decision-making cycles. In this case, the 
foreign minister’s ideas on what action to take tend to become crucial and although at some 
point coordination exists, normally the foreign minister is likely to have the leading role in 
making plans and – eventually – decisions. The role of the Indonesian foreign minister in the 
decision to hold the emergency Tsunami Summit in Jakarta ten days after the large-scale 
devastation of Aceh’s coastline in December 2004 demonstrates the salience of those three 
dimensions in practice. In short, although the foreign minister may face interference from other 
bureaucracies, these acts of interference are likely to depend on the issues and the context of 
the foreign policy event. However, such instances of interference are unlikely to hamper the 
formal authority of the foreign minister as a principal foreign policy decision-maker within a 
state. 
 
Apart from the foreign minister, another main authoritative actor in making foreign 
policy is the head of government, who in some countries is separate from the head of state. In 
Britain, for example, although the Queen is the head of state, foreign policy is actually 
formulated by the government, led by the PM. The content is likely to depend on the platforms 
of the ruling party (see Williams 2004). By comparison, in France it is the head of state – the 
French President – who oversees foreign policy, with the foreign minister working closely with 
the president rather than the PM (e.g. Wright 1978). It is important to note that the dominance 
of the president in democracies can be as significant as in authoritarian countries. The cases of 
Russia and South Africa, as Chapter One demonstrates, are examples where the president 
remained central to foreign policy issues despite the democratic transition. The discussion on 
these countries suggests that the president has been more than a mere ‘policy director’ as s/he 
was, in many instances, the ultimate decision-maker of the country’s foreign policy (see also 
Spanier and Uslaner 1982:59). In this regard, while the foreign minister is a leader by account 
of his knowledge, expertise, and experience in dealing with foreign policy matters, and hence 
has the capacity to ‘lead’ the operationalization of foreign policy, the president leads by virtue 
of his/her formal authority to commit resources in foreign policy (Wildavsky 1991:14-17). 
As the top office-holder, the salience of the president/the PM is, to a major extent, 
inevitable in determining the country’s foreign policy direction. Indeed Hill (2003:55) asserts 
that those who occupy the highest positions in a state govern foreign policy, thereby having the 
opportunity to  dispose  of  a  great  deal  of  influence  (see  also  Domhoff  1990:19;  Higley 
2010:163). By virtue of this understanding, therefore, the authority of these persons could 
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undermine the influence of other actors, i.e. the parliament. For instance, on the relationship 
between the White House and the Congress, Peterson (1994:224-25) notes: 
 
… when the executive has steered a mainstream course considered by policy elites to 
be in the best interest of the country, Congressional pressures have been more of a 
nuisance than a policy determinant. 
 
It has been suggested so far that leaders are important in examining foreign policy.  Focusing 
on the role of leaders is important because even when the decision-making environment is 
complex and multiple ideas are present, the foreign policy executive, i.e. the political leaders in 
charge of foreign policy, has remained crucial in determining the policy decisions.59 Thus, the 
president – as the main foreign policy actor –acts beyond his/her capacity as a ‘policy director’ 
(see, e.g., Halperin and Clapp, 2006:16-17). The continued salience of leaders in making 
foreign policy, therefore, indicates that foreign policy decision-making is essentially a domain 
of a few actors, particularly those in the government. This is because foreign policy is 
understood as government activities concerned with the relationship particularly between states 
and international or regional organisations in the context of international relations (White, 
1981:3). Indeed, foreign policy is normally limited to a small number of actors due to the nature 
of the issues, which can be specialised and overwhelmingly comprehensive. (Hill, 2003:69). In 
this regard, the foreign policy leaders can marginalise other actors located ‘outside’ the formal 
decision-making circle and this is likely when foreign policy is (a) decided centrally by a limited 
number of actors within the government, and (b) if the ideas maintained by those actors are 
irrelevant to the foreign policy issues at hand. Consequently, Alden and Aran (2012:19) note: 
 
Foreign policy is the product of … individuals in leadership positions identifying 
foreign policy issues, making judgements about them and then acting upon them… 
[Therefore] individual leaders of states exercise a seminal influence over the foreign 
policy process by dint of their experience, outlook and limitations, and hence, were 
worthy of special attention. 
 
 
2.4    Foreign policy change and continuity: a brief review 
 
Being a product of individuals in leadership positions, foreign policy can therefore be continued 
or changed based on leaders’ decisions. In this context, it is important to review the possible 
reasons for foreign policy continuity and change. Foreign policy continuity is likely to occur, 
even under new leadership, when leaders appreciate or calculate that the existing policies are 
less hostile to their (or their parties’) interests or when those policies have been effective in 
achieving their intended goals (see, e.g. Chalmers 1997; Anwar 2003:79; Lynch and Singh 
 
 
 
59 This focus is of course different from “leadership”, to which it defines the relations involving those who lead 
and their followers). For a discussion on the difference between leaders and leadership, see Ahlquist and Levi 
(2011). 
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2008). Leaders also continue pursuing an identical foreign policy platform if they are bound to 
deal with pressing domestic priorities, such as economic issues, over foreign policy matters 
(Cameron, undated). Others have also emphasised the importance of a perceived national 
image, i.e. the country’s ‘appropriate’ position in the international structure, as a source of 
foreign policy continuity (see Kuchins and Zevelev 2012). To this extent, Kuchins and Zevelev 
argue that although Putin had been successful in reclaiming the top leadership role in the 
country, Russian foreign policy in general would continue as the domestic debate about 
Russia’s image as a great country in international politics has remained influential in shaping 
the preferences of whoever leads Russia. Specifically, they assert that ‘subordinating Russia’s 
foreign policy goals to that of the West…would greatly overshadow the country’s image as a 
great power’ (Kuchins and Zevelev 2012:149). 
While leaders can maintain a foreign policy platform, foreign policy change is also 
likely (see, e.g. Doeser 2013; Welch 2005). As Hermann (1990:11) notes: 
 
…when leaders change foreign policy, such decisions are the result of the determined 
efforts of an authoritative policymaker, frequently the head of government, who has the 
conviction, power, and energy to compel his government to change course (italics 
added). 
 
Here, an important question is when do leaders change foreign policy and when is such a change 
the result of the domestic political context? Authors suggest that foreign policy is subject to 
change particularly when new foreign policy leaders assume office (Alden and Aran 2012:23; 
Gorjão 2002; He 2008). A leader changes the policy if the current approach did not serve the 
interest of the political groups that supported his/her ascendancy to power (Carroll et.al. 2012). 
An example is the relationship between Habibie’s decision to hold a referendum for East Timor 
and the preference of the Islamic group, particularly ICMI (see Crouch 2003). However, this is 
not to say that those supporting political groups are key decision-makers in foreign policy (see, 
e.g. Merle 1978 on the role of political parties in foreign policy). 
It is also important to note that foreign policy leaders, as a member of the wider spectrum 
of the political elites, act in order to preserve their political position. As Schwartz (2009:177) 
notes, political elites are ‘ambitious people seeking office for individual recognition, career 
advancement, and the power to affect societies.’ To this extent, foreign policy leaders adjust 
foreign policy if their position is threatened by domestic political pressures (Hagan 1995:124). 
Hence, adjusting foreign policy could be seen as an effort to lessen domestic costs a leader faces 
(Hagan 1995:124; Welch 2005). As Welch (2005:8) notes, ‘foreign policy is most likely to 
change dramatically when leaders expect the status quo to generate continued painful losses.’ 
In the domestic political power struggle, these losses could relate to the loss of political power, 
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which, for political leaders, is costly. To overcome this kind of situation, Hagan (1995:128-31) 
proposes three alternative political strategies. The first is accommodation, which emphasises a 
situation where decision-makers respond to opposition with restraints in foreign policy by 
allowing bargaining among players, hence, foreign policy compromise. The second is 
mobilisation, in which foreign policy issues are manipulated by the regime in an effort to retain 
power. This manipulation could involve, among others, leaders’ appeals to nationalist 
sentiment. And the third is insulation, where leaders reduce or deflect domestic constraints by 
ignoring, utterly suppressing, or co-opting the opposition with political favours or concessions 
on other policy issues. As Chapter Six indicates, these strategies are not unusual for foreign 
policy leaders to pursue, especially when a foreign policy issue is thought to have a major 
political repercussion on domestic politics. 
Leaders may also change foreign policy if the domestic political landscape experiences 
a significant change that led to the existence of a new perceived identity (see, e.g., Tsygankov 
2013; Maloney 2002). Authors that have looked at the role of identity in foreign policy suggest 
 
that the former matters as the source of the latter by shaping the state’s interests (e.g. Banchoff 
 
1999; Lee 2006). In consequence, foreign policy change could correspond to the change in 
national identity as exemplified by, for instance, the new anti-militaristic political culture in 
Japan and Germany following the end of World War II (Berger 1996). 
However, identity cannot directly influence foreign policy. It is the ideas, norms, or 
values60  (i.e. nationalism or patriotism) – that have been used interchangeably in explaining 
foreign policy (e.g. Checkel 1993; Price and Tannenwald 1996; Doty 1993; Katzenstein 1993) 
– that become a source of foreign policy action (see, e.g. Ashizawa 2008:581; Sjösted 2013). 
In other words, a redefinition of identity could motivate leaders to pursue new foreign policy 
ideas which, in turn, would reflect the newly defined identity. Sukarno’s Indonesia devised the 
term NEFOS (New Emerging Forces) in 1963, as a response to what he called the “OLDEFOS” 
(Old Established Forces), as a reflection of Indonesia’s non-aligned identity. In this case, the 
Cold War dominated bi-polar world led Sukarno to pursue a foreign policy based on the idea 
of non-alignment (see Leifer, 2001:202). More recently, the democratic identity of Indonesia 
has led the Indonesian foreign policy leaders to pursue new foreign policy ideas in ASEAN, 
emphasising the promotion of democracy and human rights (Acharya 2003b). This suggests 
that identity influences foreign policy by ‘shaping and generating interests’ that would guide 
 
 
 
60  Authors have also sometimes used different terms, i.e. norms and values, to define the same thing (see, e.g. 
Scott, 1971:81). Due to this fluid conceptualisation and usage of these terms, in employing them in this study, this 
thesis does not rigidly distinguish their definitions and functions. This is because they could result from an 
understanding of identity held by the foreign policy actors; hence, they can be determinants of foreign policy 
action. 
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the final policy decision (Jepperson et.al 1996:60). To provide a better understanding on the 
relationship between identity, ideas, and foreign policy, the next section will discuss how 
identity functions as a source of the authoritative actor’s foreign policy preferences. 
 
 
2.5    Identity, ideas and foreign policy behaviour 
 
In IR, Constructivism offers the most comprehensive account on the role of identity and ideas 
in foreign policy. Authors whose works are related to this theoretical strand define the 
interactive relationship between ‘ideas’, ‘norms’, ‘interest’ and identity, albeit in different 
manner. Some argue that identity informs interests (see, for instance, Adler, 2002:103; Ruggie 
1997:24), while others maintain that interests presuppose identity (e.g. Wendt, 1999:231). 
Therefore, in the latter, certain norms or values that have been generally accepted and have 
enjoyed validity over a certain period of time will shape the state’s identity (Müler 2002; see 
also, Wendt, 1994:390). This thesis, nonetheless, is not dedicated to addressing these differing 
views among scholars. This study, instead, seeks to understand how identity functions as a 
foreign policy source. 
A useful study on this matter was conducted by Kuniko Ashizawa. In analysing Japan’s 
foreign policy preferences in the creation of APEC and the ARF, Ashizawa advances a ‘value- 
action framework’. Treating identity as a concept perceived by foreign policy-makers about 
what their country is and what it represents, Ashizawa (2008:581) suggests that ‘a conception 
of state identity provides policymakers with a particular value, which sometimes becomes the 
dominant value, hence defines the preference of state foreign policy.’ Three factors are essential 
here. 
 
First, she treats identity as a concept held strictly by policymakers. Therefore, the non- 
policymakers could have different concepts of ‘what constitutes an identity’ from those 
maintained by the policymakers. Put differently, identity is fluid. In this case, the fluidity of 
identity determines the ability of the foreign policy decision-makers to highlight certain 
identities that matter in, or the implication of a particular identity on, foreign policy action (cf. 
Saideman, 2002:188). Depending on the issues, the history, and the interaction with others, one 
or more identities may become more important than others (Dawisha 2002). 
The second factor concerns the nexus between identity and values. In her other work, 
Ashizawa (2013:13) defines value as ‘some sort of pro-attitude toward action of a certain kind’; 
where one kind of action was equated to a state’s foreign policy (Ashizawa, 2008:578). 
Reflecting the works of social psychology and sociology, Ashizawa (2008:581) argues that 
values arise from identity in the sense that the latter generates an actor’s motivational 
disposition which makes, in the actor’s cognition, some actions more legitimate than others, 
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hence leading the actor to have a pro-attitude towards a certain action. For example, Japan’s 
multilateral preference in its cooperation in Asia Pacific regional arrangements was practised 
by Japanese foreign policy decision-makers in line with the ‘reassurance’ value. This value 
emphasises that any initiatives by Japan should not arouse Asian neighbours’ fears about its 
resurgence as a dominant power in the region. Japan was identified as a ‘one-time aggressor in 
Asia during the 20th  century’ (see Ashizawa 2013). Put concretely, identity informs values 
which make the foreign policy executive determine the appropriate preference for its foreign 
policy strategy. 
The third factor involves the relationship between values and preferences. Ashizawa 
(2008:580) identifies the role of values as the key variable in explaining a foreign policy action. 
In this context, she posits that the values perceived by foreign policy decision-makers lead them 
toward particular preferences in their country’s foreign policy (Ashizawa, 2008:579). This 
thesis follows this logic of relations between identity and ideas. The New Order regime had not 
envisaged a foreign policy based on promoting democracy because the policy-makers did not 
identify Indonesia with a liberal democracy. For instance, Murdiono (the former Minister of 
State Secretary and a Suharto’s confidant) once asked whether it was ‘for the sake of democracy 
that we will ruin this country?’ (Schwarz, 2000:304). Put differently, in Indonesia what the key 
policy-makers make of the country informs their ideas that are then pursued through foreign 
policy. 
 
Indeed, this conceptualisation of the nexus between identity and foreign policy suggests 
two elements. First, in order for identity to matter in foreign policy it requires an intermediary 
factor – here it is values – and it is values that determine foreign policy action as they shape the 
preferences of the foreign policy decision-makers. For this reason, the relationship between 
identity and foreign policy is likely to be context-dependent because, as previously noted, the 
nature of identity is fluid which then makes the function of identity in foreign policy indirect 
and limited (see Ashizawa, 2008:594).  Therefore, identity may serve as a weak predictor of 
foreign policy if treated separately from other elements it produces. Second, while Ashizawa 
notes that values explain foreign policy, her framework lacks analysis on value processing. She 
only briefly and thus, inconclusively, described three patterns in value processing without 
further elaboration. These include: (i) an innovative conceptual solution to transform 
conflicting preferences; (ii) values omission which lead to one dominant value; and (iii) this 
dominant value subordinates others and commands preference (Ashizawa, 2008:580). 
Consequently, these patterns lead to several questions, such as ‘how policymakers “omitted” 
values’ and ‘what are the processes involved at the omission stage’. Analysing values or idea 
processing is important because if identity is fluid, hence ‘producing’ different kind of values 
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at the same time, then one would need to know which values are constitutive for a specific 
foreign policy context in a specific time. 
It has previously been argued that ideas motivate foreign policy action. Goldstein and 
Keohane (1993:5) suggest that ‘actions taken by human beings depend on the substantive 
quality of available ideas, since such ideas help to clarifying principles and conceptions of 
causal relationship, and to coordinate individual behaviour.’ More specifically, Blyth (1997) 
notes that ideas provide the necessary conditions for successful collective action among agents 
and facilitate changes in the foreign policy options. The former suggests that ideas can bridge 
the interests among agents and can also help redefine them, meanwhile the latter stress that 
ideas can also be a precondition for these changes (Blyth, 1997:246). 
The salience of ideas in foreign policy usually starts at the outset of as well as during 
the decision-making process (see Checkel, 1993:276). In this case, ideas are useful both as 
roadmaps and focal points in influencing foreign policy behaviour (Goldstein and Keohane, 
1993:12). Ideas as roadmaps suggest that ideas become important when actors believe in the 
causal link they identify (see also Ekengren, 2011:119). For example, after the Second World 
War, a group of well-placed government actors in the US and Britain shared the idea that the 
Keynesian economic approach would serve as the most efficient means to prosperity, thus 
helping to build new political coalitions and legitimating US hegemonic power (Ikenberry 
1993). Being focal points, ideas define cooperative solutions or act as coalitional glue to 
facilitate the cohesion of particular groups (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993:12). In this case, an 
adherence to shared ideas is necessary to ensure coordination, to signal commitments, and to 
promote cooperation among the decision-makers with divergent preferences (Garrett and 
Weingast, 1993:205). 
As far as the intermediary variable is concerned for ideas to influence a foreign policy 
(Kingdon 1984), both institutions and individuals are seen as transmitters in this case. To this 
extent, the former are important as ideas are institutionalised and institutions matter in foreign 
policy (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993:20-23; Drezner 2000; Sikkink 1991; Goldstein 1988). 
However, the latter suggest that the importance of institutions is reducible to the choice made 
by individuals because individuals are essentially the basis for institutions to exist (see Blyth, 
1997:ftn.73). Determining which is more important in transmitting ideas into foreign policy 
could be a matter of what perspective one takes in analysing a case study. For instance, those 
examining a question from an actor-based perspective have argued that agents, instead of 
institutions, are salient in this context (see, e.g., Ekengren 2011; Nicholson 1999). These 
definitions suggest that ideas or values shared among the decision-makers matter in foreign 
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policy. However, they did not specify how they matter. The following pages will address this 
question. 
It is useful in this case to refer to some works that espouse the internalisation of norms. 
John Finley Scott (1971:88) identifies internalisation of a norm as ‘the propensity to conform 
to the norm, that is to behave in the way the norm reinforces.’ Therefore, one is said to have 
internalised a norm when one is disposed to give the norm a certain kind of role in one’s 
practical reasoning (Brennan et.al, 2013:196). The same can be said about ideas. Ideas, 
therefore, are ‘subjective claims about descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the 
normative legitimacy of certain actions’ (Parsons, 2002:48). In relation to policy-making, ideas 
could determine behaviour after they are accepted by most, if not all, decision-making actors 
(e.g. Rousseau, 2006:7). In other words, internalisation becomes an important element in 
understanding the causal effect of ideas/norms in explaining foreign policy behaviour (e.g. 
Sjösted, 2013:147). Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s work (1998) provides a useful 
explanation on this subject. 
Finnemore and Sikkink suggest three stages for internalisation to take place. First, 
ideas/norms would need to emerge and often such an emergence was the result of the activities 
of ideas entrepreneurs. New ideas or norms can emerge from ‘outside’ before they are fitted by 
ideas entrepreneurs into ‘local’ or ‘internal’ traditions and practices (e.g. Acharya 2004). For 
example, it is likely for a promotion of democracy to take place in a country as a result of the 
interaction between the domestic and external actors advocating democratic reform (see, e.g., 
Gleditsch and Ward, 2006:917, 919). The domestic actors would then become ideas 
entrepreneurs in promoting in their own country. The second stage is characterised by the 
acceptance of those ideas/norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:903). In their study, enhancing 
legitimacy (both national and internationally) and maintaining self-esteem have been the main 
purpose for why state’s leaders accept certain ideas. Gorjão’s study (2002) on President 
Habibie’s attempt to claim domestic and international legitimacy by pursuing a policy that 
reflected a value of democracy – freedom of expression – in East Timor provides an example 
of this. In the third stage, ideas may become so accepted that they are internalised by actors and 
achieve a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality that makes conformance with the ideas almost automatic 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:904). At this stage, ideas entrepreneurs often engage in activities 
to highlight and call attention to issues by using terms that dramatize them (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1999:268). In this context, internalisation is concerned with how individuals gain new 
information through various activities, such as observation, which may change their views on 
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certain issues and lead to a change of preferences (Sjösted, 2013:149, 156).61 The call made by 
the Indonesian parliamentarians and long-time ASEAN observers for the ASEAN Charter to 
state more explicitly about sanctions mechanism before the DPR agreed to ratify the Charter, 
by referring to the EU systems, demonstrates such activities (see Chapter Five). 
To reiterate, ideas can translate into foreign policy behaviour when they are transmitted 
by either individuals or institutions. As hinted above, policy entrepreneurs are essential in this 
context. Although there has not been a generic definition of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (see, among 
others, Kingdon 1995; Mintrom 1997; Checkel 1993; Roberts and Kings, 1991:152; and Doig 
and Hargrove 1987), ‘policy entrepreneurs’ has been used to label those individuals operating 
inside or outside the government who are able to influence setting the agenda by virtue of their 
knowledge, position, and relationship with the primary decision-makers as well as personal 
characteristics.62 Their influence usually leads to changes in the policy content by way of 
innovatively raising new, if not reproducing, ideas (see, e.g. Mintrom and Norman 2009). More 
often than not, policy entrepreneurs introduce new ideas by offering a new way of assessing 
certain foreign policy questions (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Entrepreneurs thus, become an 
important agent in channelling ideas to policy. In this case, although some policy entrepreneurs 
are located ‘outside’ the formal foreign policy-making environment, they are able to shape the 
agenda or the preference of the authoritative actors by advocating new ideas. 
While they can be influential in setting the policy agenda, their salience depends on a 
number of activities, which include problem identification, networking in policy circles, 
shaping the terms of policy debates, and building coalitions (Mintrom, 1997:739). Problem 
identification is an essential and perhaps the most fundamental element to ensure the success 
of policy entrepreneurs in asserting their influence. It could bridge between the perception of 
the leaders in power and the entrepreneurs with regard to the existence of certain problems (see, 
Checkel, 1993:279). If, for instance, the foreign policy leaders do not share the view that a 
certain problem exists, they could dismiss the entrepreneurs’ ideas. Carter and Scott (2010:420) 
pointed out two situations that generate entrepreneurship, namely, policy vacuum in which there 
is no existing administration policy to deal with the problems at hand and policy correction 
where the entrepreneurs attempt to redefine the issues and policy goals by highlighting the 
inadequacy of the current approach. 
In addition, building a policy coalition, especially with political parties represented in 
 
parliament, is also important for policy entrepreneurs who have no political affiliations or have 
 
 
 
 
61 Other authors have similarly treated the ‘internalisation’ of ideas as an explanatory element for foreign policy 
behaviour, albeit using different language. See, for example, Acharya (2009b:14). 
62 The discussion on this theme, however, is focused more on those outside government. 
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limited access to the decision-making circle. Coalitions can help channel the entrepreneurs’ 
ideas into the policy-making process, as consensus may be needed in support of their ideas (see, 
Risse-Kappen, 1991:485).63  Once the political support is obtained by the entrepreneurs, it is 
possible that the new ideas they held (re)shape the government’s initiatives through the foreign 
policy consultation process between the parliament and the government.64 Therefore, apart from 
building coalitions, policy consultations also facilitate the transmission of new ideas advocated 
by the policy entrepreneurs. Another way for the policy entrepreneurs to channel their ideas 
into the decision-making circle is by developing links with the change-oriented bureaucrats who 
are already inside the policy-making bureaucracies (Roberts and Kings, 1991:163). In 
Indonesia’s case, the role of policy entrepreneurs and their attempt to shape the policy agenda 
was particularly apparent in the case of the ASEAN Charter’s ratification process as well as in 
drafting the concept of the ASEAN Political-Security Community that was championed by 
Indonesia (see Chapter Five). 
Choosing the right moment is also important for policy entrepreneurs as it provides the 
appropriate opportunity to advance their ideas (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:895). Such an 
opportunity is regarded as a policy window (Kingdon 1995). For example, political reform, on 
the one hand, and the changing external environment salient to Soviet politics under Gorbachev, 
on the other, provided the window of opportunity for policy entrepreneurs in the country to 
influence Gorbachev’s policy decision-making process (Checkel 1993:277,280). In Indonesia, 
the transition to democracy was pushed by the middle-class, who have been the main 
entrepreneurs espousing the need for Suharto’s resignation following the lack of political 
freedom and his inability to respond to the economic crisis (Uhlin, 1997:46). The lack of 
freedom and the government’s failure to manage the crisis were the window of opportunity for 
regime change in Indonesia. In principle, when policy windows open, policy entrepreneurs are 
usually people who immediately seize the opportunity to initiate action (Zahariadis 2007). 
However, while policy entrepreneurs from outside the government’s foreign policy institutions 
can influence the content, they cannot and do not have control over the policy-making process. 
Hence, political networks to either the parliament or the government are essential for them. 
Once we assume that ideas are internalised and channelled into the decision-making 
environment, the next exercise is assessing the impact of these ideas on foreign policy, which, 
essentially, is an empirical task. One needs to discern therefore which ideas are eventually 
adopted by the main decision-makers and why. In this case, understanding the context in which 
 
 
 
 
63 For a discussion on policy entrepreneurs that came from the parliament, see Carter and Scott (2010). 
64 For greater details on the activity structure of policy entrepreneurs and their function in the policy process, see 
Roberts and Kings (1991). 
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foreign policy operates is important.65  For example, examining the interests of the actors 
involved in making foreign policy could offer a way to understand which ideas matter and why. 
Cortell and Davis (2000:70) introduce three practical indications to assess the salience 
of ideas in the domestic realm (foreign policy is made at the domestic level, hence classified as 
domestic activities). First, internalised ideas appear in the domestic political discourse. Here, 
the ideas proponents will invoke them to justify institutional or policy change. Specifically in 
the case of Indonesian foreign policy during the Reformasi era, FM Wirajuda launched 
bureaucratic reforms in Deplu to reflect on ‘the values of Reformasi’ (see, e.g. Nabbs-Keller 
2013; see also Chapter Three). Taking this into account, one can then assume that the idea of 
good governance and accountable decision-making stem from the principled values of 
democracy that had taken effect at least in the primary foreign policy institution in Indonesia. 
The second indication involves changes in domestic regulations and procedures where other 
domestic institutions exist to monitor compliance of the government. As Chapter Three notes, 
the role obtained by the DPR in scrutinising Indonesia’s foreign affairs was the result of the 
multiple amendments to the Constitution, particularly between 1999 and 2002, as well as the 
enactment of Law No.37/1999 on Foreign Relations. These regulations came in concurrence 
with Indonesia’s democratic changes. The third is changes in the policies. According to Cortell 
and Davis (2000:71), domestic political discourse is the most important indication in this 
context as changes therein will likely precede and accompany changes in institutions and policy 
and as such provide evidence as to the reasons for change. Indeed, the empirical study carried- 
out by this research provides some insights into the salience of democratic values in explaining 
Indonesia’s foreign policy decision in some specific areas of diplomacy. 
 
 
2.6 The impact of democratisation on Indonesian foreign policy: analytical 
framework, sources and methods 
 
This chapter devises the analytical framework that will be used to assess the extent to which 
democratisation has impacted Indonesia’s foreign policy. The salience of three variables are 
instrumental for understanding democratic Indonesia’s foreign policy approach in the context 
of ASEAN’s political cooperation and Southeast Asia, notably the role of the foreign policy 
leaders, the influence of institutions, and the role of ideas that guide the foreign policy 
preferences. 
Two assumptions are essentials. The first suggests that democratic transition influences 
 
foreign policy decision-making by way of introducing ‘new’ domestic political actors in the 
 
 
 
65 For instance, in selecting preferences, a connection has been made between managing conflicting ideas and the 
importance of leader’s position and decision-making style (e.g. Peterson 1997; Kowert 2002; Verbeek 2003). 
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decision-making milieu. However, the literature on foreign policy decision-making suggests 
that despite the domestic political changes, the president and the foreign minister – as well as 
the ministry of foreign affairs – remain the highest authority in the making of foreign policy. 
The second suggests that democratisation leads to a redefinition of the state’s identity, hence 
foreign policy modification is likely (see, e.g., Acharya 2003b). Yet, as previously noted, the 
relationship between identity and foreign policy is likely to be mediated by certain political 
values or ideas derived from the way identity is interpreted (Ashizawa 2008, 2013; Sjösted 
2013). In turn, these ideas determine foreign policy preference. An empirical study that focuses 
on Indonesia’s foreign policy formulation and the actors involved, as well as on the foreign 
policy context and the interests pursued by the Indonesian foreign policy authoritative actors 
could help us to understand the extent to which certain ideas influence foreign policy decisions. 
Recent scholarship analysing the relationship between Indonesia’s democratisation and 
foreign policy has focused on the perceptions of the foreign policy elites (Wibisono 2010; 
Novotny 2007), the importance of identity (in this case Islamic) (Sukma 2006; Azra 2006; 
Anwar 2010b), and the salience of democratic values in foreign policy (Sukma 2011; Anwar 
2010a). Others have looked at the bureaucratic reform within Deplu and its relation to the way 
foreign policy is made (Nabbs-Keller 2013) and also at foreign policy change (He 2008). These 
works emphasise the importance of democratisation but do not adequately explain how 
democratisation makes a difference. This thesis aims to answer exactly that question by looking 
at the three factors of the importance of leaders, institutions, and ideas in foreign policy. By 
addressing this question, this study hopes to complement the existing scholarship on 
Indonesia’s foreign affairs during the Reformasi era. 
These three factors cannot be treated as mutually exclusive and therefore must be looked 
at simultaneously in order to explain the impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign 
policy. While such an impact will be explained through the salience of the three factors, an 
understanding of the context of certain foreign policy decisions is useful to assess the change 
and continuity in Indonesia’s foreign policy and to investigate why democracy has more 
relevance in certain foreign policy decisions than in others. 
In doing so, this thesis analyses the salience of the three above-mentioned variables by 
employing an interpretative method.66  Specifically, this thesis interprets the meanings of texts 
as primary source, such as speeches and statements as well as interviews with relevant sources 
(see, e.g. Sjösted 2013; Doeser 2013 for recent works that apply similar method). As this study 
seeks to understand the impact of a socio-political process that contextualises the conduct of 
 
 
 
66 This discussion concerns the method used to apply the framework and approach the research question. For a 
discussion on the methodology, see Chapter One. 
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Indonesian foreign policy, interpreting the content of speeches or statements as well as 
documents (i.e. internal reports or minutes of meetings) that were written during the Reformasi 
era is important. 
An interpretative text study is also useful to ascertain which ideas have been 
internalised. For example, this study posits that Indonesia is a democracy because the state’s 
constitution includes provisions that correspond to democratic ideals such as human rights or 
the limitation of presidential tenure. In essence, this method calls for the interpreter’s (the 
author) attentiveness to a network of textual relations in constructing their meaning (Elkad- 
Lehman and Greensfeld, 2011:264). Specifically, the interpretative approach examines foreign 
policy by focusing on the thinking and action of individual decision-makers in order to 
understand decisions from the decision-makers’ standpoint by reconstructing their reasons 
(Carlsnaes, 2008:123-24). To this extent, this thesis pre-identifies new foreign policy 
approaches through an interpretation of a number of relevant foreign policy documents and 
information. These are obtained through various forms of communication with Indonesian 
foreign policy decision-makers as well as foreign policy experts. The readings from these 
activities, in turn, guide the examination of the primary research question of this study.67 
Being an external researcher, an interpretative method is devised because the author was 
 
not involved in the making of foreign policy decisions in relation to the cases examined in this 
thesis. This nature of being an ‘outsider’ therefore creates a limit on how the author gains 
specific insights about the decision outcomes in relation to the case studies. As mentioned in 
Chapter One, detailed information on the Ambalat case was not entirely obtainable following 
the refusal of the officials in Deplu to disclose them on the grounds that negotiations are still 
on-going. Being close to Hassan Wirajuda (the Indonesian Foreign Minister between 2001 and 
2009) and to other decision-makers in Deplu, impacted upon this research in no uncertain terms. 
On the one hand, this allowed for easier access to individuals and written sources, specifically 
unpublished documents such as the minutes of meetings between the foreign minister and the 
DPR. On the other hand, there were some interviewees (mainly in Deplu) who declined to 
provide a specific answers as they assumed that the author ‘would know better’ about the 
foreign policy issues at hand given the family relationship with Hassan Wirajuda. This view 
was misleading because the author did not and does not have full knowledge about all key issues 
and decisions that Wirajuda was involved with in the context of his ministerial portfolio. Family 
ties also created occasional feelings of ‘awkwardness’ or ‘discomfort’ on the part of active 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 For criticism of interpretative approach, see, for instance, Bevir and Rhodes (2003:40-42). 
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diplomats who shared their own thoughts about the policies taken by the top leaders. As a result, 
they preferred to be anonymous when stating their views. 
The author’s appointment to Deplu and his training at the Diplomatic Academy in 2010 
allowed him to gain further empirical insights about Indonesia’s foreign policy strategy in 
general and, to some extent, about Jakarta’s relationship with ASEAN and Southeast Asia. This, 
in turn, provided some preliminary relevant information in relation to the theme of this research. 
Being an active diplomat also allowed the author to attend several events, such as closed-door 
seminars, where he interacted with a number of high-ranking Indonesian political and foreign 
policy representatives as well as foreign intellectuals. Such events provided an opportunity for 
the author to conduct personal conversations as well as to build connections with these 
prominent individuals, who subsequently, at least occasionally, became points of contact for 
additional information. 
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3 Democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy decision- 
making process 
 
This chapter assesses the link between Indonesia’s democratisation and foreign policy-making 
and argues that the impact of democratic transition in this regard is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making process remains essentially top-down, 
emphasising the importance of the president and the foreign minister as the key foreign policy 
actors. On the other, policy-making is more consultative than it was during the New Order era, 
indicating some changes in the nature of decision-making. 
This chapter discusses Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making by examining the 
actors involved, which will be classified into two: authoritative and non-authoritative. The 
former has obtained the formal authority to make and action foreign policy decisions. The latter 
is generally not entitled to make and execute the state’s foreign policy, yet it can shape and 
influence foreign policy decisions although sometimes only indirectly. For this reason, the 
ability of non-authoritative actors to assert their ideas into foreign policy is likely to depend on 
their position in, and access to, the decision-making circle. 
This chapter consists of four sections. The first section discusses the authoritative actors 
in Indonesian foreign policy, emphasising the role of the president and the foreign minister. 
The second section then examines non-authoritative foreign policy actors. The analysis in these 
two sections will essentially cover both the Suharto and the Reformasi periods. Section Three 
investigates how foreign policy is currently made under the democratic regime in Indonesia by 
looking at the role of leaders, the parliament, and to some extent, policy entrepreneurs and 
discusses the link between democratisation and foreign policy-making. The final sentence 
summarizes the link between democratisation and the way foreign policy is made in Indonesia. 
 
 
3.1    Authoritative actors 
 
 
3.1.1    The President 
 
During the New Order period, Indonesia’s governmental system was heavily influenced by the 
tales of pewayangan (traditional puppetry), an expression of Javanese traditions (Anderson 
1972). Javanese beliefs adhere to symbolism, which includes, amongst other things, 
ceremonies68 that are often practised by most Indonesian leaders of Javanese descent. Javanese 
beliefs also postulate that a concentration of power is itself a constant quantum in the universe 
 
 
 
68 For a detailed discussion on how Javanese culture has strongly influenced Indonesian politics and how the Palace 
had adhered to Javanese tradition see Anderson (1972). 
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and  its  existence  is  self-justifying.  In  political  terms,  this  could  be  understood  as  the 
concentration of power in one would require a proportional diminution elsewhere (Anderson 
1972). In other words, the manifest sign of a man of power is when the said man focuses on his 
own personal power (Anderson 1972). 
Suharto, a four-star retired general who came from a peasant family, allegedly held a 
mystical Javanese belief of himself as being the personification of Semar – a wayang figure 
believed to be wise and divine, therefore considered as one of the sacred, if not the most sacred, 
wayang character in the Javanese mythology – which led him to occasional meditation rituals 
in the sacred Semar Cave in the Dieng Plateau, Central Java (Hein, 1986:55). For Indonesians, 
wayang is a vehicle of culture, conveying religious principles and moral values ideally held by 
humankind. In the tales of pewayangan, Semar is described as a symbol of ordinary people, 
who, despite his humble appearance with bulging rear and belly, is wise and capable of solving 
big problems, In addition, he cries upon witnessing the suffering of others, which explains why 
he has watery eyes (www.oneearthmedia.org, 30 November 2008).69 Being raised in a family 
with a strong Javanese tradition, Suharto maintained a spiritual connection with Javanese 
mystical teachings. He reportedly collected heirlooms to achieve the concentration of his power, 
which meant his leadership was more as resembling a king than a president (Eklöf 1999). In 
addition, Suharto was reported to be an abangan Muslim. In Java, Muslims are divided into 
two camps: abangan and santri. Clifford Geertz asserted that abangan is a reflection of a 
religious syncretism which, in essence, is an amalgamation of earlier religious systems, the 
substance of which become so thoroughly blended with Islam that they become part of daily 
practice and belief. It focuses a great deal of attention on symbolism, such as rituals adopted 
mainly from Javanese culture, and animistic aspects. Meanwhile, santri gives more attention to 
Islamic doctrines and rejects abangan Islamic rituals (Mahasin, 1981:172-75). For instance, for 
santri, praying in accordance with Islamic teaching is more important than the traditional native 
selamatan prayers, which led to the former being dubbed the ‘purer Muslims’ (Schwarz 2000). 
Coming into power on March 12th, 1967, when Indonesia was economically devastated 
 
in the aftermath of the tumultuous years experienced under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and 
 
his Konfrontasi campaign, Suharto was the man the nation hoped would be the satrio piningit 
 
– the man who would get things done and lead Indonesia to better times.70 Suharto came into 
 
 
 
69 Translated from Bahasa Indonesia as derived from One Earth Media, “Characteristics of Semar”. 
70 Satrio piningit is a Javanese term for “the hidden knight”. In Javanese traditions and belief, satrio piningit is a 
person whose life was characterised by suffering. Coming from a poor family, satrio piningit is a person people 
would initially turn a blind eye to. The character evolved from the very old Javanese book called Masasar, written 
by Joyoboyo (a spiritual adviser to the Kingdom of Majapahit). The Masasar itself was believed by the traditional 
Javanese population to be the book that contained Joyoboyo’s predictions of the future. This information was told 
to the author of this thesis in his childhood as he comes from a traditional Javanese family background. 
(1993), Eklöf (1999); Jenkins (1984). 
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office when Indonesia’s political situation was unstable, following the organised coup launched 
by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in September 1965 by kidnapping six army generals 
and one first-level officer.71 To date, they are known as the seven revolutionary heroes. Suharto, 
then as the Commander of the Army Strategic Command (Pangkostrad), together with Colonel 
Sarwo Edhie Wibowo – then the Commander of the Army Para-Command Regiment 
(RPKAD), now known as the Army’s Special Forces (Kopassus) – was in charge of quelling 
the PKI’s operation. Marked by the order of the March 11th (Surat Perintah 11 Maret, popularly 
known as Supersemar)72 1966 the then ill Sukarno gave Suharto the mandate to take all 
necessary measures to overcome the worsening security and political condition in Indonesia, 
primarily that in Jakarta and in Central Java. This means that Suharto assumed the highest 
authority to restore national stability. However, it was not until 12 March 1967 that Suharto 
was formally inaugurated as Indonesian President by the MPRS (Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat Sementara, the Temporary People’s Consultative Assembly).73 
As a result of his strong Javanese background, Suharto’s way of political decision- 
making was also influenced by Javanese concepts and traditions. He believed in the central role 
of a natural leader who can bring together all the conflicting and contradictory views before 
combining them in such a way as to maintain cooperation, harmony, peace, balance, and overall 
efficiency (Hein, 1986:71). For this reason, Suharto attempted to ‘Javanise’ the Indonesian 
governmental system by assigning Javanese to almost every key position in the military, 
administration, and the bureaucracy (Maulidina, 2003:3). Hailing from a humble family and 
having spent his career in the military, Suharto had only a minor interest in foreign affairs, not 
to mention that he had never been exposed to foreign trips before assuming the presidency. 
Before becoming president, he was abroad only once, when he accompanied General Nasution 
to inspect military attachés in Bonn, Paris, and Belgrade in 1961 (Hein 1986:49). 
However, his ambition in supporting Indonesia’s improving economy, given the 600% 
inflation rate when he first took the helm from Sukarno, led Suharto to be a pragmatic leader. 
He believed that economic dissatisfaction could create domestic unrest that, in the end, would 
negatively impact national security and stability (Suryadinata 1996). Therefore, in his era, the 
commanding principle was Trilogi Pembangunan (Trilogy of Development) that highlighted 
the need for growth, stability, and equality (Hein, 1986:134). Foreign affairs came into focus 
 
 
 
71 These were General Ahmad Yani, Lt. Gen. Suprapto, Lt. Gen. M.T. Haryono, Lt. Gen. Siswondo Parman, Maj. 
Gen. D.I. Pandjaitan, Maj. Gen. Sutojo Siswomihardjo, and Captain Pierre Tendean. 
72  The substance of the original copy of the Supersemar has not been without controversy in Indonesia as its 
whereabouts remain unknown. 
73 This being said, the actual duration of Suharto’s presidency was 31 years and 2 months, and not 32 years as 
most commonly addressed. For greater details on how Suharto assumed power, see, among others, Vatikiotis 
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when he recognised that Indonesia’s development depended on the surrounding countries 
(Sukma 1995). This view led him to undertake efforts to build a peaceful regional environment. 
Indeed, Suharto normalised relations with Malaysia in August 1966 and supported the 
formation of ASEAN in 1967. Suharto’s decision to send foreign minister Mochtar 
Kusumaatmaja to Moscow to foster economic cooperation indicated the extent of his interest 
to pursue a foreign policy oriented towards economic development. As Suharto stated: 
 
The Indonesian people forbid the development of communist ideology on Indonesian 
soil, but this does not imply that Indonesian people do not desire friendly close relations 
with the socialist and communist countries (quoted in Hein, 1986:41). 
 
Overall, Suharto’s foreign policy approach at the time emphasised cooperation to secure peace 
 
and to improve living standards (Weinstein, 1976:170-75; see also, Sukma 1995). 
 
As far as decision-making was concerned, the rise of the New Order ultimately unveiled 
an autocratic style of foreign policy formulation, which became almost exclusively the domain 
of Suharto and his close aides (Sukma, 1997a:239). To this extent, Suharto made decisions 
based on his own assessments, which in turn determined the guidelines, priority, and 
alternatives for Indonesia’s foreign policy. His position as president combined with his 
Javanese traditional beliefs meant that his understanding of foreign policy formulation 
amounted to a ‘statist’, top-down approach, which left foreign policy isolated from public 
constraints (Hudson and Skidmore, 1993:7-8). Its implementation, however, was placed in the 
hands of his confidants, who naturally possessed ample access to Suharto (Sukma 2006). 
Politically, Suharto was supported by the armed forces. This had, during most of his 
regime, enabled him to pursue his ideas without any interference from his political opponents. 
The Indonesian Constitution also assured the role of Suharto as the key decision-maker. In 
Article 10 the Constitution of 1945 stipulates that ‘The President holds the highest authority 
over the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force’.74 In practice, this meant that Suharto could use 
the military for his own benefit. Ultimately, being the axial figure in Indonesian politics, the 
decision-making process of the New Order had its roots in the personal role of the president 
himself (Suryadinata 1996). As noted by Jenkins (1984:37), 
 
Soeharto stood at the apex of the pyramid. His appointees sat in each of the key 
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. His writ extended into every 
department and into every state-run corporation. In short, he had established himself as 
the paramount figure in a society in which deference to authority is deeply rooted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 Aside from the Constitutional argument, the status of the President being the Panglima Tertinggi was authorised 
by the Decree of the MPRS No.IX/MPRS/1966. 
71 
 
To this extent, Indonesia’s foreign policy was Suharto’s foreign policy. This argument can be 
understood in two ways. First, the cultural background of Suharto had led him to transform the 
political system of the New Order into a stage of pewayangan, with him believing he was a 
king with Semar’s characteristics. Consequently, Javanese political culture became the 
psychological and operational milieu for Suharto’s foreign policy decision-making process. In 
this case, he opted to administrate Javanese practice into the political system because by doing 
so he could extensively impose his authority. Psychologically, Suharto’s perception of applying 
Javanese traditions in his political environment rendered him a solo player in the whole process 
of policy-making in Indonesia (Eklöf 1999). While treating the political environment as a 
resemblance of the pewayangan, Suharto’s views of Javanese culture also implied that the 
execution of his foreign policy relied on certain trusted individuals. 
Second, it can be said that while it is difficult to spell-out which policy came directly 
from him, given the closed nature of the decision-making process, personal relationships and 
favouritism among Suharto’s subordinates and protégés mattered. In this context, the foreign 
policy decision-making process of the New Order resembled Javanese beliefs whereby access 
to the centre is paramount. Indeed, there is no dispute that Suharto was the centre of power 
during the New Order era (Hein 1986; Leifer 1983). 
Being at the core of decision-making in Indonesia, Suharto had to control the military, 
and, more specifically, the army. The involvement of the military (hereafter, the TNI)75 in New 
Order policy-making processes was reasonably strong because the basis of Indonesia’s security 
practice comprised four elements: the state, the regime, the nation, and the individual citizen 
(Sebastian 2006b). As such, the TNI had a unique role because they were present in every 
regional capital in the form of a military command, so as to ensure order and stability; as part 
of the kekaryaan (functioning) policy, officers were appointed to high-ranking positions in 
civilian departments76, which often led to them being involved in resolving issues beyond their 
fixed responsibility (Liddle, 1996:19). Indeed, military secondment was a means for the 
president to ensure effective control of the bureaucracy (Nugroho, 1996:46). In addition, the 
involvement of the TNI in Suharto’s political environment was spurred by the dwi-fungsi (dual 
function) doctrine (see, for instance, Crouch 1985; Sebastian 2006b). Established as a middle 
way by General Nasution in 1966, the dwi-fungsi doctrine replaced the Army’s doctrine Tri 
 
 
75 It should be noted that during the period of Suharto, ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) was the 
formal name of the military and it comprised of the Navy, the Army, The Air Force, and the Police. In 1999, the 
Indonesian government decided to change the name by using the old term, which was the TNI (Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia). 
76  “Echelon” (eselon) here refers to the hierarchical bureaucratic rank of government officials. In Indonesia, 
Echelon I is a rank just below ministerial position. Secretary General of a ministry, Directors General, Inspectors 
General and Deputy Ministers all fall into this category. Echelon II mainly refers to Directors, Heads of Bureaus 
and the Secretaries of the Directorates General. They report to Echelon I. 
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Ubaya Cakti (Ubaya’ means promise, and ‘Cakti’ refers to sakti or divine power) (Anderson, 
 
1972:4). Tri Ubaya Cakti contained (1) the Doctrine of Basic National Security; (2) the 
 
Doctrine of Kekaryaan (civic action); (3) the Doctrine of Development (Sebastian, 2006b: 42- 
 
43). As a result, this doctrine justified the military’s involvement in bureaucratic decision- 
 
making, and to a considerable extent, Indonesia’s socio-political affairs (Kristiadi 1999:50). 
 
Nevertheless, should the military be considered as an authoritative foreign policy actor? 
There are two ways to answer this question. First, if we look at the Constitution, the military is 
structurally positioned below the president. Therefore, whilst military officers were likely to be 
involved in the foreign policy decision-making process with respect to the kekaryaan role at 
Deplu, as demonstrated by an Army officer who filled the Directorate of Security and 
Communication of Deplu in 1970 (Suryadinata, 1996:39), they were not entitled to determine 
foreign policy content as this would be the sole authority of Suharto. The second answer is 
related to the function of the TNI itself. According to Agus Widjojo, a retired Lieutenant 
General who served as Chief of Territorial Affairs and subsequently Deputy Chairman of MPR, 
the TNI was no more than an instrument for the political purposes of the government (Widjojo, 
interview with the author, 16 December 2009). In its manifestation, as Widjojo suggested, the 
TNI “would abide by and secure (akan mengikuti dan mengamankan) any political decisions 
made by the government”. Further, its main role was related to primarily domestic security 
affairs (Widjojo, interview, 16 December 2009). In sum, while the TNI was argued to have 
been the most powerful institution in Indonesia’s society (Haseman, 2003:229), its function and 
position in the political structure did not permit it to be considered an authoritative actor in 
foreign policy decision-making during the Suharto era. Therefore, the military could only 
influence foreign policy indirectly through the function of kekaryaan. 
Following Suharto’s resignation in 1998, Indonesia had a number of constitutional 
amendments, however, they are yet to significantly alter the authority of the president in the 
foreign policy decision-making context. Thus, subsequent presidents have enjoyed the same 
privileges as Suharto in terms of occupying the apex of the decision-making process in 
Indonesia. The main difference lies in how they implement their preferences when making 
foreign policy. Admittedly, other factors can influence their preferences and decisions, but in 
general the presidents’ views towards certain issues remains the main determinant. 
The decisions made by President Habibie over the 1999 East Timor referendum 
exemplified the significant role of the president. In brief, Habibie included the so-called 
“second option” alongside the autonomy which granted the East Timor a broad range of powers 
as a policy option after receiving a letter, which appears to have been inspired by the 1988 New 
Caledonia Matignon Accord, from the Australian PM John Howard in January 1999, suggesting 
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that the Indonesian government should consider a referendum in the manner of the Bougainville 
model (Leaver, 2001:6).77 The option for a referendum was apparently never consulted upon 
with then-Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, hence leaving confounded Indonesian diplomats and 
leaving them no choice but to include it in the negotiation between Indonesia, Portugal, and the 
UN in New York (Alatas, 2006:151, 155-56). The decision to incorporate the “second option” 
was influenced primarily by Habibie’s belief in the likelihood that the East Timorese would 
vote for special autonomy and thus remain united with Indonesia. This was based on reports 
originating from pro-integrationists, which were channelled by senior military figures (Jago, 
2010:379).78  In the end, the Popular Consultation, held on 30 August 1999, resulted in the 
 
separation of the province with 78.5% of the population voting against the special autonomy 
offered by the Indonesian government, as opposed to 21.5% who voted in favour (www.un.org, 
3 September 1999). 
 
When Abdurrahman Wahid came into office, he demonstrated the authoritative role of 
the president in the foreign policy domain. Wahid’s personal approach to foreign policy and his 
“erratic and unpredictable” behaviour, made diplomacy a high profile affair during his 
presidency (Azra, interview with the author, 2 March 2009). For example, having in mind the 
need to rehabilitate Indonesia’s international image and the domestic economy, in only two 
years Wahid travelled abroad more frequently than Suharto did in thirty-two years in power 
(Murphy, 2005:267). Despite his extensive travels, his diplomatic approach was unsuccessful 
in producing concrete outcomes (Suryodiningrat 2001). This situation was worsened by the fact 
that his foreign minister, Dr. Alwi Shihab, was entrusted to overcome the domestic political 
issues that Wahid had to confront, including his souring relationship with the DPR and internal 
party problems (see, Liputan 6, 15 April 2001).79 The dominant role of President Wahid also 
showed in his plan to establish diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv as a result of his interpretation 
of the bebas-aktif doctrine, an interpretation based on the “ecumenical diplomacy” approach, 
which, according to Shihab, essentially meant that Indonesia “opens all of its windows to make 
 
 
77 Other factors that have been involved in Habibie’s decision to offer referendum to the East Timorese include 
the Islamic factor and the influence of ICMI – the Islamic group headed by Habibie from which he selected his 
advisors during his presidency (see, e.g. Crouch, 2003: Chapter 9) as well as socio -economic issues that were 
damaging Indonesia’s international image (e.g. Booth 2004; Gorjão 2002). However, the loss of international 
image was also related to the human rights violations allegedly perpetuated by the Indonesian military (see, for 
instance, Tanter et.al 2006). For personal reflections on Habibie’s decisions in the East Timor case, see Habibie 
(2006:229-65). 
78 The questions posed in the referendum were the following: ‘Do you accept the proposed special autonomy for 
East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia?’ or ‘Do you reject the proposed special 
autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia?’ For greater detail on the political 
process prior to the popular consultation, see Alatas (2006:178). For accounts on the role of the UN in East Timor, 
see, among others, Jago (2010) and Schrijver (2000). 
79  To this extent, it was reported that Deplu’s diplomats had to deliver documents that required the minister’s 
approval to the Palace. This is because Shihab, being Wahid’s closest inner-circle, had to remain with Wahid most 
of the time for his responsibility as Wahid’s head of lobbying team. 
74 
 
friends with anyone without discriminating any countries or nations” (Metro TV, 15 January 
 
2011). Predictably, this plan led to an outcry at home, with Islamic groups being the 
staunchest critics. According to Suryodiningrat (2001), Wahid apparently interpreted 
bebas-aktif policy as being ‘too independent and too active’, which, amounts to a ‘no 
policy’. In 2001, Wahid was impeached by Indonesia’s parliament following his alleged 
involvement in a corruption scandal (BBC, 30 April 2001). 
Wahid’s successor, Megawati Sukarnoputri, was seen to be less active in addressing 
foreign affairs compared to Wahid as she dedicated her attention largely to domestic issues 
(Azra, interview, 2 March 2009). 80  Hence, during her presidency (2001-2004), Indonesia’s 
foreign policy was generally shaped by her foreign minister, Dr. Hassan Wirajuda, a career 
diplomat.81 This, however, did not mean that Megawati was inattentive to Indonesia’s foreign 
affairs. Instead, she sought to bring Indonesian foreign policy back to basics by allowing the 
foreign minister to take charge and by reviving Indonesia’s place in ASEAN (Anwar, interview 
with the author, 23 August 2011), a step that rekindled the best part of the New Order 
administration where “bureaucracy would be more comfortable following a familiar and 
well-tested path of foreign diplomacy” (Anwar, 2003:79). Accordingly, the focus on 
cooperation in the ASEAN and Southeast Asian context occupied the core of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy concentric circle (Anwar, 2003:79-80). 
Although Megawati allowed her foreign minister to oversee Indonesia’s foreign policy 
strategy in general, a number of foreign policy initiatives demonstrated nevertheless that the 
president was the key decision-maker. Megawati’s attempt to nurture international support for 
her presidency by accepting Australia’s PM John Howard’s visit to Jakarta in February 2002 is 
an example. This visit was strongly rejected by Indonesian parliamentarians who generally 
viewed the Australian government as a supporter of separatist movements within Indonesia 
(particularly in regards to East Timor) (Anwar, 2003:88). However, Megawati waived the 
objection of the DPR and decided to continue with Howard’s visit because she realised the 
importance of good relations with close neighbours (see, Wibisono, 2010:252-55). This action 
supports the argument presented in Chapter Two, that those who occupy the apex of the 
decision-making structure hold a great deal of authority that could in practice win over the 
preferences of other actors (see, Hill, 2003:55; Domhoff, 1990:19). 
 
 
 
80 There were six priorities in Megawati’s Cabinet working programme: 1) maintaining national unity; 2) 
continuing reform and the democratisation process; 3) normalising economic life; 4) upholding law, restore peace 
and security, and eradicating corruption, collusion, and nepotism; 5) restoring Indonesia’s international credibility; 
6) preparing for the 2004 general election. Apart from the fifth point, all were ‘domestic’ in nature. For details, 
see Djadijono (2001:129-30). 
81 In the case studies, the dominant role of foreign minister Wirajuda will be illustrated primarily under Indonesia’s 
ASEAN chairmanship in 2003. For details, see Chapter Five. 
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Under SBY’s leadership, the dominant role of the president in foreign policy decision- 
 
making process continued. Dubbed the country’s ‘foreign policy president’ (Djalal, 2008: 284- 
 
5), SBY concentrated foreign policy decision-making within his inner circle. This was 
illustrated by his decision to establish a separate office from Deplu to deal with foreign affairs, 
namely the office for Special Staff on International Relations (SKHI).82 Being Indonesia’s 
‘foreign policy president’, SBY, assisted by foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda, proved to be the 
main architect for the benign foreign policy strategy, such as those seen in the Ambalat case 
(see Chapter Seven), as well as Indonesia’s strategy in spreading democracy to the region via 
the BDF initiative (see Chapter Six). In summary, irrespective of the democratic transition, in 
Indonesia the role of the president remains generally important in shaping Indonesia’s foreign 
policy, which was assured by the Constitution. As we will see later in the case studies, 
Indonesian foreign policy content is often a reflection of ideas or perceptions held by the 
president, as foreign policy leader. 
 
3.1.2    The foreign minister and Deplu 
 
For most of the duration of Suharto’s administration, the role of Deplu and the foreign minister 
was often overshadowed by his autocratic governing style. As a result of the kekaryaan function 
of the military in civilian bureaucracy, in addition to the assessment that Indonesia needed 
security and stability, a number of military officers occupied Deplu’s highest echelons, such as 
the Director General for Information and Cultural Affairs, which was held by Major General 
Suyono in the 1980s (Hein 1986; Sukma 1997b). For example, Emmerson (1983) asserts that 
in 1981 about fifty percent of Deplu’s highest echelons were taken by the military.  This was 
because Deplu was considered essential to national security, justifying a greater presence of 
military officers (Emmerson, 1983:1227). The high rate of military occupancy in Deplu meant 
that Suharto, having full control over the TNI, also significantly influenced foreign policy 
decision-making through the presence of these military officers, thus, raising questions about 
the relevance of civilian career diplomats in Indonesia’s foreign policy formulation. 
The minimised role of Deplu was primarily visible in the context of economic foreign 
policy, illustrated by, among others, the run-up to the 1994 APEC Summit in Bogor, Indonesia. 
In the weeks just before the Summit, President Suharto appointed economic technocrats, 
primarily from the Planning and Development Ministry as well as senior economists, to manage 
APEC matters for Indonesia and among them were Prof. Widjojo Nitisastro, a prominent 
economist  who  became  Suharto’s  personal  adviser  for  APEC  affairs,  and  Prof.  Bintoro 
Tjokroamidjojo, the National Coordinator on APEC matters. They were the key actors in 
 
 
 
82 A more detailed discussion on SKHI will be included in the Section Two of this chapter. 
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drafting the policy paper that would eventually be known as the Bogor Declaration (Anwar 
et.al, 2010:15). The Deplu diplomats, on the other hand, were only assigned to plan regular 
APEC senior officials’ and working group meetings (Drajat, undated: 326).83 While, in general, 
Suharto’s decision was the most salient in shaping the overall idea of the New Order’s foreign 
policy, there have also been specific foreign policy cases where the foreign minister played an 
important role in executing the policy strategy. The case of ASEAN’s establishment in 1967 
and Indonesia’s diplomacy in pursuit of the international recognition of Wawasan Nusantara 
concept, as explained below, were some of the examples. 
In general, the Indonesian foreign ministers during Suharto’s period were figures whom 
the president believed would not challenge his political authority. Suharto’s first foreign 
minister was Adam Malik. Being slightly disinterested in foreign affairs, Suharto designated 
Malik to perform two of the most important jobs at the time. First, together with one of 
Suharto’s confidants, General Benny Murdani, Malik was involved in the dialogues to end the 
Konfrontasi between Indonesia and Malaysia (Nordin 2006). Second, following the aftermath 
of Konfrontasi, Malik became one of the architects of ASEAN’s establishment in 1967. As 
Leifer (1983:119, 122) contends, ASEAN was an Indonesian initiative that arose from formal 
talks between Malik and his Malaysian counterpart, Tun Abdul Razak. Malik’s prominence in 
New Order foreign affairs was recognised by one of the staff at Deplu, Ambassador Wisber 
Loeis, who was at the time a junior diplomat. Loeis notes that Malik’s role was “unchallenged” 
and “very dominant” as Suharto had been confident of Malik and his political credentials 
(Loeis, interview with the author, 5 August 2011). Two main factors contributed to Malik’s 
dominance over foreign policy. The first one was Suharto’s limited interest in foreign affairs 
during the early period of his presidency. Second was Suharto’s complete trust in Malik to 
establish and maintain diplomatic relations. In domestic politics, Malik, together with Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono IX, was part of the triumvirate of the New Order regime (Hein 1986; Elson, 
2001:140). 
 
When Malik ascended to the position of Vice President in 1978, an academic-cum- 
diplomat, Prof. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Remaining in office for ten years, Kusumaatmadja gained Suharto’s trust due to his modest 
character, his limited political ambition, and his lack of mass support (Hein, 1986:190). One of 
the major achievements of Indonesian diplomacy under his leadership was the international 
recognition  of  Indonesia’s  Wawasan  Nusantara  (National  Archipelagic  Outlook)  during 
negotiations leading to UNCLOS (UN Conference on the Law of the Sea) 1982, which allowed 
 
 
 
83 For a more detailed account on the role of Deplu in the dynamics of the policy-making process preceding the 
1994 APEC Summit, see Drajat (undated). 
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Indonesia to expand its territorial sovereignty.84 However, Kusumaatmadja’s apolitical stance 
also meant that he did not automatically gain unrestricted access to the president; unlike some 
of Suharto’s key political entourage, namely Murdiono (the Cabinet Secretary, later the State 
Secretary) and Sudharmono (later the Vice President). Both gentlemen shared Suharto’s 
background as military officers and as functionaries of the government’s political party, Golkar 
(Suryadinata, 1996:38-40). 
The late Ali Alatas, then a 56 year-old civil servant, was installed to replace 
Kusumaatmadja in 1988. Under his leadership Deplu continued to be the main laboratory for 
making foreign policy and Alatas himself was a highly regarded diplomat. However, even under 
Alatas Deplu’s influence in shaping the overall agenda of Indonesian foreign policy was, in 
some cases, still overshadowed by a number of factors. For instance, Alatas and Deplu were 
not on the front line so far as economic diplomacy was concerned, such as in the aforementioned 
case regarding the run-up to the 1994 APEC Summit. It is important to note that with economic 
development and stability as his political platform, Suharto’s foreign policy put a strong 
emphasis on securing loans for the benefit of national growth, hence ‘development-based 
foreign policy’ (Murphy 2009; Weinstein, 1976:171). However, on foreign political and 
security affairs, Alatas’ influence was instrumental in the making of the majority of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy strategies in the period from 1988 to 1998 concerning ASEAN. An example 
would be the enhanced interaction model to approach the Myanmar issue, which was initially 
raised as Indonesia’s objection against Thailand’s flexible engagement concept, but was then 
adopted by the Association (Kuhonta 2006; Acharya 2009a).85 
Clearly, the prominence of the foreign minister and Deplu under Suharto’s presidency 
 
depended on the issues at hand as well as the president’s preferences. In general, Deplu 
remained authoritative due to its ability to formally formulate and execute policy and the foreign 
minister holds a central role in this regard. This is because bureaucratic institutions, such as 
Deplu, presented a sphere where information and ideas were processed and later conveyed to 
the top decision-maker. As underscored in Chapter Two, although different foreign policy 
options were the result of intermittent meetings between lower level bureaucrats, they would 
require approval from leaders in the bureaucracy prior to being adopted as a policy. In this case, 
the highest authority is the foreign minister. Therefore, the foreign minister joined the president 
as a main foreign policy actor during the New Order regime. 
During the Reformasi period, apart from the East Timor case that occurred during the 
 
Habibie presidency and the turbulent political situation under the leadership of Wahid, the role 
 
 
 
84 A more detailed account of this concept will be given in Chapter Four. 
85 For details, see Chapter Six. 
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of Deplu and the foreign minister remained crucial in determining foreign policy content 
(Sriyanto, 2009:133). Legally, the authority of the foreign minister in particular, and Deplu in 
general, was not diminished by democratisation. Instead, their authorities were strengthened by 
the passing of the Law No.37/1999 regarding Foreign Relations. This Law identifies the 
president and the foreign minister as the central authorities in managing Indonesia’s foreign 
relations (see Article 6 of the Law). The practical application of this stipulation in terms of the 
influence wielded by the foreign minister occurred under Megawati, who fully supported 
Wirajuda’s management of Indonesia’s foreign relations, including reforming Deplu to become 
a fully civilian institution. 
Wirajuda was a diplomat by training. He initially had little knowledge about foreign 
affairs. After joining Deplu he was able to pursue his higher education at various prestigious 
universities, including Oxford, Fletcher, Harvard, and Virginia Law School—the latter being 
the institution from which he obtained his Doctorate. This education, in conjunction with 
Deplu’s internal diplomatic courses, gave Wirajuda knowledge in foreign affairs. On certain 
occasions, his expertise made his ideas more prominent than others in the making of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy strategy. For example, with regards to promoting human rights, Wirajuda was 
one of the masterminds behind the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission 
(Komnas HAM) in 1993. Furthermore, during his career as foreign minister, he pursued a 
number of initiatives that focused on promoting democracy in order to reflect the values of 
Reformasi in Indonesia’s foreign policy (Nabbs-Keller 2013) as well as to strengthen 
Indonesia’s very own democratic consolidation (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012). 
Taking the helm from Shihab, Wirajuda saw the need to reform Deplu for two purposes. 
First, a reformed institution would help with coordinating and changing Indonesia’s diplomatic 
approach from being thematic, e.g. political and security affairs, to being regionally based. For 
this reason, he aimed to balance Indonesia’s bilateral, regional, and multilateral diplomacy, 
which was reflected in the new bureaucratic structure of Deplu, introduced in 2002 (see 
Appendix 1). Changing the structure in such a way was also pertinent to Megawati’s foreign 
policy as she endeavoured to revitalise the country’s primacy within ASEAN. Second, the 
bureaucratic reform was necessary to reflect the values of Reformasi, and to ensure the 
transformation of Indonesia’s foreign policy (Nabbs-Keller, 2013:56). In this case, the reform 
was a reaction against a foreign policy-making process during the New Order period, which 
was dominated by an oligarchy of the military, as manifested in the kekaryaan policy (Nabbs- 
Keller, 2013:69). Before proceeding further, it is essential to briefly discuss this bureaucratic 
reform project and to examine whether the reforms have enhanced the authority of the foreign 
minister in the foreign policy decision-making process. 
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In general, as a formal foreign policy institution, Deplu consists of two major divisions: 
the supporting units, which primarily consist of bureaus, and the operational units, which deal 
with daily foreign policy issues. While supporting units are supervised by a Secretary General 
responsible for the management of the office, including budget or staffing issues, the head of 
the operational units is the Director General (DG). The first reform (known as benah diri) was 
launched in 2002. Fundamental to this reform was the bureaucratic restructure in the form of 
the creation of the position of spokesperson and the Public Directorate, as well as revitalising 
the role of the Policy Analysis and Development Body (Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan 
Kebijakan, BPPK). In essence, the formation of the spokesperson role and the focus on Public 
Diplomacy functions were undertaken in response to public demand for accountability 
(Wirajuda, personal communication with the author, 2010). After their establishment, both roles 
were immediately filled by diplomats known to be very close to Wirajuda, namely Dr. Marty 
Natalegawa and Umar Hadi, as ministry spokesperson and person in charge of public diplomatic 
affairs respectively. These individuals had served under Wirajuda for several years prior to him 
becoming foreign minister. 
As far as the BPPK is concerned, the reform was intended to revitalise its role as Deplu’s 
internal think-tank. Following the reform, BPPK has been more involved in the policy planning 
given their assessments of existing policy strategies. Its meetings involve the foreign minister 
and the head of BPPK, in addition to other relevant units. However, in practice, it has been 
difficult for BPPK to play a significant role in the policy-making process within Deplu. As 
Arthauli Tobing, who led BPPK from 2007 to 2009, noted, the main factor was that most 
diplomats believed that policy should be drafted by relevant units. ‘It took me quite some time 
to notify them that we do exist,’ Arthauli complained (interview with Arthauli Tobing, 28 
December 2011). As a result, at the lower level of bureaucracy, the BPPK staff members were 
 
often perceived as ‘second-class employees’ within Deplu (Tobing, interview, 28 December 
 
2011). Such a mind-set hampered the intended rejuvenation of the BPPK and apart from its 
presence in nearly every regular meeting conducted by the foreign minister, the salience of this 
body in supporting the policy-making process has been, at best, questionable. This situation has 
continued under Marty Natalegawa’s leadership as foreign minister (2009-2014). An example 
concerns the formulation of Indonesia’s foreign policy white paper between 2012 and 2013; 
notably, the original BPPK’s draft was ignored by the foreign minister’s office, BAM (Biro 
Administrasi Menteri), and eventually it was the BAM’s version that was ratified. 
In 2005, marked by a ‘right-sizing’ policy, which involved increasing the number of 
diplomats, and decreasing the number of administrative staffs (by halting new recruitment of 
the latter) as well as liquidating and merging some working units (see Appendix 2), Wirajuda 
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instigated the second bureaucratic reform. In principle, of around 4000 staff members at the 
time, Wirajuda aimed to decrease this ratio from 2:1 (administrative staff to diplomat ratio) to 
1:2 (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012). Pursuing the ‘right-sizing’ policy, Wirajuda’s goal 
was to create an effective bureaucracy and strengthen the units available to support Indonesia’s 
diplomacy. In addition to increasing the number of Indonesian diplomats, a meritocratic 
promotion system was introduced. Wirajuda emphasised the need for an open and fair 
promotion system to support the career progression of all staff. Dino Djalal (who later became 
Presidential Special Staff for International Relations-cum-spokesperson and speechwriter), 
Teuku Faizasyah (who later replaced Dino in 2010), and Marty Natalegawa (who in 2009 
became foreign minister), were among the beneficiaries of this meritocratic promotion system. 
At mid-career level there were also a number of diplomats who were seconded to the Palace or 
the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Law, and Security Affairs in order to further their career 
development. 
The ability of the foreign minister to control the creation of foreign policy, in some 
cases, leads the executive to surpass the DPR in foreign policy-making process as demonstrated 
by Indonesia’s passing of UN Resolution 1747 in 2007 regarding the Iranian nuclear case.86 
The Indonesian Permanent Mission in New York supported this resolution, which imposed 
tighter sanctions and an arms embargo on Iran. Notably, Indonesia’s position on this issue was 
taken without consultation and approval from the DPR. This aligned with Wirajuda’s ideas 
about appropriate foreign policy practice, whereby its implementation falls solely into the 
government’s domain (Detiknews, 29 March 2007). Further, the situation confirms what Legro 
(1997) argues, as stipulated in the previous chapter, in underscoring the importance of the 
foreign ministry in handling foreign issues, as bureaucrats operating in the ministry and the 
minister himself usually possess more expertise in diplomacy compared to other institutions 
involved in the making of foreign policy. To be sure, in this case, the government was not 
obliged to seek for approvals from the DPR because according to the 1945 Constitution (and 
the Law No.37/1999), parliamentary approvals are required only when treaty ratification is 
concerned. And since a vote for UN Resolution in the aforementioned case was not treaty 
ratification, by law, such approvals were not required. 
Overall, this section suggests that the authoritative foreign policy actors hold formal 
power to make foreign policy decisions in Indonesia. Indeed, during both the New Order and 
Reformasi periods, Indonesia’s foreign policy-making remains the domain of the leaders. In 
relation to the theoretical chapter, this confirms Hill's statement (2003:53) on foreign policy 
 
 
 
 
86 For the full content of the Resolution, see United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747. 
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being an area of policy that is administered by the president and the foreign minister who 
possess the formal authority in determining foreign affairs. 
 
 
3.2    Non-authoritative actors 
 
Within the executive branch, two non-authoritative bodies are important: the Presidential 
Special Staff on International Relations and the Presidential Advisory Council on Foreign 
Affairs. Both were founded during SBY’s presidency and functioned as advisors on foreign 
affairs attached to his office. Outside the executive, the parliament and, to a certain degree, 
prominent foreign policy observers as well as policy/ideas entrepreneurs, have also been 
influential in shaping Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda. These actors are, in principle, non- 
authoritative because parliament and ideas entrepreneurs do not have the formal authority to 
make and execute state’s foreign policy. However, while parliament can affect foreign policy 
by virtue of their power to scrutinise government’s decisions through policy consultations and 
policy coalitions, ideas entrepreneurs87  can influence foreign policy by introducing new ideas 
and transmitting them through various channels, such as presidential speeches and access to 
leaders. 
 
3.2.1    Special Staff on International Relations 
 
The office of the special staff (otherwise known as SKHI, Staf Khusus Hubungan Internasional) 
was established in 2005 and is a coordinating body on foreign policy between Deplu and the 
Palace. Headed by a Special Staff (Staf Khusus) of an Echelon I level, the SKHI was intended 
to be an exclusive group of foreign policy advisors to the president, somewhat resembling the 
West Wing of the White House (Djalal, interview with the author, 2 June 2010). Following its 
formation, President SBY appointed Dr. Dino Djalal to be the special staff on international 
relations. 
According to Djalal’s book about SBY’s leadership style called Harus Bisa (2008), his 
acquaintance with SBY dated back to when Djalal was a Political Counsellor at the Indonesian 
Embassy in Washington. At the time, SBY was a Coordinating Minister for Security and 
Political Affairs. They met in Washington when Djalal assisted SBY with his speech during the 
latter’s visit in early 2000. Their professional ties grew and following SBY’s first nomination 
as a presidential candidate in 2004, Djalal joined his campaign team as a foreign affairs advisor. 
With such a close and personal relationship between the two, Djalal was able to influence 
Indonesia’s foreign policy, particularly via his access to the president and by occupying a 
speechwriter position, which allowed him to assert his foreign policy ideas through the speeches 
 
 
87  For a detailed discussion on ideas entrepreneurs, see, among others, Mintrom (1997), Checkel (1993), and 
Mintrom and Norman (2009). 
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he wrote for the president. An example is Djalal’s attempt to revamp Indonesia’s traditional 
foreign policy doctrine (bebas-aktif) by introducing the concept of an omni-directional foreign 
policy, which he thought an appropriate foreign policy approach in relation to promoting the 
‘new Indonesia’ (Indonesia baru) identity.88 This particular speech was delivered at the LSE on 
 
31st March 2009. The speech was drafted by Djalal, and Deplu was consulted merely to 
reconfirm certain parts of the speech, particularly those highlighting Indonesia’s policy on 
specific issues, i.e. on ASEAN and on Myanmar. 
However, the foreign minister was not entirely pleased with Djalal’s attempts to insert 
 
his ideas into foreign policy forums. For this matter, the former FM Wirajuda dubbed Djalal an 
 
‘unguided missile’ for his action that at times surpassed his role as a staf khusus, who was non- 
authoritative in Indonesia’s foreign policy context, and interfered with policy-making and its 
implementation (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012).89  Wirajuda’s statement about Djalal 
on the one hand, and Djalal’s role in foreign policy on the other, reflected the competition 
between foreign policy institutions in Indonesia and demonstrated that the relationship between 
Deplu and SKHI was not always on good terms, contrary to what was suggested by a former 
SKHI’s staff member.90 Essentially, there is a competitive relationship between those who 
actually make, decide, and execute foreign policy and those who influence foreign policy 
decisions. It is competition as to who is able to submit and win support for ideas in the foreign 
policy arena. As revealed from the interviews with both parties, the views exchanged by 
Wirajuda and Djalal about each other’s part in foreign policy-making were quite critical, if not 
harsh. Djalal noted his occasional frustration with Deplu’s workpace, arguing that 
 
in Deplu, business is conducted in a regular and monotonous fashion with a lack of 
ground-breaking innovation. As a result, Deplu’s staff was hardly thinking outside the 
box. At times, this has caused a congestion in exchanging information between my office 
and Deplu. Deplu’s bureaucratic constraints have hindered it from coping with my 
office’s work-speed (Djalal, interview, 2 June 2010). 
 
Responding to Djalal’s view, Wirajuda strongly asserts that, 
 
 
[the] process of foreign policy formulation and its implementation is in Deplu. Dino’s 
role was just to ‘add colour to the painting’ as it was Deplu who prepared the inputs for 
Presidential speeches. SBY’s speech-making pattern follows either of the two: Deplu – 
President – Dino; or Deplu (raw material) – Dino – President (Wirajuda, interview, 12 
January 2012). 
 
 
 
 
88 A more detailed discussion on this concept will be included in Chapter Four. 
89 This view was likely to be informed by, among others, Djalal’s attempt to influence the decisions on 
discontinuing the existence of the US Navy-controlled NAMRU-2 (Naval Medical Research Unit) in Indonesia, 
which had led Djalal to occasionally openly challenge the Indonesian Health Minister at the time. For details, see 
The Jakarta Post, 24 April 2008. 
90 The interviewee concerned requested anonymity. This interview was conducted in Jakarta, 14 May 2010. 
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Legally speaking, the SKHI is not a state institution with decision-making power as it has no 
constitutional mandate, nor is it regulated by the law on foreign relations. However, the personal 
relationship between Djalal and SBY contributed to Djalal’s ability to indirectly influence the 
foreign policy decision-making. In other words, Djalal’s ample access to the president and his 
role as the president’s speechwriter provided a window of opportunity that have allowed him 
to channel his ideas into the decision-making process. Although Djalal left the SKHI following 
his appointment as ambassador to the US in 2010, SBY was known to frequently seek Djalal’s 
assistance, especially regarding, but not limited to, the writing of foreign affairs speeches.91 For 
instance, Djalal was frequently seen in SBY’s entourage on the president’s diplomatic trips. 
During a press briefing session at the ASEAN Summit in Bali in November 2011, SBY was 
caught looking for Djalal’s assistance to respond to a question raised by a foreign journalist 
despite the nearby presence of Foreign Minister Natalegawa and the new Staf Khusus Dr. Teuku 
Faizasyah. Therefore, occupying the position of a staf khusus does not, per se, guarantee 
influence over foreign policy content; far more important are personal relations and access to 
the president, at least as regards the incumbent. 
 
3.2.2    Presidential Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs 
 
Known publicly in Indonesia as Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden or Wantimpres, the body was 
formed in 2006 and composed of nine members (mainly former ministers and senior politicians) 
selected by SBY.92 Meeting once every two months, the role and function of this body, similar 
to the DPA93 (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung, The Supreme Advisory Council) during the New 
Order, were to advise the president on key strategic issues. 
When it was first formed, SBY appointed Ali Alatas to the post of foreign affairs 
 
adviser. In this capacity, one of Alatas’ major tasks was the drafting of the ASEAN Charter as 
 
 
 
 
91 In July 2014, Djalal was appointed Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister. 
92 Wantimpres members are selected based on the expertise on the issues that attracted the president’s attention. 
When it was first established (2006-2010), the nine issue areas were: foreign affairs (covered by Ali Alatas, former 
FM), environment and sustainable development (covered by Prof. Emil Salim, former environmental minister), 
political affairs (covered by Rahmawati Sukarnoputri, sister of Megawati Sukarnoputri), economic affairs (covered 
by Dr. Syahrir), religious affairs (covered by Ma’ruf Amin), defence and security (covered by TB. Silalahi, a close 
aide of SBY), legal affairs (Adnan B Nasution), social-cultural issues (covered by Prof. Subur BS, one of the 
founders of the Democrat Party—SBY’s political party), and agricultural affairs (covered by Prof. Iradi Gani). The 
second tenure of Wantimpres (2010-2014) was focused on the following issue areas: economy and environment 
(covered by Prof. Emil Salim), inter-religious affairs (covered by Ma’ruf Amin), education and culture (covered 
by Prof. Meutia Hatta, former minister, daughter of Indonesia’s first Vice President Mohammad Hatta), 
development and regional autonomy (covered by Prof. Ginandjar Kartasasmita, senior politician), defence and 
security (covered by Widodo AS, former minister), foreign affairs (covered by Hassan Wirajuda, former FM), 
legal and state-administration affairs (covered by Prof. Jimly Asshidiqie, former speaker of the Constitutional 
Court), governance and bureaucratic reform (covered by Prof. Ryaas Rasyid, former minister), people’s welfare 
(covered by Siti Fadhilah Supari, former health minister). Extracted from Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden, “Profil 
Anggota (Member’s Profile).” 
93 For a detailed account of the DPA, see Hein (1986:110-113). 
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Indonesia’s representative in the ASEAN’s Eminent Persons Group (EPG). Alatas sought to 
promote Indonesia’s interest in expanding democratic values within ASEAN by securing 
support for the concept of human rights protection. Consequently, the Indonesian draft of the 
ASEAN Charter came to be known later as the ‘Alatas Paper’ (Report of the Indonesian Foreign 
Minister 2004-2009:78).94 In 2010, Hassan Wirajuda was appointed to replace Alatas, who died 
in December 2008. Wirajuda and SBY had both sat in Megawati’s Cabinet as Foreign Minister 
and Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, respectively, and were therefore 
familiar with each other. Wirajuda felt that his closeness with SBY came as result of similar 
views on Indonesia’s foreign affairs (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012). As a Wantimpres 
member, Wirajuda was frequently included in SBY’s presidential trips abroad between 2010 
and 2011.95 
Being merely an adviser, both Alatas and Wirajuda did not have any formal foreign 
policy-making authority. However, given their close relation with the president, as well as their 
expertise on foreign affairs and previous experiences as foreign ministers, a number of foreign 
affairs initiatives have been undertaken at the suggestion of these two foreign affairs adviser. 
While Alatas was influential in drafting the ASEAN Charter, a more recent example of 
Wirajuda’s role in foreign policy context was Indonesia’s initiative to hold an informal 
discussion regarding the South China Sea between China and the ASEAN claimants during the 
2011 ASEAN Summit in Bali. 
 
 
3.2.3    The Parliament (DPR) 
 
With regards to decision-making processes, during the New Order period the DPR was 
frequently considered a rubber stamp body for the government’s policies (Ziegenhain 2008). 
The Indonesian Parliament was then divided into two chambers96: (1) the MPR (People’s 
Consultative Assembly), whose tasks included outlining the State’s Policy Guidance (Garis 
Besar Haluan Negara, or GBHN) in order to determine the government’s programme, electing 
and inaugurating the president, and monitoring the execution of the GBHN by the president by 
holding a general assembly once in five years, congruent with the presidential term; (2) the 
DPR (or People’s Representative Council). In the DPR, foreign affairs were scrutinised by 
Komisi I (Commission I), one out of eleven Commissions. 
 
 
 
 
 
94 This is an unpublished document and a final memorandum of FM Hassan Wirajuda to the President that was 
also handed-over to Wirajuda’s successor, Marty Natalegawa, in 2009. 
95 From 2011 onwards, Hassan has travelled less frequently with SBY because he was given another responsibility 
in Indonesia, in relation to foreign policy and public policy education. 
96 The Constitutional amendments brought on by the Reformasi saw the creation of an additional chamber to the 
Indonesian Parliament: the DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah), which was equivalent to Senate. 
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During the New Order period, the parliament was never a wholly elected body. In 1987 
and 1992 elections, for example, civilian politicians appointed by Suharto occupied 400 of the 
parliament’s seats, the majority were Golkar members, and the remaining 100 seats were 
reserved for appointed military officers (Liddle, 1999:41).97 Given such a configuration, 
parliament was an ineffective institution, lacking legitimacy and authority to perform its real 
duties of monitoring, budgeting, and legislating. This is apparent from the fact that from 1982- 
1997, the DPR never proposed any bills. Indeed, all bills were drafted by the government and 
became laws without exception (Ziegenhain, 2008:73). In this regard, the Komisi I had a poor 
record  of  scrutinising  or  influencing  the  foreign  policy  decision-making  process  (Fealy, 
2001:106). Following the political demise of Suharto in May 1998, Indonesia organised its first 
direct and open parliamentary election in April 1999. 
In October 1999, the parliament held a General Assembly to ratify the first amendment 
to the Indonesian Constitution. One outcome was an increased role of the DPR in the area of 
foreign policy. This role involved, primarily, holding up ambassadorial appointments, control 
over foreign policy expenses, and overseeing foreign policy execution (Murphy, 2005:260). 
There are three key points that explain the parliament’s strengthened role. 
First, there is the aforementioned first Constitutional amendment. The amended Article 
 
13 of the Constitution states that the government should consider the DPR’s decision in 
determining ambassadorial posts abroad as well as its position on the posting of foreign 
ambassadors to Indonesia—although the latter condition is an uncommon practice in 
diplomacy. In practice, Komisi I rejected the posting of Myanmar’s Ambassador to Indonesia, 
which was immediately followed by the suspension of the posting of Jakarta’s Ambassador to 
Yangon, as a form of protest against the continued detainment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi 
(Sambuaga, 2009:7). This decision was a reflection of the principle to “engage international 
affairs based on the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, and the value of democracy and human 
rights” (Sambuaga, interview, 30 March 2010).98 
Second, the direct election of DPR members provided them with stronger legitimacy to 
 
execute the parliament’s aforementioned three main functions.99 Apart from drafting and 
ratifying national regulations and overseeing the execution of the government’s programme, 
the DPR members are also responsible for approving/rejecting the state budget. Once approved, 
the Ministry of Finance then executes the expenses. And third, the increased role of the DPR 
 
 
97 There were only three political parties allowed to operate by the government at the time, namely Golkar, the 
Unity and Development Party (Partai Persatuan dan Pembangunan, PPP), and the Indonesian Democratic Party 
(Partai Demokasi Indonesia, PDI). As a result, the factions in the parliament represented these parties plus Fraksi 
ABRI (the military faction). 
98 Theo Sambuaga is a senior Golkar politician. He chaired Komisi I from 2004 to 2009. 
99 For the complete task of the DPR, see DPR’s Website, “Tugas dan wewenang (task and responsibility).” 
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was also motivated by the desire to redress the overwhelming dominance of the executive, 
especially in relation to policy-making process (Rüland 2009). In other words, in view of the 
spirit of Reformasi, the DPR was to be a balancing force to the executive. In this context, all 
laws needed to be scrutinised by the DPR before being applied.100 
Decision-making in the DPR takes place in the committees, with the plenary usually 
 
serving as a forum to raise issues of the day (Sherlock, 2010:166). Between 2004-2009, Komisi 
I, comprising 49 members and supported by 20 members of staff, held three meetings per week, 
which made it one of the most active and vocal groups within the DPR (Rüland, 2009:381).101 
With Deplu as its mitra kerja (counterpart), Komisi I meets regularly by way of a general 
hearing session (Rapat Dengar Pendapat Umum, RDPU) to discuss a wide range of issues, such 
as updates on contemporary diplomatic issues and issues related to the Ministry’s budgeting 
programme, and working meetings (Rapat Kerja otherwise known as Raker) to discuss more 
specific foreign issues at hand, such as border problems. Through these meetings, the DPR 
members raise and subsequently channel their ideas or preferences into the policy-making 
process. As will be discussed further in Chapter Five, the exchange of ideas between the DPR, 
the government, and a number of relevant policy entrepreneurs takes place in these meetings. 
In foreign affairs, the DPR has been very active on several issues, particularly those that 
have generated nationalist outcries, such as in cases confronting issues of sovereignty, or 
concerns about human rights and citizen protection. An example is when the DPR refused to 
meet Australia’s PM John Howard in September 2002 given prevailing sentiments regarding 
Australia’s involvement in the East Timor conflict (Dosch, 2007:58-9). As discussed in Chapter 
Two, the DPR’s response to those kind of issues, including making an appeal to nationalist 
sentiment, serves to increase the popularity of the DPR members since they are politicians 
whose primary goal involves maintaining office (see, e.g., Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Hagan 
1995). 
 
The DPR’s increasing role in foreign policy decision-making is most obvious in relation 
to issues concerning treaty ratification (Sambuaga, interview, 30 March 2010). In such cases, 
the government has faced significant political challenges from the DPR regarding the 
ratification of international agreements. The Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between 
Indonesia and Singapore offers a useful illustration. The Singapore-initiated DCA, signed in 
April 2007, was crafted as a package linked to the Indonesia-initiated Extradition Treaty (ET) 
that Jakarta was eager to conclude. The DCA contained provisions that allowed Singaporean 
 
 
 
 
100 For an explanation of how the parliament works in democratic Indonesia, including coverage of the process of 
making a bill, see Sherlock (2010, chapter 8). 
101 The membership of Komisi I for the 2009-2014 period has increased to fifty members. 
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military personnel to train in certain parts of Sumatra. For this reason, the DCA was not ratified 
by the DPR in view of Indonesia’s respective sovereignty, economic, and environmental 
considerations. Environmental reasons also played a role as fishermen operating in the Natuna 
area worried that the military training might ecologically damage the sea, leading to a scarcity 
of fishes that eventually could have a negative impact on their income (Antara, 18 July 2007). 
As a result, the whole package stalled despite a renewed commitment made by the Indonesian 
and the Singaporean governments in 2012 to renegotiate it. 
However, in spite of the increasing assertiveness of the DPR, as Sambuaga has put it 
(interview, 30 March 2010), a number of limitations have curtailed its influence in shaping 
foreign policy. First, the DPR members are limited in their knowledge and understanding of 
foreign issues. Their involvement in, and statements on, foreign policy issues – specifically 
those that are related to sovereignty and nationalistic sentiment – have frequently been premised 
on a lack of information and familiarity on the matters at hand, hence, their responses have 
rather been motivated by anger (Sambuaga, interview, 30 March 2010). This supports the idea 
that a parliament, in general, is a heterogeneous body whose members have different 
perceptions of and interests towards diplomatic issues (Putnam, 1988:443). This limits the 
extent to which they can effectively craft a state’s foreign policy (see, Barnett and Spano 2008). 
Second, in Indonesia, foreign affairs have not generally been an electoral issue. Accordingly, 
the salience of the DPR is likely to be higher in domestic than in foreign affairs. Third, the DPR 
as a whole has been struggling to mitigate its negative image due to numerous corruption cases 
involving its members. A public survey held in 2010 revealed that 78% of the people in urban 
Indonesia believed that the DPR was the most corrupt state body in Indonesia (Media Indonesia, 
21 April 2011). The inability of the DPR to distance itself from its negative image has 
encouraged observers to label the DPR ‘the ugly face of democracy’ (see, e.g., Mietzner and 
Aspinall, 2010:9). 
In sum, in comparison to the New Order period, there has been an increase in the 
influence of the DPR during the Reformasi era. Especially in, but not limited to, foreign affairs, 
the Indonesian parliament is no longer a rubber stamp body. The role of the DPR members in 
determining foreign policy has increased, as illustrated by the cases of the rejection of the 
Myanmar’s ambassadorial appointment as well as blocking the DCA ratification, as presented 
in the above. The increased role of the DPR has also made foreign policy-making more complex 
than during the New Order period. To this extent, foreign policy-making is more consultative, 
providing the DPR with greater opportunity to scrutinise government’s policy and to channel 
new ideas into the policy-making process. Notwithstanding this change, being a large and 
heterogeneous body, in addition to the shortcomings noted by Sambuaga, the DPR is at heart 
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non-authoritative in the state’s foreign policy decision-making process. Apart from scrutinising 
the state’s budget and ambassadorial appointments, and its right to ratify treaties, the DPR’s 
role in foreign policy remains quite limited. In practice, this limitation has made the parliament 
an institution whose ideas, or preferences, can be ignored by the government, as highlighted 
above in relation to Iran’s apparent nuclear ambition. 
 
 
3.3    Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making process: change or continuity? 
 
This section investigates how foreign policy has been made during the Reformasi era, arguing 
that Indonesia’s foreign policy-making is essentially top-down, with authoritative actors as the 
key decision-makers. They shape the initial focus and preferences of foreign policy in line with 
what they believe to be Indonesia’s interest. This supports the idea raised in Chapter Two, that 
foreign policy is essentially a product of individuals in leadership position (see Alden and Aran, 
2012:19). However, in a democratic system the role of parliament and idea entrepreneurs cannot 
be ignored because leaders, to some extent, accept inputs from these actors. 
That being said, if approval from the DPR is required, particularly agreement in case of 
treaty ratifications, then the foreign minister needs to initiate the bill. In this case, three stages 
must be met before a law comes into force (Sherlock, 2010:165). Stage one involves the 
delivery of the bill from the foreign ministry to the Speaker of the DPR. Once received, the bill 
is then sent to a steering committee (badan musyawarah) – whose members consist of the 
Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the DPR and representatives from all political party factions. The 
steering committee will then designate Komisi I to examine the bill. It is during this specific 
stage that policy consultations, in the form of general hearing sessions and working meetings, 
are held between the Komisi I members and the foreign minister. During this process, if 
required, the Komisi I may also invite members of the relevant epistemic community for public 
consultations. Once the process within Komisi I is concluded, the bill will then be presented to 
the working committee (panitia kerja) – whose members consist of representatives from 
factions in Komisi I. This committee will then finalise the bill. 
In stage two, the finalised bill is presented to the steering committee, who will either 
approve or reject it; if approved, it will be submitted to the plenary. If unanimous approval is 
not achieved, the working committee will resend the bill to the Komisi I for further examination. 
The plenary, in this case, will decide whether the bill can be approved by the DPR. When the 
bill is approved, in stage three, the Speaker passes the bill to the foreign minister who will 
submit it to the president for signing. The newly-sanctioned international/bilateral treaty then 
enters into force once the law becomes effective. 
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During the aforementioned process, particularly in stage two, political lobbying and 
expert inquiries sometimes compel the foreign minister to engage more intensively with non- 
authoritative actors. For instance, in 2008, Deplu organised at least 320 public campaigns, 
including policy workshops with academics and policy experts, to raise awareness about, and 
support for the ratification of, the ASEAN Charter (Assignment Report of the Foreign Minister, 
2009:69). Although those academics and policy experts do not have authority in foreign policy- 
making, they can sometimes be influential. Their support can, on the one hand, legitimate the 
decision to ratify the Charter and, on the other, apply pressure on the DPR to immediately 
approve its ratification. 
If a decision does not require the DPR’s approval, the process is simpler. The policy 
options are discussed mainly by the governmental actors, although the discussions can also 
involve individuals outside the government. The drafting process of the ASEAN Political- 
Security Community (APSC) concept paper in 2003 offers a good example of this point (see 
Chapter Five). The initial concept for the APSC came from Rizal Sukma, who tabled the idea 
at a seminar organised by the Indonesian Representative Office for the UN in 2003 (see, 
Emmerson 2005a). After deliberation involving foreign minister Wirajuda, the ASEAN unit 
within Deplu, and also Sukma himself, Sukma’s ideas were reconceptualised as to omit certain 
words from his original proposal that were thought to be too sensitive for other ASEAN 
members, such as human rights. This example suggests two important factors. First, non- 
authoritative actors can shape foreign policy content by generating ideas that are then 
considered by the main foreign policy-makers. Sukma’s credentials as a prominent foreign 
policy expert and his access to the decision-making circle have been instrumental in channelling 
his ideas into the foreign policy-making arena. This situation highlights the importance of 
networking with those in the decision-making circle in order for ideas entrepreneurs to 
influence foreign policy (see Mintrom 1997). Second, the example also confirms the salience 
of leaders in determining the final content of a state’s foreign policy decision. Additionally, the 
making of this specific policy seemed to involve only limited actors and deliberation was made 
away from the parliament and public attention, thus, indicating a top-down process. 
In summary, Indonesia’s foreign policy-making continues to be top-down because 
democratisation did not lead to a significant alteration to the role of key foreign policy-makers’ 
in the executive. While the multiple constitutional amendments between 1999 and 2002 and the 
Law regarding Indonesia’s Foreign Relations provided the DPR to have a bigger role in foreign 
policy, such a role was limited to specific foreign policy matters, such as ambassadorial 
appointment and the ratification of international agreements. In fact, these regulations reinforce 
the control of the president and the foreign minister in conducting Indonesia’s foreign affairs. 
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Therefore, the principal authority to make Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions remain in the 
hands of a limited number of major foreign policy actors in the executive. In relation to the 
public, in making foreign policy the key foreign policy actors in the executive have been 
unlikely to follow the preference of public opinion, as the decisions on Myanmar and on the 
Ambalat case, as noted in Chapter Six and Chapter Seven, respectively, illustrate. The public 
was instead utilised merely to nurture legitimacy towards certain foreign policy decision, as the 
case of Deplu’s public campaign on the ASEAN Charter revealed. 
Overall, Indonesia’s current foreign policy decision-making system demonstrates 
continuity by maintaining the salience of leaders as the state’s major foreign policy-makers. 
While suggesting that Indonesia’s foreign policy-making is top-down, this section also argues 
that foreign policy-making in Indonesia during the Reformasi period has essentially been more 
consultative than during the New Order era. Above all, the foreign minister is expected to attend 
policy forums organised by the parliament where policy scrutiny is likely. This development 
reflects a change in the policy-making process, specifically by way of making foreign policy 
more of a consultative process. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the link between democratisation and foreign policy 
decision-making in Indonesia. It has highlighted the actors involved in that process. These 
actors are classified based on their decision-making power: authoritative and non-authoritative. 
The former comprised of the president and the foreign minister as well as the decision-makers 
in Deplu since they formally make and decide the state’s foreign policy, while the latter 
comprises the DPR, institutions other than the foreign ministry, and policy/ideas entrepreneurs. 
While the non-authoritative actors can neither formulate nor conduct the state’s foreign policy, 
they can influence its content by shaping the views of the key foreign policy actors in the 
executive. Policy consultation, political networking, and the privilege to compose presidential 
speeches, provide channels to access the top decision-makers. 
This chapter has demonstrated that the top political leaders play an essential role in 
making Indonesia’s foreign policy. As such, it confirms the view that Indonesia’s foreign policy 
decisions are driven by the interests and ideas of individuals in leadership positions in the key 
decision-making institutions (MacIntyre, 2003:101). This condition remains relevant despite 
the political reforms that have taken place since 1998. At the same time, however, the roles of 
the DPR and, to some extent, ideas entrepreneurs cannot be ignored as they have gained 
importance during the Reformasi era. In relation to the increasing role of the DPR, foreign 
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policy decision-making in Indonesia during the Reformasi period has been more consultative 
than during the most of the New Order. 
Consequently, notwithstanding the consultative processes, the salience of leaders 
demonstrates the continuity in the way foreign policy is made during Reformasi and highlights 
the differential impact of democratisation on foreign policy. In the next chapter this study will 
discuss the relationship between Indonesia’s democratisation and the bebas-aktif foreign policy 
doctrine, as the latter is an important manifestation of ideas and identity that have long 
underpinned the conduct of Indonesia’s diplomacy. 
92 
 
4 Democratisation and the bebas-aktif doctrine: a competition 
between ideas 
 
As the previous chapter shows, the formulation of foreign policy in Indonesia is characterised 
by both continuity and change. Continuity because foreign policy is still largely dictated by 
authoritative actors, but also change because since Reformasi there has been increasing scope 
for non-authoritative actors to provide input to policy. This chapter will explore one aspect of 
Indonesia’s longstanding foreign policy basic doctrine, bebas-aktif. The bebas-aktif doctrine 
held that Indonesia should be independent in deciding its foreign policy course while continuing 
to play a proactive role in the establishment of world peace. Essentially, bebas-aktif is an idea 
put forward by Indonesia’s first vice president, Mohammad Hatta, who sought a conceptual 
basis for appropriate international behaviour in the context of the Cold War for Jakarta 
following Indonesia’s independence. These principles have continued to inform foreign policy 
decision-making during the Reformasi period because of three factors. First, the doctrine is still 
supported by ideas that reflect and define Indonesia’s national identity. Second, the expectations 
linked to the bebas-aktif principle are in fact widely shared by policy-makers, making the 
doctrine also a foreign-policy norm. Third, the vague definition of its components allows for 
the principle to be implemented pragmatically by people across the political spectrum. 
Because the doctrine is so open to interpretation, it has been subjected to challenges 
throughout the Reformasi period. These challenges were mainly a result of the attempts made 
by some non-authoritative actors to shape foreign policy based upon new competing ideas about 
foreign policy approaches in the context of Indonesia’s new emerging democratic identity. As 
the chapter will show, however, whether new ideas take effect in changing the bebas-aktif 
doctrine remains dependent on approval from the country’s authoritative foreign policy-makers. 
Without their consent it is unlikely that the bebas-aktif doctrine will change. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section One examines the origins of Indonesia’s 
bebas-aktif doctrine and the values it enshrined. Section Two will briefly discuss the practice 
of bebas-aktif during the New Order regime and consider whether the notion of ‘bebas’ in 
bebas-aktif is implemented at the expense of other priorities, namely the principle of non- 
alignment. The third section examines the bebas-aktif doctrine in the context of Indonesia’s 
Reformasi period. This section explores the extent to which new ideas, propagated by non- 
authoritative actors, have made decision-makers re-interpret the bebas-aktif doctrine or push its 
practice in a different direction. Section Four explains the link between democratisation and the 
continued existence of the bebas-aktif doctrine and explores how the doctrine continues to exist 
despite the political reforms. This chapter will end with a summary of the link between 
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democratisation and the bebas-aktif doctrine. 
 
 
4.1    The origin and the basic pillars of the bebas-aktif principle 
 
 
4.1.1    Bebas-aktif: a response to the competition of power 
 
Although initially derived from the former PM Sjahrir’s speech in February 1948, Mohammad 
Hatta, the first VP and then-de facto PM as well as foreign minister, was the first to articulate 
the government’s position of bebas-aktif in September 1948. This speech, entitled ‘Rowing 
between the Two Reefs’ (Mendayung diantara Dua Karang), was delivered before the KNIP 
(the National Committee of Central Indonesia) as a statement against the hostile world of two 
major blocs into which Indonesia was immediately born (see Weinstein, 1976; Hatta, 1953). 
Popularised at the wake of Indonesia’s independence, Hatta reminded the nation: 
 
Have the Indonesian people fighting for their freedom no other course of action open to 
them than to choose between being pro-Russian or pro-American? Is there no other 
position that can be taken in the pursuit of our national ideals? The Indonesian 
government is of the opinion that the position to be taken is that Indonesia should not 
be a passive party in the area of international politics but it should be an active agent 
entitled to decide its own standpoint with the right to fight for its own goal, the goal of 
a fully independent Indonesia (Hatta, 1953:446). 
 
Drawing on Hatta’s statement above, it is clear that bebas then meant Indonesia should not 
favour either of the two opposing blocs and follow its own path as Jakarta manoeuvred the 
various international issues; aktif suggested the need to work pro-actively to maintain peace 
and alleviate tensions generated by the two blocs caused by endeavours supported by most 
members of the United Nations (Hatta, 1953:444). 
Trying to emphasise the non-aligned position of the republic, in 1952 PM Wilopo 
reaffirmed that Indonesia’s policy of independence required that it should not take sides in the 
struggle between the two opposing blocs, and that it must not remain neutral, but respond to 
international incidents when they occurred based on Indonesia’s national interests and its status 
as a member of the UN (Hatta, 1953:446). Wilopo’s statement underlined two important foreign 
policy principles. One, Indonesia was committed to multilateralism and that whenever a 
problem arose, it should first refer to the UN because Indonesia was not an ‘anti-social state’ 
secluded from the larger international community (Hatta, 1953:443). Two, being independent 
did not necessarily equate to being neutral. Hatta believed that the two were different because 
‘neutrality’, based on international law, reflected ‘a condition of impartiality towards 
belligerent states’ (Hatta, 1953:443). Meanwhile, Indonesia’s foreign policy was not 
constructed with reference to belligerent states, but constructed for the purpose of strengthening 
and upholding peace (Hatta, 1953:443-4). 
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At the time, the bebas-aktif doctrine served Indonesia’s priority to sustain domestic 
priorities designed to overcome economic, social, and administrative shortcomings and to 
accommodate the sense of national revolution used as a standard by which governments could 
be judged (Leifer, 1983:29). An independent Indonesia, born in the wake of the Second World 
War, felt that a non-aligned position was important to prevent its citizens, who were 
impoverished, from being further economically deprived. While serving Indonesia’s domestic 
purposes, the doctrine was also a deliberation of the international aspiration of Indonesian 
leaders to justify the country’s rightful and natural position of leadership, particularly in 
Southeast Asia (Weinstein, 1972:367). To this extent, bebas-aktif meant more than just anti- 
colonialism and non-alignment (Leifer 1983). 
Pertinent to Indonesia’s international aspiration was the sense of ‘regional 
entitlement’—strongly held by foreign policy elites in Jakarta—which was fundamental to 
understanding bebas-aktif and had its foundation in Indonesia’s revolutionary pride, the size of 
its population, its land and maritime dimensions, natural resources, and strategic location 
(Leifer, 1983:173). Both Sukarno and Suharto espoused such a sense of regional entitlement 
and it is still considered meaningful by the present Indonesian foreign policy elites. For 
instance, according to an analyst who works as the Deputy for Political Affairs at the Indonesian 
Vice President’s office, the notion of ‘regional entitlement’ remains significant in the sense that 
Indonesia would want to lead the region and provide intellectual impetus, in addition to steering 
ASEAN’s commitments (Anwar, interview, 23 August 2011). A further discussion of this 
matter will take place in Chapter Five. 
That said, the vague nature of bebas-aktif allows Indonesian foreign policy elites to 
interpret and consequently, implement, the doctrine in a malleable fashion. During the 
revolutionary period, this had led to a sour relationship between Sukarno and Hatta. During the 
mid-1950s, with support from the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), President Sukarno 
intensified diplomatic ties with China and the Soviet Union. Sukarno’s action prompted Hatta, 
who was Vice President at the time, to resign in July 1956 following his disagreement with 
Sukarno over the increasing involvement of the PKI in governmental affairs (see, Leifer, 
1983:Ch.2). This feud inevitably ended the romance of Sukarno and Hatta, also noted as the 
 
dwi-tunggal (two as one), built during the revolutionary period. 
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4.1.2    Bebas-aktif: its basic pillars 
 
As Hein (1986:14-27) summarizes, there are five philosophical and legal pillars that underpin 
the existence of the bebas-aktif doctrine.102 It is important to explore these pillars in order to 
comprehend the underlying rationale of Indonesia’s foreign policy and how it is related to 
Indonesia’s diplomatic practice. 
The first pillar is the Constitution of 1945 (UUD 1945). Ratified one day after the 
Proclamation of Independence on 17 August 1945, the Constitution served as the commanding 
source of all laws in Indonesia. As such, it outlined the initial stance of the Republic as a new 
independent country in 1945. It also asserted the means and objectives for which Indonesia was 
created, and its legal system. The first line of the Preamble (Pembukaan) of the Constitution 
specifically acknowledged that ‘whereas independence is the inalienable right of all nations, 
colonialism must be abolished from this world as it is against humanity and justice’. The 
inclusion of this line is noteworthy considering that Indonesia proclaimed its independence 
from the Dutch at a time when the concept of self-determination was yet to be recognised in 
international law due to the conflicting views amongst Europe, Australia and the US (Hassan 
Wirajuda, personal communication, 2010).103 For the Dutch, in the case of Indonesia, self- 
determination was only to be achieved by an agreement regarding independence. However, the 
Dutch proposal was unacceptable to Indonesia’s nationalist leadership because if independence 
came as a product of an agreement, then it was not an inalienable right, contradicting the 
Preamble of the 1945 Constitution (Wirajuda 2005). In essence, the principle of anti- 
colonialism was, and is still, embedded in bebas-aktif foreign policy. 
The second pillar is national interest. Indonesia’s national interest can be defined in two 
ways. First are Indonesia’s ‘aspirational’ interests (Wirajuda, personal communication, 2010), 
which include the primary goals of the state namely (1) the protection of Indonesians, (2) the 
promotion of the country’s general welfare, (3) the guarantee of education for all Indonesian 
people, and (4) the participation in the world order based on freedom, perpetual peace, and 
social justice. These goals are stated in the fourth preamble of Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution. 
Second, Indonesia’s other national interests are commonly expounded in the government’s 
 
 
 
102 In this thesis, the author adapts to Hein’s summary on the principles in question however, the elaboration of 
each principle is not solely based on his work but rather is developed mainly from the author’s own knowledge 
and complemented by several references to existing works. 
103 The notion of the right of self-determination was first legally introduced in the UN Charter, which entered into 
force on 24 October 1945 – about two months after Indonesia declared its independence. The principle of self- 
determination was originally derived from, and further advocated by, American leaders as their attempt to support 
the political independence of the colonised countries. For further details on the original concept of self- 
determination see Throntveit (2011). For the debate on the notion of right of self-determination in the UN, 
particularly for indigenous peoples, see Xanthaki (2007). For a brief summary of the UN documents that include 
the provisions on self-determination and an Indonesian perspective, see The Jakarta Post, op.ed, 29 November 
1999. 
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strategic goals; thus these other interests are normally short-term and different from one regime 
or even government to another. During the New Order regime, Indonesia’s strategic goals were 
introduced once every five years through the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR)-designed 
GBHN (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara), or Policy Guidelines, that delineated the priorities 
of the Suharto government. Following the fall of Suharto, the GBHN have no longer applied in 
Indonesia’s political system and were replaced by an ordinary Cabinet programme defined by 
the president. As previously mentioned, bebas-aktif should be applied to pursuit Indonesia’s 
national interests. 
The third pillar is non-alignment, which was emphasised with Indonesia’s participation 
in the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Belgrade in 1961—a legacy of the 
Bandung Asian-African Conference (KAA) in 1955 (Hein 1986; see also Tan and Acharya 
2008). The non-alignment policy allowed Indonesia to remain impartial in the context of 
ideological confrontation between two major blocs at the time without having to forego its idea 
to oppose colonialism in Indonesia and elsewhere (Weinstein, 1976:163). According to one 
observer, the spirit of non-alignment was the core reference of bebas-aktif (Smith, 1999:239) 
and was included in Sjahrir’s speech about the bebas-aktif principle in February 1948. Through 
his statement, Sjahrir expressed his disapproval of the idea to align with the Soviet Union, 
exemplified in a treaty of consular affairs with Moscow, which had been negotiated by Suripno, 
a PKI figure, a month before (Leifer 1983:19). Hatta and Sjahrir were Indonesia’s two main 
proponents of non-alignment. They strongly resisted any efforts designed to bring the young 
republic into alignment with the two existing blocs. As Indonesia was seeking support against 
the Dutch and searching for recognition in the international arena, at home the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI) was attempting to mobilize in support of the government’s closer ties 
with the Soviet Union. Led by Muso, the PKI enacted a strategy of Jalan Baru untuk Indonesia 
(A New Road for Indonesia), suggesting an alliance with the Soviet Union as the only means 
of winning the struggle against Dutch colonialism (Sebastian 2006b). Hatta, in his capacity as 
incumbent vice president, rejected this strategy. As a response to this extreme left movement, 
Hatta then initiated the concept of bebas-aktif—the idea introduced in Sjahrir’s speech seven 
months earlier (Sebastian 2006b). 
The fourth pillar of bebas-aktif is Pancasila. Serving as the state ideology under Suharto 
and later as a philosophical principle for Indonesians in the Reformasi period, the ideas 
contained in Pancasila reflect Indonesia’s identity and nationalism (Hein 1986). Derived from 
Sanskrit, Panca means five and Sila means principles, consisting of (1) belief in the supreme 
God; (2) the idea/principle of a just and civilised humanity; (3) the idea of Indonesian unity; (4) 
the idea that democracy should be guided by the inner wisdom of unanimous deliberations 
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amongst its representatives; and (5) the principle of social justice for all Indonesians.104  For 
Indonesians, Pancasila was instrumental to Indonesia’s foreign policy during the first five 
decades as it unified all Indonesians, therefore leaving no reason for any groups in Indonesia to 
pursue a state policy deviating from Pancasila (Sabir, 1987:22). Proposed on June 1st, 1945, 
Pancasila served as an alternative ideological solution offering compromises between the 
nationalist and the Islamic political camps. 
In subsequent debates, the nationalist camp advocated a purely nationalist, if not secular, 
set of principles for the state, whereas the Islamic camp intended to make Indonesia an Islamic 
state. The latter for instance proposed the Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta), which was 
infamously recognised to have asserted the ‘obligation for all Muslims to follow Syaria (dengan 
kewajiban menjalankan Syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya)’. The nationalist camp 
opposed this idea. In principle, therefore, the underlying intent of Pancasila was to address the 
religious challenge inherent in the Jakarta Charter, and to render feasible a more flexible 
approach to religious freedom and religious minorities by enshrining ‘a belief in One Supreme 
God’ (Anshari 1981). 
During the Suharto period, Pancasila was being imposed on the people as an ideology 
of oppression (Douglas Ramage, interview, 9 August 2011). In this context, Pancasila 
indoctrination took place in various forms, intended to nurture the spirit of nationalism and 
patriotism, such as the obligation for all civil servants as well as students throughout elementary 
to university level to participate in the routine debriefing on Pancasila, known in Indonesia as 
Penataran Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila or P4. The justification for this 
indoctrination was Suharto’s concerns about the danger of communism and the ekstrim kiri 
(extreme left) (Aspinall, 2005:5). Pancasila thus became an unchallenged ideology, and 
attempts to subvert were regarded by the regime as makar (acts against the legitimate 
government). Since the Reformasi era, the role of Pancasila has been challenged as a 
consequence of the resurgence of other values, mainly Islamic, that were suppressed during the 
Suharto regime. To this extent, some observers believe that an ideological competition is 
occurring between those still promoting Pancasila and those who forcefully advance Islam as 
the proposed state ideology (Burhanuddin Muhtadi, interview, 22 August 2011; Abdul Mu’ti, 
interview, 11 August 2011). As Abdul Mu’ti, a Muhammadiyah leader, notes: “during the first 
years of Reformasi, there was a sharp competition of norms and identity in the domestic political 
debates, which led to undermining the role of Pancasila” (Mu’ti, interview, 11 August 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
104 This is the informal translation of Pancasila from Bahasa Indonesia made by the author. For details on the uses 
of Pancasila in Indonesian politics see Ramage (1995: chapter 1). 
105 The Law regulates the new delimitations of Indonesia’s territorial seas from 3 nautical miles as stated in the 
Staatsblad 1939 No. 442, to 12 nautical miles as asserted by the 1957 Djuanda Declaration. According to the 
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Insofar as having Pancasila as an underlying principle of the bebas-aktif foreign policy, 
Indonesia’s conduct of its foreign affairs has been morally based on faith in God, but not on 
one particular religion. Thus, despite being the most populous Muslim nation in the world, 
Indonesia is neither an Islamic state nor a secular one (Azra, 2006:89), and the country’s foreign 
policy has never had any religious basis (see, Sukma 2006; Azra 2006). The other postulates of 
Pancasila indicate strong moral values as the basis of the bebas-aktif foreign policy (Hatta, 
1953:450-1). For instance, the fourth Sila enshrines a democratic way of decision-making by 
emphasising a consensus reached through deliberation. A consensus-building way of decision- 
making (musyawarah) consequently became the preferred method for dealing with external 
affairs and later became substantiated in Indonesia’s foreign policy in the region. As Chapter 
Five notes, Indonesia has been a strong supporter of this approach being progressively 
implemented in ASEAN. 
The last pillar of bebas-aktif is national unity. It is reasonable to expect a country as vast 
and as diverse as Indonesia, constituting more than 13,000 islands on which live more than 200 
ethnicities, to ensure its sovereignty and national integrity. As emphasised in the third Sila, 
Indonesia has perceived itself as a united entity in spite of the diversity, which it embraces. 
Hence, the national motto is Bhinneka Tunggal Ika or Unity in Diversity. During the period of 
Guided Democracy (1957-1965), which also marked the increased role of Sukarno in foreign 
policy, the bebas-aktif doctrine was aimed at gaining further support to sustain national unity 
and underpin a pattern of power of which he was the principal beneficiary (Leifer, 1983:56). 
For this reason, Sukarno often referred to the idea of nationalism in the conduct of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy. The radical policy to retain Irian Jaya (or known today as Papua) from the Dutch 
in 1962 and konfrontasi with Malaysia were some examples of Sukarno’s idea to boost 
Indonesia’s national integrity through a strong anti-colonialist stance (Sukma, 1995:310). The 
importance of national unity was sustained during the New Order period. This was accentuated 
by the concept of the National Archipelagic Outlook (Wawasan Nusantara), as a way for 
Indonesians to see Indonesia in its geographical sphere as one unified entity (satu kesatuan 
yang utuh) based on the Constitution and Pancasila. From a historical standpoint, Wawasan 
Nusantara was a significant and important binding factor for Indonesia considering that it was 
at once composed of, and divided by, several kingdoms; the Javanese Majapahit in the east and 
the Sumatran Srivijaya in the west were the two largest kingdoms. 
The concept of Wawasan Nusantara was invoked in order to justify an ‘enlargement’ 
 
of Indonesian territory based on international law. The existence of Law No.4 Prp.1960105 in 
99 
 
Indonesia was only to address a unilateral means for recognising Indonesia’s maritime territory 
when it lacked international recognition. Under this condition, the most efficient means of 
gaining such recognition was to have Wawasan Nusantara as part of international law (Mauna, 
2005:391). The ‘diplomatic struggle’ for this recognition had its roots in the 1957 Djuanda 
Declaration, which outlined that Indonesia—as an archipelagic state (negara kepulauan) — 
maintains its sovereignty over territorial seas of 12 nautical miles (nm) as opposed to 3nm as 
initially regulated under the Dutch legal regime (Mauna, 2005:362). This Declaration also 
serves as a main reference to determine Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200nm 
from the starting point of the territorial seas (Mauna, 2005:362). The concept of Wawasan 
Nusantara was finally agreed at the third meeting of the UNCLOS in 1982. This entitled 
Indonesia  to  control  the  exploitation  and  security  of  its  archipelagic  waters  (Sebastian, 
2006b:178), a concept that was once denied by President Reagan who believed that the 
possession of natural resources at sea should be under private control (Wanandi, 1994:35). In 
short, the Wawasan Nusantara concept was proposed by Indonesia in order to gain international 
recognition for its geographical unity and therefore its territorial integrity. It is clear, therefore, 
why national unity is considered one of the principles underpinning the bebas-aktif formula. 
Those pillars were manifestations of Indonesia’s identity as perceived by its leaders 
during their time in power. For example, Sukarno’s initiated Pancasila was a political idea that 
served as a cooperative solution to facilitate the cohesion of different groups in Indonesia, 
particularly nationalist and Islamist camps, which later underpinned the principle of the bebas- 
aktif doctrine. Similarly, the non-alignment principle was also derived from the perception of 
Indonesia as a newly independent state. Hatta envisioned relying on the moral strength of 
conciliation for the newly independent Indonesia acquiring its own standing in international 
affairs (Hatta, 1953:452). For this reason, as a frail nation born immediately after the World 
War II, pursuing international cooperation without being dragged into one of the competing 
blocs was essential if the twin ideals of social justice and prosperity were to become a reality 
(Hatta, 1953:441). 
Generally, the underpinning ideas and principles of bebas-aktif were accepted by 
Indonesian foreign policy-makers as the basis for the practice of bebas-aktif doctrine. Some of 
these ideas, such as the concept of Wawasan Nusantara, have also been internalised as they 
were included in the national regulations. More generally, this analysis suggests that the bebas- 
 
 
 
Staatsblad, territorial seas were measured starting from the low water line (garis air rendah). Indonesia felt that 
such a measurement was inappropriate because it left the country with pockets of high seas, which would 
complicate the monitoring of Indonesia’s territorial integrity. Through this Law, Indonesia asserts that territorial 
seas of archipelagic states should be measured by connecting the outer points of the outer islands (titik terluar dari 
pulau terluar). For details on the content, see Law No. 4 Prp.1960 (UU No. 4 Prp.1960). 
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aktif doctrine served to encapsulate Indonesian identity, as constructed by the political 
leadership (Anwar and Crouch, 2003:2). Therefore, the salience of the key foreign policy- 
makers in the executive became the defining factor in Indonesia’s foreign policy as, in practice, 
they were able to maintain the relevance of the bebas-aktif foreign policy idea. 
 
 
4.2    Bebas-aktif foreign policy: its implementation during the New Order period 
 
The vague definition of bebas-aktif and the dominance of Suharto in Indonesia’s decision- 
making process contributed to the design and implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy 
decisions. During the New Order, the Suharto government pursued a pragmatic foreign policy 
approach by ‘constantly maintaining a balance in Indonesia’s relations with the existing 
powers’ (Weinstein, 1972:367) to ensure Indonesia’s territorial security and integration. In 
practice, this was evident in the case of the Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS), signed 
in December 1995 between Indonesia and Australia. Through the AMS, Indonesia and Australia 
agreed to a ‘security cooperation’ initiative, circumventing the term ‘alliance’. Among other 
things, this agreement was not relayed by Indonesia to its ASEAN neighbours, and was the 
result of eighteen months of personal diplomacy between Suharto and Australia’s Paul Keating 
(Sukma, 1997a: 235). As Sukma asserts, the then Indonesian Foreign Minister, Alatas, was not 
entirely aware of the initial process of the AMS; also Suharto opted to send State Secretary 
Murdiono to announce the AMS to the ASEAN countries at the 1995 ASEAN Summit in 
Bangkok. In other words, the AMS was a manifestation of the president’s centrality in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making process. 
The AMS stressed three elements that both countries agreed: (i) to consult regularly at 
the ministerial level on common security issues; (ii) to consult in the case of adverse challenges 
to either party or to their common security interests and, if appropriate, to consider measures 
which might be taken individually or jointly and in accordance with the processes of each party; 
and (iii) to promote beneficial cooperative security activities (Sukma, 2004:76-77). The content 
of the AMS, especially the second point, provoked questions as to whether Indonesia’s decision 
had undermined the spirit of bebas-aktif foreign policy. Interestingly, however, a line of 
criticism about Indonesia’s participation in this agreement was not made on the basis of the 
bebas-aktif principle. For instance, a prominent military figure Lieutenant General (Ret.) 
Hasnan Habib reacted negatively to the AMS, calling it ‘Australia’s successful diplomatic 
coup’ towards Indonesia’s military ability (Sukma, 1997a:236). This was because both 
countries were committed to each other in providing mutual defence assistance in the case of a 
foreign military attack. 
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For the Australians, the AMS was significant largely due to the ‘fear psychoses’ that 
 
Australia’s main security concerns had to come either from or towards Indonesia (Singh, 
 
2002:60). Moreover, the Australian defence strategy was based on the assumption that 
Indonesia constituted Australia’s main threat and with so many Australians travelling through, 
or across, Indonesia, the country was regarded as: ‘uniquely positioned to pressure Australia 
without resorting to invasion’ (O’Connor, 1997:5). This view about Indonesia continued to 
exist in Australia, particularly following the 2002 Bali bombing which took no less than 200 
lives (most of whom were Australians), and it was reported that in 2004 around 31% of the 
Australians regarded Indonesia as being the main threat to their national security (ABC, 25 
August 2004). Therefore, a stable Indonesia was key to Australia’s security and the AMS was 
to serve as a mechanism to reduce tensions between the two countries (O’Connor, 1997:6). 
For Indonesia, the AMS was the first security agreement ever established with another 
country within close proximity of Indonesia’s geographical region. In line with Indonesia’s 
strategic interest, the decision to forge the AMS with Australia did not suggest that Indonesia 
would prevent it from opposing any attempt by major powers to interfere in Southeast Asian 
regional affairs (Sukma, 1997a:240). It is worth noting that the idea of strengthening military 
ties in the region had been an aim of Indonesian leaders even since the early years of Suharto’s 
presidency. In 1970, for instance, the former Indonesian Armed Forces Chief General Maraden 
Panggabean stressed that Indonesia would be in a ready position to provide military aid to its 
ASEAN partners facing a security threat, although, in the end, this proposal went unsupported 
by other ASEAN member countries  (Acharya, 1991:160-1). 
Suharto’s thirty-two years in power emphasised the need for stability in support of 
Indonesia’s economic development and his foreign policy consistently pursued this purpose in 
a flexible and pragmatic manner (Murphy, 2009:68). As outlined by Ruslan Abdulgani, the 
Indonesian Foreign Minister between 1956 and 1957: 
 
Bebas-aktif is not a static dogma; it is a guide for action… Its implementation should 
be flexible enough to allow us to dynamically determine our stance in response to every 
development in the international environment (Abdulgani, 1988:9-10). 
 
Indeed, the case of the AMS demonstrates such flexibility and pragmatism. In view of the 
relevance of bebas-aktif principle, Sukma argues that while the AMS case may have implied a 
new interpretation of the bebas-aktif doctrine under the New Order regime, it did not necessarily 
abandon the spirit of Indonesia’s authoritative foreign policy principle (Sukma 1997a). He 
further asserts that by keeping all options open, Indonesia was able to contend with potential 
security challenges in the region, for example those posed by China. Therefore a certain degree 
of flexibility was needed, and the AMS demonstrated that there was a loosening of the once 
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rigidly applied meaning of bebas-aktif.106 Similarly, Anwar (1998:510) notes that the signing 
of the AMS indicated a shift in Indonesia’s bebas-aktif foreign policy, as a response to new 
security realities in the region. Further, the generally muted domestic reaction to Suharto’s 
decision regarding the AMS was very much attributed to the structure of policymaking and its 
top-down mechanism under the New Order regime. 
The case of the AMS suggests two points in the context of Indonesian foreign policy. 
First, the bebas-aktif foreign policy doctrine is deliberately vague, allowing its implementation 
to serve the interest of the political regime in power. In this context, it served Suharto’s interest 
in maintaining state security and stability as well as territorial integrity. For the New Order, as 
Chapter Three notes, regime security was synonymous with Indonesia’s security. In this light, 
the AMS served as a roadmap, suggesting a causal link with Suharto’s need to ensure his regime 
security. Therefore, the AMS was indirectly used to protect Suharto’s regime from external 
security threats that could come from Australia. Second, the AMS was a manifestation of the 
importance of ideas held by Suharto, as the top foreign policy decision-maker, that would define 
the content of Indonesia’s foreign policy during the New Order. For this matter, the summit 
diplomacy between Suharto and Keating was conducted without Alatas’ knowledge. To this 
extent, it was also Suharto’s belief that working with Australia would help to build mutual trust 
and reduce any political tensions (Sukma, 2004:71). As Suharto stated, ‘the AMS is expected 
to eradicate the doubts of the Australians about Indonesia’s position’ (Sukma, 1997a: 235). In 
short, the AMS case demonstrated that the implementation of bebas-aktif during the New 
Order’s period was likely to be determined by the regime’s self-interest. 
 
 
4.3    Bebas-aktif during the Reformasi era 
 
As argued in the preceding chapters, while the role of foreign policy leaders is authoritative in 
foreign policy, other actors are involved in Indonesia’s foreign policy-making and can be 
influential by introducing new ideas into the decision-making circle. This section demonstrates 
that during the Reformasi period, the concept of bebas-aktif has not been free of challenges. At 
the conceptual level, there have been attempts, mainly proposed by the non-authoritative actors, 
to challenge its relevance and redefine the doctrine in the context of a democratic Indonesia. In 
a televised interview, for instance, Rizal Sukma argued that ‘there is nothing special about the 
bebas-aktif principle because all countries in the world would claim the same foreign policy 
principle as this is a universal and normative principle’ (Metro TV, 15 January 2011). In the 
 
 
 
106  It is important to note here that the AMS signing had provided for a rather different outcome to that of the 
Indonesian PM Sukiman who, through his FM Ahmad Subarjo, signed a similar agreement with the US in January 
1952, which was responsible for the collapse of the Sukiman Cabinet one month later. For details see, Clark 
(2011:293). 
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same interview, Hassan Wirajuda, known to be a staunch supporter of the principle, was quoted 
 
as saying, in response to Sukma’s view: 
 
 
not every country is pursuing a bebas-aktif (independent and active) foreign policy 
although they would always try to secure their national interest. But it is all about the 
means…i.e. NATO as a form of alliance with a major country. And remember, there are 
only few countries that are consistent with their stance with regards to Israel. 
 
 
One year after his presidential inauguration, SBY stated in his first major speech delivered 
before the Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA) meeting in Jakarta107 that the 
conceptual elements of bebas-aktif were as follows: first, foreign policy should be conducted 
in a constructive manner. This would mean that Indonesia should be able to turn adversary into 
friend, and friend into partner, and put its siege mentality and overly defensive attitude to rest. 
Second, Indonesia must not become involved in any military alliance and should instead work 
to develop a non-threatening posture to the region. Third, Indonesia should remain attentive to 
the regional and international issues that could affect the country. Fourth, bebas-aktif should 
involve the projection of Indonesia’s international identity, which, among others, encompasses 
the world’s largest Muslim population, the third largest democracy in the world, and advocate 
for the developing world. Fifth, Indonesia’s foreign policy was to reflect Indonesia’s ‘true brand 
of nationalism’ which is not a narrow, but rather ‘open and outward looking’ (Yudhoyono 
2005). These principles reflect the will of the Indonesian elites to picture an Indonesia that is 
different from that of pre-Reformasi hence, an identity of a ‘new Indonesia (Indonesia baru)’.108 
Consequently, this newly asserted identity prompted attempts to redefine the bebas-aktif 
concept. Central to these attempts were the ones presented by Dino Djalal in his position as 
SBY’s special staff and speechwriter. 
 
 
 
4.3.1 ‘All-direction foreign policy’ and ‘million friends, zero enemies’ diplomatic 
approach: replacing ‘bebas-aktif’? 
The most profound controversy revolving around the bebas-aktif foreign policy doctrine rests 
on a concept introduced by Dino Djalal. In Djalal’s view, Indonesia should have an ‘all- 
direction foreign policy’, underpinned by a ‘million friends and zero enemies’ diplomatic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107 The speech was titled “An Independent and Active Foreign Policy for the 21st Century”, and delivered on 19 
May 2005. 
108 The term “Indonesia baru” was a public expression coined during the Wahid and Megawati presidencies, a 
symptom of the hope for a change under the new leadership in Indonesia during the early years of Reformasi. For 
a more detailed account, see Sukma (2001:ch.8). 
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approach (Djalal 2012).109 The notion was first announced during SBY’s speech at the LSE on 
 
31 March 2009 where he stipulated: 
 
 
I have vigorously pursued what I call an ‘all-direction foreign policy’, a post-Cold War 
21st  century foreign policy outlook where Indonesia seeks a ‘million friends and zero 
enemies’. That is because we know that our international engagement is the key to our 
success, to our security, to our prosperity. Our economy cannot survive while the global 
economy collapses. We cannot have a destiny that is separate from that of our immediate 
neighbourhood, Southeast Asia, and our region, East Asia.110 
 
On 14 August 2009, SBY reiterated the concept in a state address before the DPR during the 
 
commemoration of Indonesia’s 64th Independence Day. He stated: 
 
 
Today, Indonesia can freely engage in an all-directions foreign policy where we can be 
friends of any parties for the pursuance of our national interest, be it the East, the West, 
the North, and the South. We can freely conduct the diplomacy of a thousand friends 
and zero enemies because the more we are friends with others, the safer and prosperous 
our country will be. All of these are indeed conducted based on principle of 
independence, sovereignty, equality, and mutual benefit. 
 
In an interview with the author (2 June 2010), Djalal suggested that the concept was his. As 
Djalal explains, ‘all-direction foreign policy’ essentially means that Indonesia must be able to 
effectively connect with all sides: East and West, North and South, in order to affirm 
Indonesia’s assertiveness in global affairs (Djalal, 2012: 45). This idea was based on Djalal’s 
belief that Indonesia’s democratisation should be translated into the country’s international 
relations by readily engaging with other countries, because the more friends Indonesia could 
nurture, the more secure and prosperous Indonesia would be (Djalal, 2012:45). Publicly known 
for favouring optimistic and motivating views, Djalal’s convictions about Indonesia’s 
international relationships is likely to have been influenced by his open-minded persona which 
was forward-looking and opportunity-driven (Djalal, 2012:43-5). Djalal also stipulated that 
‘zero enemy’ is the idea that ‘presently no foreign countries consider Indonesia as an enemy 
and conversely, no state is considered by Indonesia as its enemy’ (Djalal, 2012:44). This 
provocative idea is problematic for two reasons. First, Djalal had used his subjective 
interpretation to exaggerate the ideas he thought to be maintained by foreign leaders about 
Indonesia. Unless Djalal was involved in the political and the decision-making in foreign 
countries, such an interpretation requires further evidence. Second, in the context of Indonesia’s 
domestic politics Djalal undermined the perception held by other actors in the executive who 
might have different thoughts about the definition of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’. As Chapter Six 
 
 
109 Normally, in the study of foreign policy or international relations, this would be noted as “omni -directional” 
foreign policy. However, the term used in this thesis would follow the original term described by Djalal, which is 
“all-directions.” 
110  The title of the speech was Indonesia: Regional Role, Global Reach, delivered at the LSE on the 31 March 
2009. Attended by the author. 
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notes, for instance, the TNI was very unlikely to treat the Malaysian Navy as a friend in the 
context of the Ambalat dispute. 
While Djalal had successfully channelled his ideas into SBY’s foreign policy speeches, 
giving the impression that the status of Indonesia’s bebas-aktif had come into question, critics 
were persistently against Djalal’s aforementioned ideas. One of the major criticisms highlighted 
the contradiction between Djalal’s concept and the relevance of national interest in foreign 
policy. As Ikrar Nusa Bakti, an Indonesian political observer, argued: 
 
There is no such thing as foreign policy in all directions. There should be a focus that is 
in-line with geographical and national interest, and that the country must pursue a 
realistic foreign policy that can improve our domestic situation, inter alia welfare, 
democracy, and justice (The Jakarta Globe, 22 October 2009). 
 
Indeed, while countries can be friends or allies with one another, the national interests of a 
country are not always similar to another. Significantly, as argued by Weinstein (1972:367), 
every nation has its own enemies. This statement, however, should not be interpreted as 
confrontation between states; it should rather be seen in a context where the ways in which 
countries pursue their national interest are likely to create tensions. For example, it is unlikely 
that the Indonesian leadership would consider Israel a friend at the cost of Palestine’s freedom, 
and it is implausible that Indonesia would act ‘friendly’ with Malaysia when territorial disputes 
are involved. Put simply, while Indonesia has been actively promoting democratic values and 
peaceful dispute settlements in the region, considering all parties as friends would be imprudent. 
As asserted by an Indonesian journalist Fardah (Antara, 23 August 2010): ‘being kind to 
neighbours is noble, but when it concerns national sovereignty, dignity is at stake and firm 
actions seem to be valued more’. 
This being said, Djalal’s ‘million friends and zero enemies’ diplomatic approach 
became problematic as the slogan ‘all-directions foreign policy’ could be interpreted as an 
indecisive foreign policy course. In addition, pursuing such a diplomatic approach rivalled the 
original spirit of bebas-aktif, which underscored the importance of national interest as the 
rationale for the government to implement foreign policy decision. As Hatta emphasised, 
 
The policy of the Republic of Indonesia must be resolved in the light of its own interests 
and should be executed in consonance with the situations and facts it has to face… The 
lines of Indonesia’s policy cannot be determined by the bent of the policy of some other 
country, which has its own interests to service (Hatta, 1953:446). 
 
Further, Djalal’s ideas about the new foreign policy concept were not supported by his peers in 
Deplu. A senior level diplomat interviewed by the author (16 August 2011) questioned the 
benefit of implementing the slogan and wondered whether other countries would treat Indonesia 
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the same way if its foreign policy was guided by Djalal’s concept.111 The diplomat further added 
that Indonesia might have to revise its Diplomatic and Service Passports with regards to the 
restriction of their use vis-à-vis Israel and Taiwan. In the eyes of the former foreign minister 
Hassan Wirajuda, Djalal’s foreign policy concept could not even be considered as a policy, and 
was more accurately described as a mere rhetorical statement which was  ‘domestic cosmetic’ 
(Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012). Wirajuda added that since he did not believe in the 
term, he preferred not to use it as a guidance for his foreign policy decisions.112 
From the above case, how can we explain the link between democratisation and the 
salience of ideas in Indonesia’s foreign policy? First, democratisation led policy-makers to 
perceive Indonesia as having a new identity, hence, the ‘new Indonesia’ (cf. Acharya 2003b). 
At the conceptual level, Djalal’s ideas were informed by this new identity as Djalal himself 
noted that democratisation should be translated into a foreign policy ideal that espoused 
openness and pragmatism. Therefore, a democratic identity of Indonesia led Djalal to embrace 
certain ideas that were thought to be able to represent this identity in the leaders’ foreign policy 
decision. This is linked to the argument maintained in Chapter Two, emphasising the 
unlikelihood that identity would directly influence foreign policy and the importance of ideas 
as a bridging variable between identity and foreign policy. Second, Djalal’s ideas were diffused 
into foreign policy decision-making through the speeches Djalal wrote for the president. In this 
regard, his position as the president’s special staff and speechwriter facilitated the channelling 
of Djalal’s foreign policy ideas. Third, while Djalal was able to channel his concept into the 
foreign policy-making circle, his ideas have failed to take effect in the conduct of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy since authoritative foreign policy-makers, namely the foreign minister as well as 
some of the Deplu’s diplomats, did not share his ideas. Consequently, Djalal’s foreign policy 
ideas were ultimately not salient to Indonesia’s foreign policy because they did not appear in 
the domestic political discourse (unlike the idea of revitalising ASEAN in Indonesia’s foreign 
policy that appeared in Deplu’s new bureaucratic structure), nor were there any changes in the 
national regulation—such as in the Law on Foreign Relations—and in policy strategies 
following the announcement of these ideas. To be sure, if Djalal’s foreign policy concept had 
been accepted as a new doctrine for Indonesia, then an opening of diplomatic relation with, for 
instance, Israel would have been possible. Fourth, the failure of Djalal’s ideas to redefine the 
bebas-aktif doctrine was also caused by his non-authoritative role in Indonesia’s foreign policy 
 
 
 
111  For ethical purposes, the person interviewed requested to remain anonymous when quoted. The material is 
available for presentation to the panels upon request. 
112 Publicly, Wirajuda was only noted to have referred to Djalal’s concept once during his 2004 -2009 term (see, 
Wirajuda, speech at Pejambon Coffee event, 22 January 2009). 
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decision-making structure. Being merely an adviser, Djalal lacked the formal authority to create 
foreign policy and therefore, his influence in foreign policy was dependent on authoritative 
actors, most notably the president and the foreign minister. These leaders could ignore (or 
adopt) new foreign policy ideas based on their preferences and interpretation of national 
interests. 
 
4.3.2    The Islamic factor 
 
A discussion of the relationship between political Islam and the bebas-aktif doctrine 
during the Reformasi period is important for two reasons. First, as a result of Habibie’s decision 
to revoke the Anti-Subversion Law and to eliminate Pancasila from being the sole principle for 
Indonesia’s political life (see Chapter One), political Islam became one of the most prominent 
influences to emerge in Indonesia’s domestic political environment. Second, Islam constitutes 
the majority religion of Indonesia (around 90% of the population) and Indonesia’s Muslims 
approximately  make  up  89.5%  of  the  total  Southeast  Asian  Islamic  community  (Fealy, 
2004:138).113 In other words, Indonesia’s identity as a Muslim majority country was likely to 
 
assume greater significance in its foreign policy. 
 
When Leifer wrote about Indonesia’s foreign policy back in 1983, he asserted that Islam 
would constitute the unresolved problem of Indonesia’s national identity where in the pluralistic 
society of Indonesia, despite the quantity of its followers in Indonesia, there was, in practice, a 
considerable variation in adherence to orthodoxy (Leifer, 1983:137). Nevertheless, Leifer was 
also convinced that the Muslim groups would ‘not give up aspirations for the incorporation of 
Islamic values into the constitutional structure of the state’ (Leifer, 1983:39). This was 
confirmed when a number of Islamic political parties in the parliament, notably the PPP (Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan, the Unity and Development Party), PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, The 
Cresent and Star Party) and PK (Partai Keadilan, Justice Party),which was the precursor to the 
PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Justice and Welfare Party), attempted to reinstate the Jakarta 
Charter. This took place at a time when the Constitution was undergoing amendments between 
1999 and 2002, although in the end these efforts failed to obtain support from other factions in 
the parliament (Amal and Panggabean, 2004:62). 
As a societal force, the revival of political Islam initially began in the 1990s when 
 
Suharto ‘blessed’ the formation of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association or ICMI 
 
(Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia) as a result of his declining relationship with the 
 
 
113 According to Greg Fealy, Muslims make up almost half of the Southeast Asian population and about 18% of 
the world’s estimated 1.2 billion Muslims in 2004. By 2009, as revealed by Pew Forum on Religion and Public 
Life, the global Muslim population increased to 1.57 billion people, with the largest concentration in Asia (61.9%); 
meanwhile Middle Eastern countries constituted only 20% of the world’s Muslims. For the complete overview of 
the 2009 data, see Koran Tempo, 10 October 2009. 
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military.114 According to Vatikiotis (1997:133), to a certain extent the establishment of ICMI 
accommodated the hopes of young Muslim intellectuals that Indonesia could become more 
Islamic than it had previously been. With several ministers coming from the organisation, ICMI 
was recognised as Suharto’s attempt to accommodate Islam in politics. Nevertheless, there were 
suspicions and cynicism regarding the creation of ICMI. One view suggested not only that ICMI 
came to be Suharto’s new source of legitimacy, but it was also used as Habibie’s—then 
chairman of ICMI—vehicle to achieve his political ends (Hefner 1993:25). Further, 
Abdurrahman Wahid also harshly criticised the organisation for promoting a rigidly exclusive, 
and thus dangerous and undemocratic form of Islam (Hefner 1993:21). 
Apart from ICMI, NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah have taken leading roles 
as the two prominent schools of thought in the discourse of Indonesia’s political Islam. Founded 
in 1926, the NU, which in English means ‘The Awakening of the Scholars’ (Leifer, 1983:138), 
was an effort by Islamic clerics to preserve the religious culture of Traditionalist Muslims in 
Indonesia. In the study of Islam, ‘Traditionalists’ favour classical doctrine and interpretations 
of older generations of scholars within established schools of thought (Ali, 1978:129-31). NU’s 
political power, according to Hefner, has much to do with its followers’ culture, which is deeply 
imbued with populist nationalist sentiment (Hefner, 1999:46). On the other hand, 
Muhammadiyah, established fourteen years before NU in 1912, reflects a Modernist approach 
concerning the interpretation of teaching and values and thus, it emphasises the importance of 
personal interpretation (Layish, 1978:264-5). Muhammadiyah followers are generally more 
urban, wealthy, and formally educated than the NU’s (Hefner, 1999:47; Schwarz, 2000:327). 
While ICMI, NU, and Muhammadiyah have been actively involved in domestic politics 
in their own respects (see, among others, Hefner 1993, 1999), their role in influencing foreign 
policy and their attempt to make it more ‘Islamic’ was less influential. Indonesia’s bebas-aktif 
doctrine has never served the Islamic interest of Indonesia. An example is how Indonesia’s 
recognition of Palestine has not been based on any religious sense of Muslim brotherhood, but 
was based rather on the spirit of anti-colonialism enshrined in the Indonesian Constitution and 
in the 1955 Asian-African Conference (Leifer, 1983:138). Indonesia’s decision to join the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference, now the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 
was also not based on religious considerations but instead on economic grounds (Azra, 2006: 
Chapter 6; Perwita 2007). During the New Order, the reasons that Islam was only a peripheral 
factor in foreign policy were threefold. First, as previously stated, Suharto was an abangan 
rather than a santri Muslim, which means that his understanding of Islamic teachings were 
 
 
 
 
114 For a brief discussion on Suharto’s waning relationship with the military, see Chapter One. 
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influenced by Javanese syncretism (Suryadinata, 1996:14-15). Second, the military, Suharto’s 
commanding source of power, still believed that Islamist mobilisation could threaten political 
stability as there were elements of the Muslim community who wanted to establish an Islamic 
state (Perwita, 2007:44). And third, Islam was not the basis of the state. Taking into account 
these considerations, Sukma (2006:5) argues that Islam was only ever given a secondary place 
in foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, with the downfall of Suharto’s regime and consonant with SBY’s 
statement regarding the conceptual properties of the bebas-aktif foreign policy that Indonesia’s 
foreign policy should embrace Islam as the country’s self-declared international identity, one 
would expect the Islamic factor to be instrumental in Indonesia’s foreign policy (Anwar, 
2010b:51). Further, Indonesia’s key foreign policy-makers were proudly calling Indonesia a 
place where Islam and democracy peacefully coexist, utilizing the moderate identity of 
Indonesian Muslims as a foreign policy asset. Further, as former foreign minister Wirajuda 
noted, Indonesia, as the world largest Muslim-majority country, had a responsibility to 
demonstrate the peaceful face of Islam at a time when the world was experiencing 
misperceptions of Islamic culture (Wirajuda, 2007b: 3). By labelling the country in such a way, 
Indonesian foreign policy-makers wanted to position themselves in the middle of the 
conundrum, therefore playing a bridging role in the Muslim world as well as in the relations 
between the West and the Muslim community. An example was when Indonesia initiated a 
world conference of the Sunni and Shiite in Bogor, 2007, aimed at mitigating the conflict 
between the two groups in Iraq. The conference, however, did not go as planned and failed to 
bring in the significant representations from both groups, leading Wirajuda to blame Iraq’s 
instability for the failure (Detiknews, 3 April 2007). Indeed, a success in organising such a 
meeting would have further elevated Indonesia’s image as being a moderate Muslim country 
and had the potential to nurture political support from the Muslim constituents at home. 
The above discussion argues that the impact of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign relations 
 
was limited and  depended on the potential  for Muslim constituents domestically (Fealy, 
 
2004:143). Put simply, policy initiatives with Islamic dimensions were aimed at gaining 
sympathy for and further boosting legitimacy from the Muslim audience at home. Further, the 
inability of the Islamic voice to factor in foreign policy was compounded by the fact that in 
parliament, the Islamic-based political parties had failed to gain a substantial number of seats. 
In the 2009 election, for instance, garnering around 24% of the total votes, it was unlikely for 
the Islamic parties to determine Indonesia’s foreign policy in a way that would fulfil Islamic 
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aspirations (see Pemilu Indonesia 2009).115 Consequently, the Islamic influence upon foreign 
policy appeared only as a form over substance, and was driven largely by domestic political 
concerns, rather than a deep philosophical or emotional commitment towards international 
Muslim solidarity (Fealy, 2004:154; see also, Anwar 2010b). 
Therefore, political Islam has limited influence in the bebas-aktif doctrine. Essentially, 
this was a result of the low tolerance for political Islam as an underlying political idea in 
Indonesia, and complicated by the low number of votes obtained by the Islamic political parties. 
The exclusion of Islam from Indonesia’s foreign policy practice was also a result of opinions 
held by the key foreign policy decision-makers about political Islam itself. As mentioned, 
Suharto was an abangan Muslim while his foreign ministers, particularly Alatas, despite being 
of Arab descent, was not influential enough to include Islam as a factor in foreign policy 
because of the dominant role of the president in deciding the foreign policy content at the time. 
During the Reformasi era, although President Wahid possessed a strong Islamic background, 
his views on political Islam were inclusive in the sense that he supported “an Indonesian society 
and not just an Islamic one” (Hefner, 1993:21). Megawati was known to be a staunch nationalist 
and her ascension to the presidency was opposed by the Islamic faction within the DPR, as 
Chapter One noted. Her interest in political Islam only went as far as the impact of certain 
foreign policy issues affected public opinion (Azra, interview, 2 March 2009). 
During SBY’s presidency, the considerations of political Islam have been mentioned 
more openly in leaders’ foreign policy speeches. While certain foreign policy decisions indicate 
that authoritative foreign policy actors recognise the role of Islam in Indonesia’s politics, 
Indonesia’s foreign policy practice in general still has not been guided by Islamic precepts. If 
it was otherwise, it is likely that Indonesian foreign policy decision-makers would have pursued 
assertive, or even aggressive, strategies whenever a case with Islamic dimensions occurred. 
In short, despite their Muslim affiliations, most, if not all, Indonesian presidents have 
not been inclined to entertain political Islam in their foreign policy agenda. Therefore, Islamic 
precepts have had a limited influence on the implementation of the bebas-aktif doctrine. 
 
4.3.3    Nationalism 
 
In Indonesia, the idea of nationalism is embodied in the tradition of domestic politics, since it 
is an inherent part of Indonesia’s political tradition that materialised during Indonesian’s 
struggle for independence (Leifer, 2000:155). The decision by the student movements to signify 
their political aspirations in removing Suharto around the date of the nation’s Awakening Day 
 
 
115 The full result of the election is as follows: the non-Islamic parties: Demokrat Party: 20,85%, Golkar 14,45%, 
PDIP 14,03%, Gerindra 4,46%, Hanura 3,77%; the Islamic parties: PKS 7,88%, PAN 6,01%, PPP 5,32%, and 
PKB 4,46%. 
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(20 May) was an example. During the Sukarno period, Indonesia’s foreign policy was highly 
motivated by the spirit of nationalism. The politics of Konfrontasi with Malaysia was an 
example. During the New Order era, a number of Indonesia’s diplomatic strategies emphasized 
the importance of territorial sovereignty and integrity, as exemplified in the pursuit of the 
concept of Wawasan Nusantara. Following Indonesia’s democratisation, nationalistic 
sentiment has emerged prominently (see, among others, Aspinall and Berger 2001; Bertrand 
2004). Foreign policy cases that entail a certain nationalistic sense, such as those related to 
territorial entitlement, could immediately attract public’s attention (see Chapter Seven). To this 
extent, Indonesia’s nationalism experienced a change in temperament in that it is no longer seen 
as a discourse propagated by the government, as it was during the Suharto period, or a 
combative stance as it was during most part of Sukarno’s period (Leifer, 2000:155-56). This 
sub-section illustrates the extent to which the implementation of bebas-aktif doctrine has been 
affected by emerging ideas of nationalism during the Reformasi era. 
Following the US war on terror, in 2006 the American Secretary of State, Condoleezza 
Rice, sent John Bolton (later made the US Ambassador to the UN) to Jakarta to meet then 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Wirajuda and urged Indonesia to endorse the US-designed 
arrangement, named the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). According to the US Department 
of State official website, PSI is a bilateral agreement between the US and other countries that 
allows the former to interdict the delivery and the development of weapons of mass-destruction. 
Under this mechanism, the US would possess the legal right to conduct rapid action consent 
procedures for boarding, search, and seizure (Stølsvik 2007). With regards to the meeting 
between Wirajuda and Bolton, Wirajuda described that in attempts to persuade Indonesia to 
endorse the PSI, Bolton acted arrogantly and was in unilateralist spirit (Wirajuda, personal 
communication, 9 October 2010). Bolton failed to impress the Indonesian side and Wirajuda 
rejected the US proposal. There were two reasons for this decision. First, on the basis of the 
primacy of Indonesia’s national sovereignty, the implementation of the PSI arrangement was 
likely to breach Indonesia’s territorial jurisdiction. Second, in the eyes of Indonesian foreign 
policy-makers, the PSI arrangement was at odds with Indonesia’s foreign policy principle of 
supporting multilateralism and UNCLOS 1982 (Gatra, 20 March 2006). 
The above example suggests that the practice of the bebas-aktif principle has continued 
to be informed by nationalism. However, it did not manifest in an overtly aggressive foreign 
policy strategy. As Sukma notes (2012:45), the strongest expression of nationalism in the 
implementation of bebas-aktif during the Reformasi period has been in Indonesia’s consistent 
opposition to the presence of foreign powers in the region, thus maintaining the aspiration for 
a free and neutral Southeast Asia. One of the reasons for why nationalism did not manifest in 
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an aggressive foreign policy decision is because Indonesia’s state’s institutions remain 
effective, even following democratisation. Notwithstanding Indonesia’s democratic 
transformation, the primacy of the president and the foreign minister as well as Deplu, as the 
primary foreign policy institution determining Indonesia’s foreign policy remained. As Chapter 
Three notes, their foreign policy decision-making authority was not weakened despite an 
increase in the importance of other actors in the foreign policy-making circle. This argument 
thus challenges the proposition held by Mansfield and Snyder (2002), who believed that 
democratisation led to weak state’s institutions because ‘the old ones have been eroded while 
the new ones were yet to be installed’. Apart from this, the focus of Indonesian leaders to 
maintain domestic economic stability (see Chapter One), on the one hand, and their conformity 
to the perceived democratic identity of Indonesia (see Chapter Seven), on the other, also 
contributed to the absence of hostile foreign policy behaviour despite the existence of 
nationalistic spirit in the conduct of Indonesia’s diplomacy. Being a tradition that had 
underpinned the bebas-aktif doctrine since its inception, combined with the vague nature of the 
doctrine, it was always unlikely that Indonesian foreign policy-makers would pursue a policy 
agenda that contradicted nationalist sentiment. And so it has proved. In this regard, a foreign 
policy decision that underscores respect for Indonesia’s territorial integration and sovereignty 
is likely to characterise the implementation of bebas-aktif.116 This is because Indonesia’s 
security concerns had been primarily internal, such as insurgencies and territorial disintegration, 
rather than external military (Anwar, 1998:511). 
Overall, this section discusses the extent to which Indonesia’s democratic transition 
impacted the traditional foreign policy doctrine of bebas-aktif. It highlighted conceptual 
challenges and the widening participation of actors in the decision-making circle, which led to 
a competition between ideas. However, the reason why bebas-aktif continues to be invoked and 
practised irrespective of the 1998 political reforms is that the idea of conducting foreign policy 
in such an independent and active way has become entrenched in the minds of foreign policy 
decision-makers. Indeed, the dominant role of Indonesia’s authoritative foreign policy leaders 
illustrates why new ideas and political changes that emerged during the Reformasi period have 
not redefined, let alone replaced, the prominence of the bebas-aktif as Indonesia’s principal 
foreign policy doctrine. The continued legitimacy of bebas-aktif was evidenced by the decision- 
makers’ rejection of other concepts, such as those proposed by Djalal. The lack of support to 
buy into the rhetoric of an omni-directional foreign policy concept has extended to the idea of 
 
 
116 In this context, it is important to mention that the Indonesian government had forged a bilateral agreement with 
the Australian in 2006, noted as the Lombok Treaty, as a means for Indonesia to reassure Australia’s recognition 
of Indonesia’s sovereignty by, one of the methods, not granting any support to separatist movements in Indonesia. 
For details, see, among others, Barry (2006); Davies (2012); Neumann and Taylor (2010). 
113 
 
Islam as a political driver; hence Indonesia’s foreign policy has not been guided by religious 
precepts despite the increasing influence of political Islam at the domestic level. In this regard, 
references to moderate Muslims in SBY foreign policy speeches are best viewed from the angle 
of domestic politics rather than as a response to external factors. Such references made by SBY 
can be linked to his desire to nurture domestic political legitimacy for his foreign policy 
programme. This relates to Farnham’s argument (2004:445) about the need for leaders to secure 
the domestic public’s acceptability of the government’s foreign policy decisions. The 
commitment of Indonesian leaders to maintain bebas-aktif as the underlying principle of the 
country’s foreign policy also reflects a continuity in Indonesia’s foreign policy practice in the 
post-Suharto period. This is because bebas-aktif is vague, allowing leaders to implement it 
pragmatically in order to serve the interests at hand. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Bebas-aktif was derived from the worldview held by the Indonesian foreign policy leaders at 
the dawn of independence, based on the historical and cultural experiences Indonesia underwent 
following the colonial period. Central to this worldview was the idea that Indonesia should 
maintain its non-aligned stance in the context of the competition between two major blocs, and 
anti-colonialism. Non-alignment and anti-colonialism have been the main ideas underpinning 
the bebas-aktif principle within Indonesia’s foreign policy. During the Reformasi period, 
highlighted by the attempt to redefine Indonesia’s foreign policy doctrine, bebas-aktif received 
renewed scrutiny. In the event though, democratisation has not led to contemporary nationalism 
to take the form of foreign policy radicalism. This is the result of three factors: first, foreign 
policy institutions in Indonesia were not weakened despite the political transformation; second, 
political leaders remained focus on the promotion of Indonesia’s economic development; and, 
third, the political leadership bought into a commitment to Indonesia’s new democratic identity. 
In short, this chapter highlights that democratisation has led to a redefinition of identity 
in Indonesia, primarily in terms of democracy. This change in Indonesia’s international identity 
led to the emergence of different ideas about how to most appropriately describe Indonesia’s 
foreign policy principles. However, these ideas were unlikely to change bebas-aktif as this 
doctrine had reflected Indonesia’s national symbol and diplomatic pride (Dosch, 2007:33; 
Anwar and Crouch 2003), while maintaining its function as an ideological buffer for the country 
(Wirajuda 2010). Consequently, key foreign policy-makers have continued to adopt the practice 
of bebas-aktif as the guiding principle for Indonesia’s foreign policy. Therefore, bebas-aktif 
will continue to serve as the main yardstick against which for all foreign policy decisions are 
assessed (Idle IV 1956). 
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5   Democratisation and Indonesia’s Regional Cooperation in 
 
ASEAN 
 
 
This first case study will explore the impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy 
in the context of regional cooperation, particularly with regards to ASEAN. This chapter argues 
that democratisation has contextualised the changes in Indonesia’s foreign policy in relation to 
ASEAN political cooperation. Indonesian leaders have pursued foreign policy preferences that 
are different from those of the New Order era, such as the promotion of democratic values and 
human rights. Notwithstanding the decision-making power held by authoritative actors, both 
ideas entrepreneurs and the DPR have strongly promoted these values. The drafting of the 
ASEAN Political-Security Community concept paper and the ratification of the ASEAN 
Charter, respectively, demonstrated the role of these non-authoritative actors. 
The first section of this chapter discusses Indonesia’s regional foreign policy strategy 
during the Suharto administration.  Suharto’s ideas regarding national and regional resilience 
was prominent in guiding Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions in ASEAN’s political 
cooperation. Section Two examines Indonesia’s foreign policy during the Reformasi era, 
highlighting the promotion of democratic values and human rights following Indonesia’s 
chairmanship in ASEAN during 2003. This section will also investigate Indonesia’s initiatives 
in relation to the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN human rights body (AICHR). Section Three 
considers the relationship between democratisation and Indonesian foreign policy on regional 
cooperation in ASEAN by focusing on the importance of leaders in determining the final 
foreign policy content. 
 
 
5.1    Regional cooperation in Suharto’s Indonesia: establishing a leadership 
 
 
5.1.1    The function of ASEAN for Suharto’s Indonesia 
 
Shifting away from the high-profile and militant foreign policy of Sukarno, Suharto’s Indonesia 
pursued a low-key foreign policy, aspiring to create a peaceful region that would effectively 
contribute to Indonesia’s effort to stabilize its political and economic situation at the time. For 
Suharto, Indonesia’s domestic stability was achievable with the nurturing of regional and 
international  solidarity.  To  this  end,  Suharto,  in  his  New  Year  address  delivered  on  31 
December 1966, stated: 
 
 
in order to create an inter-nations solidarity, Indonesia’s striking yet arrogant leadership, 
and its role as if Indonesia is a champion, pioneer, etc have been left behind… And our 
foreign policy in the future will be guided to repair Indonesia’s international relations 
(Suharto, cited in Bandoro, 1994:2). 
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About eight months after this speech, on August 8th, 1967, Indonesia signed the Bangkok 
declaration with the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore,  which came to be the 
foundational document leading to the establishment of ASEAN. This Declaration included the 
seven purposes of the ASEAN, which were: (1) to accelerate the economic growth, social 
progress and cultural development of the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of 
equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful 
community of South-East Asian Nations; (2) to promote regional peace and stability through 
abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region 
and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter; (3) to promote active 
collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, 
cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields; (4) to provide assistance to each other 
in the form of training and research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and 
administrative spheres; (5) to collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their 
agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of 
international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communications 
facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples; (6) to promote South-East 
Asian studies; and (7) to maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international 
and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even 
closer cooperation among themselves. 
ASEAN, as the declaration stipulated, was established primarily to foster stability in the 
Southeast Asian region, pursued through economic and cultural cooperation. Suharto 
designated Adam Malik, as foreign minister, to orchestrate ASEAN’s establishment. Following 
the signing of the Bangkok Declaration and echoing Suharto’s idea about regional stability, 
Malik maintained that 
 
…the nations of Southeast Asia should consciously work towards the day when security 
in their own region will be the primary responsibility of the Southeast Asian nations 
themselves. Not through big power alignments, not through the build-up of contending 
military posts or military arsenals, but through strengthening the state of our respective 
national endurance, through effective regional cooperation and through cooperation 
with other states sharing this basic view on world affairs. It is here that the importance 
of such an organisation as ASEAN comes to force (quoted by Sebastian, 2006:185-86). 
 
It was an age of uncertainty for Indonesia’s future with rising economic inflation, exceeding 
 
600% in 1966/67 alone. At the regional level, a peaceful Southeast Asia was at stake due to 
various conflicts. The Vietnam War was raging; Malaysia and Singapore had just broken their 
union; and the Philippines still had a communist rebellion to deal with. Indonesia’s external 
affairs were no less problematic. Most Indonesians were suspicious, if not openly hostile, 
towards Beijing over the domestic political and social chaos sparked by the failed putsch by 
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Communist elements in the armed forces in 1965. Konfrontasi with Malaysia was just formally 
ended. For all these reasons, according to Anwar (2005:4-8), ASEAN served Indonesia’s 
interest through a number of reasons. First, ASEAN was helping to restore and preserve 
Indonesia’s international and regional credibility. Second, ASEAN served to prevent potential 
conflict, and to create a more harmonious and peaceful Southeast Asia. Third, ASEAN was a 
security buffer for the member countries, and through ASEAN, Indonesia tried to replace the 
danger zone with the ring of friendship. Following the termination of Konfrontasi, ASEAN was 
expected to nurture regional partnership and cooperation among Southeast Asian countries. 
Fourth, the creation of a ring of friendship would help Indonesia to focus more on its internal 
problems. Fifth, ASEAN would serve as an important tool for its member countries when 
dealing with other parties. Anwar believed that due to their sizes and power, the Southeast Asian 
countries needed ASEAN in their engagement primarily with the major powers (see also Tay, 
2000:155). Sixth, with the introduction of the concept of national and regional resilience, 
ASEAN has been an autonomous and non-aligned regional organisation. Seventh, ASEAN 
helped Indonesia enhance its international position and importance in the region and beyond. 
And eight, ASEAN facilitated bilateral military cooperation among member countries. 
In the attempt to detach from the competition between the great powers during the Cold 
War period, in 1971 the Southeast Asian countries agreed to declare the region as a zone of 
peace,  freedom,  and  neutrality,  marked  by  the  signing  of  ZOPFAN  Declaration  (Chin, 
1993:171). For Indonesia, with communism still considered by most of the leadership a 
prominent threat to security and stability, the ZOPFAN Declaration and the notion of a ‘neutral’ 
Southeast Asia was a useful ideological buffer against the spread of communism. It was under 
the auspicious spirit of the Declaration that the then Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas 
reiterated during the 1992 ASEAN Summit in Singapore the relevance of ZOPFAN as the 
central mechanism for ASEAN regional order (Chin, 1993:180). In debates prior to the 
Declaration’s endorsement by ASEAN, Indonesia insisted on the removal of any references to 
‘external guarantees’ for Southeast Asia’s security (Yahuda, 2004:84). This was a response to 
the preferences of Malaysia and Singapore that China be named the guarantor of Southeast 
Asia’s formal neutralization (Yahuda, 2004:65). The elimination of all references to external 
powers as security guarantors made it possible for the Southeast Asian countries to remain as 
key factors in maintaining regional security, as asserted in Malik’s speech. 
Aspiring to an independent Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s foreign policy was guided and 
characterised by a security approach derived from Suharto’s ideas about the prominence of 
domestic resilience. 
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5.1.2    ‘Regional resilience’: the primacy of ideas and Suharto’s authoritative role in the 
 
region 
 
Notwithstanding the focus on economic and cultural cooperation, ASEAN has been concerned 
with security and peace since its formation (Leifer, 1999:26). The termination of Indonesia’s 
Konfrontasi policy against Malaysia was the seed for the birth of ASEAN (Hein 1986; Emmers 
2003). Therefore, ASEAN was expected to strengthen peace in the absence of interstate war 
since the inception of the Association in 1967, by increasing the importance of smaller states 
through institutionalism which delegitimized the use of force and through the respect for non- 
interference in internal affairs (Alagappa 2010). Over time, ASEAN governments prioritised 
regional security over other matters (Scalapino, Sato, and Wanandi, 1990:114)—a practice that 
was not explicitly outlined in the Bangkok Declaration of 1967. For Indonesia, this was 
interpreted as, and translated into, a foreign policy that put ASEAN and its international 
economic relations at its centre (Anwar, 2000:77), while continuing to embrace the importance 
of an independent Southeast Asia. 
Suharto’s regional security concept was derived from Indonesia’s internal cognisance 
of the importance of building national strength to support the economic development that the 
country was fostering at the time. The concept of ‘resilience’ was a consequence of the common 
view held by Indonesian foreign policy elites about the country’s vulnerability to a divide and 
rule approach undertaken by stronger foreign powers (Weinstein 1976). One year after this 
concept was endorsed as Indonesia’s national security doctrine, in 1974, Suharto made public 
that: 
 
…national resilience covers the strengthening of all the component elements in the 
development of a nation in its entirety, thus consisting of resilience in the ideological, 
political, economical, social, cultural, and military fields (quoted in Emmers, 2003:19). 
 
In addition, as outlined in the 1979/80-1983/84 REPELITA (Rencana Pembangunan Lima 
Tahun) document, Suharto’s five year development plan, national resilience was conceptualised 
within a framework of self-reliance: 
 
Indonesia’s national interest should only rely upon Indonesians, not other nations. The 
decision for Indonesia to discard any opportunity to join a union or defence pact will 
only strengthen the need to rely upon ourselves.117 
 
Suharto’s national resilience concept was based on the idea that a state that is internally strong 
 
does  not  have  to  fear  external  provocations  (Narine,  2002:13).  Following  this  national 
 
endorsement, ‘national resilience’ soon became ‘regionalised’, and was known as ‘regional 
 
 
 
 
117 The originial document is in Bahasa Indonesia and translated by the author. 
119 
 
resilience’.118 Regional resilience is different from the idea of prioritising regional autonomy in 
the sense that the latter focuses upon ‘reducing the roles of external powers in regulating the 
regional order’ (Anwar, 1994:174). According to Bandoro (2008), Suharto tabled the concept 
during the first ASEAN Summit in 1976 and incorporated it in the Bali Concord 1976 and the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). In his speech delivered at the opening of the 1976 
Bali Summit, Suharto asserted that: 
 
 
our concept of security is inward-looking, namely to establish an orderly, peaceful and 
stable condition within each territory, from any subversive elements and infiltration, 
wherever their origins may be (quoted by Emmers, 2003:18). 
 
Suharto believed that his concept of resilience would, in essence, strengthen the convictions of 
the countries in the region regarding the close relationship between political stability and 
economic development at both the national and regional levels (Bandoro 2008). Suharto’s 
believed  that ensuring their own security was an inherent responsibility of ASEAN member 
states, which should be built on the foundation of economic development and and regional 
independence  stance vis-à-vis international ideological antagonism and bloc politics (Anwar, 
1994:175). General Ali Murtopo, one of Suharto’s confidantes, also believed that regional 
resilience was a determining factor in the stability of the individual Southeast Asian countries 
and the region as a whole. Taking a more militaristic view, Murtopo (1975:54) believed that 
this was the “proper response towards the possible threat posed by the super powers that may 
endanger the stability of Southeast Asia”. Therefore, Indonesia wished to regionalise the 
national resilience concept, in order to protect the political stability of the ASEAN states 
(Sebastian, 2006a:179). 
Indeed, Suharto’s assertion of the concept of resilience in the region presents two points 
about Indonesia’s regional foreign policy at the time. First, Suharto’s efforts were driven by the 
primacy placed on non-alignment inherent in the bebas-aktif doctrine. In emphasising the 
importance for ASEAN governments to be independent in looking after the region, Suharto 
envisaged a Southeast Asia that reflected Indonesia’s foreign policy values. In lieu of efforts to 
maintain an independent Southeast Asia, Indonesia was also active in brokering peace-talks 
whenever regional security was at stake. An example of this were the J akarta Informal 
Meetings (JIM) I and II on the Thai -Cambodian conflict in the late 1980s and Indonesia’s 
mediatory role in the conflict between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and 
the government of the Philippines in 1993. This proposition leads to the second point, related 
to Indonesia’s aspiration for a regional entitlement. To this extent, the guiding, if not dominant, 
 
 
 
 
118 The term ‘regionalised’ as used here is borrowed from Sebastian (2006a:ch.12). 
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position of Indonesia in the region clearly reflected Jakarta’s ‘expectation of a regional order 
influenced by its own managerial position’ (Emmers, 2005:651). Specifically, such a leading 
role was pursued by projecting political and security values to the region and encouraging other 
ASEAN members to follow. 
Notwithstanding the promotion of the regional resilience concept, Indonesia remained 
committed to the implementation of the ASEAN way—a long standing framework relying on 
respect for national sovereignty and the non-interference principle, of avoiding bureaucracy and 
supra-national arrangements, and placing an emphasis on consensual decision-making 
processes (Emmers, 2003:3).119 Therefore, Indonesia’s participation in, and support for, 
ASEAN-extended regional arrangements was essentially influenced by the relevance of 
ASEAN’s existing norms in Indonesia’s own foreign policy int erests. Indonesia’s support 
for the creation of the ARF in 1994 was largely attributed to ASEAN’s centrality in this 
arrangement and to the similarities between ARF’s work -style and that of ASEAN (Sukma 
2004).  This  similarity  emphasised,  amongst  other  thin gs,  the  processes  governing 
institutional constraints, on dialogue over coercion, and on inclusion over exclusion (Ba, 
1997:647). Indonesia was not willing to divert from its preferred method of cooperation 
within ASEAN, even in interfaces with non -ASEAN countries. For this reason, working 
under a style that was successfully developed by ASEAN over the years enabled Indonesia 
to lead the intramural relationships between the ASEAN member countries; thus, ASEAN 
became a comfort zone for Indonesia’s regional d iplomacy. 
 
 
5.2    Post-Suharto’s Indonesia regional cooperation: changing preferences 
 
 
5.2.1    The 2003 ASEAN Summit 
 
Following Suharto’s fall, the magnitude of Indonesia’s domestic problems has, in many 
ways, forced the ruling government to neglect ASEAN -centred cooperation. In addition, 
Indonesia’s  regional  cooperation  in  ASEAN  was  limited  by  the  tensions  between 
Indonesia and its neighbours, for instance strained relations as a results of Habibie’s 
statement that Singapore was merely a ‘little red -dot on the map’ (Haacke 2003; Caragata 
2000). It was not until 2001 that Indonesia started to normalise its ASEAN foreign 
relations under the Megawati presidency. 
In 2003, ASEAN was under Indonesia’s chairmanship. The Indonesian leaders 
seized this opportunity to substantively reclaim their leadership over the body. For this 
purpose,  Indonesian  foreign  policy-makers  promoted  new  political  ideas  within  the 
 
 
119 For the analysis of the understandings and practices as well as the development of the ASEAN way, see Haacke 
(2003). 
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region, notably democracy and human rights. As acknowledged by Indonesia’s current 
 
foreign minister Marty Natalegawa in a spe ech before the Asia Society in New York in 
 
2010: 
 
 
I remember back in 2003 when we also began the process of our chairmanship of 
ASEAN, our then Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda posed the question to myself, 
then the Director General of ASEAN, how are we going to handle this, how are we 
going to develop our thoughts on ASEAN chairmanship. In other words, then as it is 
now, I’m convinced and I’m determined to ensure that Indonesia’s chairmanship of 
ASEAN does not simply mean procedural issues, in the sense of simply chairing 
meetings. We must show leadership, shaping and forming ASEAN as it proceeds ahead 
(italic added). 
 
The ASEAN chairmanship afforded Indonesian leaders the opportunity to diffuse political 
ideas throughout the region. Indonesia’s role in p romoting democracy and human rights 
has  been  a  hallmark  of  the  post -Suharto’s  regional  foreign  policy.  Consequently, 
Indonesia  also  sought  to  change  the  traditional  pattern  of  ASEAN’s  intra -mural 
cooperation  by  advocating  democratic  values  through  the  ASEA N  Political-Security 
Community concept paper, the ASEAN Charter, and the ASEAN Inter -Governmental 
Commission on Human Rights. 
 
5.2.2    The ASEAN Political-Security Community 
 
ASEAN has been dubbed a security community, which was intended to focus on cooperation 
to resolve disputes and conflict within the regional grouping (Acharya 1991), long before the 
ASEAN member states themselves institutionalised the concept of ASEAN Community.120 
During the ASEAN Summit in October 2003 in Bali, at which the Bali Concord II was signed, 
the ten member states agreed upon three pillars of cooperation to support the creation of an 
ASEAN community, which envisioned transforming the primarily elitist and inter- 
governmental  regional  organisation  into  one  that  was  more  people -oriented  (Anwar, 
2010a:133) by 2015. These pillars involved political-security, economic, and socio-cultural 
aspects. 
In June 2003, Indonesia took the initiative to introduce the concept of the ASEAN 
Security Community, or the ASC (which was later renamed ASEAN Pol itical Security 
Community, APSC), to stress the importance of ASEAN as a zone of peace (Wibisono, 
2009:208)  as  well  as  to  balance  the  economic  preoccupation  in  ASEAN  (Severino, 
 
2006:355).121  Indonesia felt the need for ASEAN member countries to promote polit ical 
 
 
120 For a thorough discussion on security community in general, see Deutsch (1961). For an authoritative work on 
security community in Southeast Asia, see Emmerson (2005a). 
121 ASEAN Community is desired to have three pillars, namely the APSC, the AEC (ASEAN Economic 
Community), and the ASCC (ASEAN Socio-cultural Community). However, the concept of the socio -cultural 
was the least popular compared to the APSC or the AEC For details, see, among others, Narine (2009). 
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development as a means to ‘bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher 
plane to ensure that countries in the region coexist peacefully in a just, democratic, and 
harmonious environment’ (see Bali Concord II, 2003). 
The APSC concept paper originated from Rizal Sukma’s presentation at the 
Indonesian Permanent Mission in New York, June 2003. Recognising the declining role 
of ASEAN in responding to regional political and economic challenges, Sukma (2003) 
urged Indonesia to reinstate ASEAN’s relevance by leading a transformation within 
ASEAN. He also noted the importance of the 2003 Summit as an opportunity for Indonesia 
to  ‘redefine  the  ASEAN’s  principles’  by  proposing  new  ideas  that  would  allow  for 
ASEAN to evolve into a security community. As Sukma continued, the idea of ASEAN 
Security Community should provide a sense of purpose, a practical goal, and a future 
condition that all member states should strive for. To this extent, Sukma underscored the 
need  for  greater  cooperative  involvement  between  ASEAN  member  countries  when 
human rights issues are at stake. 
Taking into account the diversity in the political systems of ASEAN member 
states122  (Stubbs, 2004:226) as well as the complexity in the regional interactions 
(Acharya, 2009a:122), Indonesian leaders were careful in drafting the ASC concept paper, 
the content of which was  reflected  in  the 2004 ASC Plan of Action. As  a result  of 
numerous meetings involving Sukma, Wirajuda, and relevant officials of the ASEAN unit 
at Deplu, it was agreed that the draft should exclude a number of terms considered to be 
sensitive for other ASEAN members, including ‘human rights’ (a term that initially 
appeared in Sukma’s paper). Also, the draft avoided bluntly using the term ‘democratise 
the region’ and incorporated a lighter term, ‘political development’. 123 This compromise 
facilitated the acceptance of the Bali Concord II amongst ASEAN member nations as, in 
the end, ‘no countries openly objected to the notion of political development’ (Wirajuda, 
interview, 12 January 2012). 
As the Bali Concord II stipulated, politically developing the region meant ASEAN 
member countries were encouraged to pursue democratic values while allowing for a more 
open and democratic atmosphere in inter-state interactions. Such a development would 
eventually effect the way Indonesia perceived ASEAN’s non -interference principle, which 
 
 
122 According to a Freedom House Report in 2008, Southeast Asia consists of a mixed degree of political freedom 
with Indonesia being the only country categorised as ‘free’, with the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore 
as ‘partly free’, and Myanmar, joined by the remaining ASEAN members, as ‘not free’. Freedom House rates 
political freedom of world countries on a range of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest 
level of freedom. Those whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered Free, 3.0 to 5.0 Partly Free, and 5.5 to 7.0 
Not Free. For the complete survey and methodological information of the Freedom House, see Freedom House 
Report (2008), “Methodology”. 
123 For a comparison of the draft of ASC Plan of Action 2004, see Acharya (2009a:263). 
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constituted ‘the traditional pattern of elite socialisation’ in ASEAN (Anwar 2010a; Acharya 
 
2003b). This  openness  was  immediately effective following the Bal i Concord  II was 
signed, when Megawati called for Myanmar to make public the timetable of its roadmap 
to democracy (The Jakarta Post, 10 November 2003). In ‘questioning’ the sanctity of the 
non-interference principle, Adian Silalahi, the former DG for ASEA N at Deplu, stated: 
 
We still adhere to those principles (of ASEAN), but I believe that on this issue 
(non-intervention) we are more open now… Indonesia is more open and flexible 
because of the democratisation process (quoted in Acharya, 2009a:254). 
 
Moreover, Wirajuda believed that the underlying consideration for this development was 
the changing characteristics of security problems in the globalising world, which was 
characterised by trans-boundary issues. To address these problems countries needed to 
cooperate with one another irrespective of jurisdictional boundaries (Wirajuda, personal 
communication with the author, 2010). 
Although it challenged the non-interference principle, Indonesia had, in practice, 
benefited from the practice of this principle. An example was the haze problem generated 
from forest fires in Kalimantan and Sumatera which forced Malaysia and Singapore to 
protest against Indonesia at a UN session in 2006 (The Jakarta Post, 26 August 2006). As 
a result of this protest, Indonesia was forced to organise the 2006 Environment Ministerial 
Meeting on Trans-boundary Haze Pollution and in that meeting Indonesia was urged by 
its neighbours to ratify the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Trans -boundary Haze Pollution 
(Acharya, 2009a:253). The Indonesian DPR refused to ratify the Agreement, as Agusman 
Effendi, chairman of the DPR’s Environmental Commission, argued that Indonesia was 
‘not ready’ for the ratification and instead blamed the illegal forestry activities conducted 
by ‘other ASEAN countries’ as the source of the haze problem (Koran Tempo, 15 October 
2006). Indonesian officials also maintained that the haze problem was an internal problem 
and therefore it should not be subject to interference from external parties (The Jakarta 
Post, 26 August 2006). 
In the context of promoting ASEAN’s political development, for Indonesia, the 
imperative for ASEAN to adhere to a shared democratic political system was fostered by 
three reasons. First, adhering to a democratic political system could reinstate Indones ia’s 
leadership role in the region. The 2003 ASEAN chairmanship presented an opportunity to 
seize and reaffirm Indonesia’s regional leadership, as it ‘may have to wait for another ten 
years before the chairmanship comes again’ if it wanted to push for such a security 
initiative (Acharya, 2009a:259). This window of opportunity was used by Sukma, as a 
policy entrepreneur, to channel new foreign policy ideas into Indonesia’s foreign policy - 
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making process. Sukma’s ideas were reproduced by the foreign minister, which resulted 
in the alteration of certain elements, including the notion of human rights, which led them 
to be incorporated in the final proposal. To this extent, as mentioned in Natalegawa’s 
speech, Sukma’s paper contributed to Indonesia’s search for a theme to distinguish its 
regional leadership (Emmerson, 2005a:179). Given the focus on domestic economic issues 
and Indonesia’s democratic consolidation, Indonesia’s attempt to reinstate its regional 
leadership was thought to be more effective if pursued t hrough a foreign policy that 
promoted the importance of related ideas and values. This is also because Indonesia’s 
foreign policy has always been based on ‘values and principles shared by all Indonesians 
which reflect the country’s unique historical, cultu ral, and political experience’ (Sukma, 
1995:305). Overall, the 2003 Bali Summit ‘witnessed Indonesia’s re -emergence to the 
role of group leader, or at least, demonstrated Jakarta’s desire to begin to steer the 
direction of the grouping again’ (Smith, 2004: 423). 
Second, as ASEAN was to take a strategic step towards wider regionalism, ongoing 
political divisions between member countries threatened to risk ASEAN’s credibility and 
focus. The role of ASEAN as a primary driving force in the multi -regional organisation 
depended  on  its  own internal  consolidation. In  this  context,  Wirajuda  (interview,  12 
January 2013) noted that ASEAN’s centrality in existing ASEAN -sponsored regional 
arrangements should not be taken for granted. The issue of ASEAN cohesiveness shoul d 
not be underestimated by member states because – as Dewi Fortuna Anwar warned – the 
Association had been able to play its current role given that the major countries had been 
‘permitting’ ASEAN to do so (Anwar, interview, 23 August 2011). Through a speec h 
delivered at a public lecture in Berlin, Wirajuda (2007a) also highlighted the importance 
of political  cohesiveness  among  ASEAN members through  subscribing to  the shared 
values of democracy and human rights, in order for ASEAN to be effective. Similarly, 
SBY (2005) held that ASEAN is expected to ‘develop and nurture common values, 
particularly those that promote human dignity and freedom.’ In other words, Indonesia 
sought to end ideological divisions in ASEAN and only when this effort is successful that 
Indonesia could further strengthen the claim of being a regional leader. 
Third, building international credibility as a democratic country could positively 
contribute to Indonesia’s democratic consolidation process at home and, as Acharya 
(2003b:378) argued, could also facilitate greater support from international donors for 
regional projects (see also Vaughn, 2001:34 -5; Seniwati and Mohd. Sani, 2012:682). 
Above all, the APSC reflected the need for domestic peace and stability in Southeast Asia, 
which  in  turn  would  contribute  to  the  process  of  democratic  consolidation  at  home 
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(Vermonte, 2005:27). The APSC was also seen a manifestation of Indonesia’s intellectual 
 
leadership in the region (Anwar, interview, 23 August 2011). 
 
 
5.2.3    ASEAN Charter 
 
At the 2005 ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN leaders agreed to establish an 
 
ASEAN  Charter,  a  legally  binding  document  that  was  expected  to  bring  about  a 
 
‘deepening of regional integration and making ASEAN a more cohesive, legalised, 
institutionalised, and rule-based organisation’ (Rüland, 2011:11). In other words, by 
imposing a definite legal structure, institutionalising the rules and roles of ASEAN bodies, 
and giving ASEAN an international legal personality, it was hoped that ASEAN would 
transform its informal nature into a formal one (Hung, 2010:836). To this extent, some 
have even compared ASEAN with the EU (see, among others, Rachminawati and 
Syngellakis 2012). As the Chairman statement of this summit stipulated, the Charter, in 
essence, would serve as ASEAN’s constituti on. 
For the purpose of drafting  the Charter,  a ten -person  Eminent Persons  Group 
 
(EPG), with representation from each of the ASEAN countries, was formed. 124 Among the 
 
28 recommendations contained in the Blueprint of ASEAN Charter, initially prepared by the 
Indonesian representative Ali Alatas (hence ‘the Alatas’ Paper’), the EPG stressed the need for 
ASEAN to update its principles and objectives in line with new regional geopolitical realities 
through the following: (a) a strengthening of democratic values and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedom; (b) narrowing the development gap among ASEAN countries; (c) 
substantiating the role of the ASEAN Secretariat and its Secretary General by entrusting them 
with monitoring compliance of ASEAN agreements; and lastly (d) to cultivate ASEAN as a 
people-centred organisation by raising the level of participation of, inter alia, civil society 
representatives as well as human rights groups in ASEAN’s activities (Koh, 2009:51). The 
blueprint was finalised by a High Level Task Force (HLTF), which was comprised of ASEAN 
member states’ senior officials and mandated the draft  of the ASEAN Charter. Indonesia was 
represented by Dian Triansjah Djani, then the DG for ASEAN Cooperation. 
When the EPG recommendations were incorporated into the HLTF in 2007, it was 
argued that the Charter’s final draft was watered-down by the latter, as it disqualified a number 
of recommendations (Sukma, 2008:44). The disqualified recommendations included, amongst 
others, the recommendation on the decision-making mechanism, on transforming ASEAN to 
 
 
 
124 The EPG consists of elder statesmen from each of the ASEAN countries, namely Aun Porn Moniroth 
(Cambodia), Nguyen Manh Cham (Vietnam), S. Jayakumar (Singapore), Ali Alatas (Indonesia), Tun Musa Hitam 
(Malaysia), Fidel Ramos (Philippines), Khamphan Simmalavong (Laos), Kasemsamosorn Kasemri (Thailand), 
Than Nyun (Myanmar), and Pehin Dato Lim Jock Seng (Brunei). 
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be a people-centred organisation, and on the dispute settlement mechanism (see Report of the 
Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter, December 2006; see also Leviter 2010). In 
response to this situation, Alatas expressed his great disappointment (see Chachavalpongpun 
2008), while others described that the Charter was ‘neither bold nor visionary’ and that it ‘failed 
miserably’ (Sukma, 2008:44, 47). Within the DPR, the Charter was initially criticised, 
highlighting the weak enforcement of sanction mechanisms, the consensus-based decision- 
making style, and on the lack of opportunity for people’s participation in the ASEAN decision- 
making process (see Sukma, 2008:45; Rüland 2011; Sastra 2008). These criticisms intensified 
during the public consultation between the panitia khusus for the ASEAN Charter within the 
DPR and six academics and long-observers of ASEAN.125 On 10 September 2008, Rizal 
Sukma, for instance, asserted that ASEAN was ‘still caged in the illusion of the past’ and 
criticised the lack of avenues for popular participation, whereby the people were merely made 
‘passive recipients’ of the decisions taken by ASEAN.126 Similarly, Jusuf Wanandi, a leading 
 
Indonesian scholar, insisted that Indonesia should not place ASEAN in the inner circle of its 
foreign policy any longer and instead suggested a new initiative, which was short-lived, called 
‘East Asia G-8’, an overarching body for strategic dialogues and for hard traditional 
security cooperation, comprising Australia, China, India, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Russia, and the US (with ASEAN represented by the chair and the secretary -general) (The 
Jakarta Post, 3 November 2008). Indonesian Parliament members highlighted that the 
Charter failed to introduce two mechanisms, namely on sanctions and on voting, to replace 
ASEAN’s consensual decision-making process. For instance, while making a reference to 
the EU systems, Sutradara Gintings of the PDIP maintained that sanctions and a 
compliance mechanism should be considered by ASEAN (Report of the Public Hearing, 
10 September 2008). Another legislator, Djoko Susilo, questioned how the Charter could 
persuade the Myanmar junta to democratise the country and improve its human rights 
track record (The Jakarta Post, 5 February 2008). These shortcomings led to the debates 
about whether Indonesia should ratify the Charter in its current form. 
In an attempt to nurture public support for the ratification of the ASEAN Charter, Deplu 
organised no less than 320 public events, including policy workshops with academics and 
policy experts, mostly held between July and October 2008 (Assignment Report of the Foreign 
Minister, 2009:69). This could be considered political lobbying by Deplu because during the 
 
 
125 These include: Banyu Perwita (an academic at Parahyangan University), Bambang Cipto (an academic from 
Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta University), Bazis Susilo (Dean at Airlangga University), Rusdi (a human rights 
activist from Imparsial), Joseph Prasetyo (a member of the National Human Rights Commission), and Rizal Sukma 
(Director of CSIS). 
126 During this hearing session, Sukma presented his paper entitled ‘The Last Wish’ (Permohonan Terakhir). This 
paper basically contains his arguments regarding why the DPR should not ratify the ASEAN Charter. 
127 
 
aforementioned public consultation at the parliament, Sukma was the only one who rejected the 
ratification, while three others—namely Perwita, Susilo, and Rusdi—indicated their support for 
the ratification, whereas the positions of Prasetyo and Cipto were unclear (Report of the Public 
Hearing, 10 September 2008). For instance, Perwita noted that ‘in order to change the existing 
voluntary compliance tradition in ASEAN… we need to ratify the ASEAN Charter’, while 
Susilo held that ‘we are not against the ratification, however, we are also open to future 
amendments of the Charter based on our national interests’ (Report of the Public Hearing, 10 
September 2008). In defence of the final version of the Charter, the then foreign minister 
Wirajuda, in a meeting with the DPR on 6 October 2008, held that the bold and visionary EPG 
recommendations reflected ‘idealistic concepts which were not necessarily realistic to be 
achieved in the negotiation process at the HLTF and the ministerial level’ (Deplu, 6 October 
2008). This is because the ASEAN Charter was a product of inter-governmental negotiations 
based on compromises designed to accommodate divergent positions that were the result of 
different national interests of the Association’s member countries (Severino, 2009:8). Wirajuda 
also maintained that a consensus-based decision-making style was still preferred by 
ASEAN countries (Deplu, 6 October 2008). For Wirajuda, Indonesia stood to benefit from 
this decision-making style, as a voting mechanism was regarded as easily leading to 
Indonesia becoming out-voted, especially on controversial issues such as human rights. 
On the issue of sanctions, Wirajuda suggested that explicitly stating this provision in the 
Charter was unnecessary, as a decision on sanctions would be agreed to by the Summit 
(Deplu, 6 October 2008). In practice, the imposition of an unwritten sanction had taken 
place in ASEAN when the leaders of the Association decided in 2005 to urge the Myanmar 
junta to ‘relinquish’ the impending 2006 ASEAN chairmanship intended for Myanmar, 
following  the  lack  of  progress  in  Myanmar’s  road  map  to  democracy  (Acharya, 
2009a:257). Indonesia then ratified the Charter on 8 th October 2008, nearly one year after 
 
the Charter was signed in Singapore in November 2007. 127 
 
For Indonesia, the ASEAN Charter was a strategic imperative because Indonesia was 
a staunch supporter for the promotion of democracy and human rights (Volkmann, 2008:78). 
Since the ASEAN Charter highlighted these values, the Charter would serve Indonesia’s 
regional political and security aspirations and would institutionalise the political ideas projected 
through Indonesia’s foreign policy, as reflected in the aforementioned APSC concept. 
Consequently, the enactment of the Charter was seen to allow Indonesia’s ideas of democracy 
and human rights to be accepted, and shared, by other ASEAN members because the Charter 
 
 
 
127  Singapore was the first to ratify the Charter, followed by Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, Cambodia, Vietnam, 
Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines. 
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was legally binding for all ASEAN member states. This, in turn, would internalise the idea of 
democracy and human rights at the ASEAN level. Only when these ideas are internalised could 
Indonesia’s goal to politically develop ASEAN be achieved. 
 
5.2.4    The creation of the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights 
 
(AICHR) 
 
One of the most crucial elements in the Charter has been the agenda setting out the ASEAN 
human rights mechanisms.128 According to Singapore’s Ambassador-at-Large Tommy Koh and 
Dian Triansjah Djani of Indonesia, both present in HLTF meetings throughout 2007, it was not 
until the seventh and eighth meeting that the discussion intensified as the group was exposed to 
the contentious issue of the creation of a human rights mechanism (Koh 2009).129 
During the seventh meeting held in Bali, June 2007, the group was able to consult on 
human rights issues with the four heads of the national human rights commissions in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Myanmar requested that the views in this meeting be 
turned into a concept paper by the Secretariat rather than the HLTF, and this idea was ultimately 
endorsed (Koh, 2009:58). Evidently, the Myanmar officials present at the meeting sought to 
avoid the possibility of the outcome being scrutinised by the junta leader considering the 
irritations that human rights issues were likely to cause Yangon. 
The eighth meeting held in Manila one month later saw the group divided into three 
camps. The CLMV countries opposed the creation of a human rights mechanism, while 
Indonesia and Thailand were in favour of, and the rest took the middle ground (Koh, 2009:58). 
Following this deadlock, the ASEAN-6 were able to persuade the CLMV camp to follow the 
former’s position (Reuters, 30 July 2007). In the end, this meeting, as further described by Koh 
(2009), adopted the following as a text on the human rights issue: 
 
ASEAN shall/may establish an ASEAN human rights body, at a time acceptable to all 
ASEAN member states to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of the people of ASEAN. 
 
 
 
 
 
128  By far, Tommy Koh’s (2009) account provided the most detailed explanation on the stages leading to the 
creation of the AICHR. 
129 Interestingly, however, efforts to promote the establishment of human rights mechanisms in the region were 
started in 1993 when the ASEAN Foreign Ministers acknowledged the consideration of the establishment of an 
appropriate regional mechanism of human rights, as a response to the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human 
Rights which decided the need for establishing regional and sub-regional arrangements for the promotion and 
protection of human rights where they do not already exist. The attempt to substantiate this process continued 
when in 1995 an informal Working Group for ASEAN Human Rights mechanism was formed, constituting 
individuals and groups who were working with government offices or have a particular concern in promoting 
human rights in the region. In 2000, the group submitted a recommendation paper to the governments of ASEAN 
although the reaction from the latter was muted. The group continuously held meetings until 2006. The group has 
continued to exist up to the point of writing this thesis. For details, see Phan (2008). 
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At the tenth HLTF meeting in Chiang Mai in September 2007, the ASEAN member countries 
accepted that the Charter would include a provision on establishing an ASEAN human rights 
body. On this occasion, they focused on (i) the function of the human rights body, (ii) the draft 
of the terms of reference (ToR) of the human rights body, and (iii) the deadline for the 
completion of the ToR (Koh, 2009:62). In response to this development, the group was divided, 
with the CLMV camp at one end arguing that the ToR must be concluded before the signing of 
the Charter and that the human rights body would only have a consultative status, while on the 
other, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand arguing that the ToR should be 
discussed separately by a group of experts after the signing of the Charter. They also wanted 
the human rights body function to extend to monitoring (Koh, 2009:62). 
The Chiang Mai meeting was intense, as an exchange of strong words occurred and one 
participant threatened to pack his bag and go home (Koh, 2009). Although Koh did not mention 
who the delegate was, a senior Indonesian diplomat admitted in private that it was the 
Indonesian representative. 130 Ultimately, the HLTF decided that the ToR of the human rights 
body were to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers. 
At the AMM in Phuket in July 2009, following the ratification of the ASEAN Charter 
by all member states, ASEAN Foreign Ministers agreed upon the ToR for the creation of a 
human rights body. In frequent consultation with human rights experts from each country, the 
Indonesian, Thai and the Filipino delegations, who were supported by active and vibrant 
national human rights organisations, insisted that the human rights body be equipped to 
investigate certain human rights abuses, while others resisted such a proposal (Currie 2010). In 
the process of creating a human rights body, Deplu had continuously consulted the Jakarta- 
based human rights NGO, Human Rights Watch (HRW), to ensure congruence between 
Indonesia’s regional stance and domestic aspiration (Djamin, interview, 8 August 2011).131 
In the negotiation process for the creation of the AICHR, Jakarta faced a situation of 
 
‘one against nine’ since Indonesia was unwilling to alter its position, advocating for a more 
 
‘progressive’ body (Suryodiningrat 2009). The division continued when the Association 
decided the mechanisms for selecting the members of the human rights body. Despite such 
turbulence, the ToR were adopted, with the authority of the body limited to a consultative role 
(see AICHR ToR, Article 3). Also, ASEAN member countries were not interested in adding to 
their responsibilities by submitting an additional report to the AICHR review mechanism in 
addition to what they had already done with regard to the UN obligatory human rights reports 
(Hsien-Li, 2011:76). Disappointed with the adopted version, Indonesia criticised the ToR for 
 
 
 
130 A senior level diplomat mentioned this to the author in 2009. 
131 Rafendi Djamin was the HRW Indonesia’s Representative and is Indonesia’s Representative at the AICHR. 
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being ‘far below the international standards’ (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012; see also 
Currie, 2010:7). For this reason, Indonesia agreed to accept it after a provision for a five-year 
mandatory review was secured therein (see AICHR ToR, Article 9.6). Despite the limitations, 
the AICHR was formally endorsed on 20 July 2009. 
The creation of AICHR demonstrated ASEAN’s willingness to adapt to new political 
realities in the region, as suggested by the EPG report. It also reflected ASEAN’s interest in 
conforming to global cultural scripts, where human rights institutions were a normal part of 
regional community structures (Munro 2011). Others have also posited that AICHR was 
derived from the need for ASEAN to secure its identity as a legitimate institution in the 
community of modern states, hence emulating the West (Katsumata 2009). In other words, 
ASEAN was concerned about its international image. Being criticised by Western countries for 
its failure to uphold basic principles of freedom, the creation of AICHR was a substantive effort 
by ASEAN leaders to boost the Association’s credibility vis-à-vis human rights. 
 
5.2.5    Indonesia and the AICHR 
 
For Indonesia, the establishment of the AICHR was a manifestation of the Charter’s demand. 
The Indonesian diplomats believed that the new human rights body could be a useful tool for 
promoting Indonesia’s political aspirations for a more democratic ASEAN. This belief was 
illustrated by the selection of Indonesia’s representative to sit in the AICHR. 
Typically a former or active government official would be appointed to this post, but 
Indonesia and Thailand, in a fashion that ‘derailed’ expectations, opted to select a non- 
government official for this post.132 In Indonesia, the selection process lasted about five weeks, 
from September 3rd to October 10th, 2009. During this process, Deplu formed a selection 
committee, consisting of representatives from government, civil society, and the media, who 
were tasked with providing recommendations to the foreign minister. Two candidates were 
considered as a result of this process. The first candidate was Marzuki Darusman, a former 
Attorney General and a former Chairman of Komnas HAM (the National Human Rights 
Commission), who was also a member of Komisi I and known for his credentials as a human 
rights defender. He was also a close friend of Hassan Wirajuda. The second candidate was 
Rafendi  Djamin.  The  DPR  members  initially  preferred  Marzuki  for  the  post.  However, 
Wirajuda opted for Djamin with the hope that a non-governmental representative “could be 
 
 
132 AICHR comprises of one representative from each ASEAN member country for a duration of three years and 
may be re-appointed for only one more term. For the 2009-2012 term these representatives are: Rafendi Djamin 
(Indonesia), Pehin Dato Hamid Bakal (Brunei), Om Yentieng (Cambodia), Bounkeut Sangsomsak (Laos), 
Muhammad Shafee Abdullah (Malaysia), U Kyant Thin Swe (Myanmar), Rosario G Manalo (Philippines), Richard 
Magnus (Singapore), Sriprapha Petcharamesree (Thailand), Do Ngoc Son (Vietnam). For the complete 
background of each of these individuals, see ASEAN, “ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission of Human 
Rights.” 
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more vocal to the region because he will not have any governmental burden and that he would 
 
be more acceptable to the human rights activists at home”.133 
 
Many have argued that ASEAN is an elites-centred organisation, established by non- 
democratic political regimes (e.g. Anwar, 2010a:133). For this reason, Deplu officials 
welcomed the election of Djamin to represent the country in the AICHR, as it illustrated 
Indonesia’s support for a people-centred ASEAN. This view, however, was not shared by 
human rights activists at home, who argued that the AICHR and the subsequent appointment 
of Djamin only reflected a people-centred ASEAN if the mechanism worked effectively 
(Currie, 2010:11). Despite this view, Djamin’s appointment sparked hope within civil society 
who anticipated that the AICHR would eventually be able to address human rights violations 
taking place in ASEAN countries. Inspired by this expectation, they  attempted to bring cases 
of human rights abuses in Indonesia to the AICHR despite the fact that AICHR possesses no 
authority to investigate human rights cases under the ToR (The Jakarta Post, 29 March 2010). 
Over time, the role of the AICHR may erode the practice of ASEAN’s policy of non- 
interference. At least this is what Indonesia has been aspiring to since Deplu first introduced 
the APSC idea in 2003. Such aspirations were evidenced by a number of comments made by 
Indonesian diplomats. For instance, PLE Priatna, a senior diplomat, argued: 
 
With the existence of AICHR, the ASEAN countries should no longer be resistant and 
hiding behind non-interference principle to isolate or to divert the human rights cases 
from being discussed (Kompas, 7 August 2009). 
 
Furthermore, Wirajuda (2008), at Foreign Policy Breakfast (FPB) meeting in Deplu held to 
communicate the ASEAN Charter to Indonesian government officials and civil society groups, 
stressed this point even further by arguing that: 
 
the fact is that non-interference principle is a dynamic concept. Gross violations of 
human rights can no longer be claimed as domestic matters, which therefore means 
discussing the problem would be interpreted as violating this principle. Other ASEAN 
member countries were concerned because they think Indonesia was interpreting the 
concept way too advanced. Nevertheless, Indonesia has no intention to interfere in [the 
domestic affairs of] other ASEAN countries, but since ASEAN is a family [it should 
act in the way a family would] when a member of the family is in trouble, other family 
members may discuss it for the good will in helping to find the solution.134 
 
In spite of the existence of the AICHR, its failure to act beyond mere consultation has invited 
 
intense public criticism. Some have described the AICHR as a ‘toothless tiger’ (Hector 2010; 
 
 
 
133 As expressed by a senior level diplomat to the author in several personal communications during the process 
of this writing. 
134 The Foreign Policy Breakfast (FPB) on this theme was conducted in Deplu on 1 February 2008. A number of 
academics, politicians, businessmen, NGO members, and other members of Indonesia’s epistemic community 
were present at this meeting. 
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Kelsall 2009), and feared that the consultative nature of the body would hinder ASEAN from 
protecting human rights in the region (The Jakarta Post, 23 March 2009; AFP, 20 July 2009). 
Adding to this criticism, it was argued that the ASEAN way limited the AICHR’s function 
(McCarthy 2009). An Indonesian rights activist Wahyu Susilo held that ASEAN non- 
interference principles would make things even worse. He argued: 
 
the weakness of the AICHR ToR was its orientation on the promotion element and 
neglecting the protection aspect, as [ASEAN] is still adhering to the principle of non- 
interference. [Further], the monitoring mechanism is simply non-existent (Sinar 
Harapan, 23 July 2009). 
 
In responding to these criticisms, ASEAN leaders asserted that it was ‘better to have any type 
of mechanism than none at all’ (Suryodiningrat 2009). For instance, the former ASEAN 
Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan pointed out that the endorsement of the body by the ASEAN 
member states would be a ‘good beginning’ for the human rights situation in Southeast Asia 
(AFP, 20 July 2009). In this context, although AICHR’s role stressed an advisory role rather 
than an enforcement capacity, 
 
it has the potential to act as a trigger to further discussion on human rights issues in 
member states and open avenues for others. [Therefore, its existence] is remarkable and 
is an essential first step towards ASEAN’s stated goal of respecting and protecting 
human rights (Kelsall 2009). 
 
In essence, although the role of the AICHR was primarily advisory, it could ‘indirectly’ pursue 
the task of investigation as the body mandated to ‘obtain information from other ASEAN 
member states on the promotion and protection of human rights’ (AICHR ToR, Article 4.10) 
and to ‘prepare studies on thematic issues of human rights in ASEAN’ (AICHR ToR, Article 
4.12). In this context, Munro (2011:1190) suggested that these particular activities would 
require AICHR to collect certain relevant information which could, in turn, lead to the 
investigation of particular abuses, hence it ‘could become a formidable body with wide-ranging 
powers’. This particular perspective regarding the ToR compelled Indonesia to accept the 
document in spite of its initial reservation. As explained by Rafendi Djamin (interview, 8 
August 2011): 
 
 
There is an avenue to ensure that the victims’ voices are heard because here there will 
be dialogue which means we can bring in the victims to talk… Therefore, promotion, 
or in this case exposure (of human rights cases), will have an implication on the 
protection of human rights. 
 
So far, this chapter has argued that Indonesia’s foreign policy as regards regional cooperation 
in ASEAN has consistently been underpinned by certain values, derived from political leaders’ 
interpretations of domestic realities. During the New Order era, Suharto launched the concept 
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of regional resilience, which was tied to the concept of national resilience, to steer fellow 
ASEAN states to a consensus that would help foster regional stability and the exclusion of 
foreign powers from the region. During the Reformasi era, Indonesian foreign policy-makers 
continued to rely on the projection of domestic political values. But now it was human rights 
and democracy that were the key salient points in this projection. At the conceptual level, 
embarking upon a foreign policy that promoted domestic values was an important feature for 
Indonesia’s regional cooperation because it had been effective in achieving the intended goal, 
i.e. maintaining the image of, and giving substance to, Indonesia’s regional leadership status. 
 
 
5.3 Democratisation and Indonesia’s regional cooperation in ASEAN: the role of 
leaders and change in the foreign policy substance 
The discussion in this chapter contends that Indonesia’s foreign policy strategy in relation to 
 
regional cooperation in ASEAN has emphasised the importance of providing an intellectual 
impetus, focusing on promoting certain ideas derived from the domestic political context. 
During the Reformasi era, these ideas have mainly been democratic values and human rights. 
In this regard, Indonesia’s foreign policy on regional cooperation experienced a change because 
the New Order regime had not promoted these values to the region. Democracy and human 
rights became a new focus for Indonesia’s diplomacy because they were seen as the best 
instruments to enhance the legitimacy of Indonesia’s democratic regime and to repair the 
country’s international image (Sukma, 2011:111), confirming what Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998:903) had argued about the rationale for leaders to accept certain ideas, as pointed out in 
Chapter Two. Habibie’s ratification of international human rights agreements, such as, the 1984 
UN Convention against Torture (ratified in September 1998) was an example. 
 
Domestically, unlike Islamic precepts as discussed in Chapter Four, democracy and 
human rights were incorporated into national regulations, as demonstrated by the revocation of 
Pancasila as being the sole principle for Indonesian organisations and the establishment of Law 
No.26/2000 about human rights courts. Furthermore, in a recent survey 79% of Indonesians 
indicated that they prefer democracy to any other political system (Berdikari, 12 October 2012). 
These examples show that democracy and human rights have essentially been accepted and 
internalised in Indonesia. To this extent, on the one hand, the external propagation of democracy 
was believed to contribute to the strengthening of Indonesia’s democratic consolidation at home 
(Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012). On the other hand, human rights promotion was the 
result of the obsolete idea of an integralistic state, implemented during the majority of the New 
Order period (see Chapter One: 30). Advocating these values in the region was regarded as an 
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effective way to give substance to Indonesia’s aspiration to become a leader in the region (see 
 
also Anwar, 2000:30, 37). 
 
This thesis also argues that there was a considerable role of policy entrepreneurs in 
shaping Indonesia’s leadership and foreign policy strategy in ASEAN. Central to this was Rizal 
Sukma. As highlighted in the discussion on the APSC, Sukma raised the importance for 
Indonesia to find new themes to give meaning to its 2003 ASEAN Chairmanship. Around the 
same time, the Indonesian foreign minister was also finding ways to distinguish Indonesia’s 
chairmanship, as the aforementioned Natalegawa’s speech indicated. In this case, Sukma 
identified the problems ASEAN and Indonesia were facing, including the lack of leadership 
and centrality. In other words, Sukma noticed a policy vacuum within ASEAN and Indonesia’s 
role within that vacuum (see Carter and Scott, 2010:420 for theoretical support of this 
argument). Indeed, problem identification was essential to ensuring the success of an idea 
entrepreneur in asserting his/her influence (Mintrom 1997:739). Sukma’s ability to identify the 
promotion of democracy as a new theme for Indonesian foreign policy and his subsequent role 
in influencing the agenda were linked to his knowledge, as he had been a long-time observer of 
ASEAN, and of his networks with primarily foreign minister Wirajuda. Sukma’s role in this 
case suggests that the argument raised by Mintrom and Norman (2009) regarding the influence 
of policy entrepreneurs that usually leads to policy changes as they innovatively raise new ideas, 
can be applied to how a policy entrepreneur matters in Indonesia. 
While Sukma was able to shape the foreign policy agenda, his ideas could not be 
considered the formal strategy of Indonesia’s foreign policy because he was not entitled to make 
one. To this extent, the presence of foreign minister Wirajuda in the decision-making process 
became important for ensuring that Sukma’s ideas were incorporated in the final foreign policy 
decision. If Wirajuda did not share Sukma’s ideas, then they could have been dismissed by 
Wirajuda because he had the formal authority to make and execute state’s foreign policy. That 
being said, as someone accustomed to the political practices between the ASEAN governments, 
Wirajuda noted the possible risk should Sukma’s ideas be adopted in full. In this regard, if the 
notion of ‘human rights’ was sustained, then an outright rejection of the APSC concept by other 
ASEAN member countries was possible and this would have led to embarrassment for 
Indonesia during its ASEAN chairmanship. 
Wirajuda’s decision to make democracy and human rights part of Indonesia’s position 
regarding ASEAN intramural cooperation also amounted to a foreign policy change from 
Suharto’s major foreign policy decisions. Such a change was related to the shift in the domestic 
political landscape that led to the existence of a new political identity. In this regard, 
democratisation changed Indonesia from an authoritarian country to become a democracy. 
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Hence, Indonesia’s new identity motivated Indonesian leaders to pursue foreign policy 
preferences based on ideas that would have reflected Indonesia’s new democratic identity (see 
also Acharya 2003b). This is not unusual because identity was said to influence foreign policy 
through ideas and values resulted from leaders’ conception of ‘what constitute a state’s identity’ 
(Ashizawa 2008). Democratisation also provided an opportunity for Wirajuda to reassert 
Indonesia’s aspirations for regional leadership (Nabbs-Keller, 2013:68). If Indonesia had not 
democratised, it would have been unlikely that Indonesian leaders would pursue a foreign 
policy informed by democratic values. Therefore, democratisation served as the context for 
Indonesian leaders decision to change the substance of foreign policy concerning ASEAN 
political cooperation by incorporating the ideas of democracy and human rights. 
As far as the role of the DPR is concerned, the case of the ASEAN Charter demonstrated 
the influence of the DPR in foreign policy, as they scrutinized the proposal made by the 
executive in relation to the urgency for Indonesia to ratify the Charter. This was evident at the 
public consultation organised by the DPR, which involved a number of experts. As a result, 
the ratification process in Indonesia took longer than in any other ASEAN countries 
because of the lengthy policy-making process in this regard (see Chapter Three, Sect.3.3 
for an explanation on this process). It is argued in Chapter Two that the parliament’s 
attention on foreign affairs is likely to be determined by the context of the issues 
concerned. In this case, human rights issues became one of the questions underscored by 
the DPR members. This is unsurprising given the salience of human rights in Indonesia 
during the Reformasi era. Further, as Chapter Three notes, the role of the DPR is 
significant in, amongst others matters, treaty ratificat ion. Indeed, the case of the ASEAN 
Charter ratification process demonstrated the relevance of these arguments. Additionally, 
unlike the case of Singapore-initiated DCA, the ratification of the ASEAN Charter would 
not have any vivid repercussions for Indonesia’s territorial sovereignty. This made the 
Charter more acceptable to the DPR. The DPR’s final approval, which had led to the 
Charter’s ratification, was linked to the perceived potential benefits of the Charter for 
Indonesia, as Wirajuda previously outl ined. Therefore, a stalling of the ratification was 
perceived at the time of threatening Indonesia’s aspiration for regional leadership. 
The role of parliament was also apparent in its influence over the person selected 
to represent Indonesia at the AIC HR. The DPR had preferred Marzuki Darusman to fill 
this position. Notwithstanding the DPR’s preference, however, foreign minister Wirajuda 
opted for Rafendi Djamin. As previously hinted, this selection was driven by the need to 
provide examples to the domestic audience about Indonesia’s support for ASEAN as a 
people-centred organisation in the future. If Wirajuda had followed the DPR preference, 
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this would have lent support to the arguments about Indonesia’s support for ASEAN’s 
 
elitism. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter investigated the relationship between democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign 
policy on regional cooperation in ASEAN. It highlighted the importance of ASEAN for 
Indonesia as a regional buffer against perceived external threats but also as an avenue whereby 
Indonesia could demonstrate its leadership. This leadership style was exhibited mainly by 
promoting political ideas. During the New Order era, Suharto advanced the idea of ‘regional 
resilience’—a concept largely informed by Indonesia’s national practices. During the 
Reformasi period, the Indonesian leaders emphasised the promotion of democratic values and 
human rights among their foreign policy preferences. This demonstrates that while Indonesia’s 
foreign policy regarding regional cooperation in ASEAN was driven by ideas that were 
prominent domestically, the instalment of a democratic regime in Indonesia has led to a change 
in the kind of ideas that Indonesia should promote. 
The decision to include democratic values was linked to three factors: Wirajuda’s 
commitment to reflecting the values of Reformasi, and hence changing the foreign policy 
strategy, the attempt to distinguish Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN while maintaining 
ASEAN’s political unity, and the influence of policy entrepreneurs in Indonesia’s decision- 
making circle. In the context of this change, the influence of ideas entrepreneurs and the 
parliament in shaping foreign policy must not be ignored. They were able to identify the policy 
vacuum and raised ideas to address it. Nevertheless, as they were essentially non-authoritative, 
the foreign minister played an instrumental role in determining the policy content. This was 
linked to foreign minister Wirajuda’s position in the decision -making structure and his 
experience on ASEAN’s political issues, including on managing ASEAN intra-mural 
cooperation. 
Overall, during the Reformasi period, Indonesian foreign policy on regional 
cooperation in ASEAN has been largely determined by the prominence of leaders, 
although one cannot exclude entirely the role of policy entrepreneurs and the parliament. 
In terms of substance of foreign policy, democratisation contextualised the Indonesian 
leaders’ decisions in making democracy and human rights important political values guiding 
Indonesia’s position on ASEAN intramural cooperation. 
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6   Beyond ASEAN: Democratisation and the Promotion of 
 
Political Values 
 
 
In the previous chapter, this thesis notes that one of the boldest changes to Indonesian foreign 
policy in the post-Suharto era was the recognition of democracy and human rights as important 
political values to be projected abroad. This chapter will further discuss Indonesia’s promotion 
of democracy and human rights in the context of democratisation by looking at two different 
levels of cooperation: regional and bilateral. In the former, Indonesia’s activities are explored 
through an analysis of the Bali Democracy Forum (hereafter, BDF) initiative pursued in Asia 
and on the cooperation in the context of East Asia regional arrangement. In the latter, 
Indonesia’s bilateral foreign policy is examined with regard to Myanmar as Myanmar is the 
most egregious case of respect for democracy and human rights in Southeast Asia. This chapter 
argues that while Indonesian leaders actively promoted democracy and human rights in ASEAN 
context, in the wider Asia and East Asia cooperation more generally democratisation has had a 
differential impact marked by Indonesia’s limited promotion of political values. These 
limitations include the lack of human rights promotion, as also visible in, to some extent, 
Indonesian foreign policy on Myanmar. 
In the first section, this chapter highlights Indonesia’s foreign policy in the context of 
BDF, where the promotion of democracy was a major goal, and East Asia cooperation, where 
it was not. Section Two analyses Indonesia’s foreign policy on Myanmar. This section discusses 
the preferences on different levels in Indonesia by highlighting the changes in the Indonesian 
leaders’ policy toward the junta and demonstrates Indonesia’s limited human rights promotion 
in Myanmar. Section Three analyses the link between democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign 
policy on the promotion of political values by highlighting three factors: the salience of leaders, 
the foreign policy change, and the limits of this foreign policy strategy. 
 
 
6.1    Promotion of democracy and human rights in Asia 
 
While Indonesia has been actively promoting democracy and human rights in ASEAN, a similar 
foreign policy approach has been only partially observable in the wider Asian region.135 The 
promotion of democracy in this region was limited to a mechanism for ‘sharing best practices 
and experiences’, without bold initiatives to create a code of conduct, if not legal documents, 
similar to what ASEAN had. This was manifested in the Bali Democracy Forum initiative. 
 
 
 
 
135 For the purpose of this research, the notion of ‘Asia’ is limited to ‘Asia’ in general and ‘East Asia’ in particular. 
As such, it includes neither Asia-Pacific nor Indo-Pacific. It also exclude ASEAN since Indonesia’s regional 
cooperation in this context has been discussed in the previous chapter. 
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Further, when regional cooperation involved major countries, as the cooperation in East Asia 
did, Indonesia did not place democracy promotion and human rights on the agenda. Instead, 
Indonesia’s focus in the East Asia regional context was dominated by attempts to maintain the 
balance of influence between the major powers by pursuing a policy motivated by the 
consideration of security. Therefore, the impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s promotion 
of political values in the wider Asia and in East Asia context was limited. 
 
6.1.1    Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) 
 
In December 2008, the government initiated the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) as a response 
to the absence of a regional mechanism to promote democracy in Asia (Sukma, 2011:115). As 
such, the BDF was an instrument for encouraging democracy as part of Indonesia’s wider Asia 
strategy (Wirajuda, 2008a; see also The Jakarta Post, 14 November 2008). In other words, the 
BDF was a means for Indonesia to place democracy at the centre of strategic regional discourse 
in the wider Asia (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012). 
The BDF was designed to be the first intergovernmental annual forum in Asia to 
promote the discussion on democracy, including the exchange of views and the sharing of best 
practices and experiences. To this extent, Sebastian (interview, 5 December 2012) noted: 
‘democracy is something that Indonesia should highlight in its foreign policy because Indonesia 
has to demonstrate to the region that democracy is working.’ The purpose of the BDF was to 
increase regional cooperation on democracy, adhering to democratic principles at the regional 
level which would, hopefully, strengthen democratic consolidation at the national level (Hadi, 
2008:4). To date, BDF participants were not limited to democracies, but also included those 
who were ‘interested to learn about democracy’, hence, participation was inclusive (BDF 
concept paper, 6 March 2008).136  Its inclusivity and its dialogue method made the BDF an 
attractive forum for non-democracies such as China and Myanmar. As demonstrated by the 
BDF IV conference in 2011, these non-democracies were given equal opportunities to share 
their views on, and practices of, ‘democracy’. 
While the BDF worked at the governmental level, considering that promotion of 
democracy in some countries could be a sensitive matter, the Indonesian leaders had established 
a semi-governmental agency, the Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD), to support the work 
of the BDF at the second track level.137  Being a university-based entity, the IPD is better 
 
 
 
136 BDF I was attended by 40 participants; BDF II by 48 participants; BDF III had 44 participants; and BDF IV by 
80 participants. For details see, Deplu, “BDF Information Sheet”. 
137 The IPD was a result of Australia’s commitment to supporting the BDF, demonstrated by its contribution of 
USD 3.6 million to the IPD in 2008 alone (Erawan, personal communication, 2011). As a semi -governmental 
organisation, the IPD relied primarily on the state-budget for its main funding and donations from donor countries. 
In a year the IPD must conduct three to four major activities, and each costs the institute USD 100-150 thousands 
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positioned than the government when working with the public and with civil society groups 
from other countries because it is not restricted by any formal principles of inter-state 
cooperation. Indonesia’s engagement with Egypt following the political change of the latter, 
for instance, was particularly driven by this second track diplomacy. In this case, allowing for 
the IPD to engage other countries reduced the potential for allegations that Indonesia was 
interfering in Egypt’s domestic affairs. As pointed out by an IPD patron: ‘the government does 
have certain limitations, we (the IPD) don’t’.138 
Critics of the BDF, however, have highlighted its informality, in a sense that there has 
 
not been any legally-binding agreement created by this forum, and government-centric nature, 
which were perceived to lessen the capacity of the forum, as it restricted government officials 
in reaching out to political forces of targeted country (Jemadu 2008). Aleksius Jemadu, an 
Indonesian foreign affairs observer, held that civil society organisations should be involved as 
they often operate in the ways that are different from the governments. Jemadu also added that 
the BDF lacked discussion on the security of the region. Similarly, while praising the BDF 
initiative, Sebastian (interview, 5 December 2012) noted that Indonesia ‘should keep the 
political and security aspects balanced because Indonesia has been more focused on the political 
aspect of democracy, since it reflected Indonesia’s new identity’. 
Responding to some of these criticisms, in his public address during the BDF IV 
meeting in 2011, SBY stated that the BDF would not be formalised as it was ‘an avenue to 
freely share experience and exchange minds’ (Tempo, 8 December 2011). Indonesian foreign 
policy leaders held that Indonesia is not ‘in the business of imposing values, but rather sharing 
them’ (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012). To this extent, through the BDF, Indonesia 
encouraged participants to nurture their own democratic values from within (Adenan 2011). 
Such a move by the Indonesian government suffered from an obvious shortcoming; if 
Indonesian leaders believed that democracy should come from within, then promoting 
democracy through the BDF would ultimately be irrelevant. In addition to this, notwithstanding 
that participation in the BDF was inclusive, the concrete outcome of this initiative was not clear. 
If its ultimate goal was to encourage democracy in non-democratic countries in the wider Asia 
then by far the effectiveness of the BDF in achieving this goal is unclear since there was no 
evidence of countries democratising because they attended this forum. The lack of power of the 
BDF to further encourage democratisation in non-democracies in Asia could be tied to its nature 
as being merely a place for countries to ‘share best practices and experiences’. If the Indonesian 
 
 
 
(Erawan, interview, 16 September 2011). For further details about the IPD, see Institute for Peace and Democracy 
<http://www.instituteforpeaceanddemocracy.org/about-ipd>, accessed on 12 April 2012. 
138 A private conversation with one of the IPD patrons during a workshop on IPD capacity building in Sanur, Bali, 
July 2011, attended by the author. 
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leaders failed to build the BDF capacity in making it more authoritative in promoting 
democracy, the BDF could in the long term sustain as merely a regional talk-shop. 
Overall, this section suggests that Indonesia’s decision to create the BDF was linked to 
the absence of pre-existing regional initiatives that fostered democracy. This section also 
highlights that Indonesia’s policy strategy in promoting democracy in the wider Asian region 
was a significant departure from the New Order Indonesia, which was averse to the notion of 
democracy itself (see Schwarz, 2000:304). In this light, the BDF initiative was an attempt to 
emphasise Indonesia’s soft power, as a regional promoter of democracy (Rüland, 2011:18). 
 
6.1.2    Beyond the BDF: an absence of democracy and human rights promotion in East 
 
Asia 
 
While the BDF was recognised as Indonesia’s hallmark of democracy promotion in Asia, it 
failed to include the promotion of human rights.139 More generally, Indonesia’s promotion of 
democracy and human rights in Asia has been limited. In the context of East Asia cooperation, 
for instance, Indonesia’s approach has been motivated by ideas derived from the identification 
of the country’s fragile position in international affairs (see Weinstein 1972), hence its policy 
of maintaining a balanced presence of big powers. For Indonesia, its participation in the East 
Asia Summit (EAS) regional cooperation was driven by the role of ASEAN in driving the focus 
of EAS (see Ba 2009). This meant that non-ASEAN member countries were required to accede 
to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) prior to joining the EAS (Kun, 2009:21- 
22;  see  also  Severino,  2004:6;  Seah,  2009:200).140   Having  been  involved  in  a  regional 
 
cooperation shaped by the competing influences of long-time rivals in the region, particularly, 
although not limited to, China and Japan (see Ayson 2009), Indonesian leaders did not prioritise 
democracy and human rights promotion. This reflected the views of Hassan Wirajuda who 
argued that: 
 
…in the integration process of East Asia, Indonesia holds its strategic interest in 
the political, peace, and security front… that is not to see China as the only 
dominant player. In this case, East Asia should be defined with a balanced and 
inclusive approach to prevent the accumulation of power in China’s hand 
(Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012). 
 
Indeed, when supporting the establishment of EAS in 2005, Indonesia had already become 
a democracy. The ASEAN Political-Security Community initiative had been launched in 
 
 
 
 
139 Since its inception in 2008, BDF has not put human rights as the main theme of the forum. For details, see 
Institute for Peace and Democracy, “Bali Democracy Forum”. 
140 For details on the process of the creation of EAS see, among others, Stubbs (2002), Jeshurun (2007), Malik 
(2006), and Evans (2005). For a discussion on the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) mechanism – an institutionalised 
regional cooperation that preceded the EAS – see, Terada (2006, 2011). 
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2003, marking Indonesia’s first attempt to promote democracy and human rights in the 
region. Instead of emphasising promoting democracy and human rights, Indonesia’s initial 
support towards the creation of EAS was influenced by Japan’s idea of minimising 
Beijing’s dominance in East Asian regional arrangement by including the presence of 
other major and middle powers, such as the US, India, Australia, and New Zealand 
(Jeshurun, 2007:334; Nakamura, 2009:193). In this regard, by following Japan’s lead, 
Indonesian leaders would like to diplomatically dampen the potential for China to rise to 
regional dominance in the East Asia regional setting. This preference was tied to the 
perception held by most Indonesian leaders that Indonesia is vulnerable and operating in 
a hostile and uncertain international environment (Leifer 1983; Weinstein 1972, 1976). 
In light of this diplomatic preference, Indonesia welcomed the US participation in 
the EAS, as indicated by foreign minister Natalegawa in 2010 in Washington (see The 
Department of State, 17 September 2010). For Indonesian leaders, the involvement of the 
US in the EAS could act as a counter-balance to the growing influence of Beijing (Emmers 
2011; Lee 2011; Severino, 2011b:10). Obama’s decision to attend the EAS meeting in 
Bali in 2011 and to withdraw US troops from Iraq and Afghanistan by that year (see 
Murphy, interview with the NBR, 17 November 2011), as well as his agreement with the 
Australian PM Julia Gillard regarding the gradual deployment of the US Marines in 
Darwin, which would be up to 2,500 personnel by 2017, were indicative of the increasing 
presence of the US in East Asia and the Pacific, more generally (see, ABC Australia, 17 
November 2011; Togo, 2012:83: Kun 2009).141 According to some observers, this was the 
 
manifestation of Secretary Clinton’s promise to make the US ‘a force for peace and 
stability, and a guarantor of security’, as indicated in her 2010 speech in Hawaii (Storey 
2011; Rajan 2012; see also The Jakarta Post, 19 January 2010). While welcoming the 
presence of the US in East Asia, the Indonesian leaders were aware of the challenges they 
might face in managing a regional platform which included major powers. This concern 
was expressed by President SBY in his remarks at the Opening of the 2011 ASEAN 
Summit. He called for the EAS countries to identify common principles that would guide 
the relations participating states (ASEAN, 17 November 2011). But even with this 
statement, Indonesia did not make democracy promotion and human rights the ‘guiding 
principles of interstate relations’, let alone mentioning BDF as Indonesia’s diplomatic 
vehicle to promote democracy in Asia. Instead, being the ‘key to Southeast Asia security’ 
 
 
 
 
141 It was also revealed during the EAS meeting in 2011 that the US planned to increase the capacity of the 
regional military partners and to equip the regional maritime police and civil authorities under the 
cooperation framework in maritime security. For details, see the White House (19 November 2011). 
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(Dibb, 2001:836), Indonesia sought to maintain ASEAN’s centrality and to prevent the 
US and China from dominating the agenda in the EAS cooperation (Wihardja 2011; see 
also ASEAN, 17 November 2011). 
According  to  Novotny,  Indonesia’s  fear  of  China’s  dominance  was  par tially 
attributed to the long history of Chinese expansionism, particularly when the old Chinese 
Empires sought to spread their authority and dominance over the Indonesian Sultanates 
(Novotny 2004). Apart from this history, China’s alleged involvement in t he Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI) and the rise of communism in Indonesia in the 1960s also 
contributed to Indonesia’s suspicion about China (see Sukma 1999). Consequently, fear 
was prominent amongst the decision-makers in Deplu. As Hamzah Thayeb (interview with 
the author, 25 August 2011), a former DG for Asia -Pacific and African Affairs noted, 
 
Indonesia envisions a peaceful and prosperous region… [That is why] it is 
important to engage China from early on and we responded to China’s increasing 
role by welcoming the US, Russia, India, and Australia. 
 
Such an attitude was also maintained by Hassan Wirajuda who, while reluctant to label 
China as a ‘threat’, suggested: ‘in diplomacy, you just cannot rely on the goodwill of 
others as China in the future migh t change its stance’ (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 
2012). 
 
The above discussion contends that Indonesia’s foreign policy on democracy and 
human rights promotion in the wider Asia was limited in terms of geopolitical areas where 
this  policy  strategy  was  pursued.  While  there  were  some  significant  changes  in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy strategy that allowed for the promotion of democracy and 
human rights in Asia generally, in relation to East Asia cooperation Indonesian foreign 
policy leaders continued to focus on the importance of security and the relevance of 
Indonesia in this context. This was demonstrated by the ‘balanced and inclusive’ approach 
aimed at minimising the dominance of a single power in the region – in this case, China.142 
Indonesia’s fragile international position had a direct impact on how it conducted itself in 
 
regional cooperation, highlighting two considerations noted in Chapter Two. 
First, with regard to the link between identity, ideas, and foreign policy, 
conceptualisation of Indonesian identity by leaders in Jakarta influenced the formulation 
 
 
 
142  Indonesia’s participation in other regional arrangements, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), was 
influenced by the relevance of ASEAN centrality, which had meant that Indonesia did not abandon the importance 
of ASEAN as a regional buffer when Indonesia engaged with other major countries. This indicated that the concept 
of Indonesia as being a vulnerable country beyond the Southeast Asia’s cooperation was salient for the Indonesian 
leaders. For details on Indonesia’s foreign policy in relation to the ARF, see, among others, Sukma (2004:78 -81). 
For a discussion on the establishment of the ARF see, for instance, Ba (1997); Midford (2000); Yuzawa (2005). 
For the link between the ARF and the ASEAN’s centrality, see Rolls (2012), Emmers (2003), and Leifer (1996). 
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of foreign policy ideas (balanced and inclusive), which later translated into foreign policy 
action (by accommodating the presence of other major countries) in the region. This 
supports Ashizawa’s argument (2008:594) about the indirect impact of identity on foreign 
policy with ideas or values as intermediary variables ( Chapter Two: 57-58). Indonesia’s 
concern about the likelihood of China’s domination in the region was channelled into 
foreign policy by individuals, primarily the Indonesian foreign minister as well as high - 
ranking officials at Deplu, who stood at the apex of Indonesia’s foreign policy -making. 
Second, the analysis highlighted the change and continuity within foreign policy. 
While the changes involved a recognition of the values of democracy and human rights in 
foreign policy toward the wider Asia, the continuity underscored the importance of 
security in Indonesian foreign policy vis-à-vis major countries in East Asia. This 
continuity was served by the idea of maintaining a balance amongst regional powers that 
characterised Indonesia’s approach to East Asia regional cooperation. This is because 
Indonesia’s regional activism since Suharto’s period had been influenced by the fear of 
domination by other countries leading to Jakarta’s emphasis on the centrality of ASEAN 
(in the ARF context) and the ‘balanced and inclusive’ approach (in the EAS context). In 
this regard, Indonesian leaders continued a similar foreign policy approach becaus e unlike 
in Southeast Asia where Indonesia was perceived as the de facto leader, in East Asia 
regional cooperation Indonesia did not have leadership status. Had Indonesia obtained 
such a status, it would not have welcomed the US strategy to continue their presence in 
the region, and would not have feared the potential for China’s dominating role. 
Continuing a similar foreign policy approach served Indonesia’s intended goal in 
preventing  the  likelihood  for  unipolarity in  international  system  outside  the  ASEA N 
context (cf. Chapter Two: 55). 
 
6.2    Promotion of democracy at bilateral level: the case of Myanmar143 
 
While Indonesian leaders have pursued different foreign policy approaches in wider Asia, 
where democracy promotion was visible, at bilateral levels promotion of political values was 
most observable in Myanmar. This is because Myanmar is the most striking case as far as 
democracy and human rights issues are concerned, and pursuing a policy that focuses on these 
issues in Myanmar would strengthen Indonesia’s role as a leader in Southeast Asia’s political 
cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
 
143  This thesis uses the designation “Myanmar” rather than “Burma”, reflecting how the country is recognised 
internationally, including in the United Nations. 
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6.2.1    Myanmar in ASEAN 
 
Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997 during the same period as Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), and 
Cambodia (1999). Myanmar was under military rule following General Ne Win’s coup in 1962. 
The 1974 Constitution ended the decree-based military rule of the Revolutionary Council – 
comprised of military officers led by General Ne Win himself – by mandating the formation of 
an Eastern European model single party socialist state, which gave birth to the Burma Socialist 
Program Party (BSPP) (Steinberg, 1999:8). In 1988, the military coup that ‘toppled’ the ruling 
BSPP gave way to the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). This coup made no 
meaningful difference to the nature of the regime, because institutionally speaking, the SLORC 
was the military (Steinberg, 1999:11). SLORC was ‘replaced’ in name by the State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC) in 1997. This replacement was undertaken to boost the 
confidence of foreign investors who, at the time, were leaving the country in response to the 
economic tremors initiated by the Asian financial crisis (Case, 2003:380). The fact that 
Myanmar’s junta did not want to embarrass itself following its admission to ASEAN also 
contributed to the change of regime name (Sundararaman, undated). Similar to the previous 
‘succession of power’, however, the SPDC was essentially run and dominated mostly by the 
same top military figures of the disposed SLORC, causing it to be labelled a ‘cosmetic exercise’ 
(Eldridge, 2002:73).144 
Myanmar’s initial plan for admission to ASEAN received mixed responses from other 
ASEAN member. For instance, according to Haacke (2006:42), in the early 1990s Malaysia 
was reluctant to support ASEAN plans to grant Yangon membership in the light of Islamic 
sensitivity and solidarity, emphasising the junta’s reckless treatment of the Rohingya Muslim 
minority in Rakhine State in 1992. Apart from Malaysia, an objection regarding Myanmar’s 
admission to ASEAN was also filed by two ASEAN democracies, the Philippines and Thailand 
(see, among others, Roberts 2010). Pressures on ASEAN to decline Myanmar’s admission also 
came from the EU and America. The strong western criticism was a result of the deteriorating 
human rights situation in Myanmar since the SLORC/SPDC began ruling the country. For 
instance, although Aung San Suu Kyi’s political party, the National League for Democracy 
(NLD) was allowed to compete in the 1990 Myanmar election, and despite the fact that it 
successfully secured 60% of the total votes (Case 2003), or 392 of 485 seats in the parliament145, 
 
 
 
 
 
144  In November 2010, Myanmar had its national election. Following this election, in March 2011 SPDC was 
dissolved and General Thein Sein became president. Sein and a number of former members of SPDC abandoned 
their military ranks and uniforms to become a fully civilian state apparatus. Indeed, these events were indicative 
of Myanmar’s initial step for democratic transition. For details, see Egretau (2012:30-33). 
145 For a complete result of the 1990 election, see Han (2003). 
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a result that would have allowed the NLD to govern the country, the junta authoritatively denied 
 
NLD victory. 
 
In their attempt to minimise increasing international pressure, ASEAN leaders 
experimented with a number of methods to engage the junta. In 1991, Thai FM Arsa Sarasin 
made public the Thai policy of constructive engagement, aimed at rejecting interference by 
external powers, particularly the Western countries, which may have isolated the country 
(Acharya, 2009a:129). The concept of constructive engagement emphasised the need for 
ASEAN countries to develop stronger diplomatic ties with and increasing economic presence 
in Myanmar, as they could improve Myanmar’s economic position, thereby gradually 
encouraging political change (IDEA, 2001:ix; Acharya, 2009a:133). However, the success of 
the concept in bringing the desired changes to Myanmar was not achieved as, ultimately, it 
failed to lead to political liberalisation and economic progress for the Myanmar people. Aware 
of the mounting criticism, on 10 July 1995, two years before Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN, 
the junta released its most iconic political detainee, Aung San Suu Kyi. Suu Kyi had been 
detained for six years from 1989 after being involved in protests that were seen by General Ne 
Win as an attempt to nurture public hatred towards the military (Observer, 23 July 1989). 
Further, Malaysia – that was previously objected Myanmar’s admission – changed its stance by 
1997, urging Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN. This change of position was driven by the 
aspiration of the Malaysian government under Mahathir for ASEAN to be inclusive of all ten 
Southeast Asian countries (Steinberg, 2001:238). In other words, support for the junta’s 
admission to ASEAN would support the realisation of the Malaysian-initiated ‘One Southeast 
Asia’ concept (Acharya, 2009a:131). Myanmar was formally admitted to ASEAN in 1997. 
For ASEAN, the decision to accept Yangon was partly attributed to the influence of 
material factors because the regional bloc wanted to reduce, if not isolate, external influences. 
In essence, it was to lessen Myanmar’s economic dependence on China (Haacke, 2006:42, 58; 
Steinberg, 2001:236; Ohmar, interview with the author, 17 May 2012). China, as a foreign 
policy issue in Myanmar, could not be separated from the domestic reality of ethnic Chinese 
living in Myanmar (Steinberg, 2001:227). In 2012, for instance, it was estimated that 3% of the 
total population were Chinese.146 This being said, Chinese economic assistance and Beijing’s 
physical presence in Myanmar was so important that the two governments agreed to authorise 
a visa-free entry for people from both countries in order to facilitate border trades (Steinberg, 
2001:229). In international fora, Beijing had been the junta’s close ally in securing Myanmar’s 
 
 
 
 
146 It has been estimated that Myanmar’s total population will reach around 56 million by July 2013. Among other 
ethnic groups living in Myanmar were the Burman (68%), Shan (9%), Karen (7%), Rakhine (4%), Indian (2%), 
Mongolian (2%), and others (5%). For details see, CIA World Factbook (2012), “Burma”. 
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diplomatic interests.147 For this sort of diplomatic protection and support, the SPDC rewarded 
Beijing with substantial access to Myanmar’s natural resources (Haacke, 2011:133). According 
to a Myanmar pro-democracy activist, Khin Ohmar, the inclusion of Myanmar in ASEAN was 
also seen by other ASEAN leaders as an effort to ‘civilise the military generals’ (Ohmar, 
interview, 17 May 2012; see also Roberts, 2010:113). 
The intensity of criticism against Myanmar’s junta, however, did not waiver even after 
its successful admission into ASEAN particularly from Washington – to which human rights 
and democracy have been a central theme of its foreign policy. During the July 1998 AMM in 
Manila, for example, the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, openly called for the 
immediate implementation of freedom of movement in Myanmar.148  In response to Western 
criticisms and taking into account the failure of Thailand’s previous diplomatic approach as 
well as influenced by the impact of Myanmar problems have had on Thailand, in June 1998 
Thai FM Surin Pitsuwan introduced the concept of ‘flexible engagement’. Flexible engagement 
stressed the need for ASEAN members to allow public commentary and collective discussion 
on fellow members’ domestic policies when these have either regional implications or adverse 
effects on the disposition of other ASEAN members (Haacke, 1999:583). Essentially, this idea 
was a desire to loosen the implementation of the association’s non-interference principle. Thai 
authorities believed that Myanmar’s enduring military suppression and its internal conflicts 
could affect Thailand’s national security in three possible ways: the drug smuggling from 
Myanmar to Thailand; the spill over of the fighting between the Myanmar Army and insurgents 
into Thai territory; and the increasing influx of Burmese refugees to Thailand (Katanyuu, 
2006:827-29). 
 
However, Pitsuwan’s counsel that ASEAN adopt the policy of flexible engagement was 
rejected by other ASEAN member states. The concept was regarded as contradictory to the 
principle of non-interference long favoured by the majority of the autocratic states in ASEAN 
(Webber, 2012:17). It was a contradiction in three respects. First, it would have allowed 
ASEAN member countries to criticise each other’s policies publicly; second, it suggested that 
public criticism of member states would be considered ASEAN policy; and third, it would have 
threatened the practice of the non-interference principle (Haacke, 1999:584-5). The non- 
interference  principle  was  understood  as  each  state’s  freedom  from  unsolicited  verbal 
involvement by foreign-state linked authorities in what were considered to be home affairs 
 
 
147  For instance, China consistently voted against any UNGA votes concerning the human rights situation in 
Myanmar between 2006 and 2011. For details, see the United Nations General Assembly, “Resolutions on 
Myanmar, 2006-2010”. 
148 Secretary Albright emphasised the need for the Myanmar’s NLD and its leader, Suu Kyi, to be able to move 
freely in their own country and therefore called ASEAN members to act more strongly against Yangon to ensure 
the political freedom of the Myanmar people. For details, see the US Department of State, 27 July 1998. 
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(Haacke, 1999:583). Consequently, the non-interference principle could be regarded as 
beneficial for ASEAN’s authoritarian governments, useful in underpinning the political 
legitimacy of the regime. 
Five years after being released, in 2000 Suu Kyi had to return to detention after she 
made repeated attempts to meet her supporters outside Yangon – a condition that was forbidden 
by the junta. Again, the situation invited primarily Western criticism149, especially when the 
junta had also forbidden Suu Kyi from seeing her late husband, Michael Aris, who was then 
dying of cancer in the UK, even before she was re-detained. Aware of the unrestricted and open 
pressures from the West, in 2005, the junta eventually made public that it would not insist on 
its turn as ASEAN chair in 2006 offering an excuse that the Myanmar government would be 
preoccupied with its national reconciliation process (Wilson, 2007:85).150 Within ASEAN, 
however, Southeast Asian leaders were generally reluctant to strongly criticise the junta. The 
junta consistently invoked the ASEAN policy of non-interference to shield itself from criticism 
from other ASEAN member states, in addition to the consensus and non-confrontational 
approach practiced by the members of the Association (Ohmar 2006; Steinberg, 2001:237-38). 
In this case, while seemingly refuting Western criticism on Myanmar membership in ASEAN, 
the leaders of the association embarked on a rather soft approach by engaging, instead of 
isolating, the country, as the Thai initiatives demonstrated. 
 
6.2.2    Indonesia’s policy towards Myanmar: articulations of preferences at different levels 
 
 
6.2.2.1   Indonesian foreign policy leaders 
 
Indonesia supported Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN without reservation. Indonesia’s support 
was driven by the historical political relationship between the two countries. Myanmar was a 
key supporter of Indonesia during the latter’s struggle for independence in the 1940s, mainly 
by providing military radio broadcasters to spread the news about Indonesia’s struggle to the 
outside world. Indeed, as noted by Ambassador Wisber Loeis – a retired diplomat and a former 
member of the New Order’s National Stabilisation Council who served for most of Suharto’s 
regime – Indonesia’s decision to accept Myanmar was heavily driven by political 
considerations, as the two countries had both nurtured similar political regimes and would 
therefore support each other in regional politics (Loeis, interview, 5 August 2011). In fact, in 
1993 during the visit of Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, the then First Secretary of the SLORC, 
 
 
 
149 For instance, in the wake of the 2005 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Rotterdam, the Dutch authorities refused 
to issue a visa for the Myanmar economic minister as a statement of dissatisfaction from Europe on the 
deteriorating human rights situation in Myanmar. The Dutch decision eventually resulted in a boycott by ASEAN 
ministers. For details on the EU critics, see Europolitics, 16 September 2005. 
150 Myanmar becomes ASEAN Chair in 2014. 
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to Jakarta, it was argued that the Myanmar junta openly expressed its intention to study the 
concept of Indonesia’s military dual-function, as the SLORC searched for a more sustainable 
political format (Sundhaussen, 1995:768-9). Suharto’s visit to Yangon in the same year as 
Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN, accompanied by his eldest daughter Siti Hardiyanti 
Rukmana, who reportedly had investments in Myanmar, unabashedly illustrated this support 
(Paul, 2010:76). 
However, Suharto’s resignation in May 1998, which was followed by Indonesia’s 
democratisation, led to gradual changes in Indonesia’s position towards Myanmar. In objection 
to Thai’s flexible engagement approach, Indonesia came up with the term ‘enhanced 
interaction’ (Haacke 2005). According to the late Ali Alatas, then Indonesian foreign minister, 
‘flexible engagement’ was inapplicable because: 
 
 
First, Myanmar has joined ASEAN thus, became a part of ASEAN family. In this sense, 
ASEAN cannot choose to engage or not to engage Myanmar. There is no flexibility. Second, 
all ASEAN member states have the obligation to help each other as part of a family. Third, 
interactions among all ASEAN member countries are inclusive of all issues of common 
interest and comprehensive in all areas of ASEAN cooperation. Fourth, all ASEAN member 
countries – not just Myanmar, should enhance these interactions among themselves, not just 
with Myanmar. And fifth, to enhance is to improve on something existing (Alatas quoted in 
Chalermpalanupap 2010). 
 
The notion of ‘enhanced interaction’ was perceived by his ASEAN peers as ‘less intervention- 
oriented’ (Acharya, 2009a: 178). ‘Enhanced interaction’ would encourage ASEAN members to 
talk openly with each other on ‘views that may originate in one country but have an impact on 
other ASEAN countries’ (Kuhonta, 2006:348). The materialisation of such an interaction 
included keeping the Myanmar issue an internal problem of ASEAN by encouraging the junta 
to discuss its internal matters within the context of ASEAN. This was not an easy process as 
Myanmar was often reluctant to do so; nevertheless, according to Alatas: ‘ASEAN policy of 
‘enhanced interaction’ was at work, therefore ASEAN countries must be careful not to interfere 
in Myanmar internal affairs’ (quoted in Yuzawa, 2007:112).151 
The Indonesian leaders’ changing policy on Myanmar was more apparent and, at times, 
assertive, particularly in calling for the implementation of political freedom in Myanmar, when 
Indonesia assumed the 2003 ASEAN Chairman. Such calls were found in comments made by 
primarily Indonesian foreign minister, and members of the DPR. For them, Indonesia’s new 
democratic  identity  was  the  foundation  for  the  change  in  Indonesia’s  foreign  policy  on 
Myanmar (Piccone 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
151 For the limitations of the practice of ‘enhanced interaction’, see Haacke (2005:199-201). 
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In May 2003, prior to the October ASEAN Summit, members of the pro-military Union 
Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) ambushed Suu Kyi and her NLD convoys in 
Depayin, in Sagaing Division, northwest side of Mandalay. This was viewed as the junta’s 
reaction to the political visit of Suu Kyi since her release from house arrest in May 2002 
(AIPMC 2005; McCarthy, 2010:337).152 Suu Kyi was then taken to hospital for the wounds she 
suffered and then sent back to house arrest. The incident outraged ASEAN leaders, although 
ASEAN member countries responded differently to this incident. While Malaysia’s Mahathir, 
who was at the time of the incident about to leave office, urged his ASEAN colleagues to take 
firm action by expelling Yangon from the bloc, Thailand’s PM Thaksin Shinawatra ‘defended’ 
Yangon. Shinawatra, in this case, published the Bangkok-planned ‘road map towards 
democracy’, which showed what ‘enhanced interaction’ meant for the Thais (see McCarthy 
2010).153 Indonesia, as ASEAN Chair, proposed that an ASEAN ministerial delegation be sent 
 
to Myanmar with the task of encouraging the Junta to hasten democratic reforms (AIPMC 
 
2005). 
 
In the event, Yangon declined Thailand’s initiative and instead designed its own ‘road 
map’, which included ‘seven steps to a disciplined democracy’.154 However, after a period of 
intensive quiet diplomacy, the junta eventually agreed to accept Ali Alatas in September, one 
month before the Summit, as an attempt to secure Suu Kyi’s release (Haacke 2006). While 
Alatas was able to meet PM Khin Nyunt and Deputy FM Khin Maung Win on the last day of 
his visit, he failed to meet Suu Kyi who, at the time, was still recovering from surgery in a local 
hospital (VOA, 23 September 2003). Alatas failed to secure Suu Kyi’s release. According to a 
report, the junta used his presence in Yangon as an attempt to reduce international and regional 
pressure on them (AIPMC, 2005:8). For the Indonesian government, the release of Suu Kyi 
could have greatly elevated Jakarta’s ASEAN leadership credentials, given that Indonesia held 
 
 
 
152 Following the incident, Myanmar Foreign Minister Win Aung made a trip to several ASEAN countries 
conveying a letter from the junta leader General Than Swe explaining that the reason for Suu Kyi’s arrest was that 
she was allegedly reported to have been planning an uprising against the Junta and that Suu Kyi was in a stable 
health condition despite the raid and the detainment. For details see, for instance, Haacke (2006). For the 
chronological account of the incident, see AIPMC, (2005). 
153 The Thai-initiated road map’s plans included five phases: (i) the release of Suu Kyi and other opposition leaders 
as well as the reopening of the NLD headquarters and the provincial offices that were closed since the incident; 
(ii) conducting an investigation of the incident; (iii) drafting a constitution that embraces the military, the pro - 
democracy groups, and the ethnic groups followed by the adoption of the actual constitution; (iv) the 
implementation of the adopted constitution which would lead to national elections; and (v) the inclusion of 
independent international monitors to oversee the election. See, Larry Jagan, Bangkok Post, 9 August 2003. 
154  These steps are: (i) reconvening the National Convention (NC) that has been adjourned since 1996; (ii) 
implementing the process of the NC towards the emergence of a genuine and disciplined democratic system; (iii) 
drafting a new constitution based on the NC; (iv) adoption of the constitution based on a national referendum; (v) 
holding free and fair legislative elections according to the new constitution; (vi) convening of the parliament 
attended by the members of parliament according to the new constitution; (vii) building a modern, developed, and 
democratic nation by the state leaders elected by the parliament, and the government and other central organs by 
the parliament. See, Htet Aung, Irrawady opinion, August 2007. 
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the ASEAN chairmanship at the time. However, as ASEAN diplomacy and Indonesia’s 
lobbying were unsuccessful in this case, Suu Kyi remained a detainee even during the Summit. 
Myanmar ignored the threat made by Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda that the 
junta’s decision could result in Myanmar’s situation being discussed as the Summit’s main 
agenda (AFP, 8 September 2003). As it turned out, Myanmar’s situation was not discussed at 
the summit, with Indonesian threats not materialising. 
The Indonesian leaders were frustrated by the way the Myanmar government responded 
to Indonesia’s threat and by the failure to keep its promise made in July 2003 when foreign 
minister Win Aung told Wirajuda that Suu Kyi would be released before the November 2003 
Summit. President Megawati expressed her irritation by calling on Myanmar to make the 
timetable of the road map public (The Jakarta Post, 10 November 2003). Unsurprisingly, the 
junta declined to do this. In November 2004, Wirajuda made an unannounced two-day visit to 
Yangon where Myanmar’s PM Soe Win met him. Although the details of the meeting were not 
made public, an Indonesian diplomat told the author (personal communication, 2011) that the 
meeting raised the concerns of the newly installed Indonesian President SBY about 
developments in Myanmar’s political situation. SBY’s visit was also meant to gather first-hand 
information about the likelihood of Myanmar’s policies with respect to ASEAN and to 
Myanmar’s democratisation process, following the removal of Khin Nyunt, Soe Win’s 
predecessor, who was charged by the junta of being involved in corruption (Burmanet News, 
12 November 2004). 
 
The ASEAN countries, however, persisted. In 2006, Malaysian FM Syed Hamid Albar, 
in his capacity as an ASEAN envoy, went to meet the generals in Yangon. However, the junta 
did not accept his visit as ASEAN envoy and did not allow Albar to meet either Suu Kyi and 
other democratic voices, or the head of state General Than Shwe (Kuppuswamy, 2006: paper 
no.1781). As a result, Albar returned early to Malaysia with empty hands. According to Khin 
Ohmar, the junta generals justified rejecting Albar by pointing to the non-interference policy 
maintained within ASEAN (Ohmar, interview, 17 May 2012). The failure of the Albar visit 
also raised disappointment on the side of Myanmar’s advocates of democracy. U Myint Thein, 
the NLD spokesperson, stated: 
 
we are saddened... he (Albar) left the country without meeting the democratic forces. We 
know that the Malaysian FM came to Burma as an ASEAN envoy to study Burma’s 
democratic reform, therefore he should meet with the opposition, but that was not the 
case.155 
 
 
 
 
 
155 For the complete position of the NLD on Albar’s visit, see NLD Express, 28 March 2006. 
151 
 
Myanmar agreed to release Suu Kyi on 13 November 2010, six days after Myanmar had its 
parliamentary election. The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), a military 
backed party won the election, which brought General (Ret.) Thein Sein to the presidency. The 
NLD participated in the parliamentary by-election on 1st  April 2012 and won 43 of the 44 
contested seats, a result which allowed Suu Kyi to become, for the first time, an active political 
practitioner in parliament (The Telegraph, 3 April 2012). 
While Indonesian leaders have critically changed their policy on Myanmar, particularly 
with regard to promoting democracy in Myanmar, this change was still limited by the practice 
of non-interference principle in Southeast Asia. Indonesia continued to respect Myanmar’s 
sovereignty and national territorial integrity in its policy decisions. The Indonesian leaders were 
fully aware that however much they wished to push for democratisation in Myanmar, they 
needed to be careful that it was done without violating the main principle of inter-state relations, 
including respecting the legitimate Myanmar government. This was evident in the banning of 
the meetings involving exiled political leaders of Myanmar in Jakarta, as discussed later. While 
democratisation in Indonesia impacted the way Jakarta perceived the principle of non- 
interference, especially regarding the promotion of democracy and human rights, the notions of 
sovereignty and national integrity remained key pillars of the bebas-aktif policy (see Chapter 
Four). Indonesia’s foreign policy on Myanmar could not compromise on the notion of state 
sovereignty and national territorial integrity or that of other countries, including in the context 
of intra-mural relations between ASEAN countries. As Alatas suggested: 
 
Respect for sovereignty will remain a basic principle for ASEAN, but increasingly we 
realise that we have to be flexible, that we have to be non-doctrinaire in some of these 
things. We realise that we have to reinvent ourselves in order to remain relevant, in 
order to remain effective (ASEAN, 7 January 2004). 
 
Regarding Myanmar’s territorial integrity, Indonesian former foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda 
noted that the country was ‘highly diversified’, therefore, ‘pushing Myanmar too hard on 
democratic transition could cause disintegration’ (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012). 
Wirajuda contended that a disintegrated Myanmar could potentially cause greater problems for 
both Indonesia and the region. SBY made a similar argument during his speech at the LSE on 
31 March 2009: 
 
 
I notice that in the West, discussions on Myanmar tend to focus on the ‘democracy’ aspect. 
This is of course important. But there is another aspect which does not get enough attention: 
Myanmar’s national unity and territorial integrity. We simply cannot allow Myanmar to 
break apart, because that will lead to a bloodbath and a humanitarian disaster that would 
undermine regional order and stability. 
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While the call for political liberalisation was prominent in Indonesia’s foreign policy on 
Myanmar, the same cannot be said for Indonesia’s promotion of human rights in relation to the 
Myanmar people. This was demonstrated by the Indonesian leaders’ relatively inactive 
response toward the issue of Rohingyas. The issue of boatmen, in particular Rohingya Muslim 
refugees seeking asylum, was a particular concern for Indonesia because they were often 
stranded in Indonesia’s territorial waters. For instance, in 2009 391 boatmen left Myanmar and 
reached Aceh province, on Sumatera Island. On the one hand, the Acehnese greeted them, yet 
on the other, the local government was unable to provide them with proper public facilities such 
as sanitation, due to the lack of funding (Gelling 2009).156 
The issue of the Rohingya also affected public opinion, particularly that of Islamic 
 
extremists in Indonesia, towards the Myanmar Buddhists, who they believed were responsible 
for the oppression of fellow Muslims. In May 2012, a 27 year-old Buddhist female, Ma Thida 
Htwe, was raped and murdered in Rakhine state by a group of alleged Muslim men (ICG Report, 
12 June 2012). The Report noted that one day later, when these men were detained by the police, 
crowds of Buddhists besieged the local police station, demanding that the suspects be handed 
over. Violence erupted when on 3 June 2012, a group of Buddhists stopped a bus in Toungup 
town and beat ten Muslim passengers to death (ICG Report, 12 June 2012). There were more 
than 4000 houses burnt, and seventeen mosques and fifteen temples were destroyed in three 
months (June-August 2012) (Antara, 18 August 2012). Apart from the communal violence, the 
Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine were continuously discriminated against by the government by, 
inter alia, denying their citizenship and restricting their rights to work and to study.157 
The impact of this communal conflict spilled-over to Indonesia. While the sympathy for 
 
the plight of the Rohingya was shared by the mainstream – such as NU and Muhammadiyah – 
 
who called on President SBY to respond firmly on the Rohingya issue (see NU Online, 29 July 
 
2012), it also triggered radical action from the Islamic extremists. A plot to bomb Buddhist 
temples in Jakarta and Solo were uncovered, as well as an attack against a Chinese temple in 
South Sulawesi, and attempted attacks on the Glodok Market in Jakarta’s Chinatown and on 
 
 
156 The majority of the refugees had actually made Australia their destination. However, in order to reach Australia 
they had to pass through Indonesian territorial waters. In 2009, in the wake of the refugees fleeing out of troubled 
countries, mainly from Myanmar and Sri Lanka, the Australian PM Kevin Rudd suggested an ‘Indonesian solution’ 
to the problem. This approach essentially emphasised Australia ‘support’ for Indonesia to solve the refugee 
problem in ways conforming to humanitarian principles. Indonesia, on the other hand, believed that the original 
motives of these refugees were economic reasons hence Jakarta regarded them rather as ‘economic migrants.’ The 
Indonesian government, therefore, was of the view that they should be repatriated to their countries of origin. In 
other words, the Indonesian government denied Australia’s proposal regarding the ‘Indonesian solution’ and 
instead urged Canberra to work together in addressing the problem. See, for instance, Topnews, 30 October 2009; 
Pearson, The Jakarta Globe, 6 November 2009. 
157 For details on the communal conflicts between the Buddhists and Muslim community in Myanmar, see ICG 
Reports, “Crisis Watch Database: Myanmar”. For a discussion about communal conflicts in Indonesia, see, among 
others, Malley (2001); Schulze (2002). 
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the Indonesian Police Mobile Brigade headquarter in Jakarta as well as government buildings, 
throughout 2012-2013, were manifestations of the Indonesian Muslim extremists’ response 
towards what happened in Myanmar (IPAC Report, 9 October 2013). These groups, particularly 
composed of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI)158 and the Islamic Ummah Front (FUI), stated 
that their action was a reaction against the Indonesian government’s inability to act firmly in 
defending the Rohingya in Myanmar (IPAC Report, 9 October 2013). The IPAC Report noted 
that the extremists’ actions were supported by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir159 – a hard-line Islamic cleric 
– who declared that ‘jihad in Myanmar was an obligation to all Muslims’ (see also Schulze, 4 
 
December 2013). 
 
In April 2013, SBY visited Myanmar and although it was not in the formal agenda 
issued by the President’s Special Staff for International Relations Dr. Teuku Faizasyah 
(Presidential Press Statement, 21 April 2013), he urged President Thein Sein to act firmly 
against anti-Muslim violence. SBY contended that this case could affect ‘the regional stability, 
in general, and Indonesia, in particular, for being a Muslim majority country’ (Vivanews, 24 
April 2013). The Muslim extremists in Indonesia were dissatisfied with this statement and 
condemned SBY for visiting Myanmar when violence against Muslims was erupting (IPAC 
Report, 9 October 2013). In July 2013, two low-explosive bombs exploded in the Ekayana 
Temple in West Jakarta and the police found a note in the location supporting the struggle of 
Rohingya in Myanmar (BBC Indonesia, 5 August 2013).160 This event indicated a continuing 
dissatisfaction amongst Indonesia’s Islamist groups against the Indonesian political leaders 
who, they believed, had failed to promote human rights and protection in Myanmar. 
In responding to the Rohingya issue, Indonesia’s foreign policy was not hostile since 
Indonesian leaders did not follow the preference of the Islamic extremists who called for jihad 
against Myanmar’s Buddhists. This can be linked to two factors. First, foreign policy-making 
patterns. If Indonesia applied a bottom-up model then a hostile foreign policy approach would 
have been likely. This is because foreign policy in Indonesia continued to be a top-down 
process, and the leaders dominated foreign policy preferences in the case of Myanmar. The 
 
 
 
 
158  Although often depicted as an extremist, FPI had been asked by the former Chief of the Indonesian Police, 
General Timur Pradopo, to assist him in overseeing Jakarta’s security during the month of Ramadan. For further 
details, see Tempo, 7 October 2010. 
159 Ba’asyir was detained in 2003 by the Indonesian authorities because of passport fraud, although particularly 
the American authorities believed that he was linked to terrorist networks of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Violation 
of the immigration law was the only factor that the Indonesian authorities could prove during his trials. For details, 
see Hainsworth (2007:137); Moore (2004); and Harvey (2004). Ba’asyir is currently serving fifteen years in jail 
for financing Jihadis training in Aceh. He has also just recently supported the Islamic Khilafa and will be swearing 
to Caliph Ibrahim (Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi) – the man believed to be the leader of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant). For details, see  Arrahmah, 13 July 2014. 
160 In Indonesia, incidents involving different faiths have risen particularly between 2008 and 2011. For details see 
Wahid Institute Reports 2008 and 2009; Kompas, 9 February 2011; and Vivanews, 8 February 2011. 
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second was the absence of Islamic considerations in Indonesia’s foreign policy. As Chapter 
Four notes, Indonesia’s foreign policy was not significantly and substantively influenced by 
religious factors, therefore, it was unlikely for Indonesian foreign policy leaders to use Islam as 
grounds for making the state’s foreign policy. 
The uncritical response to the human rights situation in Myanmar can be assessed on 
the grounds of Indonesia’s domestic human rights considerations. A number of events 
perceived widely as violating human rights, ranging from the assassination of Munir Said 
Thalib, a vocal human rights activist, on his flight to Amsterdam from Jakarta on 7th September 
2004 (see Razak 2009),161 to incidents of religious intolerance against minorities that occurred 
 
particularly between 2008 and 2011 (see, among others, Wahid Institute 2008, 2009; Kompas, 
 
1 June 2008; Kompas, 9 February 2011), hindered Indonesia from being an active human rights 
promoter abroad. Following these domestic events, the Indonesian government was heavily 
scrutinised by the international community at the recent UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 
held at the UN Human Rights Council, Geneva, in May 2012. The Review highlighted, among 
other aspects of human rights reports, the increasing trend of religious intolerance and the 
government’s response to this matter.162  Taking these domestic considerations into account, 
Indonesian leaders would face difficulty in promoting human rights abroad when ‘domestic 
order is not even in order’ (Ramage, interview, 9 August 2011). Therefore, human rights 
promotion was unlikely to substantially make for Indonesia’s bilateral foreign policy priority 
more generally if it was not clearly pursued toward Myanmar. 
The Indonesian leaders also preferred to combine Indonesia’s dialogue approach with 
the imposition of Western sanctions in Myanmar. For Indonesia, the Myanmar issue had 
damaged ASEAN with regard to its image and international reputation. Hassan Wirajuda called 
it ‘a wedge in ASEAN cooperation’, emphasising the impact on ASEAN’s external cooperation, 
particularly with the US (Assignment Report of the Foreign Minister, 2009, Section B5:84). 
The US was a consistent advocate of the imposition of economic sanctions on Myanmar in the 
hope that such a policy would lead to a change in the political system of the country (Clapp 
2010; see also Reuters, 17 May 2012).163  Up to 2009, there were four stages of sanctions 
 
 
 
 
 
161 For details on this case, including the investigation and trial processes, see The Jakarta Post, 22 June 2008. 
162 For the full Report on Indonesia, see United Nations, Universal Periodic Review Second Cycle on Indonesia, 
May 2012. 
163 In a meeting between the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Myanmar’s FM Wunna Maung Lwin in 
February 2012, Clinton made public the US policy to suspend the sanctions and to allow US investments, 
particularly in mining and energy industries as well as financial services. This decision was made after the Thein 
Sein government conducted the 2010 elections that the opposition was allowed to contest. Nevertheless 
Washington was cautious in lifting the law that regulated sanctions on Myanmar, as President Obama called the 
political progress in Myanmar nascent. For details see, Agence France-Presse, 17 May 2012. 
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imposed by Washington (Steinberg, 2010:180-82).164 However, driven by an increasing 
frustration with the unchanging situation in Myanmar, the US State Department worked to 
revise US sanctions policy as indicated by the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton after meeting 
her Indonesian counterpart, Hassan Wirajuda, during her visit to Jakarta in February 2009. 
Clinton sought support from Indonesia with respect to Myanmar. Clinton stated that: 
 
We are going to work closely and we are going to consult with Indonesia… Imposing 
sanctions has not influenced the junta, and reaching out and trying to engage has not 
either (The Jakarta Post, 18 February 2009). 
 
Responding to Clinton’s statement, during his reciprocal visit to Washington in June 2009, 
Wirajuda suggested that US sanctions have made ‘the local people suffer even more’ (The 
Jakarta Post, 9 June 2009) and thus failed to create a significant change in Myanmar. 
Therefore, Indonesia posited a ‘regional solution for a regional problem’ model, noting 
the ineffectiveness of the Western sanctions policy and by keeping the Myanmar issue within 
the ASEAN context. In contrast to the Western approach, Indonesia developed its own strategy 
for engaging the junta. In this case, Indonesia took a ‘balanced method’ by combining the 
support for the imposition of Western sanctions and Indonesia’s dialogue approach (Wirajuda, 
interview, 12 January 2012). By taking this pragmatic approach, Indonesian leaders felt 
ASEAN should remain the key in managing the Myanmar issue without openly surrendering 
Myanmar to any mechanism outside of ASEAN. In September 2009 in New York, US officials 
made public that Washington had opted to embark on a new approach towards Myanmar, which 
would combine the existing sanctions and high-level dialogues (Haacke, 2010:154). It would, 
however, be an overstatement to suggest that the new approach owed much to the suggestions 
made by Wirajuda earlier, as the ‘high-level dialogues’ element in this policy was meant to 
involve the US high officials and not ASEAN leaders. This was indicated by the visit of the US 
Assistant of Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell, together with 
the US Ambassador to ASEAN, Scot Marciel, to Myanmar to meet the junta leaders and Suu 
Kyi following the announcement of the new policy (Steinberg, 2010:191). 
Overall, while Indonesian foreign policy leaders promoted democracy in Myanmar, it 
could not act in an aggressive way that, in turn, would challenge the conventional Westphalian 
principles of inter-state relations. To this extent, the Indonesian leaders pressured the junta only 
through diplomacy, particularly since 2003, while respecting Myanmar’s sovereignty. This 
section also noted that Indonesian leaders did not actively promote human rights in Myanmar 
despite the impact of Rohingya issues on the Muslim groups and public opinion more generally 
 
 
 
 
164 For details on US policy towards Myanmar, see Steinberg (2010). 
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in Indonesia. Apart from the existence of non-interference principle that has, to some extent, 
limited Indonesia’s diplomacy in Myanmar, domestic considerations with regard to events that 
affected the respect of human rights in Indonesia have also been the factor that explained the 
absence of human rights promotion abroad. Indeed, the lack of focus on the side of Indonesian 
leaders with regard to human rights promotion has raised concern from members of the DPR. 
The following section will discuss the preferences and responses of members of the Indonesian 
Parliaments in relation to Indonesian policy on Myanmar. 
 
6.2.2.2   Indonesian Parliament 
 
Being the people’s representative, members of the DPR have more freedom to express their 
preferences and response toward the Myanmar case. These preferences occasionally included 
critics toward the junta expressed more openly and manifested in more concrete actions. Within 
the DPR, the issue of human rights promotion in Myanmar influenced these actions. 
One of the bold initiatives of the DPR was raised in 2004, when members of Komisi I 
collectively urged the Indonesian government to refuse Myanmar’s forthcoming chairmanship 
in ASEAN. A report revealed that 
 
Komisi I is urging the government to decline Myanmar to act as the chair of the ASEAN 
Standing Committee until Myanmar is able to demonstrate its progress in restoring 
democracy, the respect of human rights, the release of Suu Kyi, and the national 
reconciliation process as the government of Myanmar has promised (Report of 
Activities of the First Commission Hearing Session II-IV, 2004-2005). 
 
Also in 2004, the Indonesian DPR welcomed the formation of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary 
Caucus on Myanmar (hereafter, AIPMC), in November in Kuala Lumpur. In a statement in 
response to the establishment of the AIPMC, the Indonesian Parliament underlined that it 
‘should respond to regional situation…particularly when it is against the respect of the universal 
human rights principles’ (BKSAP, 2009:88). The DPR’s support in the establishment of 
AIPMC was made on the basis that first, Myanmar had helped Indonesia during the latter’s 
struggle for independence in 1945 and as the Myanmar people suffered under the junta regime, 
the DPR felt the need to ‘take concrete action in managing the situation in Myanmar’; second, 
the fear that political instability in Myanmar would have an impact on the wider Southeast Asia 
region; third, Indonesia’s Reformasi served as a ‘wake-up call’ for the people’s power in 
bringing about changes; and fourth, the junta has detained people who won seats in the 1990 
election (see BKSAP, 2009:89-90). 
The AIPMC includes parliamentary representatives from Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, and Cambodia. Focusing its activities primarily on promoting 
democracy in Myanmar, the AIPMC engaged in second track diplomacy and worked alongside 
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the ASEAN Summit. It also built networks with members of the Myanmar Parliament in-exile 
(BKSAP, 2009:89).165 According to the then AIPMC president, Eva Kusuma Sundari166 of the 
Indonesian PDIP, the focus of AIPMC was essentially to advocate the rights of the Burmese in 
response to the brutal acts of the military, in which she viewed as the prominent adversary of 
democracy (Sundari, interview with the author, 18 May 2012). 
As an inter-parliamentary network among ASEAN member countries, the way AIPMC 
worked in each of these countries is different. According to Lee Jones, the ability of AIPMC to 
drive liberal policies towards Myanmar did not depend on the availability of liberal institutions 
in the respected countries. In Malaysia and Singapore, for instance, institutions are considered 
‘illiberal’ yet the AIPMC legislators in Malaysia were able to critically debate Myanmar. In 
Singapore, activities even involved a public protest, an activity normally prohibited in the 
country. This was organised outside the Myanmar Embassy following the state’s violent act 
against Buddhist monks in 2007 (Jones, 2009:392,395).167  The fact that membership of the 
AIPMC did not include all ASEAN members highlighted the divisions within ASEAN with 
regards to the Myanmar issue. The non-members of the AIPMC, particularly Laos, Vietnam, 
and Myanmar itself, viewed the Myanmar issue as the internal problem of the Burmese given 
these countries’ inclination towards the strict implementation of the non-interference principle. 
To state even further its support for a political change in Myanmar, DPR invited 
Myanmar’s members of parliament in-exile, among them Khun Teddy Buri, Chair of Members 
of Parliament Union (MPU), to attend the General Assembly in conjunction with SBY’s state 
of union address delivered before the parliament on 16 August 2008 (Antara, 14 August 2008; 
BKSAP, 2009:89). The MPU accepted the invitation and attended the Assembly.168 In that same 
year, the DPR also rejected the placement of the designated Myanmar Ambassador to Indonesia 
in Jakarta, and also asked the Indonesian government to delay the posting of an Indonesian 
Ambassador in Yangon as a mark of dissatisfaction with the development of Myanmar’s 
democratic transition (Sambuaga, 2009:7). In August 2009, a two-day meeting of the Myanmar 
government in-exile held in Jakarta and also attended by Western diplomats. The Indonesian 
Police, however, banned this meeting. In this regard, Deplu’s spokesperson Dr. Teuku 
Faizasyah stated publicly: 
 
We cannot issue permits for political activities of the government in-exile in our 
sovereign area, whoever it is. It is the matter of principle and not made upon request of 
 
 
 
 
165 For details on AIPMC activities, see AIPMC, “Activities”. 
166 Eva Sundari was the AIPMC President for two periods (2008-2012). 
167 For more details on the practise of AIPMC in each of the ASEAN countries, see, for instance, Jones (2009). 
168 For the complete statement of Khun Teddy Bury in relation to this visit, see NCGUB, 17 August 2008. 
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the (Myanmar) embassy. The ban is consistent with Indonesia’s recognition of only one 
Myanmar government (The Jakarta Post, 13 and 14 August 2009). 
 
The ban was suspected by one of the activists to have been influenced by the pressure of the 
military junta (Associated Press, 13 August 2009). The repercussions of such a policy were 
striking. One day after the banning, a group called Indonesia Solidarity for Burma, which was 
comprised of human rights activists, parliament members, and experts, expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the Indonesian government’s decision, which they saw as ‘bowing to 
Myanmar’s military regime at the expense of Indonesia’s own democracy and sovereignty’ 
(The Jakarta Post, 14 August 2009). To this end, the AIPMC reacted bluntly and expressed its 
disappointment to the media. Eva Sundari told the media that: 
 
… the plan to organise the meeting had been reported to the Police since May 2009 
without objection. But suddenly, the Police informed us two days before the meeting 
about its cancellation due to objections from the Myanmar Embassy (The Jakarta Post, 
14 August 2009). 
 
Similarly, Marzuki Darusman, also from AIPMC, was quoted as saying: 
 
 
We do understand the sensitivity of the Myanmar issue, the objection from the Myanmar 
Embassy and the position taken by the Foreign Ministry. However, as a democracy, the 
government's ban should not take place. They could have helped by finding solutions 
to have the meeting go on without having to insult the Myanmar government. … The 
ban was a big Indonesian failure on the international stage, considering Jakarta had 
always thrown its weight behind democracy in Myanmar at regional and multilateral 
forums (The Jakarta Post, 14 August 2009). 
 
The Indonesian government’s decision to ban the meeting demonstrates that any support for the 
activities of the exiled Myanmar government could not be made public as it would have violated 
the principle of respecting Myanmar’s sovereignty and its government’s legitimacy. As 
privately acknowledged by a mid-level Indonesian diplomat in the ASEAN’s Political-Security 
Section of Deplu to the author (personal communication, 2010): ‘It was too sensitive for the 
junta, therefore we have to be careful in supporting these kinds of activities’. 
Acharya (2010:337,353) argued that democratisation in Indonesia created a feeling of 
 
‘democratic pride’, accentuated by the growth of a robust civil society and the desire of the 
democratic regime to pursue policies different from those of the previous non-democratic 
regime. Democratisation in Indonesia has also contextualised the emergence of the notions of 
democracy and human rights in primarily domestic political arena where new civil society 
organisations – such as Kontras (Commission on Missing Persons and Violence Victims, 
established in 1998), PBHI (Association of Legal Assistance and Human Rights Affairs of 
Indonesia, formed in 1996 but only became active in late 1990s), and IMPARSIAL (the 
Indonesian Human Rights Monitor, created in 2002) – emerged mostly in the fields of human 
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rights (Hadiwinata, 2003:72). These emerging organisations were essentially part of the rising 
middle-class in Indonesia, who, in 1998, raised the ‘Six Reform Demands’, including respect 
for legal supremacy and human rights. Therefore, Indonesia’s transition to democracy gave the 
democratic regime the task to resolve some of the problems of the past, including unresolved 
human rights abuses (Sukma, 2011:118; see also Abdullah, 2009:569). With an increasing role 
of the DPR in policy-making, marked by numerous public consultations it organised (see 
Chapter Three), it was not unusual for civil society to build networks with (members of) the 
parliament. These networks then became the channel for civil society to push their agenda into 
the policy-making process where ideas mattered in shaping preferences, which influenced the 
final policy actions (see, Risse-Kappen, 1991:490-492; Checkel, 1993:276; Ashizawa 2008). 
Therefore, it was likely that DPR became interested in human rights issues because of the 
influence asserted by these civil society groups. 
Overall, this section suggests three points with regard to Indonesia’s foreign policy on 
Myanmar. First, a change took place in the Indonesian leaders’ policy approach, namely from 
being ‘accommodative’ during the Suharto’s period to being ‘critical and assertive’ during the 
Reformasi era. Second, although critical and assertive, the Indonesian foreign policy leaders 
did not actively promote human rights in Myanmar. A combination of external and internal 
factors, namely the respect for non-interference at the international level and Indonesia’s human 
rights considerations at the domestic level, respectively, hindered Indonesian leaders from 
vigorously promoting human rights abroad, and in Myanmar, more specifically. Third, while a 
limitation existed on the side of the Indonesian government to promote human rights, the DPR 
based its policy preferences on, and actions toward, Myanmar largely on human rights 
considerations. However, DPR could not initiate formal Indonesian foreign policy on Myanmar 
because it did not have the authority to do so. The banning of the meeting it organised in 2009 
in Jakarta with Myanmar government in-exile was an example. In short, although the DPR 
could influence the focus of Indonesian leaders, the authority to make and decide the content 
of Indonesia’s foreign policy on Myanmar remained in the hands of Indonesian foreign policy 
leaders in the executive. 
 
 
6.3    Democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy on the promotion of political 
 
values: the importance of leaders, the changing preferences, and its limits 
 
In Chapter One, this thesis discussed the likelihood of countries to promote democracy through 
foreign policy as a means to increase its international status. It was also argued that democratic 
ideas must be recognised by the foreign policy decision-makers as political norms that guide 
foreign policy before they could be promoted abroad (Wolff and Wurm, 2011:88-89). This 
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means that democratic values had to be internalised before being promoted abroad. In Chapter 
Two, internalised norms or values are said to exist when they become the basis for practical 
reasoning for one’s behaviour (see page 60). Further, given that foreign policy leaders were 
supposed to behave in accordance with internalised norms, these norms could be found in 
domestic political discourse (see Chapter Two: 63). To this extent, the preceding chapters have 
included evidence that democratic and human rights values were salient in Indonesia’s domestic 
political realm. 
This chapter demonstrates that Indonesia’s foreign policy initiatives in relation to 
Myanmar and the BDF were manifestations of Indonesian leaders’ commitment to democracy. 
Generally, ensuring political freedom in Myanmar became the reason for Indonesian foreign 
policy leaders to pursue strategies emphasised the promotion of democracy. This was evident 
in, among others, Wirajuda’s call for the junta to release Suu Kyi. Indeed, success in 
transforming the political situation in Myanmar would contribute to Indonesia’s leadership role 
and status in the region as well as in repairing Indonesia’s international image. Taking into 
account Indonesia’s role as a democracy promoter, MacIntyre (interview, 28 July 2011) noted: 
‘the strategy positively contributes to Indonesia’s international standing and assists its 
diplomatic abilities’. Additionally, Hassan Wirajuda and Juwono Sudarsono, respectively, 
acknowledged the importance of raising its international status as a democracy as it would 
‘simplify Indonesia’s relationship with major powers, such as the US’ (Wirajuda, interview, 12 
 
January 2012), given that democracy is ‘an image largely applauded by the West’ (Sudarsono, 
 
interview, 5 August 2011). 
 
Indonesia’s democracy promotion in Myanmar was practiced on two different tracks; 
first track – diplomacy engaged by the Indonesian foreign policy leaders in the executive -– and 
the other was second track, highlighted by a number of initiatives made by the DPR and its 
members. Being authoritative actors, Indonesian foreign policy leaders determined the formal 
content of Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Myanmar by, inter alia, continuously respecting 
the junta as Myanmar’s only legitimate government, and hence banning the Myanmar’s 
government-in-exile meeting in Jakarta. The DPR (as a non-authoritative actor in foreign 
policy) could only propose initiatives outside the state’s formal foreign policy decisions. This 
supports the argument developed in Chapter Two about the importance of leaders in 
determining foreign policy because even in democracies the role of the parliament in defining 
the state’s foreign policy decisions is limited by the authority of the foreign policy decision- 
makers in the executive. This authority includes the power to change Indonesia’s foreign policy 
towards Myanmar from being accommodative during the New Order’s era to being assertive 
during the Reformasi era. This change was linked to the domestic changes in Indonesia, 
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highlighted by the salience of democracy as Indonesia’s new identity (Sukma 2011; see also 
 
Chapter Five). 
 
While in relation to Myanmar Indonesia’s promotion of democracy was apparent, there 
were a few limitations in the link between democratisation and Indonesia’s promotion of 
political values abroad in general. First, Indonesia’s promotion of democracy in Myanmar and 
in Asia through the BDF programme was not accompanied by a bold promotion of human 
rights. The relatively inactive response of the Indonesian government towards the Rohingya 
issues and the absence of a human rights mechanism in Asia initiated by Indonesia indicated a 
disconnect between Indonesia’s human rights promotion at the domestic and ASEAN levels, 
and at the bilateral and wider Asia levels. The early days of Reformasi were noted as a ‘hopeful 
period for human rights’ (Hamid, interview with the author, 10 August 2011), underscored by 
Habibie’s decisions to annul the Anti-Subversion Law, ratify the Convention against Torture 
and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (through Law No.5/1998), 
the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (through Law 
No.29/1999), and issued Law No.39/1999 on human rights (Vermonte 2005). Nonetheless, in 
later years, a number of events that affected the respect for human rights at the domestic level 
have impacted Indonesia’s promotion of human rights abroad more generally and in Myanmar 
more specifically. Consequently, the absence of the human rights aspect suggests that 
Indonesia’s promotion of political values was pursued only partially. 
Second, Indonesia’s promotion of democracy at the bilateral level was also limited to 
Myanmar while with other non-democracies in Southeast Asia, Indonesia did not pursue similar 
foreign policy strategies. For example, Indonesia did not promote democracy in Vietnam169, a 
country with poor human rights records.170 Further, the absence of democracy and human rights 
promotion was also observable in Indonesia’s foreign policy towards the Muslim world. In the 
OIC, for instance, Indonesia was not known to have promoted democracy in its members, which 
were mostly non-democracies. Instead, Indonesia’s engagement in the OIC has remained driven 
by economic pragmatism (Perwita 2007). Djalal (interview, 2 June 2010) noted that the reason 
Indonesia focused on Myanmar was because Myanmar continued to be under the international 
spotlight while others were not. This indicates the limited areas where Indonesia’s foreign 
policy promotes democracy. Therefore, the scope of Indonesia’s promotion of political values 
 
 
169 Vietnam’s political structure recognises four political apparatuses, namely the Communist Party, the State, the 
Government, and the National Assembly. Each and every one of them are comprised of members of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam (CPV) as the ruling party. For details on the Vietnamese state structure and how decisions are 
made in Vietnam see, for instance, Lucius (2009). For details on the Vietnamese Communist political system see, 
among others, Porter (1993). 
170 For instance, in 2009, the central government in Hanoi put a former army officer, Lt. Col. Tran Anh Kim on 
trial and sentenced him to five and a half years imprisonment after he was charged for subversion as he advocated 
the need for democratic reform in the country. See, Wall Street Journal (29 December 2009). 
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was not all-inclusive even in ASEAN where Indonesia claimed its status of regional leader. In 
the ASEAN context, as the previous chapter demonstrated, promotion of democracy and human 
rights has been the consideration that shaped the practice of Indonesian foreign policy in 
Southeast Asia, where Indonesia sought to influence ASEAN’s intramural political cooperation 
by introducing new themes and ideas to the Association. While in ASEAN Indonesia took a 
leading role, in the multilateral level, such as in the UN, Indonesia was less active in promoting 
democracy in Myanmar. Between 2006 and 2010, Indonesia either abstained from, or voted 
against, any UN General Assembly resolution related to Myanmar’s human rights situation 
(Sukma, 2011:116).171 In January 2007, as Sukma illustrates, the Indonesian Mission in New 
York opted not to support the US-backed UN Security Council resolution criticising 
Myanmar’s human rights record, by arguing that the problem did not qualify as a threat to 
international security and would therefore be better addressed at the regional level. One possible 
reason for Indonesia’s decisions in that regard was the idea to keep the Myanmar issue 
discussed at the regional level, utilising the ASEAN framework. Indonesia may have been 
adamant in tolerating international influence, if not interference, in managing human rights 
issues that are supposedly the domain of the ASEAN forum as it could have impacted 
Indonesia’s reputation as a regional leader. 
Third, in Asia Indonesia’s promotion of political values was also limited by its scope 
since, in this context, the BDF has been Indonesia’s hallmark of democracy promotion in this 
region, but, at the same time, there was an absence of similar foreign policy strategy in the 
cooperation at the East Asia level. To this extent, the foreign policy preference of Indonesian 
foreign policy leaders was mainly based on security considerations hence, the idea of 
maintaining a ‘balanced and inclusive’ presence of major countries in the East Asia regional 
setting. This being said, Indonesia’s democratisation had no effect in the country’s foreign 
policy with regard to cooperation in East Asia context. 
Consequently, these factors underline the differential impact of democratisation on 
Indonesia’s foreign policy of promoting political values beyond ASEAN, marked by a change 
in Indonesia’s policy preferences in relation to Myanmar and, to some extent, in Asia (as the 
BDF initiative demonstrated) and a continuity in Indonesia’s foreign policy on regional 
cooperation beyond Southeast Asia (as the ‘balanced and inclusive’ approach in East Asia 
suggested). 
 
 
 
171  For the list of the UNGA resolutions on Myanmar during the aforementioned period, including the voting 
records, see United Nations Bibliographic Information System, “United Nations General Assembly Resolution on 
Myanmar, 2006-2010.” The UN General Assembly has, from 1991 to 2011, issued twenty-one resolutions on 
Myanmar particularly focused on democratisation and human rights issues. For the list of these resolutions, see 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Burma, 1991-2011. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses the extent to which democratisation has impacted Indonesia’s promotion 
of political values by assessing Indonesia’s policy in the wider Asia and East Asia cooperation, 
as well as on Myanmar. This chapter argues that while democratisation contextualised the 
Indonesian leaders’ decision to promote democracy and human rights, the practice of this 
strategy was limited. This limitation includes aspects of human rights – where in certain case 
they were absent, and the areas where promotion of political values were pursued. In this case, 
Indonesia’s promotion of democracy was apparent in the Myanmar context and in Asia with 
respect to the BDF, but less observable in the East Asia’s cooperation. 
The BDF initiative, however, has not had concrete outcomes for Indonesia as it is merely 
an avenue for ‘sharing best practices and experiences’ and not explicitly meant to be a means 
for changing political regimes elsewhere. Indonesia’s focus in the East Asian regional context 
was also less about democracy promotion and more about security. In this case, Indonesia’s 
approach was highlighted by attempts to continuously maintain a balanced presence of major 
powers in the region and avoid domination by a single power. In these areas of cooperation 
more generally (BDF, East Asia, and Myanmar), the respect for non-interference principle and 
some domestic considerations have limited Indonesia’s practice of human rights promotion. 
Overall, this chapter asserts while the role of leaders remained important in determining 
Indonesia’s strategy of democracy promotion primarily on Myanmar and in relation to the BDF, 
the impact of Indonesia’s democratisation on the promotion of political values in the context of 
East Asia regional cooperation was limited. 
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7   Democratisation and conflict management: The Ambalat case 
 
 
This chapter analyses how Indonesia’s democratisation has influenced foreign policy relating 
to conflict management. It will examine the case of Indonesia’s dispute with Malaysia over the 
oil-rich Ambalat sea block which is located off the coast of the Indonesian province of East 
Kalimantan to the south-east of the Malaysian state of Sabah. Following Suharto’s fall, driven 
particularly by territorial disputes between the two countries, the bilateral relations between 
Indonesia and Malaysia were  affected by increased nationalist sentiment. However, Indonesia 
did not adopt an aggressive policy in pursuit of nationalist claims, but rather sought to introduce 
new standards of cooperation and co-existence between the two states. The Ambalat dispute is 
the most important territorial conflict that Indonesia has had to deal with in its bilateral relations 
in recent years and a useful case study for demonstrating that Indonesia has not conformed to 
the expectations of some scholars on the relationship between democratisation and an 
aggressive foreign policy approach (see, for instance, Mansfield and Snyder 2002). 
As this study shows, the democratisation process in Indonesia fostered a non-hostile 
attitude towards foreign relations, a result of the Indonesian leaders’ new commitment to 
democracy, the existence of strong foreign policy institutions, and a top-down approach to 
policy making. 
The first section of this chapter will briefly discuss the history of Indonesia-Malaysia 
relations, followed by an overview of bilateral relations during the New Order era in Section 
Two. In Section Three, this chapter will examine how bilateral ties have evolved during the 
Reformasi period, highlighting key themes and flashpoints of the relationship. In this context, 
the chapter will also discuss the Ambalat dispute and the reactions toward it on different levels 
in Indonesia. Finally, this chapter will assess the relationship between democratisation and 
Indonesia’s foreign policy on the Ambalat issue. This section explains the underlying reasons 
for the absence of hostile policy behaviour in this context by referring to legal and ideational 
considerations and their links to the key role of leaders. This section also analyses the condition 
in which foreign policy could have been aggressive, influenced by nationalistic rhetoric, before 
making some concluding remarks. 
 
 
7.1    Indonesia-Malaysia: a brief history of ‘kinship’-based relationship 
 
Indonesia-Malaysia relations have been characterised as an ‘older and younger brother’ or 
 
‘abang-adik’ relationship where Indonesia, traditionally, has been the ‘big brother’ (abang) due 
to its advanced science, size, political maturity and its economic growth. For instance, 
Indonesia’s current total population of around 240 million, over ten times that of Malaysia, with 
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a population of 23 million. Malaysia, on the other hand, has been the ‘younger brother’ (adik) 
as it generally looked up to Indonesia’s leadership role in Southeast Asia (Harun, 2006:50). 
Despite this metaphorical description of familiarity, bilateral tie have experienced what Baiq 
Wardhani (2008) described as a ‘love and hate’ relationship. 
As neighbours, Indonesia and Malaysia share land and maritime boundaries, 
particularly across Kalimantan (Borneo), the Sulawesi Sea and along Sumatra Island with the 
Malacca Strait. Taking into consideration the geographical proximity and the similarity in 
languages, culture, and race, Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur (KL) signed the Treaty of Friendship 
in KL in April 1959. The Treaty was supposed to restore blood and racial relations and help the 
two countries rediscover their common heritage, and was an attempt to emphasise avenues of 
kinship as a basis for bilateral relations (Liow, 2005:86). In other words, based on racial 
similarity, the two countries expected that they would understand each other better due this the 
common bond. However, this has not always been the case. 
In 1963, the Indonesian President Sukarno declared what he called ‘konfrontasi’ against 
Malaysia, resisting the formation of the latter which he saw as a political neo-imperialistic move 
by the British ‘whose sole purpose was to perpetuate colonial economic and military interests 
in Southeast Asia’ (Wibisono, 2010:67; also see Liow 2005; Leifer 1983; Hindley 1964; Mackie 
1975). In this case, Sukarno refused to recognise Malaysia, which he regarded as a ‘British 
puppet’ (Yazid 2007). For three years during the pursuit of Konfrontasi the slogan ‘ganyang 
Malaysia’ (crush Malaysia) served as a provocative catchcry for stirring Indonesian nationalism 
and hatred against the neighbouring country. Djiwandono (1996:47) argued that the victory in 
the West Irian confrontation against the Dutch in 1961, which resulted in Indonesian securing 
the province under its rule, greatly strengthened Sukarno’s domestic and international position, 
bolstering his confidence and  emboldening him to pursue new foreign policy ventures and 
objectives based on nationalistic claims. This became the underlying justification for 
Konfrontasi. 
Konfrontasi was a response to Malaysian PM Tunku Abdul Rahman’s proposal in 1961 
to unite Malaya with Singapore, as well as with the former British territories in Sabah, Sarawak, 
and Brunei, projected to become the Greater Federation of Malaysia (Leifer, 1983:75; see also 
Chua, 2001:8). Sukarno immediately challenged the Tunku’s proposal on two grounds. First, 
Malaya had not properly consulted with the Indonesian leaders (Liow, 2005:102), and second, 
the proposed Federation was regarded as an ‘unrepresentative alien-inspired polity designed to 
perpetuate colonial economic and military interests in the region’ (Leifer, 1983:75). The 
creation of Malaysia would put Indonesia’s regional role at risk (Liow 2005). At the time, 
Sukarno’s  political  legitimacy  was  underpinned  by  the  PKI’s  support  and  that  the  new 
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Federation of Malaysia could have eventually served as a ‘new concentration of colonial forces 
on the very frontiers of Indonesia’ (Leifer, 1983:77). 
The PKI had already become a dominant political voice in Indonesia’s domestic 
political environment during before Konfrontasi (Leifer, 1983:77). Through his political 
ideology of Nasakom that combined nationalism, religion (read: Islam), and communism, and 
was designed to be the domestic pillar of Sukarno’s legitimacy, the PKI was accorded a 
substantial role during most of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy. As communists, the PKI leaders 
were concerned that the formation of the Federation would allow Western interests to use KL 
as an anchor for their anti-communist agenda (Leifer, 1983:77). Indonesia’s rejection of the 
Federation was based upon, on the one hand, the influence of PKI leaders who feared that its 
establishment could pose a threat to their political power and activities and, on the other, 
Sukarno’s anti-colonial ideology. Sukarno’s policy of Konfrontasi was an expression of his 
staunch nationalism and world view, which in turn shaped his attitude towards international 
relations. 
Sukarno’s policy of confrontation also served the political and economic interests of the 
domestic political elites (Hindley, 1964:905). If Malaysia continued its economic progress on 
the basis of private enterprise it could persuade affluent Indonesians dissatisfied with Sukarno’s 
chaotic ‘socialism’ to agitate for change, which in turn could manifest as domestic challenges 
to Sukarno’s political dominance (Hindley, 1964:907). In this case, the policy of Konfrontasi 
was also informed by Sukarno’s concern over his domestic political legitimacy and it was 
utilised as an ‘escape clause’ and a diversionary tactic to distract the public from Indonesia’s 
poor economic performance. Konfrontasi allowed for a ‘temporary’ dismissal of internal power 
struggles between the domestic political actors, consequently uniting them against a common 
external adversary (Chua, 2001:11). Overall, while Sukarno’s policy of Konfrontasi was an 
aggressive foreign policy adopted towards the end of his presidency, the rationale for it 
stemmed from Indonesia’s domestic politics (Mackie 1975). 
The years of Konfrontasi between Indonesia and Malaysia ended after the change of 
power in Jakarta from Sukarno to Suharto, as the latter shifted away from revolutionary 
symbolism and redirected his internal policy to fervent anti-communism and the fostering of 
economic growth (Liow, 2005:109). In August 1966, marked by the agreement signed by 
Indonesia’s FM Adam Malik and Malaysia’s Tun Abdul Razak, Konfrontasi officially ended 
and bilateral ties were normalised. 
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7.2    Indonesia-Malaysia relations during the New Order 
 
Built on the notion of ‘kinship’ (saudara serumpun), Indonesia-Malaysia diplomatic relations 
enjoyed a honeymoon period during the administrations of Suharto and PM Mahathir of 
Malaysia, particularly between the 1980s and 1990s. Under Suharto, Indonesian foreign policy 
sought to foster peace and stability in order to underpin economic growth. Mahathir also 
focused primarily on promoting Malaysia’s economic development, as illustrated by the pursuit 
of Malaysia’s New Economic Policy (NEP), which demonstrated by industrialisation 
programmes designed to boost Malaysian prosperity (Beng, undated). In line with the NEP, an 
increased number of Indonesians went to Malaysia to work in industrial as well as non-formal 
sectors, such as domestic and construction workers. The pull factors were a high demand for 
Indonesian workers, who also served as a demographic buffer against the influx of Chinese and 
Indian labourers during the colonial economic policy (Liow, 2004).172 Meanwhile, in Indonesia, 
the push factors were, among others, the scarcity of employment opportunities and relatively 
low wage levels (Detik Finance, 15 February 2012).173 The pursuit of similar goals by the two 
leaders was a bonding factor that promoted regional cooperation and the maintenance of a stable 
relationship, which brought Suharto and Mahathir together. This relationship suppressed 
differences that could have endangered bilateral ties between the two countries, such as the 
dispute over the Sipadan and Ligitan islands. 
The Sipadan and Ligitan islands are located in the Sulawesi strait between the border 
area of Malaysia’s Sabah and Indonesia’s East Kalimantan. The legal ownership of these islands 
was disputed by Indonesia and Malaysia in 1982. The dispute was a result of Malaysia’s Peta 
Baru, a new map unilaterally designed by KL in 1979, which included the Sipadan and Ligitan 
islands as Malaysian-claimed territory. Malaysia’s Peta Baru was problematic not only for 
Indonesia, but for all countries sharing borders with Malaysia such as Thailand, Brunei, 
Singapore, and the Philippines. The problem arose from Malaysia’s claims regarding its 
territorial  waters,  its  Economic  Exclusive  Zone  (EEZ),  and  its  continental  shelf  (Salleh, 
2007:151). 
 
Following the claim by the Malaysians over the Sipadan and Ligitan islands, Indonesian 
leaders were concerned because these sovereignty issues had not been included in the initial 
border negotiations between Indonesia and Malaysia in September 1969 (Salleh et.al, 2009). 
The negotiations were intended to negotiate Malaysia’s border following its independence in 
1957. In these meetings Indonesian delegates referred to the national map based on Law 
 
 
172 In 2004, the Malaysian population was composed primarily of racial Malays (50,4%), Chinese (23,7%), Indians 
(7,1%), and others (7,8%). For details see, CIA World Factbook, “Malaysia”. 
173  A recent report suggests that the average hourly wage in Indonesia was Rp.5,400.00 (US$ 0,6), one of the 
lowest in the region compared to Malaysia (US$2,88), Thailand (US$1,63), or even the Philippines (US$1,04). 
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No.4/1960, while the Malaysians referred to the 1954 British-initiated Continental Shelf 
Boundaries (CSB) Treaty, which did not include the Sipadan and Ligitan islands in their 
territory (Djalal 2010). The CSB Treaty declared that Malaysia’s continental shelf was based 
on a straight baseline connecting the eastern end of Sebatik Island to Sipadan and Ligitan 
(Salleh, 2007:151). However, the CSB Treaty was made prior to Malaysia’s independence, and 
therefore the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands were not accounted for. Consequently, as Hasjim 
Djalal, who was present at these negotiations, wrote: ‘both parties were confused on who is the 
actual owner of these islands’ (Djalal 2010). 
Notwithstanding this confusion, Malaysia’s Peta Baru made claims over the islands and 
based on this, Malaysia begun to initiate tourism developments, such as cottages. Indonesia 
demanded Malaysia halt all kinds of activities in the islands as there were no existing 
agreements regarding the islands’ jurisdiction. In 1988, when PM Mahatir visited Jogjakarta, 
he agreed to Indonesia’s demands (Media Indonesia, 6 June 1991). According to Ali Alatas, 
this decision was a result of the agreement between Suharto and Mahathir to ‘solve the dispute 
with the brotherhood spirit’ (Merdeka, 3 November 1990). In 1991, both countries agreed to 
form a joint border commission (JBC) to negotiate territorial disputes, and to ‘handle the 
bilateral issues in the future’ (Suara Pembaruan, 3 June 1991; Suara Karya, 19 July 1991). 
Malaysia, however, irrespective of the ongoing bilateral negotiations, continued to develop 
resorts on the two islands and promoted them widely as tourism destinations (Suara 
Pembaruan, 3 June 1991), and in May 1991 also posted the Malaysian Forest Police on them 
(Kompas, 18 June 1991). 
Several high level meetings were conducted between Suharto and Mahathir from 1992 
to 1994, yet the result was unsatisfactory for both. In September 1994, Malaysian officials 
proposed bringing the dispute before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Meanwhile, 
cognisant of the fact that Indonesia and Malaysia were parties to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation (TAC), Indonesia preferred to use the ASEAN framework of the High Council 
(AHC). Responding to Indonesia’s preferences, the Malaysian leaders objected to the idea of 
using AHC as a mechanism to settle the dispute as doing so might have negatively implicated 
other border issues that Malaysia has had with other Southeast Asian countries. In a statement, 
in 1996 Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi noted: 
 
…this kind of issue, for Malaysia, is an issue related to other ASEAN countries. 
Malaysia has demarcation problems with Brunei, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, 
Indonesia … (quoted in Luhulima, 2006: 115) 
 
Malaysia’s reluctance to refer the matter to the AHC was based on primarily the fact that the 
 
AHC was supposed to consist of a representative at the ministerial level from each High 
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Contracting parties – the ASEAN members (see TAC, Article14.3). This would be a major 
disadvantage for Malaysia as its Peta Baru created border problems with nearly all ASEAN 
member states. Another reason for Malaysia’s reluctance was the nature of the decisions made 
by the AHC. While the ICJ verdict is binding and final (see ICJ Statute, Article 59), the AHC 
was not designed to be an adjudication body; it was instead a mediation procedure and thus it 
has no power in constituting judicial dispute settlement procedures. Therefore, from the 
Malaysian perspective, the AHC lacked the necessary enforcement mechanisms that would 
make its judgments binding (Salleh, 2007:158). 
The long-standing stalemate as a result of fourteen years of negotiation (1982-1996) 
made Suharto impatient. In October 1996 he gave the order for the case to be brought before 
the ICJ (Flores 2009). The Sipadan-Ligitan case was permanently resolved by the ICJ in 
December 2002, and based on the effectivités (effectiveness principle) – acts by a State relevant 
to a claim of title to territory by occupation or prescription, the factual elements that 
demonstrate the exercise of governmental authority in a territory – among others, its verdict 
states that the ‘sovereignty over these islands belong the Malaysia’ (ICJ Reports, 2002:625; see 
also Severino, 2011a: 61). 
The decision to delay the Sipadan-Ligitan case from being formally adjudicated in 
principle was justified with regard to the brotherhood spirit in sustaining the stability of bilateral 
relations between Indonesia and Malaysia. The leaders maintained bilateral ties because they 
felt the two countries had developed friendly relations. In honouring the passing of Suharto in 
2008, Mahathir said: 
 
 
Malaysia is indebted to Suharto in ending the confrontation policy… We looked up to 
him as a great leader and as an international statesman. For me, it’s quite personal. I 
know him and I have worked with him for a very long time. I regarded him as a friend 
of Malaysia and a personal friend. He cherished good relations with Malaysia 
(Bernama, 27 January 2008). 
 
While in Malaysia the ICJ’s judgment was cheered by the public, in Indonesia it was seen as a 
grave defeat. This situation stimulated nationalist responses in Indonesia whenever territorial 
disputes occurred between the two countries. 
 
 
7.3    Indonesia – Malaysia ties during the Reformasi period 
 
During the Reformasi era, bilateral ties between Indonesia and Malaysia entered a new chapter. 
Issues ranging from the stereotyping of people from each side, to treatment of Indonesian 
migrant workers in Malaysia to unilateral claims on cultural heritage, and to border problems 
were all prominent. While the shared ‘similarity’ of culture could have strengthened the 
relationship of the two states, it was in fact often a cause of friction. For example, Indonesian 
170 
 
perceptions of kinship centred on the idea that the Malaysians overlooked the fact that 
Indonesia’s population consists of many ethnic groups that are not amalgamated in Indonesia 
as one Malay race, as is the case in Malaysia. As Alfitra Salamm, an Indonesian activist, notes 
in his interview (Koran Tempo, 6 September 2009: A10-11): 
 
(as if) Indonesians are all Malay. Maybe they (the Malaysians) see it from a language 
perspective only… what they (Malaysia) know is the Javanese, Minang, and the 
Madurese. They don’t know Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, notwithstanding the Papuans 
and the Moluccas. They (Malaysia) did not know the Indonesians comprehensively. 
 
As regard the treatment of Indonesian migrant workers, in recent times the presence of 
Indonesian labourers has been negatively viewed and blamed as a source of social problems in 
Malaysia (Liow 2004). As argued by a Malaysian blogger, Fazlee Rahman (Vivanews, 11 
September 2009): 
 
 
In Malaysia there are too many Indonesians searching for economic fortune…. 
However, the large flow of Indonesians has also contributed to the high rates of 
criminalities such as homicide and robbery. 
 
Negative views about Malaysians also occurred in Indonesia. Indonesians publicly dubbed 
Malaysians as ‘arrogant’ and ‘thieving’ and in retaliation for ‘Indon’ – a derogatory term 
repeatedly used by the Malaysian media to describe Indonesians – referred to Malaysians as 
‘Malingsia’, a word that derived from slang in the local dialect means ‘you thief’.174  These 
 
labels were triggered by the unilateral claims made by Malaysians, particularly those that led 
to the ‘loss’ of the Sipadan and Ligitan Island in 2002 to other perceived attempts to appropriate 
Indonesian traditional folklore – namely Rasa Sayange (traditional song of Maluku), tari 
Pendet (Pendet Dance) of Bali, and the Poco-poco dance of Manado175 - and the recent case of 
the claim over the Ambalat, Overall, since the removal of the two leaders, the bilateral ties have 
been in constant flux. In the words of former Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas, bilateral 
relations between the two countries ‘make a very long fence that in many places stands on soft 
grounds’ (quoted in Flores, 2009). Given the delicate nature of the bilateral ties, what did this 
mean for Indonesia’s foreign policy on the Ambalat dispute? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
174 For a useful discussion on the term ‘Indon’, see Nelly Martin, The Jakarta Post, 7 April 2012. 
175 While other cultural disputes were widely published by the Indonesian and Malaysian news media, the last item 
that was claimed to be Malaysian, the Poco-poco dance, took place in a private dinner session hosted by the 
Malaysian government to honour the visit of Indonesian President SBY. It was known to the author that during 
the dinner, the Master of Ceremony (MC) called on the performance of the dance while announcing that its origin 
was Malaysian. This announcement, inevitably, shocked the Indonesian First Lady Ani Yudhoyono who spoke 
about this with the spouse of former foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda, Herawatie Wirajuda. In the event, the MC 
eventually amended the announcement and apologised to the Indonesian side. 
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7.3.1    The Ambalat case176 
 
Ambalat is a sea bloc located in the Sulawesi Sea near Indonesia’s East Kalimantan and 
Malaysia’s Sabah state. An oil-rich bloc with reserve capacity of around 30-40 thousand barrels 
per day, Ambalat first emerged as a bilateral issue in 2005, only one year after SBY was elected 
president. The conflicting claims to Ambalat related primarily to the East Ambalat, comprising 
Bulungan East Kalimantan, Nunukan East Kalimantan, Northwest of Natuna, Air Komering 
South Sumatera, Belida South Sumatera, East Sepayang and Sei Nangka-Senipah East 
Kalimantan (Efantino and Arifin 2009). The dispute was a result of the business contracts 
awarded on the one hand by Indonesia’s Pertamina national oil company to ENI (an Italian oil 
and gas company) and American-based Unocal in Ambalat and East Ambalat blocs in 2004 and 
– on the other hand – by Malaysia’s Petronas to Royal Dutch Shell in February 2005. The latter 
included the blocs ND6 and ND7, which are located in an area over which there are overlapping 
EEZ claims. In 1999, Indonesia had already awarded Shell an oil concession contract in the 
Ambalat bloc. This had expired in 2001, marked by the transfer of rights to ENI. However, 
speculation arose that Shell might have used the 1999 agreement with Indonesia as a basis for 
negotiation with Malaysia, which resulted in the granting of the aforementioned concession 
agreements in 2005. As noted by Iin Arifin Takhyan, then the Oil and Gas Director General at 
the Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource, and reported in The Jakarta Post (15 
March 2005): ‘the termination of the agreement in 2001 means that Shell must not use our 
(Indonesian) data to appraise the oil potential at the East Ambalat area during their 
negotiation[s] with Malaysia’. Due to these conflicting rights to explore the Ambalat blocs, 
while Indonesian authorities argued that Malaysia had ‘violated Indonesia’s sovereignty’, 
Malaysia’s former foreign minister, Syed Hamid Albar, announced that Malaysia had the same 
views towards Indonesia (Arsana and Schofield, undated). 
According to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the territorial 
sea of a state exhibits the principle of sovereignty. However, in the EEZ and continental shelf, 
a sovereign right would apply, meaning that coastal states could exercise the ‘sovereign rights 
for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources’ (see UNCLOS, Article 56 
and 77).177 Having said that Ambalat is a continental shelf zone within which overlapping 
claims in the EEZ existed. The Ambalat case is therefore ‘an issue of sovereign rights, not 
sovereignty and the dispute is all about resources’ (Sudarsono, interview with the author, 5 
 
 
 
176 Bilateral negotiations on the Ambalat case are still on-going. Accordingly, a senior Deplu official involved in 
the process advised the author that not all materials and processes could be revealed. Therefore, this thesis does 
not claim or aim to offer a comprehensive account of the Ambalat issue. 
177 For the complete provision of the EEZ (including its definition and breadth), see UNCLOS 1982 Part V, article 
55-75, and of the continental shelf, see Part VI, article 76-85. 
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August 2011). In a more detailed comment, Hassan Wirajuda explained, as quoted by Antara 
 
(26 June 2009): 
 
 
The Ambalat bloc is not included in the 12 nautical miles (nm) from the baseline, which 
would exemplify Indonesia’s sovereignty, but it is included in the area of Indonesia’s 
sovereign rights located outside the 12nm where Indonesia has the right to exploration. 
 
Legally, Malaysia’s claim over Ambalat was based on its Peta Baru. In this case, Malaysia used 
the Sipadan and Ligitan islands, whose sovereignty was then still disputed, as the outer starting- 
points to claim their territorial boundaries around the Sulawesi Sea that encroached upon 
Indonesia’s territory (Arsana, 2010:50; Efantino and Arifin, 2009:163). As a result, its later 
boundaries of territorial waters, EEZ, and continental shelves greatly overlapped those of 
Indonesia’s Kalimantan (Salleh et.al, 2009:108). In response to the enactment of the Peta Baru, 
Indonesia sent a diplomatic note to Malaysia in 1980, protesting its content on the grounds that 
the map was designed without any consultation with Indonesia. In this regard, Malaysia had 
contradicted the principles of the UNCLOS 1982, to which Malaysia was also a signatory. 
Based on the UNCLOS, parties to the Convention are expected to resort to the provisions of 
UNCLOS 1982 in dealing with maritime issues. 
Several provocative events in the Ambalat area between 2005 and 2009 intensified the 
dispute between the two countries. In January 2005, the Malaysian gunboat Sri Malaka went in 
pursuit of and reportedly fired on several Indonesian fishermen boats (KM Jaya Sakti, KM 
Wahyu, and KM Irwan) around East Kalimantan (Efantino and Arifin, 2009:164). Moreover, 
between 2007 and 2008 there were about ninety-nine intrusions by Malaysian gunboats into 
Indonesian territory (Pasaribu 2009). In addition to the public demonstrations against 
Malaysia’s provocative actions, the former Indonesian Chief of the Armed Forces (Panglima 
TNI), General Endriartono Sutarto, prepared three warships to patrol around the disputed zone, 
adding to the four units of F-16 jet fighters dispatched at Sepingan Airbase, East Kalimantan 
(Kompas, 3 March 2005; Liputan 6, 7 March 2005). However, the escalation did not reach a 
climax until the collision of the Indonesian patrol ship, KRI Tedong Naga, with the Malaysian 
warship Rencong on 8 April 2005 in Karang Unarang, close to Indonesia’s Sulawesi province 
(Koran Tempo, 11 April 2005). This incident took place only a few days prior to the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Cebu, the Philippines. This heightened tension dissipated after 
Deplu filed a diplomatic note protesting about the incident to Malaysia a few days after the 
skirmish. Although the note ultimately remained unanswered by Malaysia, both countries were 
able to prevent an escalation of the conflict in the disputed zone by dispatching a balanced 
amount of military force in the Ambalat region (Koran Tempo, 24 April 2005). 
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On 30 May 2009, however, tension re-escalated when Malaysia’s gunboat, KD Baung- 
 
3509, a fast attack craft, illegally – from Indonesia’s perspective – entered Indonesian waters 
as far as 7.3 nautical miles (nm) towards the Karang Unarang lighthouse in Ambalat, sailing 
with a speed of 11 knots (Vivanews, 12 June 2009). During this event, the Indonesian side 
attempted to open radio contact with the Malaysian boat but was unsuccessful. As a result, an 
Indonesian vessel, the KRI Untung Surapati, became involved in a pursuit to drive out KD 
Baung from a range of less than 400 yards. This event was not the first of that month. A week 
before this event took place, as reported by Vivanews (12 June 2009), KD Baung joined with a 
Beechraft airplane of Malaysia to intrude on the Ambalat area before KRI Hasanuddin 366 
successfully expelled them. 
This series of provocations created mixed reactions in Indonesia, which might have been 
influenced by the coming presidential election in July 2009, as well as by the discontent of the 
Indonesian public towards the Malaysians. 
 
7.3.2    Indonesia’s reaction: preferences and interests at different levels 
 
 
7.3.2.1   Indonesian leaders and the military 
 
The increasing tensions in the Ambalat since January 2005 forced the Indonesian government 
to respond promptly. On Sunday, 6 March 2005, Indonesian President SBY summoned his 
cabinet-level political advisors and security and military leaders to the State Palace. Among 
those present was the Panglima TNI General Endriartono Sutarto178, Navy Commander 
Admiral Slamet Subiyanto, Army Commander Lieutenant General Djoko Santoso, and Air 
Force Commander Air Marshal Djoko Suyanto. This meeting indicated that tensions between 
Indonesia and Malaysia were indeed serious, not only because it was unusual to hold a meeting 
on a Sunday, but also because a cabinet meeting attended by all ministers reportedly followed 
the initial meeting (Liputan 6, 7 March 2005). The outcome of this meeting was the decision to 
dispatch Indonesian warships to Ambalat and to prepare the military jets at the air force base 
nearest to the disputed zone, which was in Makassar, South Sulawesi. 
While military leaders remained on high alert, Indonesian diplomats continued to 
negotiate with their Malaysian counterparts. The Indonesian diplomats believed that Ambalat 
and other border issues should be resolved through dialogue and negotiations as they are 
primarily legal matters. For this reason, the DG for International Law and Treaty at Deplu led 
the Indonesian delimitation team.179  Headed by Arif Havas Oegroseno in his capacity as the 
 
 
178 General Djoko Santoso replaced Sutarto in 2006. 
179 The current negotiation team consists of fifteen officials from various institutions in Indonesia. It also includes 
a team of experts such as Hassan Wirajuda, Prof. Hasjim Djalal, former Ambassador Nugroho Wisnumurti, 
International law expert Prof. Hikmahanto Juwana, and maritime affairs expert Etty Agoes. 
174 
 
then Director for Political, Security, and Territorial Treaty at Deplu, Indonesian negotiators met 
their Malaysian counterparts no less than thirteen times between 2005 and 2008.180 According 
to Rachmat Budiman, Oegroseno’s successor, Indonesian officials met with Malaysian 
representatives four times in a year and it has reached its nineteenth meetings by August 2011 
(Budiman, interview with the author, 16 August 2011).181 For Indonesia, the negotiations were 
aimed not only at Ambalat, but also other territorial disputes with Malaysia, namely the EEZ in 
the northern part of the Malacca Strait; the EEZ in the South China Sea; the territorial sea in 
the Malacca Strait; the territorial sea in the Singapore Strait; and the EEZ, territorial sea, and 
continental shelf in the Sulawesi Sea which includes Ambalat (Budiman, interview, 16 August 
2011). 
 
The Ambalat dispute re-emerged as a public issue between late-2008 and mid-2009, 
coinciding with Indonesia’s general election. During this period, Indonesian elites took a 
stronger stance towards these issues than in 2005. This stance was taken to appease politicians 
who resorted to nationalistic rhetoric in the attempt to attract votes. The Ambalat case provided 
this opportunity. 
SBY, who was set to re-contest the presidency in 2009, continued to emphasise the 
importance of a peaceful settlement by reinforcing bilateral negotiations and avoiding military 
confrontation at sea. On Tuesday, 9 June 2009, it was reported that SBY had telephoned 
Malaysia’s PM Najib Tun Abdul Razak to bring Malaysia back to the table after bilateral 
dialogue was postponed due to changes in the team of KL negotiators (The Jakarta Post, 9 June 
2009). Six days earlier, reassured by the legal advice over the position of Ambalat, SBY made 
 
a public statement emphasising Indonesia’s sovereignty over Ambalat as final (Kompas, 3 June 
 
2009). In this case, SBY’s public stance offers an interesting perspective. He opted to use 
 
‘sovereignty’ when speaking to the press and the public in stressing the possession of Ambalat, 
when the dispute clearly only concerned sovereign rights, not sovereignty. Addressing the 
press, SBY stated: 
 
[because] Indonesia believes that Ambalat belongs to Indonesia … And I’m telling you 
that even for a piece of land or sea, if it is within our sovereignty, we have to keep it. 
No compromise, no tolerance. This is final! (Kompas, 3 June 2009).182 
 
Although SBY had frequently portrayed Ambalat as an issue of sovereignty, he would still 
maintain his position that negotiation was the best course to take, as he was quoted saying: 
 
 
180 In 2008 Oegroseno became the DG for International Law and Treaty, and in 2010, he was appointed Indonesian 
Ambassador to the Belgium and the European Union. 
181 Until December 2013, the Indonesian and Malaysian negotiators have met no less than 28 times in this regard. 
182 The original quote is ‘Sebab, Indonesia yakin Ambalat adalah wilayah Indonesia ... dan saya katakan, sejengkal 
tanahpun atau laut, kalau itu kedaulatan kita, harus kita pertahankan. Tidak ada kompromi, tidak ada toleransi. 
Itu harga mati.’ 
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We (Indonesia and Malaysia) are both members of ASEAN. There is the ASEAN 
Charter, there is diplomacy, and there is peaceful resolution. So, don’t be rhetorical only 
to be seen as a tough and brave leader, (and then) waging war everywhere. War should 
be the last resort. We (Indonesia and Malaysia) prioritise on dignified efforts and on not 
creating  any  additional  problems  to  the  country’s  development  (Kompas,  3  June 
2009).183 
 
During the election period, not wanting to rely solely on the power of negotiation and alarmed 
by the intensity of Malaysia’s intrusions—which reportedly had reached its thirteenth 
encroachment since January 2009—SBY decided to maintain the presence of the Indonesian 
naval force, by increasing the number of warships in the disputed area from three to six 
(Kompas, 7 June 2009a). SBY’s methods of combining negotiations and a display of force 
(gelar pasukan) had an impact on the Malaysian leaders. It was reported that Malaysia’s Navy 
Commander Admiral Abdul Aziz Jafar apologised for what he called: ‘the misbehaviour of the 
Malaysian Navy’ (Detik, 10 June 2009) to the Indonesian Parliament delegates, headed by 
Yusron Ihza Mahendra of Komisi I¸ during the latter’s visit to KL on 10 June 2009. This was 
the second apologetic note originating from the Malaysian authorities, after Malaysian Defence 
Minister Zainal Abidin bin Zin informally apologised to Indonesian Defence Minister Juwono 
Sudarsono at the ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting in Bali 24 March 2008 for the skirmish in 
Ambalat (see Efantino and Arifin, 2009:168). While his words were portrayed as an ‘apology’ 
by the Indonesian media, they were originally framed as ‘regret’. It was Juwono who toned-up 
his counterpart’s statement. As Juwono admitted: ‘I twisted it to be an ‘apology’ when asked 
by the media as it was necessary for the domestic consumption in Indonesia to calm the people 
at home’ (Sudarsono, interview, 5 August 2011). 
While SBY took an approach that combined ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power, his VP Jusuf Kalla 
urged a rather different approach, one contradictory to SBY. According to Bandoro (2009), 
Kalla wanted Indonesia to have a stronger position over the Ambalat issue and was prepared to 
wage war over the competing claims. Kalla, who was at the time campaigning with Wiranto as 
his running-mate, also wished to double the defence budget from Rp.33 trillion to Rp.74 trillion 
if he was elected (The Jakarta Post, 6 June 2009). He further stated that ‘we must take firm 
action on Ambalat. As a country, when intruded upon we can wage war with anyone’ (Waspada 
Online, 3 June 2009). With Bugis ethnic heritage, Kalla was known for his outspokenness. He 
therefore pursued an approach of what he called ‘diplomasi ala Bugis’, as a way to convey his 
unrestricted views openly, rather than with diplomacy itself. As testified by Kalla when he met 
Najib in Kuala Lumpur, 
 
 
183 The original quote is ‘Kita sama-sama negara ASEAN. Ada Piagam ASEAN, ada diplomasi, dan ada 
penyelesaian secara damai. Jadi, jangan beretorika agar dinilai sebagai pemimpin yang berani dan gagah, terus 
mengobarkan perang dimana-mana. Ingat, perang itu jalan terakhir. Kita utamakan jalan lain yang lebih 
bermartabat dan tidak mendatangkan masalah bagi negara yang sedang membangun.’ 
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[Najib], Ambalat is a sensitive issue. It could lead us to war. If we were engaged in a 
war, it is uncertain who would win. But there’s one thing you need to remember, in 
Malaysia there are one million Indonesians and if only I taught a thousand of them to 
make bombs and they blow these buildings in Malaysia, you’re finished! (Kalla, 
Kompas 4 August 2009). 
 
To Kalla’s comment, Najib replied: ‘Pak Jusuf, you can’t do that’, to which Kalla responded 
by saying: ‘let’s negotiate then. And don’t you send any more of your troops to Ambalat, 
otherwise we may engage in war’ (Kalla, Kompas 4 August 2009). To further stress Kalla’s 
dissatisfaction over Malaysia’s behaviour in Ambalat, he refused to stay in Kuala Lumpur that 
evening and opted for the Bugis Village in Johor (Kalla, Kompas 4 August 2009). The different 
approach to the dispute portrayed by SBY and Kalla, according to political analyst Wisnu 
Adiputra, showed that Ambalat had become ‘an attractive field for the presidential hopefuls to 
gain public support’ (see Waspada Online, 3 June 2009). 
At the bureaucratic level, preferences were also diverse and the contradiction between 
SBY and Kalla, who were still then the Indonesian president and vice president, confused the 
decision-makers, no less than the ministers. Wirajuda, for example, stated that Indonesia was 
prioritising a settlement through negotiations, while adding that: ‘I would not complain should 
the Indonesian Navy strengthen (the deployment of) their personnel therein so that Malaysia 
could restrain itself before the negotiation is concluded’ (Antara, 26 June 2009). However, 
Deplu’s general position on this issue, as reflected by Rachmat Budiman, was consistent with 
pursuing negotiations even at the risk of prolonging the issue, which may not have been in 
accordance with public preferences, yet ‘Indonesia wants to conclude it as soon as possible’ 
(Budiman, interview with Forum Keadilan, 12 July 2009). 
On the defence-security front, the TNI, though sworn to obey the political decisions of 
the President, also had its own preference. The TNI doctrine, according to Panglima TNI Djoko 
Santoso, has always been: ‘if we want peace, we must be ready for war’ (Kompas, 7 June 
2009a). Meanwhile the Navy, as assured by the Navy Deputy Commander Admiral Moekhlas 
Sidik, is: ‘always at the forefront to safeguard Indonesia’s sovereignty and will launch fire if 
ordered to’ (Kompas, 6 June 2009). At the lower levels, however, as admitted by a number of 
middle rank officers to the author, the Ambalat case served as a test for Indonesia’s military 
readiness and also for their patience with Malaysia’s manoeuvres. The expressions ‘I would 
shoot if permitted’ or ‘we have been training for, and were trained to go to war, so just let us 
go’ were common phrases among the soldiers themselves and also privately expressed to the 
author in several personal communications with them. 
In response to the desire of the soldiers, former Defence Minister Sudarsono (interview, 
 
5 August 2011) held that Indonesia was in no position to wage war and that Jakarta should not 
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act beyond mere rhetorical nationalist-flavoured statements because of a number of factors, 
including insufficient warships and Indonesia’s low military budget. By 2009, for instance, 
fewer than twenty per cent of Indonesia’s warships were operable (Iisgindarsyah 2011). He also 
added: ‘even for its logistical needs the TNI is still indebted to Pertamina184’ (Sudarsono, 
interview, 5 August 2011). In general, with only a rate of about 35 per cent in terms of military 
armaments readiness by 2009 (see Tempo, 15 September 2009), questions arose as to whether 
Indonesia could acquire sufficient military capabilities should war would become an option.185 
Indonesia, despite its status and size, is clearly not the greatest spender on military expenditure 
in the region.186  The defence budget, as admitted by Sudarsono, had to yield to the 
Kesejahteraan Rakyat, or Kesra (people’s prosperity sector) budget, which comprised 40 
percent of the national budget, given that the Politik, Hukum, dan Keamanan, Polhukam 
(Politics, Law, and Security) sector only held 20% of the whole budget (Sudarsono, interview, 
5 August 2011). The Defence Department falls under the latter sector. In 2009 alone, Indonesia 
only allocated Rp.33,6 trillion (around US$ 2,8 billion) to Defence, far from the desired figure 
of Rp.127 trillion (around US$ 11 billion) (Depkeu, 30 September 2009). 
In terms of manpower strength, however, the TNI was superior to the Malaysian Armed 
Forces. As an illustration: in 2002, Malaysia had around 196,042 personnel across all services 
while Indonesia had 250,000 (Susilo, 2009:66-68). More surprisingly, in order to deter the so- 
called ‘maritime-based threat’, the Indonesian Navy had begun to recruit fishermen as 
informants and to prepare them for duties as military reservists (Radar Lampung, 22 April 
2010). This decision would only have exposed the lack of Indonesia’s human intelligence 
capacity. It also raised questions about the function of naval intelligence. It showed that, 
strategically, Indonesia lacked threat-based defence planning, relying instead on integrated 
forces (Sukma 2005a). Indonesia’s inability to integrate its forces, as Sukma argues, caused 
Malaysia to ignore Jakarta’s deterrent forces (Sukma 2005a). Indonesia’s limited military 
capacity, however, did not prevent Sudarsono from conveying a strong message to Malaysia, 
as he admitted telling his Malaysian counterpart on one occasion that: ‘should there be an open 
war, the first ship to sink, I can assure you, will be Malaysian’ (Sudarsono, interview, 5 August 
2011). 
In short, the preferences of the political actors within the executive were diverged: there 
were those formally in-charge for foreign policy, namely the president and the foreign minister, 
 
 
184 Pertamina is Indonesia’s national oil company. 
185 As reported by Tempo, the readiness of Indonesia’s military assets is as follows: the Army’s infrastructure sits 
at 61,81%, the Navy’s warship preparedness is 16,55%, and the Air Force’s jetfighter readiness revolves around 
30,88%. See Tempo, 15 September 2009. 
186  For authoritative figures on Indonesia’s annual military spending and Southeast Asia’s in general, see The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies Report, “Military Balance”. 
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who preferred a diplomatic solutions to the dispute, while those without formal authorisation 
to make foreign policy, in this case the military, favoured an aggressive approach. 
 
7.3.2.2   The Parliament 
 
In the DPR the Ambalat issue prompted anger and led parliamentarians to yield to nationalistic 
fervour, contending that ‘NKRI harga mati! (The united Indonesia is final!)’. Among them were 
Yusron Ihza Mahendra187, Ali Mochtar Ngabalin of the PBB, Andreas Parera and Permadi of 
the PDIP, Effendy Choirie of the PKB, Djoko Susilo of the PAN, and Theo Sambuaga of Golkar 
(who was also chairman of Komisi I). Being politicians, these parliamentarians were well aware 
of the repercussions of resorting to nationalism. They did so, above all, to attract more popular 
votes by shifting the emphasis from Ambalat being an issue of sovereign rights to an issue of 
sovereignty, as the run-up to the 2009 election demonstrated. In this regard, the parliament had 
opted for a rather different approach when the issue initially arose in 2005. Extracted from an 
unpublished document, in meetings between Komisi I and the foreign minister that took place 
in 2005, the former recommended a subtle approach to the Ambalat dispute by urging the 
foreign minister to ‘immediately plan and propose a draft law on Indonesian Territorial 
Borders’, and for the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) to conduct ‘sharper geopolitical analysis 
on the position and the interest of the involved countries’ (Report of Activities of the First 
Commission Hearing Session II-IV, 2004-2005).. 
Towards the 2009 election, however, there was a shift in attitude within the DPR 
 
regarding the Ambalat case. Triggered by the Malaysian intrusions into the perceived 
Indonesia’s territory, Komisi I had recommended the Panglima TNI to ‘intensify the force 
parade of the TNI in the sea and land border territory, particularly in Ambalat’ (Report of 
Activities of the First Commission Hearing Session III, 2006-2007). About a month before the 
presidential election, which was scheduled for July 2009, a number of Komisi I members went 
to Kuala Lumpur to ‘warn Malaysia’ of its recent provocative activities in the Ambalat area 
(Kompas, 7 June 2009b). This decision was made in addition to the call made by Komisi I to 
Panglima TNI to intensify the securitisation over the area as a strategy of anticipation and 
containment against Malaysia’s provocative manoeuvre to assert its claim over Ambalat 
(Report of Activities of the First Commission Hearing Session I, 2008-2009). 
On 6 June 2009, on the brink of the presidential election, SBY met members of Komisi 
I in a consultation meeting. Held at the Presidential Palace, SBY was accompanied by the 
cabinet’s political-security establishments while Komisi I was represented by its chairman Theo 
Sambuaga, Yusron Ihza Mahendra, Sidki Wahab, Andreas Parera, Djoko Susilo, and Happy 
 
 
 
187 Yusron Mahendra was appointed the Indonesian Ambassador to Japan in 2014. 
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Bone Zulkarnaen. This meeting was held one day prior to the departure of the Komisi I members 
to Malaysia. In this meeting, SBY asked for the Komisi I to channel to Malaysia his discontent 
regarding Malaysia’s provocative manoeuvres and to urge Malaysia to respect the continuing 
negotiations (Kompas, 7 June 2009b). As stated by Mahendra after the meeting: ‘[Malaysia] 
should not undertake manoeuvres while concurrently negotiating’ (Kompas, 7 June 2009b). In 
this meeting, the notion of kedaulatan (sovereignty) was emphasised by SBY as the 
underpinning factor in Indonesia’s firm position on Ambalat. 
In Kuala Lumpur, on the same day that the rapat konsultasi was held in Jakarta, three 
members of Komisi I, Effendi Choirie, Ade Daud Nasution, and Ali Mochtar Ngabalin, 
informally met with the Malaysian Defence Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi. In a rather 
emotional approach, Ngabalin threatened Malaysia: 
 
I am urging the Malaysian Navy warships not to provoke us with any military patrol 
that would trespass Indonesia’s sovereignty borderlines. We (Indonesia) may get 
impatient and sink the Malaysian ships (Kompas, 8 June 2009). 
 
In response to Ngabalin’s statement, Malaysia re-stated its position that it would never be 
involved in a war with Indonesia. According to Hamidi: ‘the Malaysian armed forces are 
wearing the uniform made by Sritex (a large Indonesian textile company), how can we be at 
war?’ (Kompas, 7 June 2009c). 
Another member of Komisi I, Permadi, of the PDIP, also illustrated the DPR’s emotional 
response to the case. In his attempt to demonstrate his outrage, he joined the street 
demonstration outside the premises of the Malaysian Embassy in Jakarta. Permadi’s populist 
attitude had been his preferred approach to cases related to Malaysia since 2005. He usually 
attended demonstrations whenever a case related to Malaysia occurred. In 2005, Permadi stated: 
 
[that] Malaysia has violated our sovereignty and has become a new imperialist. All 
Malaysian jets and ships should be forcefully repelled. Just warn them three times, and 
shoot if they disobey. Diplomacy is not needed. If they insist that Ambalat is their 
territory, [then they] should be crushed (Detik, 8 March 2005). 
 
His consistent stance on this issue by ‘whipping up’ nationalistic sentiment was witnessed once 
 
again in 2009. In an interview with Metro TV, Permadi stated even more strongly: 
 
 
Malaysians are aware that Indonesia will not do anything to them. The Indonesian 
government is too weak to react! This is exactly why we should demonstrate (outside) 
the Malaysian Embassy, to show that Sukarno’s slogan of ganyang Malaysia is still 
relevant. 
 
In sum, the Komisi I¸ as an organic body within the parliament’s structure had opted for a 
stronger approach to the Ambalat case. While Indonesian diplomats believed that negotiation 
was the only way to solve the issue, Yusron Ihza of Komisi I, for instance, believed otherwise. 
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As he noted: ‘the Ambalat is ours, therefore no negotiation is needed. If we negotiate, that 
means we are giving up’ (Kompas, 6 June 2009). On this issue, Oegroseno of Deplu rebuked 
Yusron’s view by firmly suggesting that ‘territorial border lines are made through negotiation, 
not by war. If there is any border that exists not as a result of negotiation, show me!’ (Kompas, 
6 June 2009). These different opinions between the Indonesian diplomats and the politicians in 
DPR, as well as the activities of some of the members of DPR in meeting Malaysian authorities 
demonstrated the increasing participation of the DPR in Indonesian foreign affairs. They also 
confirmed the arguments developed in Chapter One and Two on matters related to the issue of 
sovereignty as a topic the parliament is interested in. 
 
7.3.2.3   Elite opinion 
 
Indeed, as Chapter One notes, issues related to sovereignty became more salient following 
Indonesia’s democratisation (see, e.g. Dosch 2006). Taking into account that Indonesians were 
on the brink of election when the Ambalat issue re-emerged in 2009, assessing elite opinion – 
including those running for political positions – served as an important part in explaining when 
an appeal to nationalistic sentiment and foreign policy adjustment by leaders were pronounced. 
The Indonesian elite opinion to the Ambalat case was mixed. Hikmahanto Juwana, an 
expert on international law at Universitas Indonesia, for instance, suggested that Indonesia 
should firmly warn Malaysia that the latter’s repeated provocations could violate the principle 
of respect towards other countries’ sovereignty, as highlighted in the ASEAN Charter (The 
Jakarta Post, 8 June 2009). He went further by criticising the Indonesian government for merely 
sending a diplomatic note —by which time there had been thirty-six unanswered notes—and 
thus, supporting the Indonesian legislators’ decision to depart for Malaysia to settle the dispute. 
The defeat in the adjudication process in the ICJ on the case of Sipadan-Ligitan islands against 
Malaysia created a certain degree of trauma, which the Ambalat case seemed likely to reinforce. 
For instance, analyst Ikrar Nusa Bakti held that Indonesia’s decision to dispatch its warship was 
acceptable because the Indonesian government should not ‘underestimate the Ambalat issue’ 
and the dispute ‘should not be brought to the ICJ’ (The Jakarta Post, 8 June 2009). 
Similarly, the Pemuda Muhammadiyah, a youth organisation of the Muhammadiyah, 
emphasised that Indonesia should not be deceived after Malaysia defeated Indonesia at the ICJ 
over the Sipadan-Ligitan islands. The organisation’s chairman Nadjamudin Ramli rejected the 
involvement of the ICJ in the Ambalat case as, according to him: ‘Petronas cooperates with 
Shell, a Dutch company based in the same country as the ICJ, therefore Shell will apply pressure 
(akan menekan) to the Court’ (Tempo, 8 March 2005). The NU, on the other hand, saw the 
Ambalat problem from a different perspective. Its former chairman, Hasyim Muzadi, using the 
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spirit of Muslim brotherhood, was quoted as saying that: ‘war between Indonesia and Malaysia 
would only benefit Shell and would be to the detriment of Islam, the OIC, and ASEAN because 
it would be war between Muslims’ (NU online, 21 March 2005). Strangely, however, Muzadi 
also supported the firm action by the TNI which, in essence, could motivate an armed clash, if 
not war (NU online, 21 March 2005). 
Presidential hopefuls for the 2009 election, Megawati Sukarnoputri and Prabowo 
Subianto, patrons of Indonesia’s nationalist political parties PDIP and Gerindra respectively, 
echoed the nationalist sentiment when referring to the Ambalat dispute. Subianto, former 
commander of the Indonesian Army Special Forces (Kopassus) and the Army Strategic Reserve 
Command (Kostrad), known for his strong character, publicised his readiness to lead the 
Indonesian troops to retain the country’s sovereignty over Ambalat.188  At the most intense 
period of the presidential campaign, Prabowo, who was then paired with Megawati as her VP 
candidate, suggested: 
 
I don’t know whether Malaysia mocks or challenges us … (And) I am ready to be a 
soldier again. The rank does not have to be high; even the rank of a group leader would 
be enough (Okezone, 4 June 2009). 
 
Responding to this flaring spirit, Jakarta-based ethnic group Forum Betawi Rempug (FBR), 
announced its preparation to be deployed as war volunteers (Kilas Berita, 9 June 2009). FBR 
became yet more hostile when it urged the government to cut diplomatic ties with Malaysia, to 
expel the Malaysian Ambassador in Jakarta, and to ban Petronas from Indonesia (Kilas Berita, 
9 June 2009). 
 
Megawati’s reaction to the Ambalat case, however, was unexpectedly low-key. Her 
reaction contradicted her party’s nationalistic credentials and her father’s high-profile foreign 
policy campaigns. Emphasising Indonesia’s limited military capabilities, she feared the 
possibility that Malaysia’s military allies would besiege Indonesia should the former enforce 
its will regarding Ambalat (Bandoro 2009). The small defence budget allocation was seen as a 
useful campaign tool against the incumbent SBY. In one of her public appearances, Megawati 
compared it to Sukarno’s glorious time when the Indonesia defence budget was raised to 29% 
of the overall national budget as opposed to 4% under President SBY (Sihaloho 2009). When 
making the comparison, Megawati did not mention the fact that in 2002 when she was president, 
the defence budget only amounted to 1% of the national budget, which made it significantly 
less than SBY’s (see Suryohadiprojo 2005), and less than 3.5% in the subsequent years until 
her  resignation,  as  reported  by  the  Defence  Intelligence  Organisation  of  the  Australian 
 
 
 
 
188 Prabowo Subianto was one of the contestants in the 2014 Indonesia’s presidential election. 
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Department of Defence (2010:15-16). This figure, according to the report, was much less than 
 
Malaysia’s defence budget, which consistently exceeded 7% per annum during the same period. 
 
Overall, the sentiment of nationalism and, in turn, the national pride, compounded the 
Indonesians’ views over the Sipadan-Ligitan case, and influenced the general reaction of the 
Indonesian public against Malaysia in the Ambalat case. As Chapter Four highlights, it is not 
surprising that the Indonesian public generally drew upon nationalistic pride given Indonesia’s 
struggle for independence was a product of ‘self-styled revolution and armed struggle’ 
(Vatikiotis, 1995:221). 
 
 
7.4    Democratisation and foreign policy: managing territorial dispute 
 
As Chapter One notes, the scholarly literature suggests that democratisation leads to hostile 
foreign policy is the result a weakening of the institutions with the erosion of the old ones (see 
among others, Mansfield and Snyder 1997, 2002; Keck 2006). This situation leads political 
actors to appeal to nationalist sentiment in order to gain support for their actions. Territorial 
disputes become instruments of influence for these actors and therefore, the foreign policy 
preferences they opt for are likely to be hostile (Mansfield and Snyder 1997). This, however, 
has not held true for Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Malaysia in the Ambalat case was not 
resolved using hostile actions for four key reasons. 
First, Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution underscored the aspirational goals of the 
Indonesians in, among other goals, participating in the creation of world peace. This objective 
was illustrated in the cardinal principle of the bebas-aktif foreign policy (see Chapter Four: 95). 
Any military conflict with Malaysia would have destabilised the Southeast Asia and this would 
have undermined Indonesia’s foreign policy aspirations to create regional stability (see Chapter 
Five). An unstable region, in turn, would negatively impact on Indonesia’s effort to consolidate 
its economy. In a more general context, Indonesia and Malaysia are parties to the ASEAN 
Charter. This Charter, in essence, advocates that disputes between ASEAN members should be 
settled through dialogue and other peaceful means. Similarly, the UNCLOS 1982, to which 
Indonesia is a signatory, calls on states to settle border issues through bilateral negotiation. 
Second, scholars have argued that democratisation tends to lead foreign policy makers 
to focus on domestic needs in order to strengthen democratic consolidation (see Chapter One). 
Since the fall of Sukarno, Indonesian decision-makers have primarily focused on internal 
security problems such as separatism and communal conflict rather than foreign threats (Anwar 
1998). This was even more prominent following Indonesia’s democratisation (see Indonesia’s 
Defence White Paper 2003). Therefore, it was unlikely that Indonesian leaders would pursue 
hostile foreign policy approaches or enter into armed conflict with other states. In addition, 
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Indonesia’s foreign policy goal during the Reformasi era was aimed at utilising resources 
available in the international environment for the interest of political and economic 
consolidation within the country (Sukma, 2005b:87). A hostile approach would potentially 
undermine the ability of political leaders to consolidate Indonesia’s democracy at home. 
Third, the authoritative role of the president and the foreign minister, including Deplu 
as the state’s formal institution for foreign policy-making, contributed to Indonesia’s pursuit of 
a peaceful foreign policy approach in relation to the Ambalat dispute. In this case, Deplu 
remained the primary institution deciding foreign policy in Indonesia and this was not eroded 
by the impact of democratisation. In fact, as Chapter Three notes, democratisation strengthened 
rather than weakened, the role of Deplu in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Consequently, the 
arguments underscoring hostile foreign policy behaviour as a result of weak state’s institution 
following democratisation do not hold true for Indonesia’s case regarding the Ambalat dispute. 
As this chapter argues, the foreign policy leaders in Indonesia continued to see negotiations as 
the standard for cooperation and coexistence between the two countries. 
Fourth, Indonesian leaders’ commitment to democracy and peaceful dispute settlement. 
As the preceding chapters noted, following democratisation democracy has been an important 
value guiding the practice of Indonesian foreign policy in Southeast Asia and the wider Asia 
more generally. This was tied to Indonesia’s new democratic identity, which Indonesian leaders 
then sought to reflect in their foreign policy decisions. Therefore, resolving territorial disputes 
through negotiations were favourable for the Indonesian foreign policy leaders. To this extent, 
and notwithstanding the decision to deploy military vessels into the disputed area, which had 
troubled  Sudarsono  given  Indonesia’s  limited  military  capacity  (Sudarsono,  interview,  5 
August 2011), the utilisation of military force was never an option for Indonesia. As explained 
by Wirajuda (interview, 12 January 2012): 
 
There was no talk about using force in the Cabinet meeting. Military deployment was a 
mere symbolic approach over substance and a means to convey Indonesia’s collective 
determination in opposing any territorial claims by Malaysia…Ambalat is an extension 
of a problem emanating from Malaysia’s 1979 Peta Baru [new map]. In fact this took 
place during the Suharto period when Indonesia’s military was seen as strong among 
ASEAN members yet we did not engage in any armed conflict. 
 
The preferences submitted by different actors in Indonesia demonstrate the complexity in 
Indonesia’s stances toward the Ambalat dispute, and in bilateral relations with Malaysia more 
generally. In Chapter Two, this study noted that even in a complex decision-making situation 
where a number of ideas exist, the influence of leaders in foreign policy is likely to prevail 
because they occupy the highest positions in a state, thereby hold a great deal of influence 
(Domhoff 1990:19; Higley 2010:163). To this extent, President SBY and foreign minister 
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Wirajuda continued the non-aggressive foreign policy preferences toward Malaysia by 
resorting to negotiation, a practice that began in the New Order regarding the settlement of 
border issues. Despite the changing atmosphere of bilateral relations, Indonesia attempted to 
maintain its democratic image by continuing this policy. Another reason for the continuity was 
also the top-down foreign policy-making process in Indonesia, which emphasised the 
prominence of foreign policy-makers in the executive in determining the policy content. 
Therefore, if the Indonesian foreign policy leaders were to follow the preferences of other 
actors, most notably the military, the parliament, and the public, Indonesia may have adopted 
irrational foreign policy preferences given the limited TNI’s military capacity to engage in a 
maritime war. The non-authoritative role of the DPR in making state foreign policy also 
contributed to the inability of this institution to pursue the nationalist ambitions maintained by 
its members. Nevertheless, why did Indonesian political leaders engage in nationalist rhetoric 
when submitting their views on the Ambalat conflict in 2009, and also in 2005, when the issue 
first emerged, albeit less starkly then? And if SBY opted for negotiations instead of other 
foreign policy instruments, why was the order to gelar pasukan in Ambalat made? 
In 2009 Indonesia was on the brink of its general elections. Although foreign affairs 
were not considered as an election issue in Indonesia, sovereignty remained an attractive topic 
for most politicians in Indonesia.189 The Ambalat case provided leeway for politicians to evoke 
nationalism to gain more votes. This included SBY who was re-contesting the presidency. SBY 
adjusted his foreign policy preferences by resorting to both accommodation and mobilisation 
strategy. To reiterate, as Hagan (1995:128-131) notes: 
 
…accommodation emphasises a situation where decision-makers respond to domestic 
political pressures by allowing bargaining among players, hence, foreign policy 
compromise. Meanwhile, mobilisation focuses on manipulation of foreign policy issues 
by the regime in an effort to retain power and could involve the leaders’ appeals to 
nationalist sentiment. 
 
Indeed, by doubling the presence of the Indonesian Navy in Ambalat (an attempt to 
accommodate the view that Indonesia needed to respond firmly to the dispute) and by publicly 
stating that Ambalat was a case of sovereignty instead of sovereign rights (a manifestation of 
foreign policy manipulation as a means to mobilise political support), SBY readjusted his 
foreign policy options. This placated domestic pressure during a time when ignoring these 
pressures could have been politically costly for him. Resorting to these strategies was also a 
way to attract public votes as he wished to preserve his presidential position. Pursuing such 
 
 
 
189  The top three election agendas were the issues of economic sustainability (34.5%), the primary daily needs 
(sembako) (10.2%), and the problem of unemployment (9.8%). For details, see Lembaga Survey Indonesia (4 June 
2009). 
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strategies are not unusual for politicians especially during the election periods (see Hagan 1995; 
Welch 2005). The decision to avoid hostile foreign policy preferences with regards to the 
Ambalat case also confirms that although nationalism has been a value underpinning the bebas- 
aktif foreign policy, in practice Indonesia’s foreign policy was not transformed into hostile 
behaviour driven by the spirit of nationalism. 
In sum, democratisation has affected Indonesia’s foreign policy in relation to managing 
conflict with another country by allowing different preferences to emerge. These preferences 
came from various perceptions about Indonesia’s identity. On the one hand, those who wished 
for Indonesia to take firm actions against Malaysia were influenced by the notion of Indonesia 
being a country with strong nationalist principles whose independence was gained by struggle, 
and by the sense of superiority in terms of the kinship status between the two countries, where 
Indonesia was considered as the big brother (abang) of Malaysia. On the other hand, there were 
those who maintained the importance of negotiations in managing conflicts, informed by 
Indonesia’s democratic identity. Foreign policy leaders were key in this competition of 
preferences as they made and decided the final policy action. To this extent, notwithstanding 
the changes in the dynamics of the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Malaysia, 
Indonesian foreign policy leaders continued pursuing a peaceful approach even when they were 
involved in territorial disputes with another country. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter shows the impact of democratisation on the way Indonesia handled potential 
conflict with its neighbours, using the Ambalat dispute with Malaysia as a case study as the 
most important conflict Indonesia has had to deal with bilaterally in recent years. 
The analysis of Indonesia’s response to the Ambalat dispute challenges the notion that 
democratisation leads to a more aggressive foreign policy and that a rise in nationalism 
translates into support for military solutions to foreign policy problems. This was primarily the 
result of the president and the foreign minister, who were both authoritative foreign policy- 
makers in Indonesia, opting for negotiations, thereby disregarding the more hostile approach 
preferred by a number of Indonesian parliamentarians as well as certain groups amongst the 
public. While the decisions made by these authoritative actors were related to Indonesia’s 
democratic credentials, which they wished to maintain, Indonesia’s top-down foreign policy- 
making process also contributed in this regard. 
Overall, the methods of Indonesia’s foreign policy with respect to managing potential 
territorial conflict with Malaysia indicated continuity with the previous regime. In this context, 
the role of Indonesian foreign policy leaders was more salient than that of the DPR and elite 
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opinion  in shaping  and making  Indonesia's foreign  policy decision  on Ambalat.  Therefore,  the 
salience  of leaders  and their commitment to democracy more generally is a key consideration 
for  a democratising country  in the  pursuit  of peaceful,  instead  of aggressive, foreign  policy 
behaviour towards  other states in responding to territorial disputes. 
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8   Conclusion 
 
 
This study has sought to answer the following questions: how has democratisation affected 
Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making and what has been the impact of democratisation 
on Indonesia’s foreign policy in relation to particular issues and areas? This thesis investigated 
three aspects of Indonesia’s foreign policy during the Reformasi period, namely its decision- 
making process, its basic doctrine, and the foreign policy related to regional cooperation, 
promotion of political values, and conflict management. To highlight these aspects, three cases 
were examined: Indonesia’s foreign policy in relation to political cooperation in ASEAN; 
foreign policy toward Myanmar and on East Asia regional arrangement; and the Ambalat 
territorial dispute. These case studies allow this thesis to demonstrate that the impact of 
democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy has been at best differential. These cases were 
selected because they were active points of Indonesia’s diplomacy in recent years and thus, 
useful to examine the changes and continuities in foreign policy in the context of Indonesia’s 
democratic transition. 
This research argues that democratisation has impacted foreign policy in a mixed and 
limited way. While Indonesia’s democratisation has shaped ideas that have influenced foreign 
policy, some traditional foreign policy aspects have continued to be relevant. Hence, while in 
some areas the impact of democratisation is obvious, in others it has been less visible. In order 
to understand the impact of democratisation on foreign policy, an integrative conceptual 
framework was used. This framework emphasised on the role of leaders, the importance of 
institutions, and the relationship between identity, ideas, and foreign policy. These variables 
are ultimately account for the change and continuity within Indonesia’s foreign policy. 
The following sections will review the key findings of the thesis. This review will be 
followed by a summary of specific findings in relation to the case studies. Overall, these 
findings highlight the differential impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy. The 
third section reviews the variables that make for this differential impact and the general lessons 
from the relationship between Indonesia’s democratisation and foreign policy. 
 
 
8.1     Main findings 
 
The first main finding is that democratisation provided an opportunity for new political actors, 
in addition to traditional actors such as the foreign minister and president or prime minister, to 
participate in the policy-making process. These new actors included the parliament, and, to 
some extent, certain individuals (mainly those with expertise on foreign affairs) who gained 
access to the decision-making environment either by occupying specific positions within the 
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foreign policy-making structure or by nurturing policy networks involving decision-makers in 
the executive. The issues at hand also determined the involvement of these new foreign policy 
actors. In this regard, issues related to, for instance, maintaining territorial sovereignty and 
protection of citizens abroad increased the likelihood for new foreign policy actors to influence 
foreign policy-making process. Further, the role of parliament was found to be particularly high 
when ratification of international treaty is concerned. Notwithstanding this development, as the 
second main finding offers, traditional foreign policy actors remained crucial in making state’s 
foreign policy. This study also found that democratising countries tend to be inward-looking 
due to the salience of domestic problems arising from the democratic transition. Therefore, 
pursuing active foreign relations was unlikely unless the leaders of the democratising countries 
saw domestic imperatives for doing so, which would usually involve a boost in the political 
legitimacy to the leadership, both at home and abroad. 
This thesis also argued that Indonesia experienced the stages of democratisation 
outlined by Huntington, including (i) ending a non-democratic regime, (ii) the inauguration of 
a democratic regime, and (iii) democratic consolidation process. To this extent, the fall of 
Suharto in 1998, which was followed by the instalment of the transitional Habibie regime and 
the subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections, brought Indonesia closer towards 
democracy. Furthermore, there was a presidential decision to establish national laws that 
respected the citizen’s rights, to develop political institutions in order to tackle the problems of 
the past, and to ensure the withdrawal of the military from politics, which underscored 
Indonesia’s progress towards democratic consolidation. In relation to Indonesia’s foreign 
affairs, the thesis found that democratic transitions allow for an increase in the number of actors 
involved in the policy-making, and for specific political ideas and values, notably democracy 
and human rights, to emerge. 
The second main finding is related to the conceptual framework to approach the research 
question and to examine the case studies. Specifically, this framework focused on the role of 
leaders and institutions as well as the influence of identity and ideas in foreign policy in order 
to understand the impact of democratisation. This framework was built upon theoretical 
literature on democratisation, foreign policy decision-making processes, and the nexus between 
identity, ideas, and foreign policy. 
Indeed, theories about democratisation permitted this thesis to analyse the stages of 
Indonesia’s democratic transitions. In this regard, Huntington’s theory on stages of 
democratisation was particularly useful to support the argument that Indonesia has indeed 
democratised. Meanwhile, theories about foreign policy decision-making underlined the key 
roles of leaders in the making of state’s foreign policy (Peterson 1994; Wright 1978; Williams 
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2004; Alden and Aran 2012). Consequently, these theories helped the author point out the 
limited role of parliament in foreign policy decision-making processes (see Milner 1997; 
Mitchell 2005; Jones 2009). Therefore, the arguments advanced by theories of foreign policy 
decision-making contradicted the assumptions maintained by democratisation theories with 
regard to the increasing role of parliament in foreign policy-making. Since foreign policy 
continues to be the product of individuals in leadership positions, top-down foreign policy- 
making process should be anticipated, even in democracies. Therefore, foreign policy decisions 
are likely to reflect ideas/values held by foreign policy leaders, which, occasionally, can be 
linked to their identification of the state’s identity and their interpretation of national interests. 
In this context, delving into theories about the role of identity and ideas in foreign policy (see 
Ashizawa 2008, 2013; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Ekengren 2011; Checkel 1993) helped 
this thesis to understand which foreign policy ideas matter and how ideas about democracy 
shape leaders’ foreign policy preferences. 
However, the studies on identity, ideas, and foreign policy did not explain the stages 
and conditions that would support the influence of ideas in foreign policy. For this reason, this 
thesis referred to theories on internalisation to understand which and how ideas mattered in 
foreign policy (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Cortell and Davis 2000). This is because, 
essentially, different ideas emerged during the foreign policy making-process. Internalisation 
was argued to have involved three stages, namely the emergence of ideas, the acceptance of 
these ideas by the policy-makers, and lastly, the conformance by these policy-makers to the 
accepted ideas. A number of conditions were argued to indicate that ideas have been 
internalised, including their appearance in the domestic political discourse that could serve as 
justifications for policy, regulation, and institutional changes. Indeed, the examination of these 
theories suggests that only when ideas are internalised and shared by foreign policy leaders 
could they shape foreign policy decisions. 
Integrating key arguments from theories of democratisation, foreign policy-making, and 
the role of ideas in foreign policy helps shed light on the limited impact of democratisation on 
Indonesian foreign policy. The framework has pointed out the need to bring back an analysis 
focusing on the salience of leaders in assessing Indonesian foreign policy during Reformasi in 
ASEAN and in broader Asia while not entirely discounting the roles of what this thesis refers 
to as non-authoritative actors, i.e. DPR, the military, and policy entrepreneurs. For example, 
Sukma’s role in shaping Indonesia’s APSC initiative and the preferences of, and actions 
conducted by, members of the Indonesian Parliament with regard to Indonesia’s policy on 
Myanmar, and the final policy decisions taken by Jakarta in these areas help explain the limited 
influence of actors beyond key traditional foreign policy-makers in Indonesia. In light of this 
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study, it is important to discuss the roles of these new actors because democratisation has 
allowed them to gain more influence in foreign policy decision-making processes in Indonesia 
by using the availability of more open political networks and access to the top. Overall, in this 
study, the framework was employed to approach the research questions by assessing the roles 
of different actors involved in Indonesia’s foreign policy-making to examine the extent to which 
foreign policy decision-making has been affected by democratisation and to further assess the 
salience of these actors in policy-making in the selected case studies. 
Indeed, Indonesia’s democratisation affects the way foreign policy is made by allowing 
for various actors to emerge and participate in the decision-making process. The Indonesian 
Parliament and, to some extent, individuals who possess expertise on foreign affairs or 
policy/ideas entrepreneurs, were the most notable new foreign policy actors in this regard. The 
increasing role of these actors could have encouraged Indonesia’s foreign policy-making to 
become a more bottom-up process, since leaders were more likely to follow the preferences of 
the parliament and the public. However, traditional foreign policy leaders were still dominant 
in determining the content of Indonesia’s foreign policy. This was supported by contentions in 
Chapter Two, that emphasised three considerations in the role of new actors: First, the inability 
of the parliament to make foreign policy given that it is a heterogenic body embedded with 
different perceptions of and varying interests towards foreign policy issues (see Putnam 1988; 
and Milner, 1997: Chapter 3 and 4); second, the fact that the general public were considered 
inattentive and poorly informed on foreign policy issues (Baviera 2012; Risse-Kappen 1991; 
and Sørensen 1998); and third, the idea that leaders have the formal authority to make and 
execute foreign policy since they occupied positions that enabled them to identify foreign policy 
issues, make judgements about them, and act upon them (see Alden and Aran 2012). As far as 
the link between identity, ideas, and foreign policy is concerned, the framework developed in 
this study noted that democratisation allowed Indonesian foreign policy leaders to redefine the 
state’s identity, as being a democratic country (see also Chapter One). A change in Indonesia’s 
political identity and the salience of key foreign policy-makers in Indonesia allowed for 
modification in Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions. In this context, this study found that ideas 
about democracy mediated the relationship between Indonesia’s democratic identity and a 
change in foreign policy. 
 
 
8.2     Specific findings 
 
 
8.2.1    Democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy-making 
 
In Chapter Three, a categorisation of Indonesian foreign policy actors was made, consisting of 
authoritative and non-authoritative actors. Authoritative actors included traditional foreign 
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policy-makers (the president, foreign minister, and Deplu) and they held formal authority to 
make, decide, and execute Indonesia’s foreign policy. Meanwhile, non-authoritative actors 
covered DPR, policy entrepreneurs, Presidential Special Staff on International Relations, and 
Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs as well as the TNI. These actors could not formally make 
state’s foreign policy. However, the non-authoritative actors could influence foreign policy by 
making use of their positions in the policy-making structure and their access to the key foreign 
policy decision-makers in the executive. 
In Indonesia, authoritative foreign policy actors, particularly the foreign minister, have 
been instrumental in determining the content of foreign policy during the Reformasi period. 
This was evident particularly throughout the Megawati’s presidency and, to some extent, SBY’s 
first term (2004-09). During Megawati’s term (2001-04), foreign minister Wirajuda was vital 
in setting the tone of Indonesia’s foreign policy highlighted by, inter alia, Indonesia’s proposal 
on the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) initiative during the 2003 ASEAN 
Summit in Bali. However, this did not mean that the president’s role was diminished. 
Megawati’s decision to let Wirajuda take charge of Indonesia’s foreign affairs essentially 
demonstrated that the president’s authoritative role in foreign policy had been delegated to the 
foreign minister. Apart from the substance of foreign policy, this study also found that Wirajuda 
was crucial in transforming Indonesia’s foreign policy by making some adjustments on the 
structure of Deplu. Wirajuda’s decision with regard to Deplu’s bureaucratic reform was linked 
to changes in domestic politics following democratisation. In this case, he aspired to change 
Indonesia’s foreign policy by making it reflect the values of Reformasi, namely democracy, 
good governance, and civilian supremacy over the military. Wirajuda replaced the military 
officers seconded to Deplu with civilians. This indicates a significant difference from the New 
Order’s policy where, under the dwi-fungsi doctrine, military officers were placed in civilian 
departments. 
While the foreign minister was influential, the president remained the key maker of 
Indonesia’s major foreign policy decisions. During SBY’s period, foreign policy became an 
important aspect of his presidency. He created two foreign policy bodies attached to the 
presidential palace, namely the office of the Special Staff on International Relations (SKHI) 
and the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs. The establishment of these bodies did not alter 
the formal authority of the foreign minister and the president in making state foreign policy 
decisions. Their presence served merely to provide advice to the president. Although they were 
non-authoritative, those involved were at times able to shape foreign policy by using their direct 
and unrestricted access to, as well as their personal relationship with, President SBY. This was 
demonstrated by the case of Dino Djalal who, given his unrestricted access to the president, 
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successfully inserted  new  foreign  policy doctrines  through  President  SBY  speeches  (see 
 
Chapter Four). 
 
This study found that democratisation also led to an increasing role of the DPR. The 
involvement of the DPR in foreign policy-making in Indonesia was particularly observable in 
treaty ratification and cases related to the issue of sovereignty. Indeed, the DPR made foreign 
policy-making in democratic Indonesia more consultative and complex than it had been during 
most of the Suharto era. This was illustrated in Chapter Five and Seven, which elaborate on 
how Indonesian foreign policy-makers in the executive had to engage intensively with DPR 
members in the process of the ASEAN Charter ratification and to adjust foreign policy 
preferences in response to nationalistic sentiments voiced by the DPR in relation to the Ambalat 
case. The increased role of the DPR in foreign policy indicated a change in policy-making 
mechanisms during the Reformasi era as it became more than a rubber-stamp body. Further, 
democratisation also made it possible for ideas entrepreneurs to gain access to the decision- 
making process because of more open policy-making mechanisms. In the DPR, this was marked 
by the existence of numerous public consultations. Ideas entrepreneurs also relied on direct 
access and networking with the Indonesian foreign policy leaders in the executive. This was 
evidenced by Sukma’s role in conceptualising Indonesia’s ASEAN Political and Security 
Community (APSC) initiative (see Chapter Five). Although the increasing involvement of DPR 
and ideas entrepreneurs in foreign policy was observable, in practice their roles were issue- 
dependent thus, very limited. Being politicians, DPR members needed to capture salient issues 
that would allow them to nurture domestic political support. As they were likely to seek re- 
election, commenting on issues related to sovereignty, among other issues, could become an 
effective tool for boosting their popular support. 
Notwithstanding the proliferation of foreign policy actors, this study found that, in 
general, Indonesia’s foreign policy-making remained a top-down process because no alterations 
took place in the delegation of formal authority to foreign policy decision-makers in the 
executive. Indeed, while the constitutional amendments between 1999 and 2002 and the Law 
regarding Indonesia’s Foreign Relations allowed the DPR to have a bigger role in foreign 
affairs, such a role was limited to specific foreign policy matters, such as ambassadorial 
appointments and the ratification of international agreements. Instead of altering the authority 
of the Indonesian foreign policy leaders, these regulations reinforced their control over foreign 
affairs. Therefore, the principal authority to make Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions 
remained in the hands of a limited number of traditional foreign policy actors in the executive. 
Overall, democratisation did not change the pattern of foreign policy-making in Indonesia. 
However, developments in foreign policy decision-making, as it became a more consultative 
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process, highlighted the differential impact of democratisation on the way foreign policy is 
made in Indonesia. 
 
8.2.2    Democratisation and the Bebas-Aktif doctrine 
 
Indonesia’s democratic transition has changed neither the basic tenets of its foreign policy, 
bebas-aktif, nor its underlying values. In Chapter Four, this thesis considered bebas-aktif as the 
main doctrine of Indonesia’s foreign policy and the values that underpinned it. The doctrine 
was essentially an amalgamation between Mohammad Hatta’s identification about Indonesia 
as a fragile state following its independence and his view on the appropriate foreign policy 
stance in the context of Indonesia’s ‘hostile external environment’ (see Hatta, 1953; Weinstein 
1976). Therefore, the doctrine was underpinned by political values central to Indonesia’s 
existence as a newly independent country, namely Indonesia’s Constitution, national interests, 
non-alignment, Pancasila, and national unity and sovereignty. In this regard, the initial 
existence of bebas-aktif confirms the argument held by Ashizawa (2008:581), where ‘a 
conception of state identity provides policy-makers with a particular value hence, defines the 
leaders’ preference of state’s foreign policy’. This thesis found that the doctrine and its core 
values survived the political change of 1998. There have been no foreign policy cases since 
Reformasi in which the government has publicly announced the removal of the bebas-aktif 
principle. The reason for the survival of bebas-aktif included its acceptance as Indonesia’s chief 
foreign policy principle by Indonesian key foreign policy-makers because it reinforced values 
that reflected Indonesia’s identity. 
Indeed, a conception of state identity allowed foreign policy-makers to introduce certain 
values or ideas, which would define their foreign policy preferences. Therefore, it is likely for 
new foreign policy preferences to emerge as a result of a new state identity (see Saideman 
2002). In this case, a change in the state identity, combined with unrestricted and direct access 
to the top, obtained by individuals with specific foreign policy expertise, permitted Dino Djalal, 
as the president’s speechwriter, to raise new ideas about how to most appropriately describe 
Indonesia’s foreign policy principles in the context of Indonesia’s democratic identity. This 
description was manifested in the ideas of an ‘all-directions’ foreign policy approach and a 
‘million friends, zero enemies’ slogan, coined by Djalal. At this stage, Hatta’s ideas about 
bebas-aktif and Djalal’s ideas about loose foreign policy principles demonstrated that in 
Indonesia, individuals have been the key transmitters for ideas in foreign policy (see Goldstein 
and Keohane 1993). These individuals’ conceptualisation of Indonesia’s most appropriate 
foreign policy doctrine informed the relevance of institutions (Deplu during Hatta’s period as 
foreign minister, and Office of the SKHI under Djalal’s tenure) in Indonesia’s foreign policy. 
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Therefore, the importance of these institutions in the practice of Indonesian foreign policy 
during their own terms was essentially reducible to the prominence of ideas held by Hatta and 
Djalal, respectively. This confirms Blyth’s argument (1997) on the key role of individuals as 
ideas transmitters. 
In practice, however, this thesis found that practitioners and observers were sceptical of 
the relevance of these ideas to practical diplomacy and considered them to be mere slogans. In 
other words, Djalal’s ideas were not viewed as an adaptation of Indonesia’s main foreign policy 
doctrine, nor did the country’s authoritative foreign policy makers, especially the foreign 
minister, endorse them. As a result, Djalal’s ideas were unable to change bebas-aktif. 
Nevertheless, the fact that Djalal was able to incorporate ideas into the president’s speeches 
demonstrated that non-authoritative actors, benefitting from policy networks they built and 
direct access to the top, could impact foreign policy. This situation confirms Mintrom’s 
argument (1997) about the need for policy entrepreneurs to have strong networking in policy 
circles for them to channel their ideas and shape foreign policy. 
This thesis also found that Islamic values were prominent voices in Indonesia’s politics 
following democratisation. In this regard, a more Islamised foreign policy, i.e. a policy based 
on Islamic considerations and closer ties with Islamic countries, would have been anticipated. 
However, an Islamised foreign did not emerge. Almost similar to the case of Djalal’s ideas, 
Indonesian foreign policy leaders did not embark upon Islamic-heavy foreign policy decisions 
as they did not consider Islam (or religion in general) as a value significant to the practice of 
Indonesian foreign policy. Had foreign policy been ‘Islamised’, aggressive foreign policy 
actions toward Myanmar in response to the Rohingya issue would have been likely (see Chapter 
Six). 
 
Indeed, the adherence by Indonesian diplomats, in general, and the foreign minister, in 
particular, to bebas-aktif indicated that this doctrine has been deeply internalised to the point 
that conformance to it has been almost automatic. This is not unusual because ideas matter in 
foreign policy as they are internalised thereby giving them a role in the practical reasoning for 
action (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Brennan et.al 2013). In this context, the key role of 
foreign minister in Indonesia in setting the tone and deciding the direction of foreign policy 
explained why Djalal’s ideas and Islamic values that emerged during the Reformasi period did 
not redefine or replace bebas-aktif as Indonesia’s principal foreign policy doctrine.  Another 
reason for the continuity of bebas-aktif in Indonesia was the ambiguous nature of its definition, 
which was primarily based on pragmatism. It has survived every political succession in 
Indonesia, as every leader has essentially had to be pragmatic in diplomacy in order to pursue 
an effective foreign policy. 
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8.2.3    Democratisation and Indonesia’s regional cooperation in ASEAN 
 
In examining the impact of democratisation on foreign policy in the area of regional 
cooperation, this thesis used the case of Indonesia’s foreign policy in ASEAN, particularly in 
the area of political cooperation. This study found that democratisation contextualised the 
change in Indonesia’s foreign policy initiatives, which were marked by decisions to promote 
democracy and human rights, as manifested in the creation of the APSC and ASEAN Charter 
as well as AICHR. Indonesia’s foreign policy during most of Suharto’s period was characterised 
by the projection of the ‘national resilience’ concept into the region. The Indonesian foreign 
policy leaders after Suharto continued the tradition of projecting domestic values to the region 
by focusing on democratic values and human rights. The change in the projected domestic 
values was linked to a number of factors, including the development in Indonesia’s domestic 
political realm as well as the desire by Indonesian foreign policy leaders to substantiate the 
country’s regional leadership status, particularly during Indonesia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 
2003. With regard to the development of the domestic realm, as indicated in Chapter Three, 
foreign minister Wirajuda aspired to incorporate values derived from Reformasi as part of his 
ideas of transforming Indonesia’s foreign policy. The acceptance of democracy and human 
rights as domestic political values, indicated by, inter alia, a number of regulations that promote 
human rights (see Chapter One), the conformity to democratic principles of nearly most 
Indonesians (see Chapter Five: 134), and the internalisation of Indonesia’s democratic identity 
by Indonesian foreign policy-makers, motivated Indonesian foreign policy leaders to assert 
democracy and human rights as their foreign policy preferences. 
This change in Indonesia’s foreign policy impacted on how Indonesia dealt with the 
principle of non-interference in ASEAN. This thesis found that as regards human rights issues 
Indonesia has, without hesitation, applied a more relaxed position on the non-interference 
principle. Although within limits of Indonesia’s position at the UN, Indonesia’s bilateral foreign 
policy on Myanmar, as Chapter Seven asserted, was an example of this. However, Indonesian 
foreign policy leaders certainly did not attempt to eliminate the non-interference principle from 
the core of norms that are to inform inter-state relations in ASEAN. This was primarily because 
the Indonesian government has also been taking advantage of this principle, as illustrated in the 
haze pollution case mentioned in Chapter Five. 
Indonesia’s foreign policy in promoting political development in ASEAN was to some 
extent the result of ideas entrepreneurs successfully influencing foreign policy decision-making 
in Indonesia. This was demonstrated by Deplu building on Sukma’s ideas in relation to the 
creation of an ASEAN political and security community. Indonesia’s chairmanship in ASEAN 
in 2003 opened a window of opportunity for Sukma to channel his ideas into the policy-making 
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process. However, it is important to emphasise that Sukma’s ideas were not all adopted 
uncritically. Indeed, some were not included in the government’s final APSC concept paper. 
This suggests that the role of leaders remains crucial. 
As far as the role of institutions is concerned, this study has found that the Indonesian 
Parliament, whose role was significantly strengthened in the post-Suharto period, is influential 
in the context of Indonesia’s ratification of the ASEAN Charter. To this extent, the DPR 
scrutinized the proposals made by the executive as evidenced by the various public 
consultations it organised. A measure of influence is that the DPR was reluctant to ratify the 
Charter before sanction mechanisms therein were resolved. The role of the DPR in foreign 
policy-making was also observable in the selection of Indonesia’s representative at the AICHR. 
Nonetheless, while the DPR had preferred Marzuki Darusman as Indonesia’s representative, 
foreign minister Wirajuda opted for Rafendi Djamin. These two cases demonstrate that while 
the DPR’s role in foreign policy has increased since 1998, its actual influence remains limited 
and in practice it has even been subject to preferences of the authoritative foreign policy leaders. 
 
8.2.4    Democratisation and Indonesia’s promotion of political values beyond ASEAN 
 
This study found that democratisation has impacted foreign policy by allowing new ideas, 
democracy and human rights, to feature in Indonesia’s foreign policy at two different levels: 
bilateral and regional. In the former, Indonesia’s foreign policy on promotion of political values 
was salient in the Myanmar case, as being a country that was continuously under international 
scrutiny in Southeast Asia as regard human rights protection, while in the latter, the Bali 
Democracy Forum (BDF) initiative became the hallmark for the promotion of democracy in 
Asia. Notwithstanding this development, this thesis found a number of limitations as regard 
promotion of democracy and human rights. 
First, while Indonesia has been actively promoting democracy in the wider Asia through 
the BDF mechanism, it was not accompanied by a far-reaching or sustained focus on human 
rights promotion. This was evidenced, for instance, by the absence of initiatives to create a 
human rights mechanism in Asia. To this extent, Indonesia’s experience in supporting the 
creation of AICHR in ASEAN could have informed Indonesian foreign policy leaders with 
regard to pursuing a similar policy approach in Asia. This study also found that the concrete 
outcomes of the BDF were unclear as there was no evidence of countries democratising because 
they attended this forum. 
Second, the dearth of initiatives to promote democracy and human rights was observable 
in Indonesia’s policy in the framework of East Asia regional cooperation – where Indonesia has 
no leadership status. To this extent, Indonesia’s foreign policy was influenced by security 
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considerations, i.e. Indonesia has hoped to maintain a balanced presence of influence through 
the ‘balanced and inclusive’ approach in order to contain China from becoming the only 
dominant power in the region. To this end, Indonesia’s conceptualisation as a vulnerable 
country operating in a hostile external environment was more salient than Indonesia’s 
democratic identity in influencing the preferences of foreign policy leaders with regard to 
cooperation in East Asia context. Nonetheless, this thesis found that this policy approach 
indicates a continuity of Suharto’s foreign policy in relation to regional cooperation beyond 
Southeast Asia, as it appeared in the ARF. Such a foreign policy continuity highlighted 
important considerations in maintaining Indonesia’s relevance vis-à-vis major countries in 
regional cooperation arrangements outside ASEAN. 
Third, Indonesia’s promotion of democracy in Myanmar has not been fully 
accompanied by a promotion of human rights. The lack of Indonesia’s human rights promotion 
abroad was tied to primarily domestic situations where a number of events linked to human 
rights abuses, such as oppressions against minorities, occurred and have led the Indonesian 
government being scrutinised in international forum, such as the UN. Therefore, it was 
unsurprising to see Indonesia’s relatively inactive response to the oppression of the Rohingya 
and the conflicts between Muslim and Buddhists community in Myanmar, which resulted in a 
public outcry, particularly on the side of Indonesia’s Islamist groups as manifested in some 
extreme behaviour toward symbols of Buddhism in Indonesia. But even with this public outcry 
in Indonesia, Indonesian leaders have not demonstrated a significant change in their policy to 
promote human rights in Myanmar. Specifically in this regard, Indonesia’s top-down policy- 
making and the fact that Islam has not been an influential consideration in Indonesia’s foreign 
policy explained the absence of a hostile foreign policy towards Myanmar. 
Nevertheless, this thesis found that democratisation has affected Indonesia’s foreign 
policy on Myanmar by way of installing political freedom and allowing for human rights 
considerations to matter in Indonesia’s domestic political context. This has then led to the 
emergence of different policy preferences at different levels. To this extent, while Indonesian 
foreign policy leaders in the executive primarily based their policy preferences on the lack of 
democracy in Myanmar, the (members of) DPR used Myanmar’s poor human rights situation 
as the ground for their preferences. In practice, this was observable in the policy actions taken 
by these different actors in Indonesia. For the Indonesian government, a respect for Myanmar’s 
sovereignty and non-interference principle remained the key in guiding its formal diplomatic 
action. The same cannot be said for the Indonesian Parliament who supported, if not organised, 
a number of events in Jakarta that have been perceived by the Indonesian leaders as 
disrespecting the legitimate Myanmar government, such as a meeting involving the Myanmar’s 
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government in-exile. However, being non-authoritative actors, the DPR could only engage in 
non-formal activities since it did not have the authority to determine the state’s foreign policy. 
In this regard, the salience of Indonesian leaders confirms the argument held in Chapter Two 
about the role of parliament, and even in democracies the role of parliament can be a distant 
second to that of decision-makers in the executive. Overall, Indonesia’s policy on Myanmar 
indicates a change from being accommodative during the Suharto’s period – as Indonesia’s 
support for Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN demonstrates – to being critical and, to some 
extent, assertive, during the Reformasi period. 
The findings presented in this section consequently contend the existing study of 
democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy where human rights was argued to have been a 
key feature in Indonesia’s foreign policy following democratic transitions (see, e.g., Dosch 
2007; Sukma 2011). Instead of far-reaching in Indonesian foreign policy in general, human 
rights was only significant in Indonesia’s foreign policy in ASEAN and less so in other areas 
of cooperation. Further, authors have yet to clearly identify the considerations that make for the 
absence of promotion of democracy and human rights beyond issues of BDF and Myanmar (see 
Currie 2010). The arguments on security factors in East Asia and maintenance of Indonesia’s 
position in this context, and on domestic considerations of human rights promotion in Indonesia 
are essential in this regard. The findings also contribute to the wider literature on democracy 
promotion. This literature argued that a mature democratic political system is an essential 
prerequisite for a country to promote democracy abroad (see, Nau 2000; Gershman 2004). That 
Indonesia has been promoting democracy primarily since 2003 – a period where Indonesia’s 
democracy was still young and not fully consolidated – as a way for Indonesia to substantiate 
the once questioned leadership status in the region, indicates that being a mature and liberal 
democracy may not always be the prerequisite for a country to promote democracy abroad. 
Ultimately, it depends on the interpretation of national interests by the leaders. 
In short, Indonesia’s democracy identity mattered as far as Indonesia’s foreign policy 
in ASEAN, in BDF, and on Myanmar, are concerned and less so substantively in East Asia 
regional cooperation. This, in turn, has made for the differential impact of democratisation on 
Indonesia’s promotion of democracy and human rights in general. 
 
8.2.5    Democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy on Ambalat 
 
To assess the impact of democratisation on conflict management, this thesis used the Ambalat 
dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia. In this context, this research found that 
democratisation in Indonesia fostered a non-hostile attitude, a result of the country’s new 
commitment to democracy, the existence of strong foreign policy institutions, and top-down 
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policy-making process. This finding did not confirm Mansfield and Snyder’s arguments (see 
Chapter One) on the likelihood of democratising countries pursuing hostile foreign policy vis- 
à-vis other countries whenever territorial disputes are concerned. In relation to this, the 
authoritative role of the Indonesian foreign policy leaders as well as Deplu contributed to 
Indonesia’s pursuit of a peaceful foreign policy. Deplu remained the primary institution in 
setting foreign policy in Indonesia and this was not eroded by democratisation. In fact, as 
Chapter Three notes, democratisation strengthened the role of Deplu in Indonesia’s foreign 
policy. Therefore, arguments that suggest a high probability of hostile foreign policy behaviour, 
resulting from a weak state’s institution following democratisation, do not apply to the 
Indonesia’s way of managing (territorial) conflict, at least at sea. 
The peaceful foreign policy approach adopted in the Ambalat case was also a result of 
top-down foreign policy-making. The president chose to ignore the nationalist rhetoric and 
views articulated by the military, parliament members, and, to some extent, the elite opinion in 
relation to the Ambalat issue. Indeed, he stuck to inter-state cooperation and diplomacy. This 
suggests that with Indonesia’s democratisation voices (re-) emerged that propounded the 
nationalist cause. Those who wished Indonesia to take firm actions against Malaysia were also 
influenced by a sense of superiority, where Indonesia was considered as the ‘big brother’ of 
Malaysia. However, because of the president those who preferred negotiations to manage 
conflicts prevailed. 
Indonesia’s peaceful foreign policy action, however, did not mean that the assertive 
approach was not considered. This thesis found that during the two occasions when the Ambalat 
issue came to the attention of the public (in 2005 and in 2009), the same Indonesian foreign 
policy leader, namely President SBY, acted differently. This study found that in 2005, 
Indonesian leaders did not intensively engage in nationalistic sentiments, at least publicly, 
notwithstanding the preparation of Indonesian forces in military bases close to the disputed 
areas. When the Ambalat issue reoccurred in 2009, President SBY openly dispatched 
Indonesia’s maritime forces to the disputed area and public statements referring to nationalistic 
sentiment were exposed almost intensively by the Indonesian leaders. SBY’s decision in this 
regard was linked to Indonesia’s election in 2009, as he sought re-election, thus some foreign 
policy adjustments were made. 
SBY’s decision was not unusual as leaders who seek to secure their political position 
 
are likely to resort to strategies of, inter alia, ‘accommodation’ and ‘mobilisation’ (Hagan 
 
1995). On the one hand, SBY accommodated the view that Indonesia needed to respond firmly 
to the Ambalat dispute by doubling the presence of the Indonesian Navy in the affected areas. 
On the other, he mobilised political support by manipulating the Ambalat issue, publicly stating 
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that it was a case of sovereignty instead of sovereign rights. Pursuing these strategies placated 
domestic pressure at a time when ignoring these pressures could have been politically costly 
for SBY. This being said, although Indonesia remained committed to peaceful foreign policy 
approach, political leaders used nationalism to manipulate foreign policy issues during elections 
period to achieve their goal: maintaining office. 
Indeed, this analysis leads to two crucial conclusions. First, Indonesia has not been 
adopting aggressive foreign policy behaviour in pursuit of the nationalist claim to bilateral 
territorial disputes it has had to deal with. This was largely due to the role played by the 
president and foreign minister and their commitment to democracy, hence opting for peaceful 
foreign policy approach to reflect Indonesia’s new democratic identity. The top-down foreign 
policy-making processes in Indonesia and the fact that democratisation did not weaken Deplu 
as Indonesia’s key foreign policy institution contributed to the limited impact of 
democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour as regard the Ambalat issue. This 
finding contributes to the existing literature on the relationship between democratisation and 
foreign policy (see Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002; Clare 2007) by highlighting the salience 
of leaders and arguing that instead of making state’s institutions weak, democratic transitions 
strengthened them, thus limiting the possibility for a pursuit of hostile policy approach. This 
finding, therefore, adds to the existing works on the ‘positive’ impact of democratisation on 
foreign policy in Asia (e.g. Acharya 2010; Park 2008). Second, nationalistic rhetoric only 
mattered and became more crucial during election period. This was tied to the interests of 
political actors in securing votes to maintain office. In this regard, leaders were likely to make 
some adjustments in their foreign policy in order to accommodate nationalist sentiments. 
Overall, the salience of leaders can be a key consideration in explaining the limited impact of 
democratisation on countries facing territorial disputes with other countries. 
 
 
8.3 The leaders’ factor and the differential impact of democratisation on foreign 
policy 
This thesis approached the main research question raised in Chapter One by employing a 
 
framework developed from theoretical arguments on democratisation, foreign policy decision- 
making, and the role of identity and ideas in foreign policy. This framework was used to 
understand the main foreign policy actors in Indonesia’s foreign policy, the influence of 
Indonesia’s democratic identity in foreign policy, the salience of ideas about democracy and 
human rights, and about the bebas-aktif doctrine in Indonesian foreign policy. This thesis 
analyses the key roles of leaders in foreign policy by looking at their speeches, statements, and 
interviews with state officials. This targeted and multi-method approach allowed this thesis to 
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understand the underlying ideas about foreign policy decisions and to examine the impact of 
democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions in specific areas and issues. This study 
found that the president and foreign minister remain the key foreign policy actors with the 
formal authority to create official state foreign policy. As a result, their ideas about Indonesia’s 
identity were paramount, and in this context Indonesia’s democratic identity often served as the 
context for certain ideas or values that, in turn, informed leaders’ foreign policy decisions. For 
this matter, democratic identity was salient in foreign policy issues that linked Indonesia’s 
promotion of political values. In foreign policy cases where Indonesia has no leadership status, 
for instance in the case of East Asia cooperation, Indonesia’s foreign policy was instead based 
on security rather than the considerations of Indonesia’s democratic identity and ideas about 
democracy. 
Drawing upon the conceptual framework and the literature review, this thesis argues 
that while democratic transition changed Indonesia’s domestic politics by allowing for political 
freedom to exist, hence proliferation of foreign policy actors, and certain political values to 
feature in the government’s policies, foreign policy decision-making remained top-down 
although it has become more consultative and complex. In this case, the role of key foreign 
policy actors in the executive (authoritative actors) was not altered by the presence of new 
actors as foreign policy decisions were still made based on the authoritative actors’ 
interpretation of national interests and ideas. Therefore, in analysing Indonesia’s foreign policy 
during the Reformasi era, one must focus on the individuals in leadership position in the 
government. The role of leaders was also salient in continuing the prominence of bebas-aktif 
as Indonesia’s fundamental foreign policy doctrine and in the way Indonesia handled potential 
conflict with Malaysia and in Indonesia’s preferences towards regional cooperation in East 
Asia. While some foreign policy continuities existed, a number of changes were also visible 
during the Reformasi period. They were demonstrated by Indonesia’s foreign policy in ASEAN, 
in the BDF, and on Myanmar. 
In summary, the overall conclusion of, and the lessons that can be learned from, 
Indonesia’s democratisation and its impact on foreign policy are threefold. First, 
democratisation, being a political process, cannot solely explain foreign policy decisions. Its 
impact on foreign policy could only go as far as providing a context for foreign policy actions. 
In assessing these actions, one must delve primarily into the role of leaders and their ideas about 
democracy. To this extent, assessing foreign policy decisions that include or reflect the ideas of 
democracy can be a yardstick to understand the extent to which foreign policy has been 
influenced by democratisation. Second, democratisation is not always resulted in foreign policy 
change.  The  practice  of  Indonesian  foreign  policy  demonstrates  that  notwithstanding 
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democratic transitions, Indonesia’s principal foreign policy doctrine and top-down policy- 
making processes continued to be relevant. This claim defies the expectations generated by the 
literature on democratisation and foreign policy decision-making, where the former was 
believed to affect the latter by making it bottom-up. Third, leaders matter in any political 
system. In this light, the crucial role of leaders is not limited to authoritarian systems because 
even in democracies, foreign policy is made and decided by leaders. To this extent, the practice 
of Indonesian foreign policy suggests that Indonesian Presidents and Foreign Ministers 
mattered during Reformasi as much as they did during the New Order period. Therefore, 
examining the role of leaders is useful to understand the extent to which foreign policy change 
and continuity took place in the context of democratisation. 
Ultimately, the limited and differential impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign 
policy is attributable to the preferences held by Indonesian foreign policy leaders sitting 
primarily in the executive. They were the variables that explained the change and continuity in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy during Reformasi, whereas democratisation, as a political process, 
only served as the context for these developments to come into being. More generally, being a 
political process, democratisation is not non-reversible as democratic elections in Indonesia 
could lead to the emergence of anti-democracy leaders. Therefore, the current progresses in 
Indonesia’s democracy do not necessarily serve as indicators for the sustainability of 
Indonesia’s democratic system because in the long run the quality of Indonesia’s democracy is, 
eventually, subject to the commitment of Indonesian leaders to democracy. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. The structure of Deplu prior to the bureaucratic reform 
 
 
 
The structure of Deplu in 2002 (bureaucratic reform 1) 
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Appendix 2. The structure of Deplu in 2005 (bureaucratic reform 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source for Appendix 1 and 2: The Bureau for Personnel, Deplu. 
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